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Abstract 
The achievement of radical process orientation is vital to the strategic 
and operational integrity of organisations. However, organisations have a 
dismal record of implementing process orientation, especially when it involves 
radical organisational change. There is scant research to guide organisations 
through the design and implementation of radical process orientation. Hence, 
this research develops a model that provides insights into the achievement of 
radical process orientation. 
The research uses the interpretive mode to examine the achievement of 
radical process orientation in two organisations. Therefore, the views of people 
directly involved with the changes are important. A transparent trail of evidence 
is established between the data and the theory developed from the data. These 
cases provide rich data from which to build a model for the achievement of 
radical process orientation. 
The model suggests the need for radical process orientation be 
consciously established and tentative criteria for doing so are provided. The 
model focuses attention upon the nature and content of the changes that need to 
occur, especially the realignment of organisational elements, such as strategy, 
... 
structure and information systems, to a function and process orientation. It 
proposes 'buy-in' from people be considered in relation to their acceptance of 
the changes that actually need to occur and the changes they are willing to allow 
to affect them. The model suggests that radical and evolutionary modes be 
utilised to operationalise the issues that bring about the changes, and that people 
be willing to implement these issues. It proposes that the roles of people that are 
responsible for implementing the changes and people affected by the changes 
are reciprocal. 
This research challenges conventional thinking about the achievement of 
radical process orientation, and provides fresh insights for the achievement of 
radical process orientation. 
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Chapter 1 Setting direction 
1.1 Chapter introduction 
This research is concerned with understanding the achievement of radical 
process orientation. The concepts identified in this chapter and deployed in 
subsequent chapters are directed towards constructing a model to aid the 
understanding of the achievement of radical process orientation. As the starting 
point of this research, this chapter introduces business process orientation 1 as the 
broad subject matter of this research. It outlines the research terrain and defines 
concepts, within that terrain, which frame this research's central focus. A 
corollary of defining the terrain is to identify areas that are excluded from this 
research; these are also identified in this chapter. Consequently, characteristics 
that distinguish radical process orientation from other radical change initiatives 
excluded from this research are discussed. Finally, the thesis's structure is 
presented with a brief description of subsequent chapters. 
This chapter is presented in six sections. The section that follows 
introduces this work. The third section outlines the research terrain and clarifies 
concepts central to this research as well as areas to be excluded. Next, radical 
process orientation is distinguished from four radical change initiatives outside 
the scope of this work. The penultimate section explores the structure of this 
thesis. The chapter is summarised in the final section, which also sets the scene 
for Chapter 2. 
1 Business Process Orientation encompasses terms such as Business Process Redesign, Business Process 
Reengineering, Business Process Re-engineering, Process Management, and Process Innovation. 
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1.2 Introduction 
One of the most common ways of representing an organisation, on paper, 
is to draw its structure chart. This typically has the chief executive at the head 
of the organisation with functional directors in control of their own vertical 
areas. The principles for managing the functional structure were formalised at 
the beginning of the 20th century. These principles have been developed in 
waves over this century. Each wave attempted to assist managers to take 
decisions to allocate resources, determine responsibilities, and establish 
appropriate levels of control and authority within each function. 
More recently, business process orientation focused management's 
attention on the need to identify and manage business processes that cut 
horizontally across functional boundaries. In the past, managing business 
processes received scant attention (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1995). Then, exemplar 
organisations that had implemented business process orientation were identified 
and held out as models for others to follow (Hammer, 1990; Venkatraman, 
1991). Business process orientation was shown to deliver significant 
performance improvements (Hallet al. 1994). For example, business processes 
were identified as being the basis for sustainable competitive advantage (Stalk et 
al. 1992). A major role for senior managers involves managing processes 
(Robey et al. 1995). Business processes orientation was shown to be important 
to integrating information systems across functions (Teng et al. 1994b ). 
Many organisations attempted to implement business process orientation 
expecting to achieve significant performance improvements, and reports indicate 
that many failed to achieve the expected improvements (Davenport and 
Stoddard, 1994). One of the main reasons for this failure is that organisations 
begin radical process orientation initiatives with the intention of making 
fundamental organisational changes to achieve large-scale improvements; 
however because these fundamental changes are implemented partially, 
significant performance improvements from business process orientation are not 
realised (Currie and Willcocks, 1996). The ramifications of not implementing 
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business process orientation and, as a result, not achieving the anticipated large-
scale performance improvements can have adverse affects upon people involved 
with radical process orientation and organisations. 
The consequences, for people in organisations, of not achieving the 
promised performance improvements from business process orientation are 
diverse. The people responsible for implementing business process orientation, 
usually senior line managers, face conflict with those hostile to fundamental 
organisational changes; or they are blamed for failure to secure benefits from 
process orientation; or they become alienated from their work colleagues; or 
they lose their line role altogether (Kennedy, 1994; Willmott, 1994). The 
consequences for people affected by business process orientation are their 
expectation, that the organisation's performance will improve, is not met, or 
increased cynicism about management's ability and willingness to 'really' 
achieve fundamental change, or being castigated publicly as a resistor to 
innovative ideas (Grint, 1994). These consequences can adversely affect 
people's careers. 
For organisations, the main consequences of not implementing business 
process orientation are continued decline in performance or failure to grasp and 
exploit opportunities (Cardarelli et al. 1998). Organisations also lose time spent 
on business process orientation, which could have been utilised to address 
competitive and financial pressures in other ways. Organisations also waste 
resources, as business process orientation requires funding in terms of people's 
time and external consultancy input. 
Each wave of change contains substantive elements. At the heart of 
business process orientation lies 'business processes'. The arguments that 
suggest the importance of business processes are irresistible. One, the functional 
organisation, consisting of a board of directors, with each director responsible of 
an area of specialisation is still widely prevalent in organisations. Yet a single 
function on its own can rarely deliver the organisation's products and services to 
customers. Hence, managing business processes is an essential prerequisite for 
delivering products and services to customers. 
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Two, the inexorable need to innovate and exploit opportunities requires 
organisations to manage business processes (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1995). 
However, product innovations can be mimicked easily by competitors (Tushman 
and Nadler, 1986). Business processes have been identified as a central feature 
of developing sustainable competitive advantage that is difficult to imitate 
(Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Stalk et al. 1992). 
Three, there is growing pressure on organisations to introduce 
information systems that support cross functional working by being aligned to 
business processes. This has led organisations to implement enterprise wide 
systems (Hirt and Swanson, 1999). A prior understanding of the organisation's 
business processes is considered essential to the effective implementation of 
such systems (Ross, 1999). 
Four, current theory suggests that knowledge resides at several levels. 
These include the public domain (Leonard-Barton, 1995), industry (Leonard-
Barton, 1995), organisation (Teece, 1998), a function in the organisation 
(Davenport and Klahr, 1998), group or team (Leonard and Sensiper, 1998), and 
individuals (Fahey and Prusak, 1998). Business processes form a further level at 
which managers can manage knowledge (Braganza et al. 1999). 
Five, as long as organisations have a functional structure, there will be a 
need to implement business processes that integrate activities in the functions. 
The underlying reason for this is activities, and hence the people and systems 
that perform the activities, are controlled by functional directors. Mismatches in 
the timing, prioritisation, or information flows between activities have negative 
consequences upon customer service and, ultimately, profitability. Hence, the 
co-ordination and integration of activities is key to organisational continuity. 
Therefore, this research argues that business process orientation is of 
enduring importance to organisations from a number of perspectives. Business 
process orientation has implications for the implementation of the organisation's 
strategy, the development of cross functionally integrated information systems, 
improvements in customer service levels and, over time, the organisation's 
capability to sustain its competitive position. Organisations spend significant 
amounts of funds to implement business process orientation. One organisation 
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is reported to have invested £100 million in new information technology alone to 
support business process orientation (Currie and Willcocks, 1996). However, 
these and other researchers suggest that organisations have realised benefits that 
fall short of expectations due to management's insufficient understanding of the 
organisational changes (Hall et al. 1994; Sayer, 1998). This research aims to 
develop a model that will make organisational changes apparent to managers. 
Business process orientation is conceived as radical change. However, 
organisations' record of poor implementation of radical changes suggests current 
understanding of the achievement of radical process oriented change merits 
investigation (Kallio et al. 1999). Furthermore, as revealed in the literature 
review later in this thesis, little credible research has been carried out into 
achieving a process orientation. Business process orientation has been studied 
from several different perspectives including factors affecting adoption of 
business process orientation (Newell et al. 1998); behaviour (Zaidifard, 1998); 
politics (Sayer, 1998) and IT (Broadbent et al. 1999). Each study has tended to 
emphasise mutually exclusive assumptions and research foci. This is 
exemplified by Broadbent et al.'s study, which examines the implementation of 
IT infrastructure in relation to business process orientation (Broadbent et al. 
1999) but does not examine change management issues. This research takes an 
integrative approach to weave together the changes and issues to be managed in 
order to achieve radical process orientation. Thus, this research is concerned 
with gaining greater understanding and practical insights into the achievement of 
business process orientation. 
1.3 Clarifying concepts 
1.3.1 Outlining the terrain of this research 
Business process orientation provides researchers with a number of 
possible areas for research. Several researchers have studied the initiation of 
business process orientation; many others have examined business process 
orientation that is radical during its initiation phase and adaptive during its 
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implementation phase. However, scant research attention has been given to 
penetrating and examining business process orientation that is radical during its 
initiation AND implementation phases. Thus, the terrain of this research is 
business process orientation that culminates in a radical organisational change. 
Consequently, two concepts frame this research, specifically, process orientation 
and radical organisational change. The conjunction of these two concepts forms 
the central focus of this research, namely, radical process orientation. 
Accordingly, the concepts of process orientation, radical organisational change, 
and radical process orientation are explained. 
1.3.2 Process orientation 
All organisations with a functional structure have business processes 
embedded within them. These intrinsic processes have been developed, over 
time, on a piece-meal basis. Recently, some organisations have adopted process 
orientation because it offers an holistic and radical approach to creating and 
implementing designed processes. Hence, process orientation, for the purposes 
of this research, is conceptualised as the achievemene of a business process. 
Two key terms are conjoined to form this conceptualisation namely, 
achievement and business process. These terms are defined more precisely 
below and are summarised in Figure 1.1. 
1.3.2 (i) Achievement 
For the purposes of this study, achievement refers to the initiation and 
implementation phases (Beckhard and Harris, 1987; Lewin, 1947) that effect a 
business process in an organisation, and the related consequences that arise from 
implementation. The 'initiation phase' involves organisations examining the 
reasons for the changes with reference to the external and internal environment 
(Ascari et al. 1995). During the 'implementation phase' organisations identify 
the changes they intend to make and take steps to accomplish the changes 
2 The term 'achievement' does not refer to the outputs from the business process. 
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(Kettinger et al. 1997). The 'related consequences' are the outcomes that 
emerge once the organisation has implemented process orientation (Motwani et 
al. 1998). 
1.3.2 (ii) Business process 
A business process3 is a collection of activities that transforms inputs to 
create an output that is valued by the customer (Hammer and Champy, 1993). 
Edwards broadens their perspective of the business process by arguing that a 
business process arises from the organisation's need to satisfy its stakeholders 
(Edwards, 1994). Stakeholders are external (e.g. customers, suppliers, 
shareholders) or internal (e.g. managers, employees) entities that affect the 
organisation's future success. Edwards's perspective of the business process 
goes beyond conventional definitions found in the process orientation literature, 
as the purpose of the business process, namely 'why an organisation does certain 
activities' is explicit (Prokesch, 1997). Davies (1991) and Buske and Player 
(1996) point out that the activities that constitute the business process are 
performed in different functions in the organisation. However, other researchers 
such as (Atkinson et al. (1997) and (Ettlie and Reza, (1992) consider a business 
process to be within one function. Specifically, Ettlie and Reza (1992) studied 
the adoption of technology to provide support within the 'manufacturing 
process'. Atkinson et al. (1997) assert that organisations should change the way 
they measure their 'processes', which are identified as separate functions such as 
manufacturing, logistics, personnel, and customer services. 
Yet other researchers, for example, Kettinger et al. ( 1996), drawing on 
the work of Davenport (1993), assert that "a business process can be 
conceptualised as operating within a traditional function . . . or span different 
functions" (Kettinger et al. 1996 p. 29). The critical flaw at the heart of their 
conceptualisation is that every activity in the organisation can be called a 
3 The term 'process' appears in many contexts: for example, human processes and communication 
processes (Schein, 1969); manufacturing processes (Kotter, 1978); a model of the strategic management 
process (Johnson and Scholes, 1993); and team working (Denison et al. 1996). Throughout this research, 
the term 'process' refers to 'business process' unless otherwise stated. 
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business process (Craig and Yetton, 1993). This flaw is evident in the work of 
Stoddard and J arvenpaa (1995). Their study contains a contradiction between 
their use of the term 'business process' and the organisations included in their 
research. Stoddard and J arvenpaa adhere to the view that business processes 
span functional boundaries, yet their study includes an organisation that 
redesigned functional activities: "the scope was limited to the purchasing 
department" (Stoddard and Jarvenpaa, 1995 p. 90). For the purposes of this 
research, the redesign of activities, i.e. the tasks and procedures performed by 
people or systems, within a single function are excluded from the scope of this 
research (Brynjolfsson et al. 1997; Jarillo, 1993). 
This research treats the term 'business process' to mean activities that are 
integrated, across different functions, to create outputs that are of value to one or 
more stakeholder (Crowston, 1997; Edwards and Peppard, 1997; Grover et al. 
1995; Hammer and Champy, 1993). This conceptualisation enables a business 
process to be specified with reference to three characteristics: the creation of 
valued outputs, a set of integrated activities, and these activities are located in 
different functions. Having defined the terms namely, achievement and business 
process, Figure 1.1 below summarises process orientation for the purposes of 
this work. 
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Achievement 
Initiating, 
implementing and 
identifying the 
consequences of 
integrating activities, 
across different 
functions, to create 
outputs that are of 
value to stakeholders 
Business 
process 
Process 
orientation 
Figure 1.1: Achievement and business process: conceptual constituents of process orientation 
1.3.3 Radical organisational change 
Meyer et al. (1995), based upon an extensive review of the organisational 
change literature and a longitudinal field study of thirty organisations argue that 
theories of organisational change can be classified as adaptive or radical. 
Adaptive change leaves the essence of the organisation intact. This type of 
change is also labelled as fine-tuning, evolutionary or convergent changes to 
elements of the organisation over long intervals (Tushman and Romanelli, 
1985). According to Greenwood and Hinings (1996), Pettigrew's work (1985) 
reflects continuity and evolutionary change. This research is not concerned with 
adaptive organisational change. 
Radical change fundamentally alters elements such as the organisation's 
strategy, structure, and systems (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Tushman et al. 
1986; Tushman and O'Reilly III, 1996; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). Radical 
change is characterised by a reversal in traditional strategies and practices 
(Miller, 1982). Some theorists characterise radical change as the emergence of a 
new model of the organisation, (Levy, 1986; Smith, 1982) supported by new 
practices with which to achieve the organisation's strategy (Laughlin, 1991). 
The implementation of radical change involves transforming the prevailing 
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status quo and this requires changes to several organisational elements (Miller 
and Friesen, 1980; Hammer and Champy, 1993). According to Gersick (1991) 
during the implementation of radical change people in the organisation 
experience wholesale upheaval. She explains the difference between adaptive 
and radical changes in the following way: 
"The difference between the (adaptive) changes of equilibrium periods 
and (radical) changes is like the difference between changing the game 
of basketball by moving the hoops higher and changing it by taking the 
hoops away. The first kind of change leaves the game's deep structure 
intact. The second dismantles it." (Gersick, 1991, p. 19) 
This research draws on these perspectives to characterise radical 
organisational change as changes that are made to elements of an organisation 
that leads to the transformation of the organisation as opposed to an adaptive 
change in the organisation. 
1.3.4 Radical process orientation 
A characteristic of process orientation is that it is radical in nature 
(Hammer and Champy, 1993; Kettinger et al. 1996), involving significant 
changes to several organisational elements (Anon., 1994; Grover et al. 1993; 
Hallet al. 1994; Tapscott and Caston, 1993). However, a number of researchers 
use the same term, i.e. 'process orientation' to encompass adaptive, process-
related, organisational changes (Currie and Willcocks, 1996; Harrington, 1991). 
Typically these researchers describe organisations that, in the initiation phase, 
plan to implement radical changes and during the implementation phase actually 
implement adaptive changes (Davenport and Stoddard, 1994; Currie and 
Willcocks, 1996; Stoddard et al. 1996). 
The need for clarity is at its greatest when the same term - process 
orientation - is used to denote fundamentally different concepts4• Drawing on 
radical change theory and the business process orientation literature, this 
4 This need for clarity is not unique to the field of process orientation. Researchers, in other fields, 
recognise the lack of clarity surrounding the use of terms such as total quality management (Grant et al. 
1994; Imai, 1986; Osterman, 1994; Savage, 1991), and culture (Johnson and Scholes, 1993; Meyerson 
and Martin, 1987). 
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research distinguishes process orientation into two types: radical process 
orientation and adaptive process orientation. Adaptive process orientation is 
where organisations initiate or implement mmor changes to organisational 
elements, leaving deeper aspects (Gersick, 1991) of the organisation intact 
(Harrington, 1991; Meyer et al. 1995; Tushman et al. 1986). For the purposes of 
this research, process orientation which is radical in the initiation phase but 
culminates in an adaptive change, and process orientation that is adaptive in the 
initiation phase but culminates in a radical change are excluded from this 
research. 
For the purposes of this research, radical process orientation 1s 
conceptualised to be the achievement of a business process that culminates in a 
transformation of the organisation. This research is concerned with radical 
process orientation initiatives, which in the initiation phase are radical and in the 
implementation phase significantly change organisational elements, leading to 
the transformation of the organisation. Figure 1.2 summarises this research's key 
concepts and their conjunction indicates its central focus. 
Achievement 
Radical process 
orientation: 
achievement of a 
business process 
that culminates in a 
transformation of 
the organisation 
Radical 
organisational 
change 
Figure 1.2: The concepts and central focus of this study 
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Business 
process 
1.4 Distinguishing radical process orientation from other 
radical initiatives 
1.4.1 Identifying the radical initiatives 
Radical process orientation is often misconstrued to be similar to other 
radical initiatives, namely financial restructuring, reorganisations, downsizing, 
and renewal (O'Neill, 1994; Hammer and Stanton, 1995; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 
1996). Attempting to clarify and distinguish radical process orientation from 
other radical initiatives is extremely problematic because of an inconsistent use 
of the terms financial restructuring, reorganisations, downsizing, and renewal. 
For example, Keidel (1994) and Moss Kanter et al. (1992) use the term 
restructuring but each mean quite different things. This situation leaves a 
researcher who wishes to draw tentative boundaries around these terms open to 
criticism from others who could cite eminent academic references that contradict 
or breach such boundaries. Hence, the discussion below is not held out as the 
only way to clarify the overlaps, inconsistencies and contradictions in the extant 
literature. Nonetheless, as the radical initiatives namely, financial restructuring, 
reorganisations, downsizing, and renewal, fall outside this research's scope, it is 
important that they are distinguished from the concept of radical process 
orientation. The characteristics and distinguishing features of these initiatives 
are discussed next. 
1.4.2 Financial restructuring 
Markides (1995) states that "corporate actions such as share 
repurchasing, refocusing, alliances, consolidations, and leveraged 
recapitalizations can all fall under the general term 'restructuring"' (Markides, 
1995 p. 101). For the purposes of this research, the term financial restructuring 
is interpreted to describe dramatic changes that occur when an organisation 
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changes its financial structure through a merger, acquisition, divestment, 
management buy-out, or liquidation (Goold and Luchs, 1993; Hitt et al. 1991; 
Johnston and Yetton, 1996; Markides, 1995; Moss Kanter et al. 1992). 
The purpose of a financial restructuring initiative is to alter the shape and 
composition of the organisation's financial capital. As a consequence of such an 
initiative the organisation's business processes may be affected, however, an 
improvement of a process is not central to the restructure of the organisation's 
financial capital. Instead, the balance sheet, potential tax breaks and shareholder 
value are of primary importance. Therefore, as the focus of this research is the 
initiation and implementation of a business process, financial restructuring 
initiatives are excluded from this research. 
1.4.3 Reorganisations 
Reorganisations are internally focused changes to reporting lines, a 
reduction in the number of levels in the hierarchy (also called delayering), and 
changes to administrative groupings (Halal, 1994; Jick, 1995). Reorganisations 
involve specific functions being combined, e.g. concurrent engineering (Adler, 
1995; Kromker and Thoben, 1996; Veasey, 1994) or outsourced (Cheon et al. 
1995; Keidel, 1994). Managers usually utilise the organisation's current 
structure chart as the starting point for reorganisations, and consequently, a 
change to the organisation focuses upon moving the boxes, altering their shape, 
and their size (Heckscher et al. 1994). Managers carry out the changes by 
selecting from a 'grab-bag' of rational development techniques (Buske and 
Player, 1996; Heckscher and Applegate, 1994). Each reorganisation has a 
logical explanation that makes sense to those at the top of the organisation 
looking down the structure chart, yet the changes cause confusion to those who 
operationalise activities at lower levels in the organisation (Bartlett, 1995). 
The central feature of reorganisation initiatives is a rearrangement of the 
organisation's structure chart. Reorganisations primarily affect reporting lines 
and barely alter activities that constitute the business process. Whereas business 
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processes integrate activities across functions, reorganisations tend to disperse 
activities into different functions. As a consequence of a reorganisation 
initiative, an organisation's business processes are affected. Yet, the purpose- of 
the reorganisation initiative is rarely to improve the effectiveness of the 
organisation's processes. The effects of a reorganisation initiative, upon the 
business processes, are barely considered prior to implementing the change, as 
managers attempt to create effective processes after a reorganisation initiative is 
completed. Hence, reorganisation initiatives are excluded from this research. 
1.4.4 Downsizing 
Downsizing describes reductions in the number of people in an 
organisation, what McKinley et al. (1995) state as being an "intended reduction 
in personnel" (p. 32). Keidel (1994) postulates that the central focus of 
downsizing is rapid organisational efficiency gains, driven by numerical 
calculations and financial ratios, with little concern for the people in the 
organisation (Cameron et al. 1991; Cameron et al. 1995; Scott, 1995). Other 
researchers provide broader descriptions of downsizing by including the planned 
elimination of positions, jobs (i.e. groups of positions, such as computer 
programmers), the elimination of an entire function such as marketing or 
finance, delayering, voluntary and compulsory redundancy schemes, and early 
retirement (Cameron et al. 1991; Cascio, 1993). Downsizing has also been 
described as corporate bloodletting (O'Neill and Lenn, 1995). Studies also show 
that the benefits to be derived by downsizing are elusive (Cameron et al. 1995; 
McKinley et al. 1995). The impact of downsizing upon people is well 
researched. O'Neill and Lenn (1995) argue that employees suffer a range of 
mixed emotions including anger, anxiety, cynicism, resentment, anguish, and a 
desire for retribution. 
Planned reductions of a significant number of people in an organisation 
will affect its business processes. However, the aim of a downsizing initiative is 
typically to achieve an immediate cost reduction. Changes to the organisation's 
business processes are a secondary consequence as they have to be simplified or 
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automated because fewer people are available to carry out activities which 
deliver the same, if not greater, volume of products and services to customers. 
Hence downsizing initiatives are excluded from the scope of this research. 
1.4.5 Renewal 
Renewal refers to organisations that find their very survival at stake. A 
large number of terms describe the changes organisations undergo when faced 
with extinction, including 'transformation' (Goodstein and Burke, 1991), 
'renewal' (Beer and Eisenstat, 1996), 'turnaround' (Barker III and Duhaime, 
1997; Castrogiovanni et al. 1992), and 'regeneration' (Bigler, 1996). A common 
feature of renewal is mature organisations (Beatty and Ulrich, 1991) going 
through a survival-threatening decline (Weitzel and Jonsson, 1989) over a period 
of time (Barker III and Duhaime, 1997). Often organisations are forced to 
renew themselves when the industry in which they operate is restructured, for 
example due to changes in technology (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Meyer et 
al. 1995). In a recent study of over a dozen organisational renewals conducted 
by Ghoshal and Bartlett (1996), they conclude that many organisations recognise 
the need to make radical changes yet "most shy away from it" (Ghoshal and 
Bartlett, 1996 p. 35). They assert that such organisations are unable to overcome 
or break through the barriers of organisational inertia, namely overarching 
concepts or beliefs that reinforce the status quo within an organisation in spite of 
a growing mismatch between the demands of the external environment and the 
organisation's capacity to respond. Hence organisations face decline and 
ultimately failure ( Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1996). 
The confusion between renewal initiatives and radical process orientation 
arises because managers are advised to make process orientation a 'survival' 
issue. Managers are directed to create a 'burning platform', a metaphor for a 
bleak future scenario, even where one does not exist (Carr and Johansson, 1995). 
Organisations that face survival-threatening declines in performance react by 
reducing costs or cutting the range and number of businesses. They often follow 
retrenchment strategies that shrink the asset base or reduce the scope of trading 
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to those product or market segments that have the largest profit margins. These 
organisations rarely consider process orientation as a way of overcoming the 
threat. Hence, renewal initiatives are excluded from this research. 
In summary, this research is concerned with radical process orientation, 
i.e. the achievement of a business process that culminates in a transformation of 
the organisation. The four initiatives discussed above are significantly different 
from radical process orientation. The key aspects that differentiate radical 
process orientation from financial restructuring, reorganisations, downsizing, 
and renewal are summarised in Table 1.1. 
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Central focus of this research Radical initiatives excluded from this research 
Radical Process Orientation Financial Reorganisations Downsizing Renewal 
restructuring 
Primary Significantly improving the Change in the shape Reducing the number of Reduction in the Focus upon a profitable 
purpose of the effectiveness of the business and composition of levels in the hierarchy or number of people line ofbusiness, product, 
radical change process the balance sheet removing functions in the organisation or servtce 
Organisation Set of activities that cross Entire organisation Hierarchical levels or Individual in any Entire organisation 
unit affected functional boundaries or function functions part of the 
organisation; 
hierarchical levels 
Terminology Process orientation; redesign; Mergers; Delayering, concurrent Rightsizing; blood Turnaround; 
process reengmeenng acquisitions; engineering, outsourcing letting; cutting regeneration; 
liquidation; excessive fat 
reorganisations 
Key driver of Satisfy stakeholder React to excessive Internal rearrangement of Cut costs to Survive 
the change expectations diversification; the structure chart increase profits 
shareholder value; 
repositioning 
Key (Ascari et al. 1995; Braganza (Goold and Luchs, (Adler, 1995; Cheon et al. (Cameron et al. (Beatty and Ulrich, 1991 ; 
references and Myers, 1996; Braganza and 1993; Hitt et al. 1995; Halal, 1994; 1991; Cameron et Castrogiovanni et al. 
Myers, 1997; Edwards and 1991; Johnston and Heckscher et al. 1994; Jick, al. 1995; Cascio, 1992; Ghoshal and 
Peppard, 1994; Edwards and Y etton, 1996; 1995; Kromker and Thoben, 1993; McKinley et Bartlett, 1996; Pratt, 
Braganza, 1994; Edwards and Markides, 1995; 1996; Veasey, 1994) al. 1995; Scott, 1992; Weitzel and 
Peppard, 1996; Hammer and Moss Kanter et al. 1995) Jonsson, 1989) 
Stanton, 1995; Venkatraman, 1992). 
1991) 
Table 1.1: Summary of distinguishing features between radical process orientation and restructuring, reorganisations, 
downsizing, and renewal 
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1.5 Structure of this thesis 
Chapters 1, 2 and 3 establish the conceptual and methodological 
underpinnings of this research. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the empirical work5. 
Chapter 7 constructs an emergent model for the achievement of radical process 
orientation by interpreting empirical results and current research. Chapter 8 
summarises the contribution, limitations and implications of this research. In 
addition to these chapters, the Appendices 4, 5 and 6 contain detailed 
information about each case study in the form of first order constructs, 
interpretation and second order constructs. These appendices are an extension of 
the case study chapters and form an integral part of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
respectively. The topics covered in each chapter and the links between the 
chapters are outlined in Figure 1.3. A glossary of terms used in this thesis can 
be found at the end of the appendices. 
Chapter 1 introduces the subject area of this research, namely business 
process orientation. It identifies the terrain of this research and establishes its 
central concern to be the achievement of radical process orientation. This 
chapter also identifies areas that are excluded from this research: adaptive 
process orientation, adaptive organisational change, redesign of processes in one 
function, and radical initiatives such as restructuring, reorganisations, 
downsizing, and renewal are identified as outside the scope of this research. 
As the focus of this research is the achievement of radical process 
orientation, Chapter 2 critically reviews the business process orientation and 
radical organisational change research literature. The functionalist and 
interpretivist paradigms, as defined by Burrell and Morgan (1979), are used to 
analyse the theoretical and intellectual foundations of current research in 
business process orientation and radical organisational change. This analysis 
leads to this research being located in the interpretive paradigm, as intellectual 
and theoretical underpinnings of this paradigm are most appropriate to the 
research of the achievement of radical process orientation. Chapter 2 analyses 
the business process orientation literature as it relates to the achievement of 
5 Pseudonyms are used for organisations and interviewees at their request. 
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radical process orientation. Ten conceptual categories are identified as being 
relevant to the achievement of radical process orientation. These conceptual 
categories lead to an initial model for the achievement of radical process 
orientation. This chapter also sets out the research objective and research 
question for this work. 
Chapter 3 lays out the research methodology of this research. This 
chapter starts by setting out the theoretical foundations of this research, and its 
case research design. The foundations are based upon Schutz (1967) and his 
notion of first and second order constructs. Five aspects of design are of 
importance to this research: theoretical criteria for identifying the unit of 
analysis, choosing the basis for constructing a sample, choosing the data 
collection technique, identifying people to be interviewed, and establishing a 
trail of evidence from data analysis to theoretical propositions and to the 
emergent model. Each of these five design aspects is examined from a 
theoretical and an operational perspective. This chapter also highlights findings 
from the pilot study insofar as the findings affect the methodological and 
theoretical aspects of the research. 
Chapter 4 and Appendix 4 contain the first and second order constructs 
derived from Financial Data, the pilot study. The purpose of the pilot is to 
exercise the methodology developed at the beginning of the research. This 
chapter assesses the five aspects of the case design established in the previous 
chapter, and reveals actions taken to rectify deficiencies in the design. 
Chapter 5 and Appendix 5 present the first order constructs, their 
interpretation and second order constructs for the Carton Carrier case study. The 
focus of the Carton Carrier case study is the achievement of the redesign of the 
organisation's parcel delivery process. This case study led to the identification 
of 218 first order constructs that were interpreted to form 67 second order 
constructs. 
Chapter 6 and Appendix 6 present the first order constructs, 
interpretation and second order constructs for Foundry Insurance. The focus of 
the Foundry Insurance case is the achievement of the inspection process. The 
analysis led to the identification of 205 first order constructs that were 
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interpreted to form 60 second order constructs. The second order constructs for 
both these case studies are classified according to the conceptual categories 
identified from the literature. Both cases are concluded by synthesising the 
second order constructs for each conceptual category. 
Chapter 7 constructs an emergent model that explains the achievement of 
radical process orientation. This chapter begins by providing a brief reminder of 
the initial model. It then focuses on the substantial task of developing a 
theoretical proposition for each conceptual category relevant to the achievement 
of radical process orientation. The theoretical propositions are synthesised into 
an emergent model for the achievement of radical process orientation. 
Developments made to the initial model to form the emergent model are 
explained in this chapter. 
Chapter 8 concludes this research by recapitulating the arguments from 
each chapter that lead to the emergent model. The central focus of this chapter 
is the contribution of this research to knowledge relating to the achievement of 
radical process orientation. The limitations of this research are also examined. 
Implications for future research directions and for practitioners are outlined. 
This thesis contains six appendices and a glossary of the terms used in 
this research. 
1.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter achieved its four aims. First, it introduced this research's 
subject area, which is business process orientation. Second, it defined concepts 
central to this research namely, process orientation, radical organisational 
change and radical process orientation and identified areas excluded from this 
research to be adaptive process orientation and adaptive organisational change. 
Third, this chapter distinguished radical process orientation from other non-
process centred radical initiatives. Fourth, it set out the structure of this thesis 
by outlining the essential aspects of each of the eight chapters. 
The next chapter reviews current and past research into business process 
orientation and radical organisational change. It uses the functionalist and 
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interpretive paradigms as defined by Burrell and Morgan (1979) to locate 
current research and this research's theoretical and intellectual foundations. It 
also identifies conceptual categories that are relevant to radical process 
orientation, and develops these into an initial conceptual model for the 
achievement of radical process orientation. The next chapter sets out the 
research objective and question for this research. 
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Chapter 1 Setting Direction 
Introduces this study, sets out its research 
terrain and defines the concepts in this study 
I 
Set scope for review 
• Chapter 2 Literature review 
Locates current business process orientation 
and radical organisational change literature 
within functionalist and interpretive 
paradigms, positions this research in the 
interpretive paradigm, identifies conceptual 
categories that are relevant to achievement of 
radical process orientation, develops these into 
an initial conceptual model, and sets out the 
research objective and research question for 
this work 
I 
Identified appropriate paradigm 
.. 
Chapter 3 Research methodology 
Establishes this research's theoretical and 
intellectual foundations, discusses the 
theoretical case study design and its 
operationalisation, and examines the pilot 
study's methodological and theoretical 
implications 
:onceptual 
ategories 
Set out the basis for synthesis 
Chapter 7 Synthesis 
This chapter develops theoretical 
propositions from conceptual categories by 
conjoining second order constructs, and 
synthesises the theoretical propositions to 
create an emergent model for the 
achievement of radical process orientation 
' 
sed Asses 
and 
refine 
case 
design 
d 
d Secon 
order 
constru cts 
Brings together 
main arguments, 
contribution etc. 
Figure 1.3: Overview of this thesis 
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Chapter 4 Financial Data (pilot 
study) 
This chapter, supported by appendix 4. 
describes the achievement of the order 
process in Financial Data through an 
interpretation of first order constructs, 
develops second order constructs, 
classifies these according to the 
conceptual categories and concludes with 
a synthesis of second order constructs 
Chapter 5 Carton Carriers 
This chapter, supported by appendix 5, 
describes the achievement of the parcel 
delivery process in Carton Carrier 
through an interpretation of first order 
constructs, develops second order 
constructs, classifies these according to 
the conceptual categories and concludes 
with a synthesis of second order 
constructs 
Chapter 6 Foundry Insurance 
This chapter, supported by appendix 6, 
describes the achievement of the 
inspection process in Foundry Insurance 
through an interpretation of first order 
constructs, develops second order 
constructs, classifies these according to 
the conceptual categories and concludes 
with a synthesis of second order 
constructs 
Chapter 8 Concluding remarks 
This chapter summarises this research, 
identifies its contribution to the business 
process orientation literature, highlights 
limitations and identifies implications for 
__. further research and practitioners 
Chapter 2 A critical review of research literature in 
business process orientation and radical organisational 
change 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter established that the central focus of this research is 
the achievement of radical process orientation, and that two concepts are 
important, namely radical process orientation and radical organisational change. 
This chapter penetrates the superficial surface of current radical process 
orientation and radical organisational change research to understand their 
theoretical foundations. Such an understanding will enable the theoretical and 
intellectual foundations of this research to be located in a research paradigm that 
is consistent with studying radical process orientation. Drawing on the radical 
process orientation literature, conceptual categories relevant to the achievement 
of radical process orientation are identified. These conceptual categories are 
developed into an initial conceptual model for the achievement of radical 
process orientation. The focus of this research, its theoretical foundations, and 
the analysis of the extant literature lead to the research objective and research 
question. 
This chapter has seven sections after this introduction. This section 
introduces the chapter and its structure. The second section explains paradigms 
used to examine the literature. Following this, the radical process orientation 
and radical organisational change research literature is classified according to 
their underlying philosophical and theoretical assumptions. Immediately 
following is a discussion of this research's intellectual and theoretical location in 
relation to current process orientation knowledge. Then, conceptual categories 
from the literature are identified, and from these, an initial model for 
achievement of radical process orientation is constructed. The research 
objective and research question are established next. A chapter summary and a 
brief insight into the subsequent chapter bring this chapter to a close. 
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2.2 The conceptual paradigms to classify the literature 
Organisational researchers have a variety of paradigms from which to 
develop theory for the achievement of radical process orientation. Theorists 
assert it is important for researchers to understand the theoretical roots that 
underpin their chosen paradigm (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Krone et al. 1987; 
Lane, 1994). Each paradigm provides different lenses with which to delve 
beneath the surface of the phenomenon under investigation. Hence, this 
research needs a conceptual framework that enables it to trace its intellectual and 
theoretical roots. 
Burrell and Morgan's (1979) conceptual framework allows researchers 
to classify a range of organisational theories and, hence, make sense of and 
understand the potential insights to be gained from competing theories (Jackson 
and Carter, 1991; Jackson and Carter, 1993). The functionalist and interpretive 
paradigms, as defined by Burrell and Morgan, dominate the development of 
organisational theories (Schultz and Hatch, 1996). The functionalist paradigm is 
characterised by a perspective that treats its subject matter from an objective 
point of view. The functionalist paradigm is concerned with generating rational 
explanations of social matters. Researchers in this paradigm address practical 
problems and endeavour to provide practical solutions. Typically researchers 
located in this paradigm investigate human affairs using models drawn from the 
natural sciences. Hence researchers following the functionalist tradition 
consider the social world to have a concrete existence that is objective and value 
free (Hassard, 1991). Functionalists assume that the social world can be 
demarcated and measured using techniques drawn from the natural sciences. 
Functionalists believe the stable and ordered nature of the natural world to be a 
characteristic of the world ofhuman affairs. 
The interpretive paradigm takes a subjectivist perspective in the study of 
social affairs. The interpretive paradigm is concerned with understanding 
human affairs as they are. The central concept of interpretive sociology is 
intentional acts by members of the organisation. Insights into such acts are 
generated from within the frame of reference of the organisation member rather 
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than the observer or researcher of the action. Interpretivists attempt "to 
understand and explain the social world primarily from the point of view of the 
actors directly involved in the social process" (Burrell and Morgan, 1979 p. 
227). Reality is created through the interactions of individuals. Social reality is 
conceptualised as "a network of assumptions and intersubjectively shared 
meanings" (Burrell and Morgan, 1979 p. 28). 
The radical structuralist paradigm shares many of the same underpinning 
assumptions of the functionalist paradigm. Researchers in this paradigm have to 
take the view that reality is hard, tangible and has a concrete existence that can 
be measured and studied independently of people (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Radical structuralists place little emphasis upon the role and nature of people as 
individual human beings. Hence, this paradigm is unsuited to this research, 
which is based upon the assumption that reality is socially constructed. 
Researchers choosing the radical humanist paradigm for the study of 
organisations have to accept that their results will lead to an anti -organisation 
theory. From a radical humanist perspective, organisations have a precarious 
ontological existence. This paradigm questions whether organisations exist at 
all, and therefore doubts that organisations can be treated as units of analysis 
that are worthy of attention in their own right (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
According to Burrell and Morgan the radical humanist paradigm "is a 
perspective which challenges, at a most fundamental level, the very basis of the 
enterprise in which most contemporary organisation theorists are engaged" p. 
321 (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). A researcher adopting a radical humanist 
perspective has also to accept the paradigm's underpinning tenets if the 
researcher is to be consistent in its assumptions. According to Burrell and 
Morgan, a researcher located in this paradigm has to "reject all aspects of 
organisation theory as (a) narve, misconceived and politically distasteful 
enterprise" p. 324 (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Therefore, this paradigm is 
inappropriate for this research, as its focus is organisations. 
These paradigms are framed by meta-theoretical assumptions that 
underpin a researcher's frame of reference, and their mode of theorising. Each 
paradigm focuses upon common perspectives, although within these paradigms 
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theorists have developed several schools of thought, and there is much debate 
between the schools within a paradigm. As theorists within one paradigm share 
a similar set of assumptions, they are often unable to conceive alternative 
perspectives of reality, which fall outside the boundaries of their paradigm. 
Burrell and Morgan state that each paradigm is mutually exclusive and 
contradictory (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Consequently, researchers tend to 
adopt a single paradigm at any one time6. 
The intellectual map provided by Burrell and Morgan has been criticised 
for being too simplistic, and for overlooking subtle inferences that exist within 
particular theories (Chua, 1986; Hopper and Powell, 1985). Nonetheless Burrell 
and Morgan's paradigms have been exercised in the study of a wide range of 
subjects. For example, (Schultz and Hatch, 1996) used the paradigms in the 
study of organisation culture. Hirschheim and Klein (1989) applied them to the 
development of information systems. Lane (1994) used the map to classify 
methodologies within the systems dynamics discipline. These extensive uses 
and applications of Burrell and Morgan's paradigms give them credence. 
Therefore, this research utilises their paradigms to understand existing 
knowledge on radical process orientation and radical organisational change. 
2.3 Classifying current research in radical process orientation 
and radical organisational change 
2.3.1 Literature in the functionalist paradigm 
2.3.1 (i) Radical process orientation literature 
Much of the literature relevant to radical process orientation is found in 
the functionalist paradigm. The research is characterised by practical solutions 
that organisations could undertake for the achievement of radical process 
orientation. Functionalist researchers claim that the solutions they propose are 
6 This restriction is debated in the literature, and has led to what some theorists refer to as 'paradigm 
wars'. The war is between theorists who believe each paradigm is, and should remain, discrete and be 
developed independently (Jackson and Carter, 1991; Jackson and Carter, 1993) and theorists who adopt 
multiple paradigms (Hassard, 1991) or theorists who integrate the paradigms to create different levels of 
understanding (Lee, 1991; Willmott, 1993). 
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derived from rational and objective study of radical process orientation, and 
hence can be utilised by a wide range of organisations. 
Within the functionalist paradigm, researchers have studied radical 
process orientation from a number of perspectives. Some researchers have used 
contingency theory to study the relationship between organisations and their 
environment. Contingency theory can be traced to the work of Lawrence and 
Lorsch (1967). They were among some of the first researchers to challenge 
classical management and human relations theories. These classical theories 
suggest that there is a single set of principles that can guide management action. 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) argued that organisations apply different principles 
depending upon the nature of the situation it faces. They argued that the 
effectiveness of an organisation is a consequence of achieving alignment 
between a particular situation and its design. Researchers in radical process 
orientation have used contingency theory concepts to argue that organisation's 
gain substantial benefits by aligning one or more business processes to its 
environment (Hallet al. 1994; Hammer and Champy, 1993) 
Also within the functionalist orthodoxy are researchers who argue that 
radical process orientation enables organisations to achieve strategic advantage 
(Porter, 1980). Teng et al. (1994) state that as radical process orientation is 
capable of providing organisations with breakthroughs in business performance 
"it should be approached as a strategic endeavour" (p. 21). Scherr (1993) argues 
that processes enable organisations to implement their strategy. Researchers 
focusing upon strategic benefits are concerned with achieving radical process 
orientation to gain large-scale improvements. These improvements are 
exemplified by being able to change more quickly than competitors (Hendry, 
1995), utilising technology more effectively (Venkatraman, 1994), or 
introducing new products more efficiently (Boynton and Victor, 1991). 
Researchers, that consider organisations to be like a machine (Morgan, 
1986), are positioned in the functionalist paradigm (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Much of the research on radical process orientation is published under the term 
'reengineering'. The term, 'reengineering', reflects a mechanistic perspective, 
which has its roots in the work of Taylor (1911) and Weber (1947). 
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Reengineering cames the connotation of scientific principles, precise 
measurements, and objective reality (Jones, 1995). This interpretation of the 
term, 'reengineering', suggests that organisations implement it in a manner not 
dissimilar to the way a mechanic repairs a car engine. This imagery suggests 
that organisations can be deconstructed, reengineered, and then reconstructed 
into a set of processes that work together smoothly and with a greater degree of 
precision (Teng et al. 1994b ). The reengineering approach is criticised for 
marginalising and trivialising the human aspects of change (Grey and Mitev, 
1995; Willmott, 1994; Willmott, 1995). 
Functionalist researchers deal with the achievement of radical process 
orientation by developing prescriptive models. The models consist of discrete 
stages, with the stages connected to each other by arrows to indicate the precise 
sequence in which they are to be followed. The boundaries around each stage 
indicate where one stops and the next begins. Each stage has prescribed 
implementation steps that organisations are expected to follow (Teng et al. 
1994a; Gouillart and Sturdivant, 1994). Others proponents in the functionalist 
paradigm bypass the development of a model and propose implementation steps 
that organisations should take or avoid to achieve radical process orientation. 
There is significant overlap between the generic implementation steps and the 
prescriptive models (Coleman et al. 1996; Davenport, 1993; Hammer and 
Champy, 1993; Hammer and Stanton, 1995; Hendry, 1995). 
Typically the prescriptive models contain the following sorts of 
implementation steps: define parameters for the changes that align with the 
organisation's vision, identify and select a business process, set stretch targets 
and goals, map the process, and then, implement the redesigned process. Senior 
managers are expected to provide unstinting commitment to the changes and 
constantly communicate the vision to the people in the organisation (Anon., 
1991; Davenport and Short, 1990; Grover et al. 1995; Kettinger et al. 1997; 
Morris and Brandon, 1993; Scherr, 1993; Teng et al. 1994a). The prescriptive 
models are steeped in logic, systematic diagnosis, and detailed planning. They 
are presented as being universally applicable. An example of a prescriptive 
model is the Process Reengineering Life Cycle (Guha et al. 1993). It consists of 
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SIX stages and within these there are twenty steps. The first two stages, 
Envisioning the Future and Redesigning the Process, deal with the initiation of a 
radical process orientation initiative. These two stages consist of five 
implementation steps each, i.e. 50% of the model. However, the (Re)construct 
stage, which deals with implementing changes to organisational elements, 
consists of two implementation steps, labelled Develop and Deploy New IT and 
(Re )organise. This weighting towards the design of a radical process orientation 
initiative is common across many prescriptive models (Hammer and Champy, 
1993; Morris and Brandon, 1993; Motwani et al. 1998). Yet empirical studies 
(Anon., 1994; Asamoah and Duncan, 1993) reveal that organisations use a wide 
variety of methods to achieve radical process orientation. These studies 
question the usefulness of prescriptive models. 
Implicit in the prescriptive models is that there is a single reality and that 
people in the organisation begin with a shared reality. Functionalist researchers 
are criticised for assuming that implementors are neutral and objective and that 
people will want to change when presented with an irrefutable case for change. 
Implementors expect people to be committed to the changes, and antagonism 
towards the business process orientation initiative is seen as evidence of inertia 
and resistance to change. Such reactions from people are taken to mean that 
they lack understanding of management's vision of the future, or an irrational 
attachment to the 'good old days'. Overcoming inertia and resistance requires 
strong and persuasive leaders who communicate and sell business process 
orientation to employees (Grey and Mitev, 1995; Willmott, 1995). Indeed, the 
purpose of communications about radical process orientation is to create a single 
reality throughout the organisation (Carr and Johansson, 1995). 
Researchers draw on a number of other theories in the functionalist 
paradigm to argue the merits of different prescriptive models. For example, Van 
Ackere et al. (1993) draw on systems theory to argue that implementors should 
take a broader perspective of initiation and implementation. Crowston (1997) 
bases his approach for designing processes from the co-ordination theory 
perspective. Mumford (1994), Terlaga (1994) and Tinaikar et al. (1995) criticise 
existing prescriptive models for neglecting social systems within organisations. 
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They revert to socio-technical theory to argue that models espoused by such 
theorists provide a balance between technological and social aspects of process 
orientation. The problem with these arguments is that the underlying theories 
(systems, co-ordination, and socio-technical) barely lend themselves to 
fundamentally challenging the status quo (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) 
within the organisation. Thus, prescriptive models derived from theoretical 
foundations in the functionalist paradigm are unlikely to lead to the achievement 
of radical process orientation. 
A number of researchers In the functionalist paradigm diminish the 
change achieved during the implementation phase from radical to adaptive 
(Meyer et al. 1995). Two typical examples of this diminution are found in the 
work of Petrozzo and Stepper (1994) and Robey et al. (1995). Petrozzo and 
Stepper (1994) argue, from a perspective that is rooted in the functionalist 
tradition, that organisations should be radical during the initiation phase of 
process orientation. This, they claim, requires strong leadership, a willingness to 
'fight the good fight', the need to 'communicate aggressively' the importance of 
radical process orientation, and the creation of a 'burning desire' for radical 
process orientation. The organisation is expected to assemble a team of capable 
people who will gather information and undertake root cause analysis. Based 
upon strong leadership and extensive analysis, the team is expected to develop 
innovative and substantially improved processes. However, Petrozzo and 
Stepper (1994) argue that as the organisation enters the implementation phase, it 
should minimise the extent to which the new designs interfere with the 
prevailing status quo and internal environment. In effect, they advocate that the 
new process should culminate in adaptive change. Robey et al. (1995) develop 
an approach that suggests radical initiation, which culminates in adaptive 
change. Their approach is rooted in merging two organisational metaphors, 
namely as a machine and as an intelligent organism (Morgan, 1986). They 
argue that during the initiation phase organisations create radical and innovative 
process designs from a 'clean slate' perspective. However, they argue that 
radical designs encounter greatest obstacles during the implementation phase. 
Hence, Robey et al. (1995) conclude that the radical designs created during the 
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initiation phase should be incorporated into the overall development and 
learning that an organisation goes through. They recognise fully that their 
developmental and learning approach will culminate in adaptive changes during 
the implementation phase (Robey et al. 1995). 
There are several consequences of implementing adaptive process 
orientation that was radical during the initiation phase. First, researchers and 
practitioners cause a great deal of confusion when using the same term, process 
orientation, to describe these two quite different types of process orientation. A 
second consequence is that the anticipated strategic benefits are unlikely to be 
achieved (Hall et al. 1994; Lynch, 1995). Organisations that undertake radical 
initiation are urged to set 'stretch goals' such as 100% improvement in cycle 
time, cost reductions of 75%, and 30 times improvement in performance (Dixon 
et al. 1994; Kaplan and Murdock, 1991). According to Miles (1995) such 
breakthroughs in performance are unlikely to be achieved through adaptive or 
piece-meal implementation (Davenport and Nohria, 1994) which are often 
"patchwork repair efforts" (Miles, 1995 p. 129). A third consequence is its 
effect upon employees. During the radical initiation phase, employees' 
expectations rise, as implementors communicate plans of significantly brighter 
future prospects and identify innovative business processes. However, as the 
plans are not achieved during the implementation phase, employees become 
cynical about the entire initiative and about management's willingness to really 
change the organisation, and people's morale falls (Andersson and Bateman, 
1997). A fourth consequence is that organisations are faced with a morass of 
prescriptive methodologies that apparently lead to a radical change, but whose 
sub-text is actually to 'leave the prevailing status quo intact'. Not surprisingly, 
radical process orientation initiatives that culminate in an adaptive change are 
deemed to have failed. 
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2.3.1 (ii) Radical organisational change literature 
Researchers at McGill University carried out seminal work to understand 
radical organisational change (Miller and Friesen, 1980; Miller, 1982). They 
conducted an empirical study of forty organisations from a contingency theory 
perspective. They argue that organisational change is based upon extrapolations 
of the past. Once an organisation adopts a particular change direction, there is a 
tendency for that direction to have a momentum associated with it. The 
momentum of a given direction is maintained even though organisational 
elements such as strategy, structure, and technology change continuously. This 
is possible because modifications to one element create change in others. 
Consequently, organisational elements stay aligned in broadly the same 
direction. This evolutionary alignment of elements creates a prevailing gestalt, 
that is, an accepted configuration of strategy, structure, and technology that 
remains fundamentally the same over time (Miller and Friesen, 1980). Van de 
Ven and Poole (1995) describe radical organisational change as an "underlying 
logic that explains a causal relationship between independent and dependent 
variables in a variance theory" (p. 512). 
Radical organisational change IS characterised as a reversal in the 
prevailing direction of change. A change is radical in nature when the reversal 
of direction affects a large number of organisational elements. Researchers have 
been able to associate reversals in direction with certain events, such as a shift in 
power within the organisation or sudden performance deterioration (Miller, 
1982) and (Miller and Friesen, 1980). These events lead to the creation a new 
gestalt among organisational elements, for example, by introducing a radically 
new concept of the business, its nature, goals, and strategies. Hence, several 
elements, including the structure, information systems, and working practices 
experience a reversal in direction. 
In order to generate knowledge that is objective and transmittable in a 
tangible form, theorists adopt positivist methods that are steeped in testing 
hypotheses and scientific rigour. The intention of these theorists is to generate 
knowledge that can explain and predict the social world by finding causal 
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relationships between elements of the social world. Theorists in the 
functionalist paradigm share at least one assumption: that radical organisational 
change is a concrete, tangible phenomenon which can be studied, measured, and 
understood from a distance, using positivist methods. This has lead theorists to 
study radical organisational change through the quantitative analysis of 
historical records such as annual accounts and published case studies. Theorists 
in this paradigm apply their own frame of reference and hypotheses to define 
radical organisational change and use measurement templates derived from 
constructs developed by other experts in this field. 
2.3.2 Literature in the interpretive paradigm 
2.3.2 (i) Radical process orientation literature 
The interpretive paradigm provides an alternative to functionalism. A 
small number of studies have been carried out based upon the assumptions that 
underpin the perspective. The aim of these studies has been to understand 
radical process orientation from the perspective of people who are closest to it, 
and hence overcome the drawbacks of the functionalist orthodoxy that 
dominates the vast majority of research. 
Four topics relevant to this research are reviewed. First, research that 
examines the radical initiation of process orientation; second, frameworks that 
suggest implicitly that reality is constructed by people directly involved in 
process orientation; third, research into radical initiation and adaptive 
implementation of process orientation initiatives; fourth, research that examines 
the achievement of radical process orientation. 
Earl et al. 's (1995) work characterises studies relating to the first topic, 
radical initiation of process orientation. They assert that four issues need to be 
aligned during the initiation phase. These are business strategy planning, 
information systems strategy planning, change management models, and 
reengineering. They develop a tentative alignment model based upon these four 
issues and, using a grounded theory approach, explore process orientation 
33 
initiatives through their model. They hypothesise that organisations have four 
potential initiation strategies available to them. They assert that each strategy 
adopts a particular conception of the purpose and attributes of a business 
process. For example, their proposed engineering strategy focuses upon 
workflow analysis of the process, and the use of technology to automate the 
process. This strategy is characterised by finding solutions to operational 
problems, and leads to adaptive changes being implemented. Earl et al. (1995) 
conclude that the choice of which strategy an organisation pursues is not always 
readily apparent. They recognise too that the views and opinions of people 
influence the organisation's choice of strategy. For the purposes of this 
research, Earl et al.'s (1995) work suffers from three drawbacks. First, as their 
work focuses upon the initiation phase, they neglect the actions taken by the 
case study organisations to implement the changes. Second, they examine each 
organisation's process orientation initiative from the perspective of those people 
who were responsible for its initiation. This includes the project sponsor, 
project manager, information systems project manager, and business planner. 
Their selection of respondents is narrow and they are likely to hold biased 
views, as they have a vested interest in portraying the initiation phase to be 
successful. Third, Earl et al. (1995) singularly fail to address the type of change 
their initiation strategies are intended to address, namely adaptive or radical 
(Meyer et al. 1995). They avoid this issue on the basis that "there is no coherent 
theory of change within BPR research" (Earl et al. 1995 p. 34). Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the strategies they propose are silent on the type of 
change organisations can expect to have to manage through the implementation 
phase. However, it is apparent, from the implications they raise about future 
research, that their strategies barely lend themselves to radical process 
orientation. 
The second topic 1s frameworks that suggest implicitly that people 
directly involved in process orientation construct reality. A common assumption 
that underpins the work of these researchers is that process orientation emerges 
from the experiences and actions of people who are closely related to the 
initiative. The purpose of the frameworks is to enable people to share their 
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perspective of process orientation, and hence, reach consensus. Kilmann (1995), 
for example, draws on his extensive work in the area of cultural change to 
propose what he describes as a holistic, eight track framework for implementing 
process orientation. A central feature of this framework is for people within the 
organisation to share their views on different aspects of the change. Kilmann 
(1995) places heavy emphasis upon workshops, where people from different 
vertical functions discuss and shape process orientation. The workshops provide 
an opportunity for people to have an on-going dialogue about their perceptions 
of process orientation. Clemons (1995) recognises that radical, discontinuous 
process orientation is a difficult and risky undertaking, especially during the 
implementation phase. He asserts that the risks can be minimised where 
managers share a common view of the future external environment their 
organisation may face. This requires people within the organisation to 
communicate with each other, as each person is likely to perceive future 
scenarios differently, based upon their personal assumptions. He argues that 
people need to construct a range of possible future scenarios, and suggests that 
they use scenario analysis techniques as a way of developing commonly held 
views of future scenarios. However, Clemons (1995) highlights the danger of 
the scenarios being anchored to or extrapolations of the past. He asserts that 
senior managers need to challenge their own assumptions when constructing 
scenarios. He concludes that radical designs are more likely to be implemented 
where managers share a commonly held view of the future. 
Whereas Kilmann (1995) and Clemons (1995) extend previously 
developed concepts to the field of radical process orientation, other researchers 
have developed frameworks specifically for this area. For instance, Edwards 
and Peppard (1994) and Earl and Khan (1994) propose frameworks for 
classifying processes. These frameworks are based implicitly upon the 
assumption that people closest to process orientation should understand and 
agree the nature of the process( es) to be changed. The interpretive nature of the 
Edwards and Peppard (1994) framework is demonstrated through its usage 
(Edwards and Peppard, 1997). The classification of the processes is an outcome 
of a high degree of interaction between people associated with process 
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orientation. Edwards and Braganza (1994) developed a framework that enables 
people in organisations to understand and agree the degree and scope of the 
changes. The degree of change refers to the scale or magnitude of the changes, 
and scope refers to the breadth of the organisation affected by the changes. 
These two dimensions form a framework that people utilise to agree the type of 
radical process orientation initiative they believe should be implemented. 
Edwards and Braganza ( 1994) argue that as the degree of change can vary for 
each organisational element, process orientation initiatives can range from minor 
changes within a small part of the organisation to a radical change across a 
business process. These frameworks suggest that researchers consider 
organisational reality to be socially constructed, with individuals creating 
meaning through their interactions. 
The third topic relates to studies of radical initiation and adaptive 
implementation of process orientation. Three studies frame this topic (Currie 
and Willcocks, 1996; Stoddard and Jarvenpaa, 1995; Stoddard et al. 1996). 
Stoddard and Jarvenpaa (1995) conducted a longitudinal case study to address 
the issue of radical and adaptive change in the field of process orientation. They 
argue that organisations undertake process orientation that can culminate in 
either radical or adaptive change. Radical process orientation results in a major 
change to the existing status quo, that is, the structure, business practices, and 
assumptions. Adaptive process orientation, on the other hand, preserves the 
status quo. Stoddard and Jarvenpaa (1995) found that during the initiation 
phase, a great deal of attention was given to managing issues such as leadership, 
management commitment, employee involvement, information technology 
changes, communication, structural and cultural changes, to generate radically 
new processes. Organisations planned a radical change, and hence designed 
processes that were significantly different to the status quo. However, during 
the implementation phase, proposed radical changes were scaled down, 
deadlines were allowed to slip, or certain changes, especially cultural and 
structural changes, were simply put on hold. Organisations were unable to 
change the status quo, and process orientation resulted in adaptive change. They 
describe this as a paradox and summarise their observations thus: 
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"the more radical the planned change, the more the organisations 
employed revolutionary change during design, but not necessarily during 
implementation (p. 94) ... sustainable incremental improvement via an 
evolutionary change process might be what companies should sometimes 
expect from BPR" (Stoddard and Jarvenpaa, 1995 p. 105). 
The second study is also by Stoddard et al. (1996). They selected 
organisations that had initiated one or more process orientation projects. They 
defined a process orientation project as "an effort that the management in the 
company launches as a radical organizational initiative" (Stoddard et al. 1996 p. 
74). This definition emphasises the initiation phase and provides an incomplete 
perspective. For example, they undertook a longitudinal study of Pacific Bell's 
order fulfilment process. Based upon this organisation's experience, they argue 
that: 
"whereas BPR is different from the total quality approaches in design, 
during the implementation stage well done BPR is similar to total quality 
approaches. As the early writings of reengineering suggest, during 
design, BPR is radical, takes a clean slate approach, is process driven, 
top-down directed, and IT enabled. However, during the implementation 
stage, BPR is continuously incremental, (and) constrained by 
organizational realities" (Stoddard et al. 1996 p. 60 - italics in original). 
It is apparent from their work that very few, if any, of the organisations 
included in their sample actually achieved radical process orientation. This is 
hardly surprising, given their definition of a process orientation initiative focuses 
on radical initiation with no mention of implementation. 
The third study is by Currie and Willcocks (1996). They conducted a 
longitudinal study into the Royal Bank of Scotland's radical process orientation 
initiative. They describe their study as an examination of the implementation of 
a radical process orientation initiative. Yet, they admit that the bank's initiative 
culminated in an adaptive change. Currie and Willcocks (1996) identified the 
reasons the bank veered away from radical change. First, conservative practices 
and procedures that pervaded the organisation inhibited large-scale change. 
Second, the bank faced difficulties in two areas, customer services and increased 
pressure from competitors. However, the bank was profitable based upon 
existing work practices and levels of customer service. The need for radical 
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process orientation was poorly communicated: "environmental pressures for 
change seemed less obvious to many of the workforce of the bank" (Currie and 
Willcocks, 1996 p. 230). Third, traditional hierarchical and functional 
boundaries reinforced the status quo. These organisational elements were being 
threatened by the process orientation initiative and managerial staff found they 
were unable to commit to changing the status quo. Fourth, the process 
orientation initiative was perceived by the staff to be an information technology 
project: 
"At the Royal Bank, re-engineered core processes were to be heavily 
dependent on IT to deliver the anticipated large-scale improvements in 
financial performance" (Currie and Willcocks, 1996 p. 230). 
The project required people from business divisions and the technology 
division to work together. This surfaced historical tensions between the 
business and technology divisions. Consequently, managers interpreted process 
orientation, at strategic and operational levels, in ways that furthered their 
personal position and their department's position. The bank also faced a 
shortage of technical and project management skills needed to develop the IT 
system. External contractors were brought in which also created tensions and 
difficulties between the bank's traditional IT staff and the contractors: 
"For existing technical staff if it (the new technology being introduced to 
support reengineering) did not threaten jobs, it certainly placed doubts 
about the relevance of their traditional IT skills. The large influx of 
technical staff and contractors signalled new working practices and types 
of contract, and that banking was no longer a job for life" (Currie and 
Willcocks, 1996 p. 232). 
Fifth, the proposed process orientation caused anxiety and concern 
across all levels in the workforce: 
"the 'New Bank' vision, in its human resource implications, could be 
perceived as threatening interests and change at all levels" (Currie and 
Willcocks, 1996 p. 232). 
The senior managers appear not to have recognised people's anxieties, 
concerns, and feelings of being threatened and as these were neglected the 
researchers "found considerable evidence of emergent protectionist strategies 
amongst the banks workforces" (p. 232). The researchers assert that based upon 
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their observations of the Royal Bank, two maJor barriers prevented the 
implementation of radical process orientation: middle and line manager 
resistance to process orientation, and lower level employee fear and resistance to 
change. These three studies show that researchers in the interpretive paradigm, 
like functionalist researchers, diminish radical process orientation from radical 
to adaptive implementation. 
The fourth topic deals with the implementation of radical process 
orientation. Caron et al. (1994) chronicle the experiences and lessons learnt at 
CIGNA Corporation, a US-based insurance company. The salient features of 
radical process orientation in two divisions, CIGNA Reinsurance and CIGNA 
Property and Casualty, are outlined briefly. 
CJGNA Reinsurance (CIGNA Re) This division was the pilot site for 
radical process orientation and the radical nature of the changes is readily 
assesses. Over an eighteen month period, CIGNA Re was transformed from a 
traditional, functional reinsurance organisation to one that had five cross 
functional, customer focused teams, with team based incentive schemes, and 
fewer computer applications (17 down to 5) operating across a local area 
network. The organisation introduced team based management, and emphasised 
accountability and customer focus. A wide range of actions were taken to 
implement the changes including developing job descriptions for team leaders, 
selecting team leaders, creating new compensation packages, and implementing 
a work flow system. The organisation undertook an extensive communication 
programme, however, people felt uneasy about radical process orientation. This 
was partially due to people having to reapply for roles that were created, and 
also because fewer people were needed, as previous roles were merged to meet 
the process's requirements. Headcount at the administrative levels fell by about 
50% due to workflow systems installed. People, who did not get jobs in the new 
role, were able to apply elsewhere in the Group for jobs. 
CJGNA Property and Casualty The information contained in Caron et 
al.'s (1994) article about this division's initiative is thin. This division's radical 
process orientation initiative was initiated in October 1993. The implementation 
phase was completed through six inter-related projects. These covered areas 
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such as realigning divisional measures so that they matched the measures 
individuals had to achieve, introducing new workflow technology, and creating 
team based working (Golden, 1995). An interesting feature of the CIGNA 
experience is that an internal process orientation team was created. The team 
was called CIGNA Systems Reengineering Group, and it reported into the CIO. 
It is a permanent team of about ten people, described as future leader types, who 
would remain on the team for 12-18 months. This team was involved in all 
divisions' radical process orientation initiatives. 
One limitation of current understanding is that as little research has been 
conducted into the initiation and implementation of radical process orientation 
from an interpretive perspective, the consequences that arise from 
implementation are poorly understood. A further shortcoming of existing 
research in the interpretive paradigm is that researchers withhold the theory, e.g. 
ethnomethodology, underpinning their work. It is difficult, therefore, to identify 
whether the conclusions of researchers such as Currie and Willcocks (1996), 
Earl et al. (1995), Kilmann (1995), and Stoddard et al. (1996) are a consequence 
of the particular research approach taken, or due to a deeper theoretical reason. 
2.3.2 (ii) Radical organisational change literature 
Gersick (1991) conceptualises radical change as a punctuation rn an 
organisation's period of equilibrium. She suggests that organisations experience 
periods of equilibrium when fundamental organisational elements remain the 
same. Minor changes to organisational elements are made to compensate for 
external perturbations, however, the organisation's deep structures remain 
unchanged. According to Gersick (1991), organisations experience radical 
change when the basic assumptions and organising logic of the organisation are 
dismantled, and reconfigured into a new way of organising and operating. 
Organisations experience a period of upheaval and uncertainty during the radical 
change, and this continues until equilibrium is achieved around a new set of 
assumptions. Other seminal theorists are Tushman and Romanelli (1985), 
Tushman et al. (1986), Tushman and O'Reilly III (1996). They refer to radical 
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change as frame-breaking or discontinuous. Such a change is characterised by a 
sharp and simultaneous shift in strategy, structure, and controls. They describe a 
frame-breaking change as changes of, as opposed to, in the organisation. They 
assert that frame-breaking change can be driven proactively by people within the 
organisation, either in response to foreseeable events (e.g. maturation of 
products) or unexpected events (e.g. unexpected legal changes). The effects of 
radical change are felt throughout the organisation, particularly in terms of the 
power and status held by individuals and the way people work together. 
2.4 Locating this research in Burrell and Morgan's paradigms 
By far the largest volume of research in radical process orientation has 
been carried out from within the functionalist paradigm. However, functionalist 
approaches are criticised for three basic assumptions. First, that radical process 
orientation can be formulated into an objective reality that is structured and 
rational. This assumption leads researchers to treat radical process orientation as 
though it has an existence that is concrete and tangible. Second, that the social 
world of organisations experiencing radical process orientation is ordered and 
stable. Researchers in this paradigm instinctively conceive organisations to be 
mechanistic in nature. Third, that positivist methods, derived from the natural 
sciences, provide adequate means to make sense of and explain the social world. 
The theories that have guided researchers in the functionalist paradigm inClude 
contingency, socio-technical, and systems theory. While these theories provide 
insights into the design of radical process orientation, the resultant changes to 
the prevailing status quo are adaptive. Consequently, radical process orientation 
has been diminished to radical initiation and adaptive implementation. The 
results of functionalist research leads to the identification of prescriptive models 
which have discrete stages, where one stage leads neatly to another in a smooth 
flow to the change that might be radical or adaptive. The lack of consideration 
of the social aspects and the broad generalisations that comprise the prescriptive 
models reveal the inappropriateness of functionalist approaches to study radical 
process orientation. Radical changes to the status quo deeply affect the social 
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aspects of the organisation. Functionalist approaches are simply not geared to 
penetrate the intrinsic complexity of managing the achievement of radical 
process orientation. Functionalist researchers miss the opportunity to develop a 
rich model of the complexity, which can provide greater insights into the 
achievement of radical process orientation. Hence, this research will not adopt a 
functionalist perspective because to understand the achievement of radical 
process orientation there is a need to develop such a rich model. 
Alternative philosophical perspectives are provided by the interpretive 
paradigm. Researchers adopting this perspective take cognisance of the views of 
people directly involved in radical process orientation. Researchers in the 
interpretive paradigm have used grounded theory and longitudinal case study 
approaches. These studies reveal that the achievement of radical process 
orientation is messy, with some people supporting and other resisting changes. 
An important finding from research carried out in the interpretive tradition is 
that radical process orientation is not achieved in discrete stages. Instead, the 
boundaries between initiation and implementation are blurred and indistinct. 
In essence, this research is theory building in nature. Burrell and 
Morgan ( 1979) provide the following advice to researchers who pursue a theory 
building study: 
"Theorists who wish to develop ideas ... cannot afford to take a short cut. 
There is a real need for them to ground their perspective in the 
philosophical traditions from which it derives; to start from first 
principles; to have the philosophical and sociological concerns by which 
the paradigm is defined at the forefront of their analysis; to develop a 
systematic and coherent perspective within the guidelines which each 
paradigm offers, rather than taking the tenets of a competing paradigm as 
critical starting points of reference. Each paradigm needs to be 
developed in its own terms" (p. 397). 
This research is concerned with managing the achievement of radical 
process orientation. This research argues that understanding radical process 
orientation from the perspective of people involved with and with experience of 
its achievement is crucial to gaining pragmatic insights from which to develop 
theory. Unlike functionalist researchers, interpretive researchers are able to 
grasp the rich picture that these people can provide. Developing such a rich 
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picture involves the researcher taking the perspective of these people. The 
exploration of radical process orientation from their perspective is at the heart of 
this research. Hence, this research is rooted in the interpretive paradigm. 
2.5 A review of the business process orientation literature to 
identify conceptual categories 
The literature was analysed as it relates to the achievement of radical 
process orientation. The purpose of this analysis was to identify conceptual 
categories, namely issues that are considered important to the achievement of 
radical process orientation. The analysis was based upon the definition of the 
term 'achievement' 7, established in the previous chapter. It should be borne in 
mind that a different conceptualisation of the term 'achievement' might lead to 
different conceptual categories being identified. 
2.5.1 Rationale for radical process orientation 
Researchers argue that radical process orientation is undertaken by 
organisations in response to one or more drivers for change. Drivers for change 
represent the rationale for initiating radical process orientation, and address the 
fundamental question 'why change' (Dixon et al. 1994). Researchers argue that 
a shared understanding of the drivers for change is critical to the achievement of 
radical process orientation, as these drivers are utilised to create a case for 
change. There is widespread agreement that people are unlikely to support 
radical process orientation unless they understand and accept the drivers for 
change. Two broad classifications of drivers for change can be identified: 
threats or opportunities. Threats include increased competitor activity (Ascari et 
al. 1995), severe economic downturns (Teng et al. 1994a), industry changes 
(Buchanan, 1997), and outdated working practices that no longer satisfy 
stakeholder expectations (Ayers, 1995). Opportunities include developing new 
competencies (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994), new product introductions (Gerwin 
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and Guild, 1994), and improving customer service (Gouillart and Sturdivant, 
1994). 
2.5.2 Choice of change initiatives 
The literature postulates that the drivers for change lead directly to one or 
more radical process orientation initiatives. This is based upon two lines of 
reasoning (Ascari et al. 1995; Hammer and Champy, 1993; Kettinger and Teng, 
1998). One line of reasoning is that radical process orientation is the better 
choice with which to address drivers that require an organisation to undertake 
radical change, as other change initiative options are inherently limited (Carr and 
Johansson, 1995). While the criticisms of other change initiatives maybe valid, 
the argument that, by default, radical process orientation is automatically more 
appropriate is weak and unsustainable. The second line of reasoning is that 
drivers for change require organisations to achieve radical performance 
improvements, and that radical process orientation is an effective means of 
achieving such improvements (Hammer and Champy, 1993). Yet studies show 
that initiating a radical process orientation initiative on the basis of performance 
improvements can lead to failure (Currie and Willcocks, 1996; Stoddard and 
Jarvenpaa, 1995), as the changes are found to be unacceptable to people within 
the organisation. 
Organisational change scholars recognise that organisations have 
available to them competing options for dealing with drivers for change (Duck, 
1993; Keidel, 1994; O'Neill, 1994). For example, organisations can deal with 
the threat of increased competition by merging with or acquiring the competitor 
(Markides, 1995) or by forming strategic alliances (a recent trend in the airline 
industry). Rapidly changing technologies could be dealt with by outsourcing 
aspects of the business to specialist companies (Cheon et al. 1995). It is 
noticeable that current research is silent in terms of providing theoretical criteria 
with which to select radical process orientation against other change options. 
7 'Achievement' refers to the initiation and implementation phases of change to effect a business process 
in an organisation, and the related consequences that arise from implementation. 
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Hence, a gap in the literature is that theoretical criteria for selecting radical 
process orientation as against other types of change initiatives is missing. 
2.5.3 Content and nature of changes experienced 
Researchers in the radical process orientation literature conceptualise 
radical change in terms of significant expected performance improvements. For 
instance, Dixon et al. (1994) assert that their working definition ofreengineering 
is that it is a revolutionary approach which focuses upon the attainment of 
significant desired results from a business process. Stoddard et al. ( 1996), 
drawing upon the work of Davenport (1993) and Hammer and Champy (1993), 
assert that radical change refers to the magnitude of the performance 
improvement: 
"a change that results in incremental improvement (e.g. a 10% cost 
reduction) would not be considered a radical change" (Stoddard et al. 
1996). 
Stoddard et al. 's (1996) view of incremental improvement stand in stark 
contrast with Tushman et al.'s (1986) conception of an incremental 
improvement: 
"almost any organisation can tolerate a 'ten-percent change'. At any one 
time only a few changes are being made; but these changes are still 
compatible with the prevailing structures" (p. 34). 
Two implications are borne of conceptualising radical change in terms of 
performance improvement. One is highlighted in a recent survey (Grover et al. 
1998), which found a fundamental problem facing organisations embarking on 
radical process orientation is that the "need for managing change is not 
recognized" (p. 57) by board members and senior managers (Grover et al. 1998). 
This is because people focus upon measuring performance improvements rather 
than changes to organisational elements (Kaplan and Murdock, 1991 ). The 
second, is radical process orientation is deemed to be a strategic initiative 
because organisations set out to achieve order of magnitude improvements (Hall 
et al. 1994). 
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The conceptualisation that radical process orientation researchers ascribe 
to radical change is incongruous with the perspective asserted by radical change 
theorists (Gersick, 1991; Miller and Friesen, 1980; Tushman and Romanelli, 
1985; Tushman et al. 1986; Tushman and O'Reilly III, 1996). Radical change 
theorists conceive radical change to be one that culminates in a significant 
change to organisational elements such as strategy, structure, people, and 
systems. 
This is not to say that researchers in process orientation overlook the 
views of the change theorists. Indeed, researchers assert that the radical nature 
of reengineering involves the organisation in making a change in direction or 
challenging the status quo (Dixon et al. 1994). Nor do change theorists argue 
for change for change sake, i.e. without a corresponding performance 
improvement. However, process orientation researchers give prominence to 
radical performance improvements when conceptualising radical change. This 
emphasis upon radical performance improvement has led to process orientation 
researchers urging implementors to set stretch goals and dramatic performance 
improvement targets (Hagel III, 1993). The organisational change implications, 
which stem from a quantum leap in performance improvements, are regarded as 
a contingent effect. This is an inappropriate conceptualisation of radical change 
because 'change' is placed as a subsidiary issue to performance improvement. 
Radical change theorists, on the other hand, focus upon changes to 
organisational elements namely, strategy, structure, people's responsibilities and 
appraisal criteria, behaviours and information systems, and treat performance 
improvements as a result of implementing radical changes to these elements. 
The conceptualisation of radical change distances radical process orientation 
researchers from mainstream radical change theorists. 
The content of the organisational changes required to achieve radical 
process orientation is labelled change management issues or change 
management problems (Earl et al. 1995; Grover et al. 1995). The change 
management issues frequently highlighted in the literature are summarised in 
Table 2.1. 
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Change Responsibilities Organisation Appraisal Information Behaviours 
Author structure criteria systems 
(Hammer ./ ./ ./ ./ 
and 
Champy, 
1993) 
(Hallet al. ./ ./ ./ ./ 
1994) 
(Asamoah ./ ./ 
and 
Duncan, 
1993) 
(Caron et al. ./ ./ ./ 
1994) 
(Davenport ./ ./ ./ ./ 
and Nohria, 
1994) 
(Ascari et ./ ./ ./ ./ 
al. 1995) 
(Earl and ./ ./ ./ 
Khan, 1994) 
(Kilmann, ./ ./ 
1995) 
Table 2.1: Content of changes that occur during a radical process 
orientation initiative 
At first glance, the above table leads to the conclusion that there is a high 
degree of consensus about the content of the changes that occur. However, on 
closer examination, the details of the organisational changes differ widely, as the 
following detailed analysis of the content of the change reveals: 
Detailed changes to people's responsibilities are: 
+ greater empowerment, where people in the process decide how and 
when work is to be done (Hammer and Champy, 1993) 
+ decision making authority is increased for the person responsible 
for the process (Davenport and Nohria, 1994), 
+ defined along the horizontal or process dimension rather than on a 
vertical or functional basis (Earl et al. 1995) 
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./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
Detailed changes to organisation structure are: 
+ hierarchy flattened in terms of the number of levels (Hammer and 
Champy, 1993) 
+ a decrease in the number of vertical functions (Davenport and 
N ohria, 1994) 
+ size and power of the functions decrease (Ascari et al. 1995) 
+ organise by process rather than function (Hodgetts et al. 1999) 
Detailed changes to appraisal criteria are: 
+ introduction of performance related pay (Asamoah and Duncan, 
1993) 
+ team based compensation (Caron et al. 1994) 
+ compensation linked to profitability of the process (Davenport and 
Nohria, 1994) 
+ linked to broader process goals (Earl et al. 1995) 
+ linked to the individual's and group's contribution to improving 
the process (Kilmann, 1995) 
+ rewards should be in the form of bonuses linked to value created 
by the process (Hammer and Champy, 1993) 
Detailed changes to information systems are: 
+ development of new systems that support the process (Caron et al. 
1994) 
+ a mix of old and new systems (Davenport and Nohria, 1994) 
+ tailored IT solutions (Ascari et al. 1995) 
+ shared databases (Earl and Khan, 1994) 
Detailed changes to behaviours are: 
+ employees believe they work for and take ownership of customers 
(Hammer and Champy, 1993) 
+ enhancing trust, communication, information sharing, and 
willingness to change in the organisation (Kilmann, 1995) 
+ demolishing old assumptions (Earl and Khan, 1994) 
+ changing business practices (Caron et al. 1994) 
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The above analysis shows that there is little agreement in the literature in 
terms of the content of the changes. It highlights a lack of clarity in current 
thinking about the nature of the changes. Some proponents argue that the 
changes lead to realignment from a functional structure to a predominantly 
process orientation; while others suggest that organisations retain their 
functional structure; yet, others are silent on this issue. 
This examination suggests that there is much confusion in the radical 
process orientation literature surrounding the conceptualisation of radical 
organisational change and, the content and nature changes that organisation's 
experience in a radical process orientation initiative. 
2.5.4 Gaining and sustaining buy-in 
Researchers argue that the concept of 'buy-in' is critical to the 
achievement of radical process orientation. Three empirical studies identified 
loss of board and senior management buy-in to be the major barrier to radical 
process orientation being achieved (Anon., 1994; Bashein et al. 1994; Grint and 
Willcocks, 1995). The components of buy-in manifest themselves, in the 
literature, in three overlapping ways: 
+ People being convinced that the drivers for change, be they threats or 
opportunities, really exist and that the organisation faces potential 
risks or missed opportunities were it not to proceed with radical 
process orientation (Bashein et al. 1994; Carr and Johansson, 1995; 
Dixon et al. 1994; Jarvenpaa and Stoddard, 1998) 
+ People commit themselves to the organisation's future vision. The 
vision may be stated in terms of radical performance improvements, 
better customer service, or the development of innovative products 
(Anon., 1994; Hammer and Stanton, 1995; Motwani et al. 1998; 
Petrozzo and Stepper, 1994) 
+ People buy-in to the steps being taken to implement the redesigned 
process. Examples include managers being more open with each 
other, involving employees in the redesign, and increased levels of 
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communication. A survey revealed that insufficient buy-in, to the 
steps by which the changes associated with radical process orientation 
are to be achieved, was one of the major implementation problems 
encountered by organisations (Grint and Willcocks, 1995). 
Buy-in is operationalised typically by one or more senior managers being 
asked to accept or directly taking on the mantle of sponsor, champion, leader or, 
even, 'reengineering czar' (Hammer and Champy, 1993). One of the primary 
roles of the champion is to gain and sustain people's buy-in to radical process 
orientation. Some proponents direct champions to adopt rational approaches to 
gain and sustain people's buy-in to radical process orientation, for example, by 
preparing and communicating a case for change (Carr and Johansson, 1995; 
Hammer and Champy, 1993). However, others criticise this rational approach 
for underplaying the organisation's social and political dimensions (Grint and 
Willcocks, 1995). They argue that people's buy-in to the drivers for change and 
implementation methods needs to be gained and sustained at the level of hearts 
and minds, and that rational approaches are inadequate (Buchanan, 1997; 
Kilmann, 1995; Smith and Willcocks, 1995). They suggest buy-in is obtained 
through political means. 
2.5.5 People affected by the changes 
Current research assumes organisational changes affect board members 
and senior managers less than middle managers and employees during the 
implementation of a radical process orientation initiative. Researchers argue 
that the major impact on board members and senior managers is that their role 
changes to one of leadership (Armistead and Rowland, 1996; Hammer and 
Champy, 1993). This role requires them to create conditions conducive to 
implementation (Bashein et al. 1994; Petrozzo and Stepper, 1994), and convince 
and persuade people to undertake radical change (Dixon et al. 1994; Grint and 
Willcocks, 1995). The argument in the existing literature is underpinned by an 
assumption that board members and senior managers are unlikely to be 
recipients of organisational changes, whereas middle managers and employees 
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are significantly and directly affected by the changes (Grint and Willcocks, 
1995; Hammer and Champy, 1993). 
Research shows that not everyone affected by radical process orientation 
may be willing to allow the changes to touch them (Grover et al. 1995; Smith 
and Willcocks, 1995). A number of theorists adopt the view that people 
inherently resist change (Jaffe and Scott, 1998). Some people publicly express 
their resistance to change, while others remain silent, which makes it difficult to 
distinguish in advance, those people who are likely to resist organisational 
changes (Currie and Willcocks, 1996). The characteristics of people's resistance 
to change are well rehearsed in the literature. These include uncertainty, fear, 
anxiety, risk of criticism, scepticism, loss of status or authority or power, loss of 
employment, anger, and upheaval (Jaffe and Scott, 1998; Kilmann, 1995; Morris 
and Brandon, 1993; Stoddard et al. 1996). A consistent argument in the 
literature is that the greatest source of resistance is people most affected by the 
organisational changes brought about by radical process orientation, and 
consequently, middle managers and employees are singled out as likely to resist 
changes (Currie and Willcocks, 1996; Moss Kanter et al. 1992). Board members 
and senior managers are rarely identified as resistors to change due to the 
assumption that they are not affected by the changes. Yet, empirical evidence 
suggests that board members resist changes, which infers that they are likely to 
be affected by radical process orientation (Braganza and Myers, 1996). 
2.5.6 Selecting the issues to be managed 
The research relating to the issues managed to achieve radical process 
orientation falls within two classes: prescriptive models and generic actions 
(Motwani et al. 1998). The first, prescriptive models, are derived from a variety 
of sources including the distillation of consultancy company's proprietary 
methodologies (Kettinger and Teng, 1998), a review of the literature (Motwani 
et al. 1998), and anecdotal evidence (Davenport and Short, 1990). The models 
consist of a number of discrete stages and each stage contains implementation 
steps that organisations are expected to take to achieve radical process 
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orientation. These models tend to concentrate upon the steps necessary for the 
initiation of radical process orientation. In relation to implementation of the 
changes many models make a general recommendation that organisations should 
use change management techniques, but offer little guidance beyond that (see for 
example, Guha et al.'s (1993) Process Reengineering Life Cycle Methodology). 
The models often focus upon a particular issue such as culture (Kilmann, 1995), 
IT (Guha et al. 1993), or sociotechnical issues (Mumford, 1995; Terlaga, 1994), 
while neglecting or marginalising other issues. 
The second class, generic actions that can lead to the achievement of 
radical process orientation, are presented as key success factors (Hall et al. 1994; 
Stoddard and Jarvenpaa, 1995), best practice (Ascari et al. 1995; Carr and 
Johansson, 1995), universal dangers, pitfalls and actions (Cardarelli et al. 1998), 
and lessons learnt (Caron et al. 1994). Researchers derive these factors from 
reviews of the literature (Ascari et al. 1995), consultancy company's proprietary 
methodologies (Bashein et al. 1994), surveys (Anon., 1994; Asamoah and 
Duncan, 1993), and field studies (Dixon et al. 1994; Earl et al. 1995). 
The models and generic actions are criticised on three grounds. One, the 
models and actions are posited as being universally applicable to all 
organisational contexts. Buchanan's study (1997) of the use of some of the 
actions in a hospital setting is a compelling testament for not deploying certain 
actions without an appreciation of the context in which those actions are applied. 
The universality of the models and actions is contrary to the weight of other 
research, which reveals that context is an important variable to guide action 
(Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991). Two, a comparison of the models and actions 
identified surfaces conflicting and confusing messages (Braganza and Myers, 
1996). Three, the models and actions are presented as being of equal importance 
and having similar impact upon bringing about changes to organisational 
elements. 
52 
2.5. 7 Mode of operationalising the issues to be managed 
An area of consensus in the literature is that organisations should agree 
the issues they plan to manage to achieve radical process orientation (Motwani 
et al. 1998). However, the literature neglects to consider the mode of 
operationalising the issues to achieve radical process orientation (Jaffe and 
Scott, 1998). In fact, Stoddard and Jarvenpaa (1995) identify this as a major 
area of weakness in the literature and suggest that greater clarity is required. 
What work does exist is polarised along two dimensions. One is the 
structured approach to, and the second relates to the nature of the mode of 
operationalising the issues to be managed that will change the organisational 
elements. The key arguments surrounding the structured approach debate are 
reviewed in the literature (Braganza and Myers, 1997). Essentially, those in 
favour of a structured approach suggest organisations develop a plan that breaks 
down each issue into a series of tasks. Each task is assigned to an individual or 
group who have the responsibility for completing their task within an agreed 
time period (Davenport, 1993; Kettinger et al. 1997). The tasks, people and 
dates can be represented in the form of a critical path to the achievement of 
radical process orientation (Morris and Brandon, 1993). However, others are 
disenchanted with such rational and structured modes of operationalisation 
(Hammer and Champy, 1993; Jaffe and Scott, 1998). A number of researchers 
argue for organisations to adopt an emergent approach for operationalising the 
issues, whereby agreement about each aspect of the approach is sought as the 
initiative progresses (Bashein et al. 1994; Hammer and Stanton, 1995; Hammer 
and Stanton, 1995). However, the emergent approach is beset by hazards that 
can lead to failure (Buchanan, 1997). 
In terms of the nature of the mode, Hammer and Champy (1993) argued 
that the mode for operationalising the issues had to be radical. A number of 
researchers disagreed with their view (Davenport and Stoddard, 1994; Mumford, 
1995). These and other researchers argue that organisations should design 
radical changes to process but that implementation should be evolutionary in 
nature, i.e. it conforms to the organisation's current situation (Stoddard and 
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Jarvenpaa, 1995). These researchers argue strongly in favour of an evolutionary 
mode for operationalising all the issues to be managed. The reasons that 
underpin the argument is a radical mode of operationalising will be perceived by 
people as being challenging or costly and hence they resist all changes (Carr and 
Johansson, 1995; Robey et al. 1995). Proponents of the evolutionary mode 
suggest that organisations should avoid operationalising the issues in a way that 
causes disruption, appears counter cultural, challenges the status quo, or 
interrupts current operations (Kettinger and Teng, 1998; Morris and Brandon, 
1993; Petrozzo and Stepper, 1994; Stoddard and Jarvenpaa, 1995). This 
argument is unchallenged in the literature and, when scrutinised, reveals a 
crucial flaw at its core: an evolutionary mode of operationalising issues to be 
managed leads to adaptive radical process orientation, rather than radical process 
orientation (Currie and Willcocks, 1996). 
2.5.8 Actual implementation of the issues 
The transition from the selection of the issues to be managed to their 
actual implementation receives little research attention (Stoddard and J arvenpaa, 
1995). Instead the literature focuses upon identifying problems organisations 
face during implementation and tactics for overcoming these problems. By far, 
most of the problems can be traced to the social aspects of change (Kettinger et 
al. 1997). These problems manifest themselves as lack of commitment, 
especially the commitment of functional directors (Braganza and Myers, 1996), 
poor communication (Cardarelli et al. 1998), and an insensitivity to the political 
aspects of the proposed changes (Grint and Willcocks, 1995). Another, albeit 
less challenging, problem area surrounds the lack of know-how of radical 
process orientation and attendant management techniques, e.g. poor project 
management, project planning and information systems implementation 
expertise (Grover et al. 1998). 
Broad swathes of tactics are proposed to overcome the social and know-
how problems. The tactics for overcoming the social problems include 
clarifying the new work contract between the organisation and employees (Jaffe 
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and Scott, 1998); communication (Davenport, 1993; Motwani et al. 1998); 
making the implementation team personally accountable for the change 
(Cardarelli et al. 1998); persuading people to change (Kettinger and Teng, 
1998); enrolling people through appeals to their heart and mind (Grint and 
Willcocks, 1995); and involving people in the design of the changes (Buchanan, 
1997). The tactics for overcoming the know-how related problems include 
training people in the concepts and methods of radical process orientation 
(Bashein et al. 1994); achieving quick wins (Hall et al. 1994); employing 
consultants to compensate for skill shortages (Carr and Johansson, 1995) and 
involving information systems people from the outset of the initiative (Coleman 
et al. 1996). Others suggest harder tactics often with violent connotations, for 
example, Hammer is quoted as saying "on this journey we shoot dissenters" 
(Grint and Willcocks, 1995). These harder tactics are severely criticised for 
being uncaring towards people (Grey and Mitev, 1995; Jones, 1995). 
The tactics have two notable weaknesses. One a closer examination of 
the tactics reveals a considerable overlap with the prescriptive models and 
generic actions discussed in the previous section (see for example, Bashein et al. 
1994; Carr and Johansson, 1995; Hammer and Champy, 1993; Kettinger and 
Teng, 1998). Hence the tactics add few insights beyond those already identified 
by the prescriptive models and generic actions. Two, researchers present the 
tactics as a collection of actions from which organisations can select the ones 
they will deploy to address implementation problems. Alternatively, other 
researchers argue in great detail their rationale for suggesting particular tactics 
(Grint and Willcocks, 1995). However, neither group of researchers penetrates 
the reasons that underpin and explain why people actually implement the tactics 
for overcoming social and know-how problems. 
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2.5.9 Post implementation of radical process orientation 
The achievement of radical process orientation is assessed on the basis of 
performance improvements being realised (Stoddard et al. 1996). Where 
anticipated significant performance improvements are realised, radical process 
orientation is said to be achieved; where performance improvements fall short 
of expectations, radical process orientation is deemed to have failed (Motwani et 
al. 1998). Organisations that achieve radical process orientation are advised to 
continuously improve, i.e. make adaptive changes to the processes. Different 
initiatives are proposed as ways of ensuring continuous improvements are made. 
These include total quality programmes or learning initiatives to avoid 
organisations reverting to their former state (Morris and Brandon, 1993; Robey 
et al. 1995). Organisations that have not achieved anticipated performance 
improvements are faced with a limited number of options. One, they can 
evaluate whether the improvements that have been achieved are sufficient in 
terms of the investment made and are politically acceptable (Currie and 
Willcocks, 1996). Where the benefits are acceptable, the organisation can make 
adaptive changes to improve gradually. Two, organisations reattempt the 
implementation of the changes to organisational elements (Motwani et al. 1998). 
Given the dearth of studies that have implemented radical process orientation, 
research into the situation after achievement is sparse. 
2.5.1 0 Implementor and recipient roles 
People involved with the achievement of radical process orientation are 
divided into two groups, namely implementors and recipients. Kettinger and 
Teng (1998) capture the roles people are expected to fulfil during the 
achievement of radical process orientation: 
" ... the smooth transition to a new organization including reorganization 
and staff reductions, team and employee selection, job rotation and 
employee training. Based on the new process design, new organizational 
structures and job assignments must be conveyed to the affected 
employees outlining their future roles and performance expectations. . .. 
(such) dramatic changes during this step will cause anxiety that must be 
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addressed by continual communication between top management, the 
regeneration team, and employees" (p. 1 04; italics added). 
They clearly demarcate the roles of top management and the regeneration 
team from the role of employees: the role of top management and the 
regeneration team is to design the changes and be responsible for implementing 
the changes; whereas employees receive the changes. The literature is 
concerned mainly with gaining the perspective of implementors (Earl et al. 
1995; Hammer and Champy, 1993; Prokesch, 1997; Robey et al. 1995). The 
recipients' views are rarely gathered. Therefore, many of the extant models and 
actions are developed without the input of the recipients. 
The demarcation of roles is prevalent in the change management 
literature as well. Organisational change typically involves two groups: 
implementors and recipients. Implementors consist of the organisation's 
leaders, such as the chief executive, managing director and top management, and 
people responsible for achieving the changes. The board members are initiators 
and conceptualisers of the changes (Moss Kanter et al. 1992). Recipients are at 
the "bottom of the organization" (Moss Kanter et al. 1992 p. 16) and are distant 
from the implementors. Change recipients "represent the largest group of 
people that must adopt, and adapt to, change" (Moss Kanter et al. 1992 p. 379). 
In other words, people at the middle and bottom, but not those at the top, of the 
organisation experience the changes. 
A recurring issue in existing prescriptive models and generic actions is to 
select and create a cross functional team that is responsible and accountable for 
the achievement of radical process orientation (Hammer and Champy, 1993; 
Kettinger and Teng, 1998; Kilmann, 1995). The team is given various labels: 
reengineering project team (Motwani et al. 1998), regeneration team (Kettinger 
and Teng, 1998), BPR team (Carr and Johansson, 1995), and change team 
(Morris and Brandon, 1993). The team members are drawn from the 
organisation and led by a senior member of the management team. While 
external consultants may be used, control over the team's activities rests with the 
organisation (Carr and Johansson, 1995; Dixon et al. 1994; Earl et al. 1995; 
Guha et al. 1993). The characteristics of an effective team include 
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understanding the technical aspects of radical process orientation such as process 
modelling as well as political skills (Buchanan, 1997; Grint and Willcocks, 
1995) and IT skills (Grover et al. 1993). According to many proponents, this 
team carries out the implementation steps within the prescriptive models 
discussed earlier. Team members adopt the role of implementors while others in 
the organisation are recipients of the changes. Hence, the underlying argument 
in the literature is for a distinction to be made between the roles of the 
implementors and recipients. 
2.6 An initial conceptual model for the achievement of radical 
process orientation 
The initial model takes the form of conceptual 'bins' (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994) that contain the concepts that are of central importance to a 
piece of research (Golden-Biddle and Locke, 1997; Huberman and Miles, 1994; 
Janesick, 1994; Marshall and Rossman, 1989; Yin, 1989). The conceptual bins 
for this research are an intellectual representation of the conceptual categories 
derived from the literature that will be explored further, refined by empirical 
data collected, and analysed from an interpretive perspective. 
The conceptual category, 'rationale for radical process orientation', 
suggests that the achievement of radical process orientation requires 
organisations to identify the reasons for initiation. These could be in response to 
threats facing the organisation. Alternatively, organisations may have identified 
opportunities to improve their competitive position and initiate radical process 
orientation to exploit these opportunities. The conceptual category, 'choice of 
change initiatives', suggests that when faced by drivers for change, 
organisations have to choose from a range of change initiatives, one of which is 
radical process orientation. However, the basis for selecting or rejecting radical 
process orientation is unclear. Hence, current understanding of the initiation of 
radical process orientation is unclear. The conceptual categories, 'rationale for 
radical process orientation' and 'choice of change initiatives', suggest the 
creation of the conceptual bin labelled commencement. 
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The conceptual category namely, 'nature and content of the changes 
experienced' reveals that there is lack clarity in the literature, as organisations 
face competing and contradictory advice. The conceptual category, 'gaining and 
sustaining buy-in', is considered important to the achievement of radical process 
orientation. However, the means, whether rational or political, by which buy-in 
is secured throughout the implementation of radical process orientation is 
unclear. The conceptual category, 'people affected by the changes', represent, 
the source of greatest resistance and, as resistance to change is identified as one 
of the biggest barriers to the achievement of radical process orientation, ensuring 
all sources are identified enables resistance to change to be minimised. Hence, 
the three conceptual categories, 'nature and content of changes experienced', 
'gaining and sustaining buy-in', and 'people affected by the changes', reveal a 
common theme namely, the changes that take place during the achievement of 
radical process orientation. These three categories congeal to form the 
conceptual bin labelled changes that occurred. 
The conceptual category, 'selecting the issues to be managed', shows 
that organisations face a choice between utilising a prescriptive model or picking 
from a plethora of generic actions. As both options have been shown to have 
critical deficiencies, gaining a better understanding of the selection of the factors 
that will be managed is important to the achievement of radical process 
orientation. The conceptual category, 'mode of operationalising the issues to be 
managed', is polarised on two dimensions: structured approach and nature. 
Organisations have to choose between a planned or emergent structure and a 
radical or evolutionary mode of operationalising the issues. There are 
significant risks associated with each option, not least the evolutionary mode, 
which leads to adaptive radical process orientation. The conceptual category, 
'actual implementation of the issues', suggests that while the prescriptive 
models and generic actions are well documented, little is understood about the 
reasons that underpin why people in one organisation actually implement the 
issues that change organisational elements while other organisations shy away 
from actual implementation. Hence, penetrating the reasons that underpin actual 
implementation is considered essential to the achievement of radical process 
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orientation. The three conceptual categories, 'selecting the issues to be 
managed', 'mode of operationalising the issues to be managed', and 'actual 
implementation of the issues', have a unifying theme, namely issues that are 
managed to implement the changes. Hence, they inform the conceptual bin 
labelled issues managed. 
The conceptual category 'post implementation of radical process 
orientation' suggests that implementation is achieved once significant 
performance improvements are realised. Having implemented radical process 
orientation, organisations are expected to make incremental improvements to the 
process. These improvements require the organisation to make adaptive 
changes. Where organisations initiate but only partially implement radical 
process orientation, current thinking suggests they redouble their effort and 
make further attempts to implement the residual changes. The initial model 
includes a conceptual bin that relates to the conceptual category 'post 
implementation of radical process orientation' to understand the consequences 
that follow once an organisation has implemented radical process orientation. 
This conceptual bin is labelled effects of radical process orientation. 
The four conceptual bins form an initial conceptual model for 
achievement of radical process orientation. The conceptual model is exhibited 
in Figure 2.1. Two aspects of the model are noteworthy. One, implementors 
and recipients are shown as two separate groups, at the edges of the model, to 
reflect their demarcated roles discussed in the conceptual category, implementor 
and recipient roles. The recipient perspective is lacking 'spectacles' to indicate 
that the literature neglects gathering their view of radical process orientation. At 
the very outset of this research, it too focused upon collecting views of 
implementors. However, as discussed in greater detail in subsequent Chapters 
(3 & 4), as a result of the pilot study, this research seeks to ascertain their 
perspective on the achievement of radical process orientation. This dual 
perspective on the conceptual bins provides a rounded view of the achievement 
of radical process orientation. As discussed in the next chapter, recipient views 
are included following the pilot case study. The second is that the model's 
structure reflects its interpretive roots and draws on the interpretive radical 
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process orientation literature. Previous research in this paradigm suggests that 
the boundaries between the conceptual bins are likely to be indistinct. This 
stands in stark comparison with models developed in the functionalist paradigm, 
which show concepts to be discrete from each other, with clearly delineated 
boundaries and with arrows between the concepts to establish relationships and 
indicate that one concepts leads to another. Hence the initial model's conceptual 
bins are depicted with indistinct boundaries. 
ipients' perspective 
Commencement 
+ Rationale for 
radical process 
orientation 
+ Choice of 
change 
initiatives 
Changes that occurred 
+ Nature and content of the 
changes experienced 
+ Gaining and sustaining buy-in 
+ People affected by the changes 
-~ 
+ Selecting the issues to be manage 
+ Mode of operationalising the issues 
to be managed 
+ Actual implementation of the 
Issues 
Implementors 
radical 
process 
orientation 
+ Post 
implementatio 
of radical 
process 
orientation 
Figure 2.1: An initial conceptual model for the achievement of radical 
process orientation based upon the literature 
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2. 7 Framing this study's research objective and question 
The research objective and research question draws upon the analysis 
carried out in the previous sections, specifically this research's location in the 
interpretive paradigm, and the conceptual categories, and the initial conceptual 
model for the achievement of radical process orientation. This research's 
paradigmatic location and initial model frame its research objective, which is to 
develop an emergent model that explains the dynamics that underpin the 
achievement of radical process orientation. This research argues that these 
dynamics can be penetrated and analysed by studying the achievement of radical 
process orientation from an interpretive perspective. 
This research's objective and argument leads to the following research 
question: 
What do implementors and recipients of radical process orientation consider to 
be important to its achievement, i.e. initiation, implementation and consequences 
of implementation? 
The research question implies that the following aspects of an 
organisation's process orientation initiative would be of particular interest: 
+ The business pressures faced by the organisation 
+ The views of implementors and recipients who directly experienced 
radical process orientation 
+ An exploration of the changes that occurred and the issues managed to 
achieve radical process orientation 
+ An understanding of the consequences of implementation 
+ An interpretation of the dynamics that enable organisations to remain 
radical during the implementation phase. 
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2.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter set out to achieve five aims. One, to examine the theoretical 
foundations of the current radical process orientation literature. Two, to locate 
this work in a research paradigm so that its theoretical and intellectual 
foundations are consistent with the study of radical process orientation. The 
literature was analysed using the functionalist and interpretive paradigms, as 
defined by Burrell and Morgan (1979). This highlighted that a large part of the 
literature is functionalist in nature. This work was criticised as the underlying 
assumptions of the functionalist paradigm and the remoteness from the 
phenomenon enforced by positivist methods, prevent researchers from 
understanding the subtle and complex social interactions that are critical to 
achievement of radical process orientation. Hence, the functionalist paradigm is 
largely rejected by this research. The literature in the interpretive paradigm 
focuses upon radical initiation, frameworks for reaching consensus, and radical 
initiation and adaptive implementation. Research into the achievement of 
radical process orientation in this paradigm is scarce. The assumptions that 
underpin the interpretive paradigm allow researchers to gather pragmatic 
insights into the achievement of radical process orientation. Research 
undertaken in the interpretive paradigm is shown to lead to an understanding of 
the dynamics of the achievement of radical process orientation. Hence, this 
research is located in the interpretive paradigm. 
Three, to analyse the literature in order to identify issues that are 
considered important to the achievement of radical process orientation, and from 
this analysis, to develop ten conceptual categories. Four, to develop an initial 
conceptual model for the achievement of radical process orientation. This model 
is based upon the conceptual categories identified in the literature. The 
conceptual categories and the related conceptual bin are summarised in Table 
2.2 below. Five, to establish the research objective and research question. 
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Conceptual category Conceptual bin Key references 
Rationale for radical process (Ascari et al. 1995; Buchanan, 1997; 
orientation Dixon et al. 1994; Hamel and Prahalad, 
Commencement 1994; Teng et al. 1994a) Choice of change initiatives (Ascari et al. 1995; Duck, 1993; Hammer 
and Champy, 1993; Keidel, 1994; 
Kettinger and Teng, 1998; O'Neill, 1994) 
Content and nature of changes (Davenport and Nohria, 1994; Dixon et 
experienced al. 1994; Gersick, 1991; Hallet al. 1994; 
Miller and Friesen, 1980; Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1985; Tushman et al. 1986; 
Tushman and O'Reilly III, 1996) 
Gaining and sustaining buy-in 
Changes that (Anon., 1994; Bashein et al. 1994; Carr 
and Johansson, 1995; Dixon et al. 1994; 
occurred Grint and Willcocks, 1995) 
People affected by the changes (Currie and Willcocks, 1996; Grover et 
al. 1995; Jaffe and Scott, 1998; Kilmann, 
1995; Morris and Brandon, 1993; Moss 
Kanter et al. 1992; Smith and Willcocks, 
1995; Stoddard et al. 1996). 
Selecting the issues to be (Kettinger and Teng, 1998; Motwani et 
managed al. 1998; Ascari et al. 1995; Cardarelli et 
al. 1998; Davenport and Short, 1990; 
Guha et al. 1993; Kilmann, 1995; 
Mumford, 1995; Terlaga, 1994) 
Mode of operationalising Issues managed (Braganza and Myers, 1997; Buchanan, issues to be managed 1997; Kettinger et al. 1997; Stoddard et 
al. 1996) 
Actual implementation of the (Bashein et al. 1994; Grey and Mitev, 
Issues 1995; Grint and Willcocks, 1995; Grover 
et al. 1998; Jones, 1995; Kettinger and 
Teng, 1998) 
Post implementation of radical (Cardarelli et al. 1998; Jarvenpaa and 
process orientation Effects of radical Stoddard, 1998; Kettinger and Teng, 
process orientation 1998; Morris and Brandon, 1993; 
Motwani et al. 1998; Robey et al. 1995) 
Implementor and recipient (Moss Kanter et al. 1992; Carr and 
roles Johansson, 1995; Earl et al. 1995; 
Hammer and Champy, 1993; Kettinger 
and Teng, 1998; Kilmann, 1995) 
Table 2.2: A summary of the conceptual categories and the conceptual bins 
derived from the categories 
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The next chapter takes as its starting point the location of this research in 
the interpretive paradigm, and delves into a greater level of detail relating to this 
research's intellectual and theoretical foundations. It establishes the design and 
conduct of the methodology utilised to fulfil the research objective and address 
the research question. 
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Chapter 3 Research methodology: design and 
implementation 
3.1 Chapter introduction 
Based on an analysis of the current literature, this research into the 
achievement of radical process orientation is located in the interpretive 
paradigm. Attention now turns to the research methodology to be used in this 
study. The chapter examines this research's design in terms of its intellectual 
foundations within the interpretive paradigm, and the case study design that 
aligns with these foundations. The operationalisation of the case study design is 
also examined. The findings from the pilot study, insofar as these affect the 
methodological and theoretical aspects of this research, are discussed. 
Four sections follow this introduction. The next section explores the 
design of this research, its choice of intellectual underpinnings and the rationale 
for eliminating other approaches. The conceptual design of the case study 
approach for this research is also examined. This section also examines the 
rationale for conducting a pilot study. The third section examines the 
operationalisation of the case study design to demonstrate that the conceptual 
design was adhered to. Next the pilot study findings are discussed in terms of its 
implications upon methodological and theoretical considerations. The chapter 
closes with a summary and a glimpse into chapter 4. 
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3.2 Research design 
3.2.1 Theoretical considerations 
3.2.1 (i) This research's intellectual underpinnings 
This study is interpretive in nature. Within the interpretive paradigm 
there are several schools of thought, one of which is phenomenology (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). Phenomenology is concerned with understanding the social 
world that is lived by people (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991). Phenomenology 
uses people's actions as a starting point for research, and consequently, the 
description of the actions is crucial (Blaikie, 1995; Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
It also treats reality as a social construction created by people, and hence aims to 
tease out meanings people ascribe to their actions. As this research is concerned 
with interpreting people's actions to build theory, phenomenology provides a 
theoretical underpinning for this work. Theorists in the phenomenological 
tradition, including Schutz (1967), Pettigrew (1985) and Silverman (1985), have 
developed approaches to study people in their social setting. This research is 
guided by Schutz's (1967) approach. 
Schutz's work is based largely upon that of Weber (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979). Schutz agreed with Weber's position that the social sciences are 
interpretive in nature, that is, the essence is to understand the subjective 
meanings of people. However, Schutz departed from Weber's work in one 
important respect (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Weber treated the meanings 
people attributed to experiences as equivalent to the meanings social scientists 
attributed to the same experiences. According to Schutz, Weber assumed two 
things: first, that the social scientist's interpretation of the experience was an 
adequate basis upon which to attribute meaning. Second, that there would be no 
differences between the individual's and the social scientist's interpretations. 
Schutz rejected these assumptions, and set out to develop an approach that 
ensured primacy of the individual's meaning of the experiences encountered in a 
social setting (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Schutz's central thesis is that 
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meamng anses when people attempt to make sense of expenences they 
encounter and come to terms with them (Layder, 1994). 
Schutz (1967) distinguishes between three types of meaning: the 
meaning the person works with while experiences are taking place; the meaning 
the person attributes to experiences after they are completed; and the meaning 
attributed to experiences by a researcher (Blaikie, 1995 italics in original p. 42). 
The meaning attributed to an experience relies upon the person turning back on 
him or herself to understand what has been going on. According to Burrell and 
Morgan, Schutz argues that "only the already-experienced is meaningful, not 
that which is in the process of being experienced" (Burrell and Morgan, 1979 p. 
244). Schutz posits that to raise an experience to the level of being meaningful 
requires the individual to tum back on that past experience, and bring to bear 
upon it reflection, recognition and identification (Schutz, 1967). Schutz 
suggests that only the person who has lived through an experience can reflect 
upon it and give meaning to the experience. In other words, people attach 
meaning to experiences retrospectively (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Researchers, Schutz argues, do not have first hand knowledge of the experience. 
Hence, it is inappropriate for the researcher to attribute meaning to the 
experience. According to Schutz, the meanings ascribed to an experience by 
people other than the person who lived through it, should be relegated to second 
place (Blaikie, 1995). Schutz (1967) reinforces the point by stating: 
"If I (the actor) call one of these experiences meaningful it is only 
because, in taking heed of it, I have 'selected it out' of and distinguished 
it from the abundance of experiences coexisting with it, preceding it and 
following it" (Schutz, 1967 p. 41 ). 
Schutz makes it clear that researchers are unlikely to gain insights into 
experiences that people consider meaningful without asking them directly 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979)8. He refers to the reflections of people directly 
involved with a phenomenon as first order constructs. In other words, first order 
constructs are the experiences people consider meaningful in relation to the 
8 For instance, where the researcher acts as an observer or takes a positivist stance. 
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phenomenon being studied. These first order constructs take the form of 
interview data (Blaikie, 1995). Researchers interpret the first order constructs to 
form second order constructs, that is constructs of the constructs of the people 
on the social scene (Schutz 1967). Second order constructs form the basis for 
developing theoretical propositions (Blaikie, 1995; Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Schutz's work guides this research in two ways. First, it provides a 
theoretical foundation that supports the interpretation of interview data provided 
by people directly involved with the achievement of radical process orientation. 
Second, his work also acts as a methodical bridge between the data people 
provide and the meaning this researcher attributes to those data. This bridge 
enables this research to generate theoretical propositions about the achievement 
of radical process orientation (Blaikie, 1995). 
3.2.1 (ii) Eliminating competing interpretive approaches 
Other theorists have developed alternative approaches in the interpretive 
paradigm (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Pettigrew's (1985) approach consists of 
understanding three issues when analysing organisational change: context, 
content, and process of the change. This contextualist analytical framework is 
grounded in the perspective that organisations are basically political systems. 
According to Greenwood and Hinings (1996), Pettigrew's approach is better 
suited to the study of organisational change which culminates in adaptive change 
over an extended period of time (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Adaptive 
process orientation falls outside this research's boundary, and therefore basing 
this research upon only Pettigrew's framework is inappropriate. Nonetheless, 
the methodological design of this research ensures the contextual, content and 
implementation of change is considered. 
Another approach within the interpretive paradigm is ethnomethodology. 
This approach focuses upon the detailed study of the world of everyday life. 
Ethnomethodologists are concerned with the way in which people order and 
make sense of their everyday activities within the social contexts in which they 
find themselves. Typically researchers get 'inside' a situation by 'going native' 
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(Silverman, 1985; Silverman, 1993). To study radical process orientation, 
ethnomethodologists endeavour to observe its achievement in a local setting as it 
unfolds over time. Ethnomethodologists may consciously disrupt or question 
people's underlying taken-for-granted assumptions in order to reveal how people 
go about seeing, describing and explaining their social world. Such a study 
would provide rich insights into the achievement of radical process orientation. 
However, this approach also poses a large degree of risk to a study concerned 
with examining the achievement of radical process orientation. The risks are, 
for example, the initiative could cease halfway through the research study or the 
initiative could veer towards an adaptive process orientation (Currie and 
Willcocks, 1996). These risks are outside a researcher's sphere of control and 
cannot be mitigated once the organisation's management team decides to take 
either choice. The reasons for either risk materialising are manifold: key people 
being replaced or moving jobs, or funding being withdrawn. The effect of a 
radical process orientation initiative being stopped half way through 
implementation, upon research whose central focus is the initiation and 
implementation of radical process orientation, is to cease any further research in 
that organisation. The time spent in the organisation would be wasted and the 
data collected would have to be discarded. Hence, for pragmatic reasons, an 
ethnomethodology approach is not pursued. 
Action research is another method available to researchers in the 
interpretive paradigm (Susman and Evered, 1978). Action research is a 
cognitive process rooted in the social interaction between researchers and actors 
in their surroundings (Baskerville and Wood-Harper, 1998). Researchers 
undertaking action research act as participant observer, i.e. the researcher is an 
integral part of the social event, often intervening to simulate change (Avison 
and Wood-Harper, 1990). These interventions, in an action research context, are 
characterised as a stimulus and response in relation to social events. Action 
research focuses on social events, especially the changed state framed by the 
stimuli-reaction surrounding the event. Based on an extensive review of the 
action research and social sciences literature, Baskerville and Wood-Harper 
identify seven characteristics that must be present to underpin the validity of 
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action research. These are ( 1) The research should be set in a multivariate social 
situation; (2) The observations recorded and analysed in an interpretive frame; 
(3) There was researcher action that intervened in the research setting; (4) The 
method of data collection included participatory observation; (5) Changes to the 
social setting were studied; (6) The immediate problem in the research setting 
must have been resolved during the research; (7) The research should 
illuminate a theoretical framework that explains how the actions led to a 
favourable outcome (Baskerville and Wood-Harper, 1998). 
For the purposes of this study, this set of criteria suggests a number of 
implications. One is that researchers should examine radical process orientation 
initiatives as they unfold. This would leave researchers open to the risk of 
analysing a situation, which begins as radical process orientation and yet results 
in the achievement of adaptive process orientation. This outcome may be due to 
circumstances beyond the control of the researcher. This would frustrate a 
research project that sets out to study radical process orientation. Moreover, 
researchers adopting an action research method are expected to intervene in the 
achievement of radical process orientation as it proceeds and ensure a favourable 
outcome. This requirement places onerous conditions on researchers, especially 
in terms of time taken to achieve radical process orientation and the consequent 
delays in order to assess the outcome. Hence, an action research approach was 
considered inappropriate for the purpose of this study's research objective. 
Grounded theory emerged in the late 1960's as a push back to the 
ascendancy of positivist approaches. The architects of grounded theory, Glaser 
and Strauss, were concerned that researchers placed too much emphasis on 
measuring and testing theories, while insufficient attention was being given to 
the generation of the theories being tested (Glaser and Strauss, 1968). Their 
original work contributed to the generation of theories, grounded in data, 
through an inductive process of analysis. They argued that this approach 
produced theories whose concepts and categories were relevant, appropriate and 
able to explain and predict the phenomenon being studied. A critical part of 
grounded theory is constant comparative analysis, which is a technique for 
developing conceptual categories and their properties from the data. While it is 
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possible to use conceptual categories that exist in the literature, grounded theory 
is best applied to the generation of new categories (Blaikie, 1995; Glaser and 
Strauss, 1968). The constant comparative analysis technique leads to the 
development of two types of theories. Substantive theories evolve from the 
study of an empirical phenomenon in one particular context and is related to 
specific social processes (Blaikie, 1995; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Formal 
theories emerge from the study of a conceptual phenomenon in different 
situations. Formal theories are more generalisable than substantive theories 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
The grounded theory method makes little reference to the intellectual 
underpinnings of the interpretive paradigm (Blaikie, 1995). Recent 
developments in the grounded theory method place increased emphasis on 
applying scientific criteria such as repeatability to validate qualitative research 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990) suggests that grounded theory is better classified as 
post-positivist rather than interpretive in nature (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; 
Hughes and Wood-Harper, 1999). While a post-positivist perspective 
recognises multiple realities and researcher interpretations (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994 ), grounded theory concepts are not explicitly derived from lay 
language. Instead concepts are developed from labels constructed to create 
categories to organise the data (Blaikie, 1995). The grounded theory method is 
considered inappropriate to this research, which uses lay descriptions to develop 
conceptual categories developed from the literature. 
Hermeneutics is concerned with understanding the hidden meamngs 
contained in texts, especially the interpretation of historical social life. A central 
tenet of hermeneutics is that understanding is circular (Palmer, 1969). The 
circularity of understanding is the movement from the 'whole' phenomenon to 
its constituent 'parts' and back to the whole. Palmer explains the circularity as 
follows: 
"We understand the meaning of an individual word by seeing it in 
reference to the whole of the sentence; and reciprocally, the sentence's 
meaning as a whole is dependent on the meaning of individual words. 
By extension, an individual concept derives its meaning from a context 
or horizon within which it stands; yet the horizon is made up of the very 
elements to which it gives meaning ... (through) interaction between the 
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whole and the part, each gives the other meaning; understanding is 
circular" (Palmer, 1969 p. 87). 
Theorists also argue that the hermeneutic method can be applied to 
understanding and describing social phenomenon (Blaikie, 1995). Such studies 
involve the exploration of social situations based upon hermeneutic methods and 
assumptions (Butler, 1998). Researchers taking a hermeneutic approach 
endeavour to read and understand social actions as texts. This involves 
analysing and interpreting the internal processes of the social actor's mind to 
discover what the person knew while they undertook the action (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). This has led to a paucity of studies being undertaken in the 
hermeneutic tradition. While some theorists attempted to develop objective 
hermeneutic methods notably Dilthey, others such as Heidegger and Gadamer 
consider hermeneutics as a philosophical exploration of all understanding and 
regard objectivity as impossible (Blaikie, 1995). 
The hermeneutic tradition is inappropriate to this research for two 
reasons. The first relates to the misalignment between this research's objectives 
and the hermeneutic method, which is to analyse and interpret people's thoughts 
(Butler, 1998) and mental processes (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The second 
reason is pragmatic in nature. The research methods to gather and analyse data 
in the hermeneutic tradition are insufficiently developed. 
3.2.2 Conceptual design of this research's case study approach 
3.2.2 (i) Rationale and design considerations 
The case study approach supports research that is located in the 
interpretive paradigm, and that is exploratory and theory building in nature. 
Five aspects are critical to designing case studies that lead to robust theories 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Janesick, 1994). These are, namely, theoretical criteria for 
identifying the unit of analysis, choosing a basis for constructing a sample, 
choosing data collection techniques, identifying people to be interviewed, and 
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establishing a trail of evidence from data collected to the theory that is 
developed. The design considerations of these five aspects are examined next. 
3.2.2 (ii) Theoretical criteria for identifying the unit of analysis 
A central concern of the case study approach is the identification of the 
unit of analysis or 'case' to be studied (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1989). 
The case may be an individual, a group of individuals, or a phenomenon (Stake, 
1995; Yin, 1989). The case places a boundary around the specific concepts to 
be studied. It is incumbent upon researchers to specify the case in their 
particular study. Leading theorists suggest that where the focal point of the 
research is a phenomenon, it can be specified by theoretical criteria (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Erickson, 1986; Stake, 1994). Stake (1994) explains that whereas doctors 
and social workers receive their cases, researchers studying a phenomenon are 
regularly required to choose their case. Understanding the central phenomenon 
therefore depends upon choosing the case well and this choice is made on the 
basis of criteria that represent the phenomenon. Stake (1994) illustrates his 
point by using an imaginary study into hostage taking. Criteria used to frame 
the choice of cases to be studied, i.e. hostages to be interviewed might include 
hostages that are strangers to the kidnappers, hostage taking that is accompanied 
by a criminal act, and where the purpose of the hostage taking was refuge. 
These criteria define the cases, i.e. individuals to be selected for study. The 
criteria also rule out certain individuals, e.g. where a father takes his own child 
as a hostage. 
Three theoretical criteria circumscribe the case to be included in this 
research for the achievement of radical process orientation. 
Theoretical criteria 1 - Business process orientation: the organisation 
must have designed and implemented a business process which is 
conceptualised to be activities that are integrated, across different functions, to 
create outputs that are valued by one or more external stakeholder (Crowston, 
1997; Edwards, 1994; Grover et al. 1995; Hammer and Champy, 1993). Hence, 
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this study is concerned with organisations that have completed a business 
process orientation initiative. 
Theoretical criteria 2 - Radical organisational change: Tushman and 
Romanelli (1985) and Tushman et al. (1986) are among some of the leading 
interpretive theorists in the area of radical organisational change. Tushman et al. 
(1986) identify changes to five organisational elements that constitute a radical 
organisational change. The five organisational elements are: 
+ Changes to one or more of the core values that the organisation 
considers important 
+ Power and status are redistributed 
+ Structure, systems, and procedures are changed 
+ Interactions between people are changed, as people take on new roles 
and responsibilities 
+ New executives are usually brought into the organisation 
It should be noted that Tushman et al. (1986) are silent about whether or 
not all five elements have to change or if a change to a subset of the elements 
would be considered a radical change. 
Theoretical criteria 3 - Business process is operational for a period of 
time: This theoretical criterion is included to establish that organisations 
completed business process orientation and that the redesigned process must be 
the accepted way of working (Earl et al. 1995). This criterion ensures that 
implementors and recipients have some time to assimilate their experiences 
during the initiation and implementation of radical process orientation, so that 
they can reflect upon and make sense of their experiences (Schutz, 1967). 
3.2.2 (iii) Choosing a basis for constructing a sample 
Many qualitative research studies focus upon only one case, often a 
single individual or event. Research design theorists suggest that a single case 
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study leads to vivid theories when the chosen case is unique or revelatory (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1989). These theorists argue that where the chosen 
case is not unique or revelatory, more defensible theories can be built by 
studying more than one case. Interpretive researchers need to consider the basis 
upon which they determine the number of cases to be included in the research. 
Eisenhardt (1989) argues that theories developed from case studies rely on a 
theoretical sampling strategy, and not statistical sampling logic. One strategy for 
creating a theoretical sample is to select cases that reflect maximum variations or 
extreme situations, for example, instances of success and failure. The maximum 
variation in relation to this research is the examination of non-achievement of 
radical process orientation (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Researchers have 
published studies of organisations that have not achieved radical process 
orientation (Currie and Willcocks, 1996; Davenport and Stoddard, 1994; 
Stoddard et al. 1996). These studies were possible by default rather than by 
design. To explain, these researchers were conducting longitudinal studies into 
the achievement of radical process orientation. However, managers in the 
organisation did not carry through the planned radical process orientation, thus, 
by default, these researchers were able to report instances of non-achievement. 
The strategy for the construction of a theoretical sample, that is relevant 
to this research, is to choose purposefully a small number of cases in settings 
that fulfil the pre-defined theoretical criteria that circumscribe the case 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Kuzel, 1992; Miles and Huberman, 1994). The selection 
need not be a random sample from a population (Eisenhardt, 1989). Researchers 
begin by studying one case and further cases are studied to gather data to 
develop theory about the subject being investigated (Yin, 1989). 
The focus of interpretive research is not to gather data from a mythical 
sample of case studies (Blaikie, 1995), and consequently, sample size, i.e. the 
number of cases, becomes significantly less relevant for interpretive research 
than for research rooted in the functionalist tradition (Yin, 1989). What is 
germane to interpretive research is that data collected and its analysis is 
consistent with the study's overall intellectual roots and the case being 
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researched. This consistency, Ward Schofield (1993) argues, is of primary 
importance to interpretive researchers conducting qualitative cases: 
"The goal is not to produce a standardized set of results that any other 
careful researcher in the same situation or studying the same issues 
would have produced. Rather it is to produce a coherent and 
illuminating description of and perspective on a situation that is based on 
and consistent with detailed study of that situation." (p. 202, italics in 
original). 
3.2.2 (iv) Choosing data collection techniques 
The case study approach has associated with it different types of data 
collection techniques. These include interviews, ethnography, and participant 
observation (Yin, 1989). This research uses in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
as the primary technique for data collection (Berg, 1989; Erickson, 1986). The 
interviews were taped and transcribed. In addition to the interview data, internal 
and external documents, such as plans, charts, internal newsletters and industry 
and contemporary newspaper reports form an integral part of the data set for this 
research. 
The other techniques, ethnography and participant observation, involve 
researchers 'going native', often immersing themselves in the phenomenon 
being studied, and influencing developments either directly or indirectly by their 
very presence (Silverman, 1985). The interpretive perspective, suggested by 
Schutz, requires people directly involved with radical process orientation to 
provide their perspective and to reflect upon its achievement. Hence, techniques 
that are based intrinsically upon the researcher watching and observing radical 
process orientation unfold are inappropriate to this research. 
The in-depth, semi-structured interview technique enables researchers to 
begin with a few lines of inquiry. Both the researcher and people being 
interviewed are allowed considerable freedom to alter the course of the 
discussion (Janesick, 1994). The use of in-depth, semi structured interviews 
enables researchers to enter quickly into a dialogue with individuals. A typical 
interview is conducted with the researcher introducing a topic, asking open 
ended questions about it, and then following up with probes (Berg, 1989) that 
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encourages people to reflect on the issues they have raised. Probes are also used 
to elaborate upon or elicit further information on aspects of the radical process 
orientation other people have raised or that have been observed by the 
researcher. 
This case study design involves collecting data retrospectively from 
people. Hence, data quality depends upon the honesty of those people (Marshall 
and Rossman, 1989). Problems associated with collecting data relating to past 
events include: (a) people deliberately falsifying their account of events 
(Marshall and Rossman, 1989), (b) people hiding things from the interviewer so 
to avoid embarrassment, e.g. errors or things they are ashamed of (Tuchman, 
1994), (c) people forgetting things that happened, or (d) justifying actions 
retrospectively (Tuchman, 1994). 
These problems can rarely be overcome completely. However, these 
problems can be minimised (Fontana and Frey, 1994) by adopting certain 
tactics. First, by triangulating data collected from a variety of sources, such as 
internal reports and other documents to verify interview data (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994; Fontana and Frey, 1994). There are three types of triangulation 
(Denzin, 1970). Theoretical triangulation uses different means for analysing the 
same data. Data triangulation gathers observations and data from several 
sources. Methodological triangulation uses different methods to collect data 
about the same phenomenon. Denzin (1970) argues that each type of 
triangulation can be used independently. This research utilises data 
triangulation. This type of triangulation, in the context of interpretive research, 
requires researchers to gather data from several sources. This is exemplified by 
gathering data from many respondents (Stake, 1995), internal documents such as 
presentations, and external reports, e.g. industry reports (Fontana and Frey, 
1994). Second, by gaining corroborative data from several reliable primary 
sources of data, i.e. others directly involved in the phenomenon being studied 
(Tuchman, 1994). 
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3.2.2 (v) Identifying people to be interviewed 
The basis of selecting people to be interviewed should align with a 
study's theoretical underpinnings (Yin, 1989), consequently, the primary source 
of interview data is people in roles that were actively involved with and had 
direct experience of the phenomenon being explored (Blaikie, 1995; Schutz, 
1967). Much of the current process orientation research focuses upon gaining 
the perspective of internal stakeholders, i.e. people in the organisation. 
Typically these stakeholders are in implementor roles such as senior executives, 
strategic planning managers, information systems planners, and process 
orientation team members (Caron et al. 1994; Earl et al. 1995; Stoddard et al. 
1996). A negligible number of extant studies seek the views of internal 
stakeholders who are recipients of radical process orientation (Currie and 
Willcocks, 1996). The views of external stakeholders, e.g. customers and 
suppliers, are also rarely gathered in the literature. 
This research is concerned with understanding the achievement of radical 
process orientation from the perspective of people who were actively involved 
and with direct experience of its initiation and implementation. The people that 
match this profile most closely are likely to be internal stakeholders. Taking its 
lead from the process orientation literature, this research began by collecting 
data from implementors only. However, as discussed later in this chapter, 
recipients were included as a result of the pilot study. Hence, this research 
gathers the views of people in implementor and recipient roles. Consequently, 
from the case study design perspective, the basis of selecting implementors and 
recipients is that their roles had direct involvement in the initiation and 
implementation of radical process orientation. For the purposes of this research, 
the implementor roles include four groups namely, directors responsible for 
process orientation, people responsible for IT, process orientation team leader, 
and process orientation team member. The recipient roles include two groups 
namely, line managers and staff. The number of potential recipients that can be 
interviewed at managerial and staff levels is much greater that at senior 
management levels, e.g. there is only one managing director in an organisation 
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and over a hundred line managers. Hence, this research follows the advice 
provided by (Taylor and Bodgan, 1984), which is to select at least one person 
from each group, and expand outwards as necessary. Stakeholders that were 
passively involved and who did not have direct experience of the changes are 
excluded from this study. Two groups are prominent in this category. One, 
internal stakeholders, i.e. employees in the organisation that were unaffected by 
the radical process orientation initiative. Two, external stakeholders because 
although they were beneficiaries of the changes they were also peripheral to the 
changes associated with radical process orientation. 
3.2.2 (vi) Establishing a trail of evidence from data collected to 
theoretical propositions 
Interpretive research is criticised because of the chasm that separates data 
from theoretical propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989). Hence, establishing a credible 
trail of evidence, between data collected and theoretical propositions, is a critical 
aspect of case study design. Yet, the fabric for building theoretical propositions 
from lay descriptions of social life is a largely neglected area (Blaikie, 1995), 
and for which there is no standard format of data analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
One framework, for designing a trail of evidence for multiple case 
studies, suggests researchers analyse the data for each case and prepare a report 
that contains the interpreted results for that case. Researchers then synthesise 
these results across the cases, and from this synthesis derive theoretical 
propositions (Yin, 1989). However, researchers still have to choose the 
technique by which the data for each case is to be analysed. The technique for 
data analysis should dovetail with the research's theoretical underpinnings 
(Blaikie, 1995). Hence, this research uses Schutz's notion of first order and 
second order constructs to analyse the data from each case (Blaikie, 1995; 
Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Figure 3.1 is an overview of the data analysis trail 
of evidence, based upon within case analysis, first and second order constructs 
lead to cross case synthesis and theoretical propositions. First order constructs 
are experiences people directly involved with the phenomenon under 
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investigation consider meaningful. First order constructs, in the context of this 
research, are what people directly involved with radical process orientation 
consider important to its achievement. Second order constructs represent the 
researcher's interpretation of the first order constructs. 
Second order constructs serve two roles: one, to analyse the cases being 
studied (Blaikie, 1995), and the other is to build theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Building theory from second order constructs requires researchers to compare 
these to the concepts that are central to the research (Yin, 1989). This 
comparison may lead to changes in the initial concepts, which can be replicated 
in later cases (Stake, 1994; Yin, 1989). For the purposes of this research, the 
initial model's conceptual bins are used as an analytical framework for 
developing second order constructs. Cross case synthesis involves conjoining 
the second order constructs that explain and develop the concepts identified at 
the beginning of this research (Blaikie, 1995). The conjoined second order 
constructs, when compared with extant theories, lead to the identification of a 
theoretical proposition (Blaikie, 1995; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1989). The use of 
first order and second order constructs strengthens theory building research by 
making the data and its interpretation open, accessible and transparent, thus 
overcoming criticisms of the case study approach (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
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The key danger facing researchers when interpreting data is that they 
stray too far from the first order constructs and hence reduce the reliability of the 
theory developed. The way in which researchers can overcome this danger and 
ensure reliability is by making sure their interpretation is consistent with the 
people's perspective contained in the first order constructs (Schutz, 1967). 
Critics of the case study approach also claim that theories derived from 
case studies cannot be generalised on the grounds that individual cases are not 
representative and there is an insufficient sample size from which to draw 
statistically meaningful results. Researchers using other methods such as 
surveys assert that their methods lead to generalisable theories. Yin (1989) 
argues that it is possible to generalise from survey-based methods, as inferences 
can be drawn "about a population (or universe) on the basis of empirical data 
collected about a sample" (p. 38) from that population. Researchers using the 
survey method generalise their results on the basis of gathering large amounts of 
data to which they apply statistical analysis. However, statistical generalisation 
is based upon sampling logic that is wholly inconsistent with the qualitative case 
study approach. According to Walsham (1993) generalisability from case 
studies is possible but not on the basis of a representative sample drawn from a 
population. He states that: 
"From an interpretive position, the validity of an extrapolation from an 
individual case or cases depends not on the representativeness of such 
cases in a statistical sense, but on the plausibility and cogency of the 
logical reasoning used in describing the results from the cases, and in 
drawing conclusions from them." (p. 15). 
The trail of evidence set out above ensures the plausibility and cogency 
of the results derived by this case design and, hence, overcomes the criticisms in 
terms of generalisation from the case study approach. 
3.2.3 Rationale for the pilot study 
A pilot study enables researchers to check for inadequacies in the case 
study design (Yin, 1989). This is achieved by conducting the pilot study using 
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each aspect of the design. The pilot enables researchers to test whether or not 
the theoretical criteria that circumscribe the case are workable; the open ended 
questions can be assessed; and the data analysis techniques and the initial 
emergence of theory from the data can be probed. Where inadequacies in the 
design are identified, these can be rectified prior to further cases being 
undertaken. 
3.3 Operationalising the case study design 
3.3.1 Identifying the unit of analysis 
The cases in this research are purely qualitative in nature. They were 
identified from three business process orientation symposia held at Cranfield 
School of Management between 1992-1995. Managers from about forty 
organisations presented their organisation's achievements in business process 
orientation. This researcher listened to their presentations and drew up a short-
list of seven organisations that claimed to have implemented radical process 
orientation. All seven organisations were approached to find out whether they 
had achieved what had been claimed and if they would be willing to participate 
in this research. Three out of seven organisations were either unwilling to 
participate or wanted to restrict the people that could be interviewed. One out of 
seven had overstated their achievement in the presentation. Three of the seven 
were willing to participate and provide unrestricted access to people. 
The three are Financial Data Limited (pilot study), Carton Carrier 
Limited and Foundry Insurance Limited. Carton Carrier is a subsidiary of a 
large retailer that sells directly to consumers. Carton Carrier's primary business 
is the transportation of parcels to consumers' homes. Foundry Insurance is a 
subsidiary of one of the UK's largest composite insurance companies. Foundry 
Insurance's primary business is the inspection and insurance of large 
engineering and industrial plant and equipment. Financial Data designs, sells, 
and installs dealing systems for stocks and shares. They are a subsidiary of a 
global news agency. Prior to commencing the case studies, separate meetings 
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were held with Foundry Insurance's managmg director, Carton Carrier's 
commercial director, and Financial Data's deputy managing director to establish 
that the theoretical criteria that circumscribe a case for the purposes of this 
research were satisfied. 
Theoretical criteria 1: Business process orientation 
Carton Carriers achieved, i.e. completed the initiation, implementation 
and post implementation phases in relation to the parcel delivery process. This 
process satisfies customers who expect their orders to be delivered to their 
homes in a consistent period of time. The parcel delivery process integrates 
thirteen activities across three functions. Foundry Insurance achieved, i.e. 
completed all three phases, in relation to the inspection process. This process 
ensures customers have up to date reports that show their plant and equipment 
complies with relevant statutory requirements. The inspection process integrates 
nine activities across four functions. Financial Data achieved the order 
fulfilment process. This process meets the needs of customers who require a 
new dealing system or an additional service to an existing dealing system. This 
process consists of fourteen activities in three functions. Table 3.1 summarises 
the salient features that show the three organisations comply with the theoretical 
criteria namely, business process orientation. 
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Organisation Carton Carrier Foundry Insurance Financial Data (pilot study) 
Theoretical criteria 
Stakeholder focus Customer Customer Customer 
Activities integrated Receive parcels from the Schedule inspection Follow up sales lead 
warehouse Visit site Obtain customer order 
Sort parcels Inspect plant Check order construction and enter on NIS 
Collate parcel manifest from sort Write report Administrative checks 
centres to depots Send report to HO to update Validate order content (technical 
Trunk parcels to the depot records perspective) 
Unload parcels at the depot Update customer records Site survey 
Load them on the van Send report to customer Specify material requirements 
Check the van maintenance Change policy Consult service providers 
Book out drivers Set and monitor technical Complete order planning 
Deliver parcels standards Confirm order with customer I 
Record delivery details Commissioning or decommissioning 
Manage returns product 
Transfer delivery information Prepare, confirm and send invoice to 
Track parcels customer 
Receive payment 
Performance I progress reporting 
Functions Sort centre Customer services unit Sales 
Trunking Field Engineers Business administration 
Depot operations Administration Technical 
Technical 
- ~ 
-- --~ 
--
Table 3.1: Compliance with theoretical criteria - business process orientation 
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Theoretical criteria 2: Radical organisational change 
This theoretical criterion was circumscribed in terms of five 
organisational elements (Tushman et al. 1986). The concern at the beginning of 
this research was to identify whether or not the five organisational elements had 
changed. One of the weaknesses of Tushman et al. 's (1986) work is that it does 
not provide a measurement scheme to assess by what degree each organisational 
element has to change to constitute a radical change. Hence, it was not possible 
to measure radical change. Nonetheless, in an attempt to ensure that the change 
was radical, this research included organisations that had experienced changes in 
all the elements, even though this may not be strictly necessary (Miller and 
Friesen, 1980; Miller, 1982; Tushman et al. 1986). The changes identified in 
Table 3.2 show the changes against each organisational element in terms of 
'From', i.e. prior to radical process orientation and 'To', i.e. post 
implementation of radical process orientation. 
Theoretical criteria 3: Business process operational for a period of time 
The reason for including this criterion was to ensure the cases studied 
were those where achievement of process orientation had taken place and the 
process had become the de facto way of working. This criterion was 
problematical to establish as the literature provides little guidance about what 
the time period should be. Several time periods were considered at the start of 
the work, including twelve to fifteen months from the process becoming 
operational. However, these time periods excluded all organisations as none 
were able to meet this criterion when this research started. Hence, the time 
period of six months from the process becoming operational was selected for 
pragmatic reasons. The directors for each organisation were asked in the 
preliminary discussion whether the redesigned business process was the 
accepted way in which the organisation worked for at least six months. They all 
confirmed that this was the case. For Carton Carrier it was about ten months, 
and for Foundry Insurance and Financial Data it was about nine months. 
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3.3.2 The basis for constructing a sample 
The sample s1ze for this research was derived from a theoretical 
sampling strategy. After conducting the pilot, further cases were undertaken to 
elicit first order constructs and second order constructs to develop this research's 
initial conceptual model. The cases in this research yielded over 400 first order 
constructs and 127 second order constructs. 
The maximum variation sampling strategy, i.e. instances of non-
achievement of radical process orientation, was not available to this research for 
one main reason: people were unwilling to participate. In the early phase of this 
research approaches were made to two organisations (in addition to the seven 
discussed) that had set out to but not achieved radical process orientation. 
Senior managers were asked whether they would wish to take part in this 
research. They declined. They did not wish to discuss what they considered to 
be a failed initiative. They were worried about the recriminations that would be 
stirred up. Other organisations approached during the later phases of this 
research have reacted similarly. Nonetheless, the current literature provides 
examples of non-achievement of radical process orientation and these are used 
as a source of secondary data (Currie and Willcocks, 1996; Stoddard et al. 
1996). 
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Organisation Carton Carrier Foundry Insurance Financial Data (pilot study) 
Theoretical Criteria 
Changes to one or more of From: Operated and considered itself to From: Cradle to grave employment; To: From: Line manager is more 
the core values about be independent of other group Employment rests upon profitability and important than customers; 
what it holds to be companies; To: Integrated with group individual performance To: Customers given priority 
important compames 
Power and status are From: People in support functions From: General manager most powerful, From: Each function considered 
redistributed treated secondary; To: People in the made all decisions; To: Middle itself to be most powerful; 
business; support personnel feel on par managers decide, and heads of technical To: Cross functional teams 
with business people functions given early retirement or left determine the service 
organisation 
Structure, systems, and From: Seven regions; To: Three From: Many functional I departmental From: Many functions, 
procedures are changed regwns boundaries; To: Integrated functions complex reporting lines; To: 
From: Outdated systems, pens and From: Minimal systems- 2 pc's in cross functional service teams 
paper; To: New systems and organisation; To: New systems and From: Separate functional 
procedures for sorting and delivering procedures, e.g. engineers home working systems; To: New integrated 
parcels systems and procedures 
Interactions between From: Depot managers as clerks; To: From: People located in branches; To: From: People grouped by skill I 
people are changed, as Depot managers I Regional managers Branch people relocated to head office expertise; To: People grouped 
people take on new roles made responsible for depot's financial From: Managers kept in the dark; To: by process 
and responsibilities performance Managers given responsibility for their From: Experts in different 
From: Support personnel centralised; departmental plans and budgets buildings; To: Experts I 
To: support people per region collocated I 
New executives brought in New joint managing directors from New general manager from other group New managing director from 
to the organisation other group organisations company other group company 
- - ------
Table 3.2: Satisfying theoretical criteria for radical organisational change 
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3.3.3 Data collection techniques used 
The first order constructs were collected through in-depth, semi-
structured interviews. Appendix 1 lists the dates of the interviews. An 
interview schedule was prepared which had in it the key topics for discussion. 
The interview schedule is set out in Appendix 2. The schedule was used to 
guide the interview. All interviews began with a brief background about the 
researcher, an overview of the work and the purpose of the interview. 
Interviewees were reminded that all discussions in and out of the interview 
situation would remain totally confidential. They were also assured that no one 
other than the researcher would have access to the original transcripts, and while 
quotes from their transcripts would form part of the case report, no quotes would 
be attributed to any one individual. They were asked if they had any questions 
prior to starting the interview, and these were dealt with. All interviews were 
taped and transcribed. 
The interviews were conducted with open-ended questions, which 
encouraged people to reflect on the changes that had taken place during the 
achievement of radical process orientation. Open-ended questions were 
followed-up with probe questions that required individuals to consider whether 
specific organisational elements may or may not have changed. These probes 
were used to jog people's memories. Open-ended questions were also used to 
elicit people's reflection of issues they consider important to the achievement of 
radical process orientation. They were also asked to explain why they believed 
particular issues were important, to get them to reflect on their initial comments 
and as a way of delving into the meaning they attached to particular issues they 
raised. 
In addition to the interview data, internal documents, including structure 
charts, internal newsletters, and process maps were gathered. These documents 
were used to support the interview data. A conscious effort was made to 
observe what happened in the organisation when visiting the case study site. 
Visits were made to specific sites such as the depots in Carton Carrier. There, 
for example, this researcher 'walked' a parcel through the entire sorting 
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operation at the busiest time of the day. These observations were recorded 
shortly after each meeting I visit. 
Two tactics were deployed to m1mm1se the theoretical problems 
associated with qualitative data. These tactics ensure that data is rigorous and 
credible. One, data was collected on the same topic from several primary 
sources, i.e. people who were directly involved with the achievement of radical 
process orientation. This enabled data to be cross-checked and corroborated 
across interviews. Two, data collected from a variety of sources, e.g. internal 
documents, presentation material and external reports were triangulated to verify 
interview data. 
The high level of consistency, repetition, and confirmation found in the 
interview transcripts, and cross-checking between data suggests that the data 
collected is credible and rigorous. The robustness of the data collected is 
demonstrated further as they stand up to scrutiny because the trail of evidence 
exposes the data itself. This research has achieved a reasonable balance between 
collecting good quality data while avoiding being trapped and asphyxiated by 
the data. 
3.3.4 People interviewed 
The researcher gathered information from implementors and recipients 
actively involved with and with direct experience of the achievement of radical 
process orientation. The approach adopted to identify and interview specific 
interviewees is as follows. An initial meeting was held with the most senior 
person (the gatekeeper) this researcher had contact with. In Financial Data, the 
gatekeeper was the deputy managing director, in Foundry Insurance it was the 
managing director, and in Carton Carriers it was the commercial director. 
During this meeting, the gatekeeper was asked to consider which people would 
be interviewed. In accordance with the case design, the gatekeeper was asked to 
identify one person from each group within implementor and recipient roles. 
The job titles held by the people interviewed and their corresponding role are 
summarised in Table 3.3. Each gatekeeper agreed, in principle, that further 
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people could be interviewed as the case study progressed, if they were identified 
as having useful or relevant information9. 
A short time after the initial meeting, the gatekeeper in Financial Data, 
Carton Carrier, and Foundry Insurance was telephoned to ascertain the names of 
the potential people to be interviewed. During this discussion, general inquiries 
were made about each person's background (length of service, experience) and 
their involvement and role in the changes. The researcher then spoke, as far as 
possible, to each person over the telephone to arrange an interview date. This 
conversation was held to 'break the ice' and develop a rapport with the 
interviewee, as the researcher wanted each person to take a small interest in his 
work. Some interviewees made it clear that this work was a low priority item on 
their agenda (one person stated this in no uncertain terms). During the phone 
call each person was given a quick summary of the work. The researcher 
stressed that everything they said would be treated in strictest confidence. 
Interviewees were reminded (the gatekeeper was asked to inform them first) that 
the interview would be taped to test their reactions, and most people reacted 
favourably. They were given an opportunity to ask questions. Brief notes were 
made about impressions from this conversation. For example, one person came 
across as eager and knowledgeable but potentially lacking confidence in an 
interview situation. The researcher made it a point to begin this particular 
interview by asking how the individual felt about being interviewed. It became 
apparent that she could not imagine why anyone would want to ascertain her 
views. The researcher explained that her experiences were the 'raw material' for 
his analysis. This interviewee said that by talking about the way she felt prior to 
the interview, and gaining a better understanding of why she was being 
interviewed, she felt more comfortable with the interview. 
Twenty-one people directly involved with the achievement of radical 
process orientation were interviewed across the units of analysis, of which 
fifteen were in Foundry Insurance and Carton Carriers. Two roles namely, 
managing director and IT manager, within Foundry Insurance require 
clarification. The managing director agreed to the case study being undertaken, 
9 This researcher spent approximately thirty hours in each case organisation. 
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Role 
however, between reaching this agreement and the interview date he was 
promoted to the director of the Group's European operations. This resulted in 
him cancelling the interview, as he began spending significant amounts of time 
outside the UK. However, he agreed that the transcript of the paper he delivered 
to the Cranfield conference could be used in this research. This setback was 
overcome by interviewing the deputy managing director. The IT manager role 
during the achievement of radical process orientation was filled by two people. 
One was promoted to deputy managing director and the other became the 
customer services manager. The IT manager incumbent at the time of the data 
collection was not interviewed because he had no direct involvement in the 
achievement of radical process orientation. 
Organisation Carton Carrier Foundry Insurance Financial Data 
(pilot study) 
Implementor roles 
Director Managing director Managing director Deputy managing 
responsible for Deputy managing director 
process orientation director Technical director 
Person responsible IT co-ordinator Deputy managing IS manager 
for IT director I Customer 
services manager 
Process orientation Services manager Implementation team Divisional business 
team leader leader manager 
Process orientation Team member Implementation team Technical manager 
team member Personnel manager member 
Recipient roles 
Line managers Regional general Engineering Not included 
manager manager 
Depot manager Customer services 
Assistant depot manager 
manager 
Staff Driver Department team Not included 
leader 
Table 3.3: Summary of the people, directly involved in the achievement of 
radical process orientation, that were interviewed 
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3.3.5 Fulfilling the trail of evidence: from data analysis to 
theoretical propositions 
The interview tapes were transcribed. Each transcript was read several 
times to truly immerse the researcher in the data. Once this researcher felt 
familiar with the nature of the statements in a transcript, tentative themes were 
identified in the margin of the transcript that captured the nature of the first order 
constructs. The themes in the margin used the individual's words as far as 
possible. An extract from an interview to illustrate the identification of themes 
is set out in Appendix 3. This formed the beginnings of understanding the first 
order constructs, i.e. penetrating the surface of people's perspective on what is 
important to the achievement of radical process orientation. Once this 
researcher had gone through the entire transcript for an individual, the other 
transcripts were treated in the same fashion, until all transcripts for a case were 
analysed. 
Next, the tentative themes from the margin were used to conjoin first 
order constructs from different interviews. A table was created to display the 
tentative themes and the first order constructs along with a reference to the 
source transcript. This table formed the set of first order constructs for further 
examination. These first order constructs were examined to ensure the data 
relating to a particular theme could be corroborated with data from other 
interviews. Instances of contradictory or disconfirming data were sought from 
other transcripts. For example, one person in Carton Carrier described the 
previous organisation prior to the changes as being a "family firm" and "a close 
knit community", whereas several others described it as "dictatorial", 
"autocratic", and an organisation where managers "frightened people by 
threatening to sack them." The first order constructs were also compared to 
other data from other sources to triangulate the first order constructs. There was 
a high degree of cohesion between the interviews and between the first order 
constructs and other sources of data. 
The interpretation of the conjoined first order constructs endeavoured to 
preserve the essence of people's descriptions. This ensured that the 
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interpretation 1s consistent and understandable in terms of the first order 
constructs. Hence, the resulting second order constructs capture the 
interpretation of the first order constructs. 
At each stage of the trail of evidence, researcher subjectivity can result in 
the data being misconstrued, which leads to weak theory being developed. 
While researcher subjectivity can never be fully eliminated, this research made 
every endeavour to expose such subjectivity. Specifically, data in the form of 
first order constructs is presented, along with the interpretation of the data. In 
this way researcher subjectivity, while not eliminated, is effectively managed. 
These second order constructs, from the cases studies, were compared to 
and classified within the conceptual categories, identified from current research 
as being important to the achievement of radical process orientation. Cross case 
synthesis involved conjoining second order constructs from the case studies that 
fell within the same conceptual category. The conjoined second order constructs 
are discussed and compared to the existing literature to identify gaps in existing 
research and in order to construct theoretical propositions for the achievement of 
radical process orientation. These theoretical propositions form the basis of the 
emergent model for the achievement of radical process orientation. 
3.4 Methodological and theoretical findings from the pilot 
study 
3.4.1 Lessons learnt 
The pilot study, in Financial Data, provided three lessons. First, the pilot 
study confirmed that the case study design is robust and workable. The pilot 
study indicated that the case study design would yield data that could be 
analysed to lead to theoretical propositions. The pilot highlighted that the design 
needed refinement. In keeping with the literature, the gatekeeper was asked to 
identify people who held an implementor role, and therefore, interviews were 
conducted with implementors. During the analysis of the transcripts it became 
apparent that the three of the implementors were also recipients of the changes. 
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In response to some of the probe questions, these respondents intuitively 
answered from the perspective of a recipient. These responses came to light 
while analysing the data. To redress the lack of recipient data, Financial Data 
was approached to allow recipients to be interviewed. However, the gatekeeper 
had been promoted to managing director of another subsidiary, and the new 
deputy managing director declined the request. Second, this research expected 
to find discrepancies and inconsistencies in the data provided by people. 
However, there is a high degree of consistency in the data. In a number of 
instances people even used similar terms to describe certain situations. 
Although, as expected, some people had more information on issues they were 
closer to, very few issues were raised by one person only. Where 
inconsistencies were found they were clarified with the interviewee directly. 
Third, the pilot revealed that it is critical to interview people directly involved in 
process orientation. This researcher interviewed a person from the training 
department at the gatekeeper's suggestion. As it had not been possible to speak 
to her over the phone prior to the interview, it was not apparent that she had 
been involved tangentially in the achievement of radical process orientation. 
She was extremely embarrassed during the interview, as she was unable to 
comment upon topics raised for discussion. The interview was terminated early 
by mutual agreement. This incident cost a day in lost time, and a potential loss 
of goodwill. A significant practical constraint became apparent as the pilot 
study unfolded. The Financial Data pilot study was scheduled to take four 
months, instead it took ten months to complete. This delay was due mainly to 
people cancelling meetings. On two different occasions during the pilot study, 
two interviewees, with whom meetings had been arranged six weeks earlier, 
telephoned on the morning of the interview to cancel. The meeting was 
rescheduled eight weeks after the first date. However, not all delays were due to 
the organisation, as on one occasion this researcher cancelled interviews due to 
other work commitments. 
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3.4.2 Methodological and theoretical implications of the pilot study 
Three implications arise from the pilot study. First, the case study design 
was refined to include recipients as a source of data. Other aspects of the design 
remained unchanged, as including recipients did not materially affect other 
aspects of the design. Second, recipients are included in the initial conceptual 
model developed from the literature. Third, as the views of recipients forms part 
of the refined case study design and recipient data in Financial Data was not 
collected, the second order constructs are not taken further. 
3.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter discussed the intellectual foundations, and the design and 
operationalisation of the case study approach, and the effects of the pilot study 
upon the design. The salient points are that this research is located in the 
interpretive paradigm and is exploratory in nature, it uses Schutz's work as its 
theoretical base, and it uses the case study approach. Four aspects that are 
essential to the design of cases studies are namely, theoretical criteria for 
identifying the unit of analysis and sample size, choosing data collection 
technique, identifying people to be interviewed, and establishing a trail of 
evidence from data analysis to theoretical propositions. A multiple case 
approach is taken and cases are selected based upon three theoretical criteria. 
These are namely, business process orientation, radical organisational change, 
and the business process is operational for six months. Theorists argue that the 
credibility of case-based theories are not due to statistical sampling logic, but 
upon theoretical sampling, which involves ensuring consistency between the 
cases to be studied, data collection and its analysis, and the theoretical 
propositions to be drawn from the analysis. The data collection technique to be 
used in this research is in-depth, semi-structured interviews. These were taped 
and transcribed. The problems with collecting retrospective data are identified 
and tactics used in this research to minimise these include triangulation and 
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collecting corroborative evidence from several primary sources. The people 
interviewed were in roles directly involved in the achievement of radical process 
orientation. The analysis of the data and the trail of evidence to theoretical 
propositions are examined. Transparency, between data, its analysis and 
interpretation, and theoretical propositions is achieved by using Schutz's notion 
of first and second order constructs. This data analysis technique supports the 
theoretical foundation of this work. The second order constructs are conjoined 
based upon the conceptual categories developed from the literature. Theoretical 
propositions are constructed by comparing conjoined second order constructs 
with current literature to identify gaps in knowledge about achievement of 
radical process orientation. The pilot study influenced this work at a 
methodological and theoretical level. At a methodological level, a consequence 
of the pilot was to expand the people to be interviewed to include recipients. At 
a theoretical level, the initial conceptual model was refined to include the 
recipient's perspective. 
The next chapter details the achievement of radical process orientation in 
Financial Data. This case was conducted as a pilot and the chapter contains the 
first order constructs, interpretation and second order constructs. The chapter 
uses the initial conceptual model as the framework for developing second order 
constructs. These are from the perspective of implementors only and, hence, the 
second order constructs from the pilot study are not taken further as recipient 
data was not collected. 
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Chapter 4 Interpreting the achievement of radical 
process orientation in Financial Data Limited 
4.1 Chapter introduction 
To recap briefly, the first chapter established that the achievement of 
radical process orientation is the focus of this research. The next chapter located 
this study in the interpretive paradigm and developed an initial conceptual model 
from the literature. The third chapter set out the research methodology and the 
case study design. This chapter ( 4) draws upon the previous chapters and 
presents the first of three empirical cases. This chapter reports the first order 
constructs, interpretation, and second order constructs elicited from Financial 
Data, the pilot study. This report forms a rich description of Financial Data's 
achievement of radical process orientation. 
Second order constructs are developed from an interpretation of the first 
order constructs. The initial conceptual model is used as the analytical 
framework to develop second order constructs. These are developed as follows: 
first order constructs are conjoined by bringing together data relating to a similar 
theme. This is followed by an interpretation of the first order constructs. 
Second order constructs are derived from this interpretation. Next, the second 
order constructs are classified according to the conceptual categories. 
The pilot case study conclusions are discussed after bringing together the 
second order constructs for each conceptual category. Finally, the case study 
design is assessed based upon its deployment in the pilot study. 
Basic background information on Financial Data is found in the 
following section. A single second order construct for each conceptual bin in 
the initial model is developed as follows: section 3 -commencement, section 4-
changes that occurred, section 5 - issues managed, and section 6 - effects of 
radical process orientation. The remaining second order constructs are located 
in Appendix 4, which forms an integral part of Chapter 4. Second order 
constructs are numbered sequentially to form a link in the chain of evidence: the 
number is used to trace data to the emergent model and vice versa. Following 
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the classification of the second order constructs, the pilot study conclusions are 
presented. Next, the theoretical and methodological aspects of the case study 
design are assessed. The final section summarises the chapter and sets the scene 
for the next chapter. 
4.2 Background information 
Financial Data is the UK subsidiary of Global Data pic. Financial Data's 
mmn lines of business are the provision of systems to enable its clients to 
receive financial information. Financial Data's main clients are in the financial 
services industry such as banks and insurance companies, although organisations 
in other industries also purchase its systems. The deregulation of the financial 
services industry during the late 1980's created a huge demand for Financial 
Data's products. Electronic access to on-line equity and currency prices became 
vital to dealers and investors. The advent of the personal computer also 
contributed to the demand for Financial Data's products, as these were 
considered the most reliable and versatile in the industry. Using Financial 
Data's terminals, dealers could construct their own screens of information 
downloaded from different pages of Financial Data's systems. Individual screen 
items could be arranged in a way that suited each dealer. Different graphs could 
be displayed concurrently, so that instant real-time comparisons could be made 
between the currencies covered by that dealer. The new screens also allowed 
simultaneous display of prices, graphs and news on a single screen. These 
products combined with the processing power of personal computers could lead 
to significant profits being made, provided up to date and accurate information 
was available. However, the organisation was unable to cope with the four-fold 
growth in business in a six-year period, which led to the radical process 
orientation described next. 
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4.3 Commencement 
4.3.1 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Previously ... up to eight administrators would touch any order, now it's 
only one ... previously the customer would deal with anything up to 15 
people, none of whom knew anything about him as an individual or a 
company." (Implementation Team Leader) 
"Our business is selling products, installing products and billing for 
them. Four/five years ago when we started this exercise we had large 
numbers of people in the organisation who were not particularly close to 
that element of the process and had lots and lots of people who were well 
away from it ... the technical function was solely involved in technical 
tasks. They lived in a building over by City Road and were servicing 
orders generated by a sales department who lived in this building ( 5 
miles away) and were served by an administration function who lived in 
another floor of the same building as the technical people lived in. Our 
average lead-time for basic core products, from the customer signing an 
order from a salesman to an engineer installing a product was somewhere 
in the region of 7 weeks. A significant amount of that lead-time was 
built up out of people communicating with each other. Paper, memo, use 
of our management information systems at the time, etc., jobs would 
wait in trays for a couple of weeks for someone to come back from 
holiday, or to get round to getting that extra piece of information they 
needed to complete the task. So there were a lot a delays in the overall 
process. A lot of frustration for both us and customers. 
People were not concerned about money, cost. It was 'I have an order, I 
need to do it'. Chuck the systems in there, chuck the products in front of 
the customers as quickly as possible without really controlling basic 
business parameters like knowing what the sales rate is or knowing what 
your debt position is or even invoicing anyone for anything in any 
accurate way. Your typical engineer in the old installation department 
was a guy who took an order from his in tray/management information 
system and he processed it. No particular sense of urgency. There might 
have been a figure at the bottom of the screen, which indicated how 
much money the company was going to get on an ongoing basis if we 
installed it, but it really did not mean very much to him. We plodded 
through the work. His mind was very much on doing things to a high 
level of quality, accurately, enjoying the technology and playing with the 
toys, as it were, to try and give the customer what he wanted and in their 
own way the people there considered they were providing a good service 
... We used to have an installation order book which was almost like a .... 
I make it akin to a big bag and you used to get orders in there and every 
now and then an engineer would put his hand in the bag and pull an order 
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out and say 'right, I'm going to do this today' and there was no real 
priority, no measurement in terms of how long it took us to do an order." 
(Implementation Team Member) 
"The previous order process was long and slow, there was no single 
owner of the order process, so for any order coming in to the Company, 
it would go through as many as five or six different people. Lots of 
hand-offs between different groups and different departments, and it 
would split into various directions and, if you were lucky, some months 
later it would get installed and the whole thing would be brought back 
together again and result in a bill. If you were unlucky, it could end up 
in a myriad of locations and people would then make enquiries and a 
whole host of people were engaged just to hunt around for where an 
order had got to, provide the status and to try and keep the customer calm 
. . . before you knew where you were you had ten people doing a 
particular function and that only. So all the billing was going into the 
department of ten people just producing invoices. There was another 
department of some 35 people just doing credit checks and debt 
collection. Now people would pass documents over to credit checking, 
nobody knew what they really did. If you spoke to the credit checkers 
they'd say 'oh it's an art really, there's all sorts of sources and things to 
check and you know, Dun & Bradstreet, whatever it was'. And if you 
went to the debt collectors and said 'well how do you do your job', of 
course they are just looking at the total outstanding debt and they would 
just be ringing clients as they felt they wanted to, and from the client's 
perspective, the left hand didn't know what the right hand was doing 
because they may well have just agreed that day with the sales executive 
and an administrator on a final agreement as to what the installation was 
going to be, what the problem was over an unpaid bill, they'd get it all 
agreed and the next day a debt collector rings up in an aggressive tone 
saying 'you owe us £500,000 for the last six months and you still haven't 
paid'. And so 'just a minute, I was only speaking to one of your staff 
yesterday' and the other people wouldn't know anything about it. That 
type of occurrence was prevalent, highly prevalent in the environment 
we were working in." (Deputy Managing Director) 
4.3.1 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Financial Data's previous order process typically started with a sales 
person obtaining a signed order from a client. The order passed through the 
hands of several sales administrators, each of whom recorded or added 
information to the order. For example, orders were sent to the credit-checking 
department to verify the client's account was within agreed credit limits and 
creditworthiness of the client. Sales administrators sent the order to the 
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technical function, located in a different building. Administrators in the 
technical function received the order and logged it in an installation order book 
and on the BOS (billing and order system). The physical order was sent to an 
engineer. The order could wait for several weeks in the engineer's in-tray until 
he or she selected it. Engineers selected orders in no particular order of priority. 
Engineers were required to plan the technical aspects of the order, including the 
ordering of components from internal and external suppliers. They would await 
delivery of the components, configure the product, and arrange for its 
installation on the client's site. It was common for engineers to require 
additional components, which were not specified on the client's order but were 
necessary for the product. The order and the component breakdown would be 
sent to the invoicing department. They prepared and sent invoices based upon 
the order and additional components needed for the product. Engineers often 
part-installed a product or delivered to clients a different product to the one 
ordered. This resulted in mismatches between any two of three: order, products 
delivered, and the invoice. Clients therefore refused to pay or queried the 
invoice sent to them. Unpaid invoices were sent to the debt collection 
department, who wrote and phoned clients to extract payment from them. Many 
administrators spent their working day attempting to resolve invoicing queries. 
The previous order process involved up to 15 people to fulfil any one 
order. These people were in five different functions: sales, technical, finance, 
purchasing, and customer training. People in each function were experts in their 
own area, who rarely shared their knowledge of their activities and how they 
were carried out. It took Financial Data between 8 weeks and several months to 
install a product and several months thereafter to receive payment. People in 
each function had little sense of urgency, nor were they concerned with the 
revenue associated with the order or the costs incurred to fulfil it. Because of 
the long delays between placing an order and receiving the product, clients 
enquired about the status of their order. Administrators in the sales function 
went from function to function tracking orders and advising customers when 
they might get delivery of their order. 
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As each function was in a different location, people communicated by 
sending memos to each other. For example, engineers sent memos to sales 
people when they required further information about an order. Each function 
had its own information system and these were barely integrated. Consequently, 
information about orders, customers, delivery dates, invoices and debts due were 
out of date and incorrect. 
Financial Data's previous order process was incoherent, slow, delivered poor 
levels of customer service and had poor systems support. ( C _SOC # 4.1) 
The remaining first order constructs, interpretation, and second order 
constructs relating to the conceptual - commencement - can be found in 
Appendix 4, section AI_ 4.3. 
4.4 Changes that occurred 
4.4.1 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"A mission statement that was issued and everybody knew what we were 
trying to do. If we'd gone down a path which said 'yes, do all this and 
we are still trying to grow revenue and cut costs and other things', they 
would have been in conflict with the business process re-engineering 
mission and that would have been fatal." (Technical Director) 
"We realised, whereas in many cases people are looking for process 
engineering to make losses/reductions in staff, our target was in fact to 
service the client better, with a much higher standard . . . there was an 
overall mission statement for the organisation which was to serve our 
clients promptly and accurately and to their full reasonable satisfaction." 
(Deputy Managing Director) 
"People see themselves very much more now as contributors to customer 
service rather than purely departmental goals." (IT Manager) 
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4.4.1 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Financial Data previously focused upon revenue growth and cost 
reduction. The organisation achieved growth but was unable to maintain its 
levels of service to customers. The board realised that the organisation should 
provide better levels of service to customers and developed a mission statement, 
for the organisation that emphasised service to clients. The mission statement 
was framed in measurable terms, e.g. speed, accuracy and service standards. 
These measures were meaningful to people in the organisation because they 
could assess their contribution to the organisation's mission. 
The directors realised service levels needed to improve and refocused the 
organisation's mission to serve clients promptly, accurately and to their full 
reasonable satisfaction. (CTO _SOC # 4. 7) 
The remaining first order constructs, interpretation, and second order 
constructs relating to the conceptual bin - changes that occurred - can be found 
in Appendix 4, section A2_ 4.4. 
4.5 Issues Managed 
4.5.1 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Most importantly, we organised a survey, using an independent 
organisation, to survey every one of our customers. That was quite a 
challenge and we could have taken a sample, but given that we had a 
relatively small number of clients, in the UK about 2,500 clients, it was 
feasible to do this. Some organisations clearly would not have been able 
to do that, but we felt at 2,500 we could sample every single one of them. 
We asked them some searching questions. We got about a 50% 
response, which was very high. We asked them their views about many 
aspects of the service that we provide, technical service, help desk, sales, 
account management, administration, technical support, value for money, 
a whole range of questions. We asked them about the level of 
importance of different issues in their minds. Although we didn't in the 
initial surveys, we do indeed survey every year incidentally since then, 
we have subsequently further developed these questions and we have 
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asked them to compare us with the competition as well. Initially our 
need was not to just compare with the competition; it was actually to just 
get a fix as to whether they considered any part of our service very poor, 
poor, satisfactory, good or very good. From that we were then able to 
decide the relative priorities of the various programmes that we had to 
put in place. 
We also asked key customers on a personal basis, we sent managers out 
to get further information from key clients . . . that was done with our 
own managers. If you like, to added further evidence really. We were 
pretty certain, when we set out our programme of change, of the things 
that were going wrong because we had billing problems, we knew we 
had billing problems, we knew we had service problems, we knew it 
took us a long time to do things, we knew we had debt problems. So we 
could probably quite reasonably work out what was the problem. But 
there's nothing like getting the clients to tell you ... the customer surveys 
helped enormously to give us a check to make sure we were prioritising 
the right things for improvement." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"We decided very quickly before we really got into BPR, but when the 
organisational change was already mooted, to contact customers and ask 
them a series of questions about how they perceived Financial Data's 
services ... there is a group of clients who gathered together and formed 
a group called the PSUG (product and services user group) which is 
literally a loose collection of customers who got together effectively to 
protect themselves from the data providers who they saw as providing an 
expensive service with poor quality. So that was a group that we asked 
to help us get it right in terms of 'look we know we have got a problem, 
we're not going to hide it from you but we would appreciate your help 
on this because if you can help us, then our service to you will get 
better'. That group has been used on an ongoing basis throughout the 
process." (Implementation Team Leader) 
4.5.1 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Financial Data employed an independent market research organisation to 
conduct a survey of its clients. The research organisation developed a wide 
ranging questionnaire, covering all aspects of Financial Data's service including 
technical service, help desk, account management and administration. The 
clients were asked to rate Financial Data's performance in terms of providing 
these services, and to rank the level of importance of the service to them. 
Financial Data sent the survey to its entire client base and received a 50% 
response rate. Financial Data also asked user groups to provide their perception 
of services. This required Financial Data's management team to admit, publicly, 
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to its clients that the organisation had operational problems that they (the 
management team) were attempting to resolve. The board and senior managers 
had already identified the problem areas faced by the organisation and the results 
confirmed their views. The board prioritised the areas in which the changes 
would be made based upon the survey results. 
Financial Data's board commissioned a survey of customers and external user 
groups to identify areas of poor service and used the results to prioritise areas 
where the changes would be made. (IM _SOC # 4.19) 
The remaining first order constructs, interpretation, and second order 
constructs relating to the conceptual bin - issues managed - can be found in 
Appendix 4, section A3_ 4.5. 
4.6 Effects of radical process orientation 
4.6.1 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"How we then fared from the point of view of customer surveys, because 
in order to help us check to make sure that we were tackling the right 
issues/problems, we started customer surveys in a very detailed way, 
surveying every single customer we had. We got about 40% return in 
terms of customers who were prepared to tell us. That gradually 
increased and by the 3rd year that we'd done the surveys, it had gone up 
to 53%, which is a good percentage. Each year we found about an 
overall improvement in satisfaction of about 50%, each year, 50% year-
on-year. For overall, over the 2 years, our improvement's been quite 
considerable. We have achieved 70% or 80% on key areas of 
dissatisfaction ... the benefits you'll see are in terms of how the client 
sees it. Shorter order process, faster, more responsive, accurate billing, 
accurate delivery of services ... An independent survey by a market 
researcher gave us vote of the 'Vendor that clients most want to do 
business with', which is a far cry from where we were 3 years ago when 
we were: the vendor that clients least wanted to do business with. In the 
newspapers and various user groups and amongst the clients, there is 
wide recognition that we are miles away from the company we were 3 or 
4 years ago - it's a truly revolutionised company." (Deputy Managing 
Director) 
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"We've cut this down from 25 days and we are now doing them in about 
8, so that's astonishing, the improvement in performance. You wouldn't 
have believed it. When we came out with 25 days people said 'phew and 
the rest!', partly because we hadn't got a clue what it was anyway, 25 
seemed a reasonable stab . . . so it's astonishing what you can do when 
you begin to tune the process under control." (Technical Director) 
"We always targeted 2-3 days when we were doing it manually and we 
were genuinely achieving either 2 or 3 days within City North and they 
actually had an order within the first couple of days which was a very 
simple service only order. Totally clean site, very simple order and it 
went through something like six minutes, that's from the point at which 
we received it to the point at which the customer got service." 
(Implementation Team Leader) 
4.6.1 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Financial Data, through the redesigned order process, was able to 
improve customer satisfaction levels year-on-year by 50%. Key areas of 
dissatisfaction identified in the original survey were reduced by 70-80% within 2 
years of the survey being conducted. An independent survey showed that their 
clients voted Financial Data to be the 'vendor they most wanted to do business 
with'. The order process cycle time has dropped from several months to 8 days 
for a complex product, and minutes for additional services. 
Substantial increase in customer satisfaction in terms of Financial Data's service 
levels. (IM _SOC # 4.52) 
The remaining first order constructs, interpretation, and second order 
constructs relating to the conceptual bin - effects of radical process orientation -
can be found in Appendix 4, section A4_ 4.6. 
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4. 7 Classifying the second order constructs 
The second order constructs are classified according to the conceptual 
categories identified from the literature. 
Conceptual 
category 
Rationale for 
radical process 
orientation 
Choice of change 
initiatives 
Content and nature 
of changes 
experienced 
Gaining and 
sustaining buy-in 
Second order constructs 
Financial Data's previous order process was incoherent, slow, 
delivered poor levels of customer service and had poor systems 
support. (C_SOC # 4.1) 
Financial Data's clients were deeply dissatisfied with the service 
levels they received. (C_SOC # 4.2) 
Financial Data had a substantial amount of unpaid invoices, which 
required the organisation to raise its bad debts provision. (C_SOC # 
4.3) 
Managers had little control over the previous order process but 
sought to gain control over it. (C SOC# 4.4) 
Financial Data attempted to address the drivers for change by 
introducing a total quality management initiative. (C_SOC # 4.5) 
The drivers for change required change initiatives in the technical, 
sales, and finance functions to be aligned. (C_SOC # 4.6) 
The directors realised service levels needed to Improve and 
refocused the organisation's mission to serve clients promptly, 
accurately and to their full reasonable satisfaction. ( CTO _SOC # 
4.7) 
The directors created the order process with activities in the sales, 
technical, and the (newly created) business administration functions 
and gave priority to the process. (CTO_SOC # 4.8) 
The board recognised that people would need to take responsibility 
for functional activities and the order process. (CTO_SOC # 4.9) 
The board realised that people's pay would be changed to a very 
limited extent. (CTO_SOC # 4.10) 
The board aligned people's appraisal criteria to the order process 
and the sales, technical and business administration functions. 
(CTO_SOC # 4.11) 
Directors realised that people in different functions needed to work 
together and that their behaviours needed to be more collaborative 
and customer focused. (CTO_SOC # 4.12) 
Directors recognised that the existing systems were unable to 
support the previous and the redesigned order process. (CTO _SOC 
#4.13) 
The board realised assumptions people made that reinforced poor 
service levels needed to be removed. (CTO SOC# 4.14) 
Previous functional directors and senior managers did not accept 
that collaboration across functions was necessary. ( CTO _SOC # 
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4.15) 
The new board accepted that late deliveries and inaccurate invoices 
would be eradicated. (CTO_SOC # 4.16) 
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People affected 
by the changes 
Selecting the 
issues to be 
managed 
Mode of 
operationalising 
issues to be 
managed 
Directors, managers and account team members were affected as they 
took ownership for their function and the order process. (CTO SOC 
# 4.17) -
People from technical, sales, and finance functions were willing to be 
collocated for the order process to operate effectively even though 
they disagreed with the changes. (CTO SOC # 4.18) 
Board members and senior managers agreed the organisation's 
mission and objectives and explained these to people. (IM SOC # 
4.21) 
The board accepted that the business would be divided into four 
divisions each using the same order process and supporting systems. 
(IM _SOC # 4.26) 
The board reduced the number of levels in the hierarchy. (IM_SOC # 
4.27) 
Board and senior managers set up service level agreements, with 
internal central service providers and external suppliers, so that they 
fit into the requirements of the order process. (IM _SOC # 4.31) 
Board made people in the order process jointly responsibility for 
customer service levels. (IM_SOC # 4.33) 
Board introduced measurements for each activity in the order 
process. (IM_SOC # 4.39) 
People were trained to have a broader range of skills for the order 
process and to operate the systems. (IM_SOC # 4.40) 
The board recognised that the internal IT department, with additional 
expertise, could develop the systems to support the order process. 
(IM_SOC # 4.45 
The board and senior managers collocated people from the sales, 
technical and finance functions. (IM _SOC # 4.50) 
Financial Data's board commissioned a survey of customers and 
external user groups to identify areas of poor service and used the 
results to prioritise areas where the changes would be made. 
(IM_SOC # 4.19) 
Financial Data's deputy managing director and external consultants 
designed the order process and supporting systems. (IM_SOC # 
4.20) 
People at all levels, board members, senior managers and staff 
accepted the organisation faced major operational problems and 
discussed these openly. (IM_SOC # 4.23) 
The board and senior managers accepted that they would have to 
enforce some changes. (IM_SOC # 4.24) 
Board and senior managers were willing to explain to staff the 
proposed changes and its progress, using a variety of methods 
including a newsletter, town hall meetings, and small group 
discussions. (IM _SOC # 4.28) 
The board accepted that people would have to be recruited with the 
skills and personal characteristics required by the order process. 
(IM SOC # 4.36) 
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Actual 
implementation 
of the issues 
People at all levels accepted that individuals in account teams would 
be paid different amounts based upon their role in the team. 
(IM _SOC # 4.3 7) 
The implementation teams used the existing systems to support the 
order process prior to developing the new systems. (IM_SOC # 4.42) 
Financial Data designed and implemented the order process first and 
then developed the new information system to support activities 
within the order process. (IM_SOC # 4.43) 
Developed a plan to migrate from old to new systems one division at 
a time and used both old and new systems in some parts of the 
organisation. (IM _SOC # 4.48) 
The board broke up traditional sales, technical, and finance functions 
and moved people from these functions into account teams. 
(IM SOC # 4.49) 
The board members and senior managers were willing to unite to 
implement the necessary changes. (IM_SOC # 4.22) 
The managing director and deputy managing took personal charge for 
implementing the order process and the supporting systems. 
(IM _SOC # 4.25) 
Board members and senior managers recognised people's opinions 
and fears to be important and developed an internal marketing plan to 
address people's opinions and fears. (IM_SOC # 4.29) 
Organisation piloted the order process and the systems with actual 
orders from clients and with their consent, and used the pilot as the 
start of implementing the new order process across each division. 
(IM _SOC # 4.30) 
Account teams and line managers use service level agreements to 
escalate non-performance of activities in the process, which senior 
managers have to respond to. (IM _SOC # 4.32) 
Functional managers, in sales, technical and business administration, 
accepted joint responsibility for the order process, and convinced 
those below them in the hierarchy to take joint responsibility for the 
process. (IM_SOC # 4.34) 
Board set standards that people at all levels had to meet to remain in 
the process, and those who did not, were unwilling to or unable to 
meet the standard either left the organisation or were given different 
roles. (IM_SOC # 4.35) 
Board members were willing to take risks to ensure implementation 
was achieved. (IM_SOC # 4.38) 
Financial Data documented all aspects of the order process in 
considerable detail to achieve consistency across divisions. 
(IM_SOC # 4.44) 
Account teams cleaned clients' data before migrating to the new 
system. (IM_SOC # 4.46) 
Senior managers set up user groups and they controlled priority of the 
new system developments. (IM_SOC # 4.47) 
Senior managers allocated clients to specific account teams. 
(IM SOC# 4.51) 
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Post 
implementation of 
radical process 
orientation 
Implementor and 
recipient roles 
Substantial increase in customer satisfaction in terms of Financial 
Data's service levels. (IM_SOC # 4.52) 
Management and staff are in control of the order process and 
understand the implications of their activity on others in the order 
process. (ERPO_SOC # 4.53) 
Some aspects of the organisation have not changed. (IM _SOC # 
4.54) 
Substantial decrease in bad debt provision and invoices are accurate 
and paid by customers on time. (IM SOC# 4.55) 
The board created implementation teams with senior managers and 
external consultants, and devolved responsibility for achieving the 
redesigned order process to them, they took on the responsibility 
and made divisional directors and divisional functional managers 
responsible of implementation in their division. (IM SOC # 4.41) 
4.8 Synthesising the second order constructs for each 
conceptual category: case conclusions 
The aim of this section is to conclude the Financial Data case study. The 
brief concluding comments below are not linked back to the second order 
constructs because these comments do not form part of further analysis. Instead, 
the second order constructs are linked rigorously to the theoretical propositions 
developed in Chapter 7, which is to follow. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'rationale for radical process 
orientation' suggest that Financial Data began radical process orientation 
because the previous order process was ineffective in terms of customer service 
and costs. Financial Data's customers were dissatisfied because products were 
delivered late, or the wrong products were delivered, or the invoice did not tally 
with the products delivered. Consequently, Financial Data faced a growing 
amount of unpaid invoices, as customers refused to pay their bills. Financial 
Data's board members and senior managers realised that the organisation had 
little control over the previous order process and that redesigning this process 
would provide managers with a greater degree of control. The redesigned order 
process would also lead to improvements in customer service levels and better 
cash flow, as customers were more likely to settle their invoices on time. 
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The second order constructs categorised as ' choice of change initiatives' 
point to Financial Data undertaking a total quality management initiative to 
address the poor service levels delivered to customers and the non-payment of 
mv01ces. This initiative focused upon documenting the activities of each 
function in isolation. Each function implemented the total quality standard- BS 
5750 - at different times. Consequently, some functions attempted to conform 
with the procedures documented in the quality manuals, while other functions 
were less interested in following procedures. People, who received conflicting 
messages from senior managers, questioned the commitment of the board 
members and senior managers to the total quality management initiative. On 
one hand board members and senior managers told people to follow the quality 
procedures while, on the other hand, senior managers themselves disregarded 
the procedures, e.g. by launching the products without establishing the 
administrative support required to support the product. The total quality 
management initiative failed to reduce customer dissatisfaction levels or the 
volume and amount of late payments, and hence this initiative was stopped. 
Thus, it is apparent that Financial Data did not immediately select radical 
process orientation to address the customer and cash flow pressures faced by the 
organisation. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'content and nature of 
changes experienced' suggest that board members and senior managers 
recognised that changes would be made to organisational elements. These were 
Financial Data's strategy, structure, people's responsibilities and appraisal 
criteria, their behaviours and the information systems, and that these elements 
would be aligned to the functions and the order process. For example, people 
were responsible for their specific job and were able to carry out their job in a 
fashion that suited them, with little heed to the consequences upon people in 
other functions. The board recognised that people had to take responsibility for 
their job and also other activities in the order process. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'gaining and sustaining buy-
in' indicate that it is important to understand the changes that board members 
and senior managers accept need to occur in the organisation. The previous 
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board did not accept that people in different functions should collaborate. The 
new board members accepted that some aspects of the organisation would be 
changed to a very limited extent, e.g. people's remuneration. Hence, these 
changes did not occur. The new board did accept that late deliveries and 
inaccurate invoice should be stopped, and this change did occur. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'people affected by the 
changes' suggest that people at all levels were affected by the changes, including 
board members and senior managers. For example, the previous managing 
director and deputy managing director were replaced, divisional directors were 
appointed to the new board, and senior functional managers were appointed as 
divisional managers. People were willing to allow the changes to affect them 
even though they disputed the changes. Engineers did not want to be collocated 
with salespeople but they agreed to sit together in cross functional account 
teams. The second order constructs led to the conclusion that people's 
willingness to be affected by the changes is essential to the achievement of 
radical process orientation. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'selecting the issues to be 
managed' point to Financial Data aligning the issues to the changes that need to 
occur. For example, people in different functions were made jointly responsible 
for the order process and the board split the organisation into four divisions. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'mode of operationalising 
issues to be managed' reveal that people in Financial Data took actions that were 
evolutionary in nature, e.g. appointing external consultants and also took actions 
that were radical, e.g. shifting people away from functions to account teams. 
This suggests Financial Data deployed radical and evolutionary modes of 
operationalising the issues. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'actual implementation' 
suggest people were willing to carry out the actions required to implement the 
changes. For example, directors and senior managers in different functions were 
willing to unite to implement the changes. People piloted the changes to 
improve them and to demonstrate that the order process could be 
operationalised. 
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The second order constructs categorised as 'post implementation of 
radical process orientation' suggest that the drivers for change were addressed. 
Customer satisfaction levels were significantly improved and this was 
recognised publicly as Financial Data achieved first position in an independent 
survey as the supplier customers most wanted to work with. Managers regained 
control over the order process, and deliveries invoices were accurate and on 
time. However, the style of management continues to be directive. 
The second order construct categorised as 'implementor and recipient 
roles' suggests that implementors were also recipients of change and that the 
demarcation in roles is misleading. 
4.9 Assessment of the pilot on the case study design 
The purpose of the pilot was to assess the theoretical case study design 
prior to conducting the case studies for this research. Each aspect of the case 
design is considered. 
4.9.1 Identify the unit of analysis 
The case design requires that the unit of analysis be defined in terms of 
three theoretical criteria. In an interview with the deputy managing director, he 
had little problem in establishing that Financial Data met the three criteria. He 
confirmed that Financial Data had focused upon a business process as defined 
by this research, namely the order process. He was able to identify activities 
that were integrated across different functions to deliver Financial Data's 
products and services to customers. He was also able to provide instances of 
changes to organisational elements that constitute radical change. He also 
confirmed that the order process had been operational for more than six months. 
This suggests that the theoretical criteria in the design can be operationalised to 
identify case studies for this research. 
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4.9.2 Identifying the sample size 
The sample size for this research depends on gaining sufficient data that 
would enable the initial conceptual model to be developed. The pilot yielded 55 
second order constructs, which indicates that other studies might also produce a 
similar number of constructs with which develop the initial model. Hence, this 
design suggests a smaller number of case studies would be necessary than at first 
thought. 
4.9.3 Data collection techniques 
The in-depth interview technique worked well. The interviews were 
relaxed yet purposeful. Interviewees appeared willing to provide information. 
All interviewees answered all questions. No one refused to answer a follow up 
probe. The interview schedule developed at the start of the pilot was refined. 
The schedule had the list of probes on a single sheet of paper and during the 
interviews each interviewee's initials were noted against the probes to indicate 
that they had been dealt with. This resulted in a rather untidy record of the 
probes. After the pilot, a table was created, which listed the follow up probes 
along the side and interviewees initials across the top. This ensured a tidier 
record could be maintained. The interview data is rigorous and credible, as 
evidenced by the high degree of corroboration across interviews. This was 
apparent as the interviews unfolded. The interview data was triangulated against 
other sources of data, i.e. internal and external reports. These other sources do 
not cast any doubt nor contradict the interview data. 
4.9.4 Identifying people to be interviewed 
The main issue identified from the pilot, in relation to this aspect of the 
case design, relates to gathering data from recipients as well as implementors. 
At the start of this research, the case study design suggested that implementors 
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only should be interviewed. This was based upon the extant research literature, 
which reported and developed models based upon the views of implementors. 
However, it became apparent during the analysis of the data that the literature's 
clear demarcation between implementor and recipient roles is less evident in 
practice. People who were both implementors and recipients, on occasion, 
responded from the perspective of the recipient of change. This data provided 
more rounded insights into issues that were important to the achievement of 
radical process orientation. This led to the case study design being refined to 
include recipients. Financial Data was approached with a request to interview 
recipients, however, this request was refused, as the deputy managing director 
had moved to another part of Global Data pic. 
4.9.5 Data analysis 
A critical issue of the case design is ensuring there is a trail of evidence 
between first order constructs and second order constructs by making the 
interpretation transparent. As evidenced by the bulk of this chapter, a clear and 
transparent trail of evidence can be established. This rich set of analysed data 
suggests that this research's analysis technique provides data to develop an 
emergent model for the achievement of radical process orientation. 
4.9.6 Conclusions from the pilot study 
The pilot study reveals that the overall case design, subject to the 
refinements identified above, is credible and will satisfactorily discharge the 
research objective and question for this research. The intention at the beginning 
of this research was to utilise the pilot study's second order constructs to inform 
the emergent model. However, as recipient data forms a central part of the 
refined design and this data was not collected from Financial Data, the second 
order constructs identified in this chapter are taken no further in this research. 
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4.10 Chapter summary 
This chapter described the achievement of radical process orientation in 
Financial Data, the pilot study. It set out the first order constructs, interpreted 
these and identified second order constructs. This chapter classified the second 
order constructs according to the conceptual categories identified in the 
literature. This chapter assessed the contribution of this pilot study, and 
concluded that, with a few refinements, the case study design developed for this 
research is credible and robust. 
The next chapter deploys the refined case design to examine the 
achievement of radical process orientation in Carton Carrier. It provides a rich 
picture of Carton Carrier's parcel delivery process. 
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Chapter 5 Interpreting the achievement of radical 
process orientation in Carton Carrier Limited 
5.1 Chapter introduction 
The preceding chapter drew on the research methodology and initial 
conceptual model to interpret the achievement of radical process orientation in 
Financial Data. The same methodology and model will be used to present a rich 
description of the achievement of radical process orientation in Carton Carrier. 
The second order constructs are based upon refinements made to the case study 
design following the pilot study. The second order constructs are classified 
according to the conceptual categories developed from the literature, and case 
study conclusions are discussed. 
This chapter is structured as follows. After the introduction, basic 
background information about Carton Carrier is presented. Then the third, 
fourth, fifth, and sixth sections develop a single second order construct for each 
conceptual bin in the initial model as follows: section 3 - commencement; 
section 4 - changes that occurred; section 5 - issues managed; and section 6 -
effects of radical process orientation bin. The remaining second order constructs 
for each conceptual bin are located in Appendix 5, which forms an integral part 
of Chapter 5. Again second order constructs are numbered sequentially to forms 
a link in the chain of evidence. The case study conclusions are discussed after 
the second order constructs are classified on the basis of the conceptual 
categories. The last section summarises the chapter and sets the scene for the 
next chapter. 
5.2 Background information 
Carton Carrier is the distribution and delivery division of General 
Merchandise Retailers pic (GMR). The distribution and delivery division traded 
under name GMR (Transport) from its inception until 1990, hence its name 
changed to Carton Carrier. As this case study covers the period 1989 to 1994, 
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both names are used as follows: GMR (Transport) denotes the organisation prior 
to initiating changes to the parcel delivery process, and Carton Carrier denotes 
the organisation during the initiation and implementation phases to achieve the 
parcel delivery process. 
Within GMR there are four divisions: Home Merchandise, Financial 
Services, Information Services, and GMR (Transport). Each division operates 
as a business unit, in the form of a limited liability company. GMR' s largest 
division is Home Merchandise and its main line of business is the direct sale, to 
customers, of a wide range of household and clothing products. Home 
Merchandise is one of the largest companies in its market place. 
According to recent annual accounts, GMR (Transport) employed 2289 
people in March 1990. Sales turnover over the previous three years fluctuated, 
rising from £65.6 million in 1988 to £69.2 million in 1989, but falling back to 
£68.4 million by 1990. During the same three-year period, pre-tax profits 
moved inversely to sales, starting at £13.1 million in 1988 then falling to £12.2 
million in 1989, but then rising to £13.6 million in 1990. By late 1989 GMR 
(Transport) delivered about 70 million parcels per annum to about 4.5 million 
Home Merchandise customers, and 3 million parcels to a smaller number of 
third party clients. 
5.3 Commencement 
5.3.1 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We used to have trailers coming in loosely loaded from the warehouse. 
What I mean by that is you would have X amount of thousands of 
parcels put onto a trailer. They used to come into Malham Depot and 
they would be off loaded. They would be sorted by a night sort crew 
into 'rounds' and at the time, I believe, we had about 60 rounds. Now 
these parcels would be separated into the 60 rounds and put onto the 
drivers' pads, we call them." (Assistant Depot Manager) 
"Six or seven years ago everything was manual. The sort was counted 
physically, the night sorters used to count parcels, and they'd say 'we've 
had 13,211 parcels in tonight'. That was then put on a Kalamazoo sheet 
which said 13,211. And the drivers came in and a supervisor said 'well, 
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you will take out 200 parcels', so he booked out Charlie Bloggs for 200 
parcels and they added all those 200 parcels up or whatever it was, and 
they said 'well, we had 13,211, we've taken out 11,000, so we've got 
2,211 '. It was a balancing act, just like that." (Depot Manager) 
"So all we had was a little abacus: it was a little Apricot computer which 
kept a tally of the number of parcels when they came in overnight. The 
night sort supervisor would take all this information off the different 
sheets of paper and key it into the computer. Then about once or twice a 
day, we'd put a disc in that computer, and we'd take it through and put 
information (numbers of parcels) on the disc and walk through to the 
office and they'd put it on their computer and upload the information, 
and the number of parcels would equate to a certain amount of revenue 
the depot was going to get. Once a day (parcel information) got 
transferred down a line to the computer in Worcester, a fairly old 
mainframe we'd got down there." (IT Co-ordinator) 
"200 parcels was, to use a well worn GMR (Transport) phrase, 'a good 
day's work'." (Personnel Manager) 
"Traditionally drivers in the past have doorstepped parcels, which is an 
emotive word but I mean to say, unsafely (sic) delivered parcels, is 
probably better." (Depot Manager) 
"(Doorstepping meant) throwing it (the parcel) over the back gates." 
(Regional General Manager) 
"To give you an example, in them days, if a customer was to phone up 
and say 'I ordered a pair of shoes - where are they?' you couldn't 
actually tum around and say 'Ah well Mrs Smith, them shoes will be 
delivered today', or 'they're sitting in our depot awaiting delivery'. In 
all fairness, we didn't know where they were, so you'd have to answer 
the question the best way you could." (Assistant Depot Manager) 
"(The information systems were) very poor. Very very poor indeed. Five 
years ago, if you were looking for information on a parcel, let's say, 
because that's our business, it would be touch and go whether you got 
the right information, and you would have to go round many many 
houses to try and achieve that information." (Assistant Depot Manager) 
"If a customer made an enquiry, we wouldn't have a clue what to say 
'yes, they're (the drivers) going there', 'no they're not going there'. 
We'd say 'there is somebody out in that area today. If they're not there 
today, then they'll be there tomorrow or the day after'." (Team Member) 
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5.3.1 B Interpretation and second order construct 
Each evening GMR (Transport)'s thirty-six depots received parcels for 
delivery in its pre-defined geographic area. The parcels were sent from the 
warehouses controlled by Home Merchandise. The parcels arrived loosely 
packed on the back of trunkers. A night supervisor and a crew of 'sorters' 
segregated parcels into rounds, between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. The parcels for each 
round were loaded into British Rail Utility Trucks (BRUTs) and were left for the 
driver to collect from a 'pad', which is a square shaped area that backs on to a 
depot wall. Each morning about 60 drivers arrived at the depot to complete their 
round. The drivers went to one of two 'booking out' supervisors, who logged 
the drivers and their round for that day. Drivers then randomly selected two 
hundred parcels from the BRUT and loaded these on to their van. Drivers then 
drove to their round, which for a driver in an inner city area meant that he began 
delivering parcels within minutes, whereas a driver in the lake district might 
drive for an hour before his first delivery. Yet drivers were paid for the number 
of parcels they delivered. Drivers left parcels, at the point of delivery, on 
customers' doorsteps or in some other safe place of their choice. If the parcel 
was out of sight, drivers put a note through the customer's letterbox advising 
them of its location. After completing their rounds, drivers returned to the depot 
with any undelivered parcels. These parcels were returned to the BRUT and 
carried forward for delivery when the driver next selected the parcel. Often 
parcels remained in the depots for several weeks awaiting selection. 
The systems used to manage parcels in the depot were manual. The 
information technology that supported the delivery of parcels was rudimentary 
and ineffective. The quality of data keyed into the systems was poor. Depot 
line managers rarely had operational information necessary for them to carry out 
their assigned jobs. For example, customers phoned GMR (Transport) to locate 
their parcels or to find out the delivery date. People in the depots were simply 
unable to answer such questions, as they did not know. Depot line managers 
had little management information, which led to ineffective controls: managers 
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were unaware of the depot's actual position in terms of the number of parcels it 
held, the numbers being returned, or the number of thefts. 
GMR (Transport)'s previous parcel delivery service was ineffective, manually 
intensive and had poor systems support. (C_SOC # 5.1) 
The remaining first order constructs, interpretation, and second order 
constructs relating to the conceptual bin - commencement - can be found in 
Appendix 5, section A1 5.3. 
5.4 Changes that occurred 
5.4.1 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Its (GMR (Transport)'s) objectives were quite simple. It was there to 
generate a profit . . . GMR (Transport), for its part, would receive 
products (for delivery) and would along with the product, receive a 
revenue product (from Home Merchandise), and it would seek to make a 
profit out of it." (Managing Director) 
"Certainly back in '89 I '90, that sort of time, the breakdown in the 
traffic that we carried was probably about 95% Home Shopping, and 5% 
outside business." (Personnel Manager) 
"I don't just mean mickey mouse money from Home Merchandise. I 
mean from real profit." (Regional General Manager) 
"We (the directors of Carton Carrier) ... tr(ied) to recognise the service 
factors, ... now it has reached the stage where we treat performance in 
terms of quality of service on an equal footing with performance in terms 
of profit and cost control. But it's taken us a long time to get there, but 
they are now seen to be of equal importance." (Managing Director) 
5.4.1 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
GMR (Transport)'s strategic purpose was to make a profit. However, 
directors in GMR plc and Home Merchandise recognised that GMR 
(Transport)'s profit contributed little to the group's overall profit, as its major 
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customer was the merchandising division. Even within GMR (Transport), 
senior managers did not really believe in the profit generated from intra-group 
business. The directors realised that providing customers with a better level of 
service was as strategically important to the organisation's future as profitability. 
The organisation treats performance in terms of both service quality and profit 
and cost control as strategically important. (CTO_SOC # 10) 
The remaining first order constructs, interpretation, and second order 
constructs relating to the conceptual bin - changes that occurred - can be found 
in Appendix 5, section A1_5.4. 
5.5 Issues Managed 
5.5.1 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"When I came in to Carton Carrier, it was from a background of having 
worked within the Group for a few years, and I came in just about 1989 
to work for Carton Carrier, on the basis that I'd worked for the 
Chairman, who'd recently been appointed to Chairman, in other areas of 
the business in the past. So we knew each other. We knew our style of 
management, and therefore to a degree, having decided which direction 
we were going to take the business in, it's easier from that kind of 
background to work together. When I first came in, the job that I 
undertook was to actually take charge of the non-operational areas of the 
business: the management services, the engineering plant, systems - IT 
side of it, and to try and bring my experiences from other parts of the 
Group to play within Carton Carrier through that area, whilst the day-to-
day operations was the responsibility of somebody else." (Managing 
Director) 
"In 1989 the Board was restructured and a Home Merchandise director 
came on to the GMR (Transport) board, and adopted the attitudes that 
were then prevalent in Home Merchandise." (Services Manager) 
5.5.1 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
A Home Merchandise director was appointed to GMR (Transport)' s 
board. This director had worked in other parts of GMP pic. He had a close 
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working relationship with the chairman, and they knew each other's styles of 
management. They shared a similar outlook for the business and agreed the 
future direction of Carton Carrier. This individual was initially appointed as 
services director, with responsibility for the non-operational aspects of the 
business, while operational responsibilities lay with the incumbent joint 
managing directors. 
The chairman appointed a Home Merchandise director to Carton Carrier's board 
to manage non-operational functions. (IM _SOC # 5 .25) 
The remaining first order constructs, interpretation, and second order 
constructs relating to the conceptual bin - issues managed - can be found in 
Appendix 5, section A1_5.5. 
5.6 Effects of radical process orientation 
5.6.1 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Having put the effort into developing a model for the depot it is 
fundamental that the first step was to document what it was, to actually 
implement those changes into 35 other depots spread across the whole of 
the mainland UK, had risks attached to it in that there was no guarantee 
that you could actually migrate the principles intact, to 35 other depots, 
particularly since it's impossible to be personally involved in all of that. 
So therefore, the importance was that we clearly documented the 
principles of the model depot." (Managing Director) 
"Some guarantee that what was implemented into the other 35 depots 
was what we wanted to implement rather than 35 variations on the same 
theme. So that was the importance of consistency." 
"Translate that into a scheme that could be migrated towards 3 5 depots 
so that every depot would then be converted to this different style of 
management. And that obviously meant that there had to be more 
contact with existing operators." 
"I think the structure is designed so that if anybody left, somebody else 
would just step into that person's shoes." (Assistant Depot Manager) 
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"I meant, as someone who's had practice at this, you can go into any 
depot, in any part of the country, as a driver or a PDM or indeed any 
other role, and the particular jobs, the particular tasks throughout the day 
are the same. The paperwork's the same, the timing pretty much the 
same. If you're a clerk, you've still got to do the same particular jobs at 
particular times of the day. So no matter where you go in the country, 
they are all operating on the same system with a couple of exceptions. 
The major one I can think of is Regional Sort, which is dependent on. 
Well there's two regional sorts in the south, and no Regional Sorts in the 
north, so about half the depots receive some of their parcels ready sorted 
into cages, and the remainder receive none of their parcels like that. But 
again all that effects is the way the parcels are taken off the trailer. That 
doesn't affect the way the data is processed or what we do with those 
parcels." (Team Member) 
5.6.1 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The organisation achieved a high degree of consistency m the 
operational and managerial aspects of the parcel delivery process by 
documenting the principles of the first implementation. These principles were 
implemented in each of the other depots. Hence, every depot has a similar mode 
of operating. This enabled people to move not only from one activity to another 
but also from one depot to another more easily, e.g. a parcel delivery manager 
moving from one depot to another utilises the similar activities, procedures, 
systems, and behaviours. In effect the parcel delivery process was replicated 
across each depot and any exceptions to a replica are consciously agreed, 
explicit, and visible for all to see. 
The parcel delivery process was implemented in all depots so that the 
organisation operated consistency. (ERPO_SOC # 5.64) 
The remaining first order constructs, interpretation, and second order 
constructs relating to the conceptual bin - effects of radical process orientation -
can be found in Appendix 5, section A1_5.6. 
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5. 7 Classifying the second order constructs 
These second order constructs are classified according to the conceptual 
categories from which the initial conceptual model was derived. 
Conceptual 
category 
Rationale for 
radical process 
orientation 
Choice of change 
initiatives 
Content and nature 
of changes 
experienced 
Second order constructs 
GMR (Transport)'s previous parcel delivery service was ineffective, 
manually intensive and had poor systems support. (C_SOC # 5.1) 
GMR (Transport)'s major customer, Home Merchandise, faced 
increased pressures from competitors. (C_SOC # 5.2) 
GMR (Transport) continued to provide poor levels of service to 
Home Merchandise in spite of its changing situation. (C_SOC # 5.3) 
Home Merchandise wanted the two organisations' operations to be 
more closely aligned. (C_SOC # 5.4) 
Customers were leaving due to long and inconsistent delivery times. 
(C_SOC # 5.5) 
A depot had 82,000 undelivered parcels and 27 trailers with 
undelivered parcels on board parked on the street outside the depot. 
(C_SOC # 5.6) 
Lack of management control over parcel selection and actual 
delivery of parcels led to inconsistent delivery times and poor levels 
of service and managers sought to take control over activities that 
affected delivery times and service levels to customers. (C_SOC # 
5.7) 
Carton Carrier began to address its drivers for change with a work 
study initiative which involved examining the activities performed 
to deliver a parcel. (C_SOC # 5.8) 
The drivers for change required organisational changes to be co-
ordinated across the sort centres and depot operations at managerial 
and operational levels. (C_SOC # 5.9) 
The organisation treats performance in terms of both service quality 
and profit and cost control as strategically important. (CTO_SOC # 
10) 
Carton Carrier created the parcel delivery process from activities 
within the functional structure. (CTO_SOC # 5.11) 
Carton Carrier altered the balance between functions and the parcel 
delivery process, such that the process is considered as essential as 
the functions in the organisation. (CTO_SOC # 5.12) 
People, including directors, depot managers and parcel delivery 
managers, in Carton Carrier took responsibility for their functional 
activities as well as the parcel delivery process. (CTO_SOC # 5.13) 
People's appraisal criteria are linked to their functional activities 
and the results expected from the parcel delivery process. 
(CTO SOC# 5.14) 
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Gaining and 
sustaining buy-in 
People affected by 
the changes 
Selecting the 
issues to be 
managed 
People, including board members, regional general managers, depot 
m~agers, assistant depot managers, parcel delivery managers and 
dnvers, changed their behaviours towards one another where they 
are less threatening and recognise people at all levels contribute to 
the business. (CTO_SOC # 5.16) 
Carton Carrier's new information systems track parcels across the 
parcel delivery process. (CTO SOC# 5.17) 
The board accepted that people's remuneration, including regional 
general managers, depot managers, parcel delivery managers and 
drivers should be changed. (CTO_SOC # 5.15) 
Directors accepted that existing operational assumptions were 
flawed and incompatible with the parcel delivery process. 
(CTO_SOC# 5.18) 
GMR (Transport)'s board did not accept that the organisation's 
autonomy needed to be reduced. (CTO_SOC # 5.19) 
GMR (Transport)' s directors assumed that they could continue to 
provide line managers with inaccurate financial information or even 
withhold information. (CTO_SOC # 5.20) 
Carton Carrier's directors accepted that the withholding of 
information from or providing incorrect information to line 
managers actually needed to be reversed so that they had detailed 
and accurate information. (CTO_SOC # 5.21) 
Depot managers were willing to take on responsibility for their 
depot's profitability even though they had little control over the 
constituent elements, i.e. income and fixed costs. (CTO _SOC # 
5.22) 
Carton Carrier reduced the number of regions and created regional 
functions to support the activities in the parcel delivery process. 
(CTO_SOC # 5.23) 
Board members and regional general managers were affected by the 
changes. (CTO SOC# 5.24) 
Regional general managers devolved responsibility for budgets to 
and shared financial information with line managers. (IM _SOC # 
5.33) 
People, from function and line management positions, in different 
regions and depots met each other to share information. (IM _SOC 
# 5.34) 
Board and regional general managers accepted that the quality, 
accessibility, and reliability of process-related information would be 
improved. (IM_SOC # 5.35) 
Carton Carrier developed an appraisal system with criteria linked to 
the parcel delivery process. (IM _SOC # 5.41) 
Carton Carrier directors accepted that they had to negotiate with the 
trade union to change drivers' pay conditions. (IM_SOC # 5.43) 
Directors invested substantial amounts in information systems, 
including the development of a small number of bespoke 
applications. (IM_SOC # 5.49) 
Directors and senior managers encouraged people to question the 
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Mode of 
operationalising 
issues to be 
managed 
previous parcel delivery service as well as the proposed changes, 
and they were willing to do so and to provide feedback to the 
implementation team. (IM_SOC # 5.53) 
Drivers' pay and bonus scheme aligned to their responsibility to 
achieve service quality and volume of deliveries within a standard 
ten-hour day. (IM_SOC # 5.56) 
Board members and managers considered van drivers key to Carton 
Carrier's future success. (IM_SOC # 5.57) 
Van drivers recognised the importance of service quality. (IM_SOC 
# 5.58) 
Board members refocused the corporate objective. (IM_ SOC # 
5.59) 
Board members, regional general managers, depot managers, 
assistant depot managers, and parcel delivery managers listen to 
those below them in the hierarchy. (IM_SOC # 5.61) 
The board encouraged people to develop a range of skills by 
moving from a service to a line management role, and from the 
warehouse to the depot operations and vice versa. (IM _SOC # 
5.63) 
Directors undertook a customer survey from which they identified 
that customers were dissatisfied with the service and that they 
wanted consistent delivery periods within an overall delivery time 
of a week. (IM_SOC # 5.37) 
Carton Carrier's board set up a cross functional team, led by a 
person from the service function, with a mandate to design the 
parcel delivery process. (IM_SOC # 5.38) 
Cross functional team challenged existing operational assumptions 
made by directors, managers and drivers. (IM_SOC # 5.39) 
Cross functional team and line managers identified the principles of 
the future parcel delivery process, designed the managerial, 
operational and systems aspects of the process, and proved it 
worked prior to implementing it in other depots. (IM_SOC # 5.40) 
Carton Carrier's board recognised that the organisation had 
inadequate financial resources and poorly skilled people to develop 
the information systems required to support the parcel delivery 
process. (IM_SOC # 5.46) 
Carton Carrier outsourced its computer department and future 
information systems developments to Home Merchandise's IT 
function, but retained control over the information systems budget 
and development schedule. (IM _SOC # 5.4 7) 
Carton Carrier introduced systems in modules rather than develop 
entire systems and implement them in a single attempt. (IM _SOC # 
5.50) 
Implementation team members listened to people's ideas and 
incorporated these into future implementation plans. (IM _SOC # 
5.54) 
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Actual 
implementation of 
the issues 
Post 
implementation of 
radical process 
orientation 
Implementor and 
recipient roles 
The chairman appointed a Home Merchandise director to Carton 
Carrier's board to manage non-operational functions. (IM SOC# 
5.25) -
Chairman won the power struggle against the existing joint 
managing directors, divided the depots into two groups and assigned 
operational control to different directors. (IM_ SOC # 5 .26) 
Existing joint managing directors left the organisation and a new 
managing director was appointed. (IM _SOC # 5 .28) 
The chairman was willing to understand the reasons for the crisis 
and be involved directly to resolve the crisis. (IM_SOC # 5.29) 
Depot and assistant depot managers were trained to understand 
financial accounts and budgets, and were willing to learn about 
managing depot finances. (IM_SOC # 5.36) 
People unwilling to accept the changes or unable to meet the 
required standards after being trained left voluntarily or were 
sacked. (IM_SOC # 5.45) 
Carton Carrier created implementation teams, consisting of 
implementors and recipients, who took joint responsibility for 
installing the new systems that underpinned the parcel delivery 
process. (IM_SOC # 5.51) 
Board members and regional general managers recognised as 
important people's feelings of fear, insecurity, indifference, 
confidence, and criticism. (IM_SOC # 5.60) 
Board members and line managers made symbolic changes in 
support of the parcel delivery process. (IM SOC# 5.62) 
The parcel delivery process was implemented in all depots so that 
the organisation operated consistency. (ERPO_SOC # 5.64) 
Carton Carrier entered into new markets successfully using the 
parcel delivery process developed to handle Home Merchandise's 
parcels, without increasing the number of depots. (ERPO _SOC # 
5.65) 
Carton Carrier's management have regained control over the parcel 
delivery process. (ERPO_SOC # 5.66) 
Some aspects of the old organisation still remain. (ERPO _SOC # 
5.67) 
The chairman and key directors consolidated their position in the 
organisation. (IM_SOC # 5.30) 
Board devolved operational control of the parcel delivery process to 
regional general managers and the regional functional managers. 
(IM_SOC # 5.31) 
Responsibility for profitability and service quality cascaded from 
directors to regional general managers to depot managers to 
assistant depot managers and parcel delivery managers. (IM _SOC # 
5.32) 
Regional personnel managers monitored the appraisal system. 
(IM_SOC # 5.42) 
Implementation team members were willing to withstand pressure 
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from shop stewards not to implement the parcel delivery process. 
(IM_SOC # 5.44) 
The managing director raised the service department's profile in the 
organisation. (IM_SOC # 5.48) 
Training and IT managers trained line managers to use the systems 
and depot line managers taught people in their depots. (IM SOC # 
5.52) -
Parcel delivery managers were made responsible for the service 
quality achieved and quantity delivered by a team of van drivers. 
(IM SOC# 5.55) 
5.8 Synthesising the second order constructs for each 
conceptual category 
The aim of this section is to conclude the Carton Carrier case study. The 
brief concluding comments below are not linked back to the second order 
constructs at this point of the analysis because in Chapter 7 the cases are 
synthesised at the level of the second order constructs and because these 
comments are not built upon in further analysis. 
The second order constructs classified as 'rationale for radical process 
orientation' suggest that Carton Carrier faced mounting pressure to change. 
These pressures stemmed from having a parcel delivery service that was 
ineffective and manually intensive with inadequate systems to support day-to-
day operations. These pressures were a threat to Carton Carrier. The 
organisation recognised that it had little control over activities in the previous 
parcel delivery services, and a fundamental change in the service was an 
opportunity to regain control over activities that were critical to consistent 
deliveries, and hence Carton Carrier's future success. Thus, these second order 
constructs suggest that Carton Carrier began radical process orientation in 
response to drivers for change. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'choice of change initiatives' 
suggest that Carton Carrier attempted to address the drivers with a work study 
initiative that measured each activity in the previous parcels delivery service. 
However, the directors recognised that this initiative was insufficient to bridge 
the functional divide that existed in the organisation between sort centres and 
depot operations. Each function operated to its own set of priorities and 
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timescales, while disregarding the affect they had on the overall delivery of 
parcels. Senior managers began to realise that the drivers for change required 
organisational changes to be co-ordinated across different functions. Thus, these 
second order constructs suggest that drives for change do not lead automatically 
to an radical process orientation initiative. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'content and nature of the 
changes experienced' indicate that the content of the changes affected several 
organisational elements. Carton Carrier's strategy, structure, people's 
responsibilities and appraisal criteria, their behaviour towards each other, and 
information systems that support the parcel delivery process were changed. In 
relation to the nature of the change the organisational elements no longer have a 
solely functional orientation. Each element was changed to a function and 
process orientation. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'gaining and sustaining buy-
in' suggest that it is essential to understand the changes board members and 
senior managers accept need to occur. For example, the previous joint 
managing directors did not accept that Carton Carrier's autonomy should be 
reduced, hence they wanted Home Merchandise to be kept at arm's length. It is 
apparent from case evidence that changes that board members did not accept 
were not implemented. Thus, these second order constructs led to the 
conclusion that gaining and sustaining buy-in as described in the literature is 
insufficient and that acceptance of the changes that need to occur is of greater 
importance. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'people affected by the 
changes' suggest that people were willing to be affected by the changes and that 
the changes affected people at all levels. Board members and regional general 
managers were affected, for example, as the number of regions were 
consolidated from seven to three. 
The second order construct categorised as 'selecting the issues to be 
managed' highlight that people took actions that brought about changes to the 
organisational elements identified in the content of the changes. For instance, 
people's responsibilities needed to change. Consequently, the board devolved 
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budgets to regional general managers, changed the appraisal system, and the 
drivers' pay and bonus system. In order to change the pay and bonus scheme, 
Carton Carrier's directors had to negotiate with the trade union. Another 
example relates to the changes in people's behaviours towards one and other. 
Directors encouraged people to question the previous parcel delivery service and 
changed their own views of drivers, from being easily dispensable to a vital part 
of the organisation's future success. Thus, the second order constructs suggest 
that the issues were linked to the changes that people believed needed to occur. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'mode of operationalising the 
issues to be managed' point to actions that were evolutionary in nature, e.g. 
carrying out a customer survey and actions that were radical, e.g. outsourcing 
the computer department and future information systems developments. Thus, 
these second order constructs suggest that Carton Carrier used evolutionary and 
radical modes of operationalising the issues. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'actual implementation of the 
issues' suggest that radical process orientation was implemented because people 
took on and sustained the responsibilities for implantation and carried out the 
actions necessary for implementation. Some of these actions involved by-
passing the previous managing directors, e.g. by dividing the depots into two 
groups, leading eventually to the managing directors leaving the organisation. 
At the same time board members had to be cognisant of people's feelings, their 
fears and insecurities. Thus, these second order constructs indicated that people 
have to be willing to implement the issues. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'post implementation of 
radical process orientation' suggest that drivers for change were resolved. 
Hence, parcels were delivered on time, which improved customer satisfaction 
levels being improved and further backlogs in undelivered parcels being 
avoided. Management also regained control over the parcel delivery process. 
However, aspects of the organisation, e.g. the dictatorial style of management 
that existed prior to radical process orientation can still be found in the 
organisation. 
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The second order constructs categorised as 'implementor and recipient 
roles' lead to the conclusion that the roles are not discrete. Regional general 
managers were recipients of the changes, e.g. by having their region's budgets 
devolved to them; they in tum became implementors as they cascaded control 
over depot budgets to depot managers. 
5.9 Chapter summary 
This chapter provided a rich description of the achievement of the parcel 
delivery process in Carton Carrier Limited. It did so by setting out first order 
constructs, i.e. the perspective of people, both recipients and implementors, who 
were directly involved with the achievement of radical process orientation. It 
then interpreted these first order constructs in order to established second order 
constructs. These second order constructs will be utilised to inform the 
emergent conceptual model. This chapter classified the second order constructs 
based upon the conceptual categories. This classification will enable the second 
order constructs to be conjoined with those from the Foundry Insurance case 
study to follow. The second order constructs were synthesised to conclude the 
case study. 
The next chapter sets out the achievement of radical process orientation 
in Foundry Insurance. This case examines the initiation, implementation and 
consequences of implementation of the organisation's inspection process. 
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Chapter 6 Interpreting the achievement of radical 
process orientation in Foundry Insurance Limited 
6.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter shares the same aims as the previous chapter. It also uses 
the same methodology and conceptual model to present a rich description of 
Foundry Insurance's achievement of radical process orientation from an 
interpretation of first order constructs. It also develops second order constructs 
from the interpretation of the first order constructs. It classifies the second order 
constructs according to the conceptual categories, and presents the case study 
conclusions. 
This chapter has the same structure as the previous two chapters. Basic 
background information about Foundry Insurance is presented next. Then the 
third, fourth, fifth, and sixth sections develop a single second order construct for 
the respective conceptual bins namely commencement, changes that occurred, 
issues managed, and effects of radical process orientation. The remaining 
second order constructs are located in Appendix 6, which forms an integral part 
of this chapter. Next, the second order constructs according to the conceptual 
categories are classified, and the case conclusions follow. The chapter is 
summarised and the scene set for the next chapter. 
6.2 Background information 
Foundry Insurance is the engineering insurance subsidiary of Composite 
Insurers pic. A major part of Foundry Insurance's business is the inspection and 
insurance ofboiler, mechanical and electrical plant. Foundry Insurance inspects 
plant to ensure it conforms to health and safety legislation, and insures 
organisations against plant breakdown and third party damage. The organisation 
has a wide range of customers: from comer garages to nuclear power stations. 
Foundry Insurance has a long heritage. In the mid-1800's manufacturing 
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industry began using high-pressure boilers which, due to poor design or neglect, 
often exploded resulting in a loss of life and business. A group of high-pressure 
boiler users formed the Steam Users Association. A small number of 
Association members banded together to offer a service that inspected and 
insured the quality, design and safety aspects of boilers. Foundry Insurance 
grew out of this service and since then has provided services in response to 
changes in health and safety legislation. Composite Insurers is one of the four 
largest insurance companies in the UK. Composite Insurers has several 
divisions, each offers different types of insurance coverage including life, non-
life (car, home, etc), and engineering. Each division operates autonomously in 
the form of a limited liability company. 
6.3 Commencement 
6.3.1 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Only probably four or five years ago, every surveyor had a portable 
typewriter, and he would spend his days up until, say, two or three 
o'clock, inspecting plant, go home with his notebook, and perhaps a 
copy of his previous report would be with him, and he would then retype 
that report. Now some clients required duplicate copies, some clients 
required one copy, some clients required five copies. That poor old 
surveyor was having to stuff five and six pieces of paper and carbon 
paper into a portable typewriter and come up with something which 
people couldn't read at the sixth copy! And, er, absolutely, you know, 
archaic really when you think about it now." (Engineering Manager) 
"That actually changed the company from very manual paper based ... as 
far as the business life was concerned, nobody used the computer. They 
had manual portable typewriters, they had to stuff loads of pieces of 
paper into it. Phenomenal amounts of paper flowed between us in there. 
We had a huge team of people sat here prior to that date to input 
information on to the system that we use there just to record 
information." (Customer Services Manager) 
"Errors really, that could be caused by the clerk who might lose a little 
bit of concentration, or whatever, and think 'Yes, I'll put it in' or, no 
they hadn't. So, as I said, we used to input the inspection date." 
(Departmental Team Leader) 
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"An old yellow Pre7 type form, and he would post that into Head Office 
which would have to be manually again, added to the screen, and then 
with the description of the item. 
He got lots of different typefaces and different styles, and phraseology. 
Perhaps some Snopake and who knows what, you know; hand-written 
changes, and when you think, quite often the customer is paying a lot of 
money and all he gets at the end of the day is the report. He may get a 
technical appraisal of the plant, but it's embodied in the report." 
(Implementation Team Member) 
"That actually changed the company from very manual paper based, 
labour intensive operation." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"Whereas previously that access to information was either with the 
surveyor in a filing cabinet or it was in a multitude of paper files that we 
had here, and to find out anything, one had to go away from one's desk 
to find information." (Customer Services Manager) 
6.3.1 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Foundry Insurance's inspection service operated in the following way. 
Typically each surveyor received a list of new and existing customer sites with 
plant that required an inspection during the following three-week period. This 
list was printed on up to six inches of paper, as only one site appeared on a page. 
Each surveyor created his schedule for site visits for the three weeks. Some 
engineers kept copies of previous reports and took these with them. While 
inspecting the plant or equipment, the engineer hand wrote notes in his 
notebook. Inspection visits were usually completed by about two o'clock each 
afternoon. Each surveyor took the hand written notes home and typed the 
inspection report on a portable typewriter. The number of copies required varied 
by client as some wanted two copies and others perhaps four copies. Engineers 
used carbon paper in the typewriter to create the copies. 
Each surveyor sent his reports to the head office administration 
department in the engineering function. In the administration department clerks 
keyed information from the reports into the head office systems. An important 
item of data was the next inspection date, as this was stipulated by statute. It 
was common to find inspection dates incorrectly keyed in at head office. 
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Customers often asked engineers to add and inspect new items of plant 
while on site. New plant would have to be added to the customer's existing 
register. Adding or removing items of plant was a complex set of procedures, 
which when examined took thirteen flip chart sheets to document. The 
procedures for issuing new policies were highly fragmented. To explain, one 
department calculated the number of days cover was required, another 
department calculated the cost of cover, yet another department calculated 
premium information, the policy typing pool typed the policy, and eventually it 
reached a department that checked the entire policy. If during the final check (or 
at any earlier stage) a department noticed an error or omission on the policy, it 
wound its way back through each department. 
The end product of the inspection service was a typed report, certifying a 
customer's plant and equipment fit for service, in compliance with statutory 
regulations and insured. Customers with multiple sites dealt with different 
engineers. As each engineer sent his report independently to the customer, the 
quality and consistency of the reports varied significantly. Information was 
poorly managed in the organisation. Individuals, especially engineers held 
information in their heads or in their filing cabinets. As customer and plant 
information was dispersed, few, if any, people had an overall view of the 
inspection and insurance service. 
Foundry Insurance's inspection service was highly fragmented, with much 
duplication and repetition and significant amounts of paper being passed 
between head office and engineers. (C_SOC # 6.1) 
The remaining first order constructs, interpretation, and second order 
constructs relating to the conceptual bin - commencement - can be found in 
Appendix 6, section A1_6.3. 
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6.4 Changes that occurred 
6.4.1 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"The Business Plan I inherited was a model of brevity; it ran to one and a 
quarter pages. It basically said 'We're going to keep on doing what 
we've always done and we're going to make a profit in 1991 '. . .. our 
Service Standards, well we didn't have any. We had no measure of 
almost anything in the organisation in terms of how long it took us to do 
anything or the quality of delivery." (Managing Director) 
"Whereas the guy before, I think, was quite ruthless. Nobody did 
anything without his say so. (The previous general manager) released 
the brakes a little, but could only let the culture go so far because he 
wanted to keep total control of the costs ... but also in this, a recognition 
of where was this company going? Do you people know where you are 
going? Then the answer was, 'Well we're chugging along as ever'." 
(Deputy Managing Director) 
"The valuable difference ... any process, especially if you've got a 
number of elements - the most obvious one is when nothing goes on at 
all and something is sitting around waiting around to be put on the 
machine or waiting to be serviced in some way- nothing happens, or it's 
in transit. The second part, is when you do things to whatever it might 
be but when you look carefully, much of that's unnecessary anyway. 
Then you start to get to the more interesting bit. The necessary activities 
- now these are your target for automation and improvements in 
efficiency. And finally, the bit that matters and the only bit that matters, 
the small bit is the valuable difference, the bit where your organisation, 
or the person involved in that process, actually adds value for your 
customer." (Managing Director) 
"They (the management team) also, I think, learned they needed to be 
commercial (in terms of profitability) and that servicing the client was 
equally important." (Deputy Managing Director) 
6.4.1 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Foundry Insurance's objective was to make a profit by controlling costs. 
Foundry Insurance's previous management team prepared the business plan on 
the basis of previous years' financial performance. The previous board's plan 
barely considered customer service. People within Foundry Insurance, from 
board members to clerks, were unaware of customer service levels provided to 
customers and service standards did not exist in the organisation. The new 
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managing director focused upon the valuable difference, namely the essence of 
the process that adds value to the customer. He encouraged the management 
team to consider not only cost control and profitability to be important but also 
service quality to customers. The board realised that the organisation needed to 
raise the level of customer service and achieve profit targets. 
Foundry Insurance's objectives became to provide customers with inspection 
reports promptly and to achieve profit targets. (CTO _SOC # 6. 7) 
The remaining first order constructs, interpretation, and second order 
constructs relating to the conceptual bin - changes that occurred - can be found 
in Appendix 6, section A2 _ 6.4. 
6.5 Issues Managed 
6.5.1 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"My chairman is the chap who's just been made Chief Executive of 
(Composite Insurers) and he had just taken over the chairmanship of 
Foundry Insurance in 1990, and he basically looked around and said 'We 
have a problem, I need someone to sort it'. And that's why I actually 
didn't last long in the IT Department. I'd actually gone into the IT 
Department I think to help them. But when they looked round and said 
they had this problem, I got pulled out and pushed into Foundry 
Insurance to sort this." (Managing Director) 
"I think as an organisation, we were very much sort of home grown. The 
junior could end up as the managing director, sort of thing." 
(Implementation Team Leader) 
"I think the fact that when (the new managing director) arrived, he was a 
different type of managing director, general manager as he was then ... 
previous general managers had been home grown, had been insurance or 
engineering specialists, and he being neither of those, brought about the 
thing that had this catalytic bit, which is the drive from the top. He was 
able to provide the impetus top down which brought about the change ... 
certainly he (the IT manager) was there on the Exec., but the others have 
gone, and new people have come in. (The new marketing director) came 
in - he was appointed from outside, (the engineering director) came from 
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outside - outside the group altogether, both of them." (Implementation 
Team Member) 
6.5.1 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Composite Insurers appointed a new chairman to Foundry Insurance's 
board. He recognised that Foundry Insurance faced major difficulties due to 
overdue inspections. He also recognised that Foundry Insurance had outdated 
systems that needed to be replaced. The chairman appointed a senior manager 
from another division to assist Foundry Insurance's IT department to update the 
systems. Foundry Insurance's general manager retired, and the chairman 
appointed the senior manager he placed in the IT department to the general 
manager position. This appointment differed from those of previous general 
managers. Previous general managers were steeped in engineering insurance, 
and were promoted traditionally from within Foundry Insurance. Whereas, the 
new managing director had little engineering insurance experience, and was the 
first to be appointed as the head of Foundry Insurance from outside. He had 
little allegiance to any one function nor did he feel the need to preserve the 
status quo. 
Foundry Insurance's general manager retired and the chairman appointed a new 
managing director even though he had little insurance experience. (IM _SOC # 
6.23) 
The remaining first order constructs, interpretation, and second order 
constructs relating to the conceptual bin - issues managed - can be found in 
Appendix 6, section A3 _ 6.5. 
6.6 Effects of radical process orientation 
6.6.1 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Instead of doing, for example, we probably only serviced 70-75% of our 
business, and it's now 98-99% on time, and we've achieved that by 
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concentrating the efforts on those things . . . . .. all this has led to a greater 
focus on the customer to give us the contractual ... to enable us to satisfy 
the contractual responsibilities which we had ... we're actually delivering 
the service we promised to do . . . without increasing the staff . . . our 
overdue situation has improved because we have focussed on managing 
these issues." (Engineering Manager) 
"The first inspection reports - they all go out to the client within about 24 
hours when they've been printed." (Departmental Team Leader) 
6.6.1 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
There has been a substantial increase in the service level provided to 
customers based upon the redesigned inspection process. Prior to this, 
customers waited several weeks or months for an inspection report. The 
redesigned inspection process ensures that most customers receive their reports 
1-3 days after the inspection is carried out. 
Foundry Insurance implemented the inspection process and consequently 
achieves substantially improved service levels and fulfils its contractual 
obligations to comply with relevant statutory regulations. (ERPO _SOC # 6.56) 
The remaining first order constructs, interpretation, and second order 
constructs relating to the conceptual bin - effects of radical process orientation -
can be found in Appendix 6, section A4_6.6. 
6. 7 Classifying the second order constructs 
These second order constructs are classified according to the conceptual 
categories from which the initial conceptual model was derived. 
Conceptual Second order constructs 
category 
Rationale for Foundry Insurance's inspection service was highly fragmented, with 
radical process much duplication and repetition and significant amounts of paper being 
orientation passed between head office and engineers. (C _SOC # 6.1) 
The board realised that the organisation needed to retain existing 
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Choice of 
change 
initiatives 
Content and 
nature of 
changes 
experienced 
Gaining and 
sustaining buy-
Ill 
People affected 
by the changes 
customers, as longstanding customers moved their business to 
competitors. (C_SOC # 6.2) 
Foundry Insurance experienced its first financial loss of £6.3 million and 
had unfulfilled contractual obligations. (C_SOC # 6.3) 
Foundry Insurance wanted to bring activities that affected customer 
service under management's control. (C SOC# 6.4) 
Foundry Insurance previously attempted to address drivers for change by 
upgrading its information systems and carrying out a reorganisation. 
(C_SOC # 6.5) 
The drivers for change required organisational changes to be co-ordinated 
changes across engineering, boiler, electrical, machinery, administration, 
and customer services functions at managerial and operational levels. 
(C_SOC # 6.6) 
Foundry Insurance's objectives became to provide customers with 
inspection reports promptly and to achieve profit targets. (CTO_SOC # 
6.7) 
Foundry Insurance created the inspection process from activities in the 
functional structure. (CTO_SOC # 6.8) 
Directors, managers, team leaders and clerks are responsible for their 
functional activities and the inspection process. (CTO _SOC# 6.9) 
The board changed appraisal procedures to align appraisal criteria for 
functional activities and the inspection process. (CTO _SOC # 6.1 0) 
People, including board members, senior managers, team leaders and 
clerks, behave in an informal way with one another, and are more 
communicative and open with each other. (CTO_SOC # 6.12) 
The board realised that information systems needed to provide seamless 
support across activities that form the inspection process. (CTO _SOC # 
6.13) 
The board accepted that reward systems would not be changed. 
(CTO_SOC # 6.11) 
Foundry Insurance's service target became to achieve a 24-hour 
turnaround of inspection reports. (CTO_SOC # 6.14) 
Foundry Insurance's board recognised prevailing operational assumptions 
were untenable and changed them to align with the redesigned inspection 
process. (CTO_SOC # 6.15) 
In Foundry Insurance, the previous management team did not accept that 
greater emphasis needed to be placed on customer service than upon 
controlling costs. (CTO_SOC # 6.16) 
The previous board did not accept that operational assumptions such as 
withholding information actually needed to change. (CTO _SOC # 6.17) 
The previous management team did not accept that people's 
responsibilities should extend beyond their immediate job or be 
collaborative across hierarchy and function. (CTO _SOC # 6.18) 
Foundry Insurance's new managing director and board members accepted 
that line managers should actually have financial and operational 
information. (CTO_SOC # 6.19) 
Directors and senior managers were affected by the changes, as the 
organisation structure and the number of people reporting to them 
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Selecting the 
issues to be 
managed 
Mode of 
operationalising 
issues to be 
managed 
changed, in some cases, significantly. (CTO _SOC # 6.20) 
The board was willing to reduce the number of people employed by the 
organisation. (CTO_SOC # 6.21) 
Foundry Insurance's board devolved control over budgets to senior 
managers who, in tum, took responsibility to develop and operate their 
own budgets. (CTO SOC# 6.22) 
The board agreed a new vision and objectives for the organisation. 
(IM_ SOC # 6.25) 
The board and managers accepted that people wanted to know about the 
changes due to take place and they became more open with this 
information. (IM_SOC # 6.27) 
Board members shared financial information and devolved budgetary 
responsibility to managers. (IM _SOC # 6.28) 
Managers have operational information required to manage the inspection 
process. (IM _SOC # 6.29) 
Board members were willing to communicate with people on a face-to-
face basis, in small groups. (IM_SOC # 6.30) 
People in the organisation received consistent messages about external 
pressures facing the organisation and the need to implement the 
inspection process. (IM_SOC # 6.31) 
Board members and senior managers recognised that people at lower 
levels of the organisation, e.g. engineering and clerical levels, are 
important to the organisation's future. (IM_SOC # 6.33) 
The board introduced early retirement and voluntary redundancy schemes 
to reduce costs quickly and avoid trade union conflicts, but lost some 
'good' people. (IM_SOC # 6.34) 
People aligned appraisal criteria to the inspection process and made the 
annual appraisal meeting discursive. (IM_SOC # 6.36) 
The board reduced the number of levels in the hierarchy, merged and 
created departments to align the functional structure with the inspection 
process. (IM_SOC # 6.39) 
The board promoted people on the basis of their performance rather than 
length of service. (IM _SOC # 6.40) 
The board invested substantial amounts of resources in new systems, 
including some bespoke applications. (IM SOC# 6.44) 
The board commissioned a survey and the results revealed that customers' 
expectations were not being satisfied and gave people, in the organisation, 
customer feedback about the quality of service customers received. 
(IM _SOC # 6.32) 
Foundry Insurance insourced the plant database, from Composite 
Insurer's IT function, thereby bringing its systems under its own control. 
(IM_SOC # 6.45) 
Foundry Insurance developed the systems required to support the 
inspection process at less expense and in a shorter period of time by 
managing the development themselves rather than relying on Composite 
Insurer's IT function. (IM_SOC # 6.46) 
The board implemented systems to support the inspection process. 
(IM SOC # 6.48) 
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Actual 
implementation 
of the issues 
Post 
implementation 
of radical 
process 
orientation 
The managing director and IT manager set tight deadlines for 
implementation teams, and prioritised systems, which were developed in 
modules. (IM_SOC # 6.49) 
Board members and managers designed the inspection process after 
questioning existing operational assumptions. (IM_SOC # 6.50) 
Board members and managers provided implementation teams with 
support, especially when things were not going according to plan. 
(IM SOC# 6.53) 
Foundry Insurance's general manager retired and the chairman appointed 
a new managing director even though he had little insurance experience. 
(IM_SOC # 6.23) 
Board members retired or resigned, and the board was restructured with 
new board members appointed from outside or promoted from within the 
organisation. (IM_SOC # 6.24) 
People left the organisation because they did not accept the proposed 
changes. (IM _SOC # 6.26) 
Board members and managers recognised and attempted to reduce 
people's fears, anxieties and stress levels by changing their own 
behaviour and by supporting people through the implementation. 
(IM_SOC # 6.35) 
The managing director was willing to find out about the previous 
inspection service and to lead the implementation of the inspection 
process. (IM_SOC # 6.37) 
The managing director made symbolic changes to bring people together. 
(IM_SOC # 6.38) 
Engineers and other system users were willing to learn to operate the 
systems, and their aptitude to use the systems was tested. (IM _SOC # 
6.47) 
Foundry Insurance's board members created IT implementation teams 
with people from different departments and external support. (IM_SOC # 
6.51) 
Line managers and implementation team members took responsibility for 
implementing the inspection process. (IM_SOC # 6.52) 
Foundry Insurance created user groups to work with implementation 
teams during the development of the systems but mismanaged some of 
their expectations. (IM_SOC # 6.54) 
The board gave the implementation teams a mandate to implement the 
inspection process and the supporting information systems. (IM _SOC # 
6.55) 
Foundry Insurance implemented the inspection process and consequently 
achieves substantially improved service levels and fulfils its contractual 
obligations to comply with relevant statutory regulations. (ERPO _SOC # 
6.56) 
The organisation moved back into profit. (ERPO _SOC# 6.57) 
Foundry Insurance's systems are substantially improved although they 
were developed on separate platforms. (ERPO_SOC # 6.58) 
Foundry Insurance's management has better control over the inspection 
process. (ERPO SOC# 6.59) 
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Some aspects of the old organisation can still be found in the redesigned 
inspection process. (ERPO SOC# 6.60) 
Implementor The board devolved operational responsibility for the inspection process 
and recipient to managers below them in the hierarchy. (IM _SOC # 6.41) 
roles Managers took responsibility for the inspection process, and cascaded this 
responsibility to team leaders and engineers. (IM_SOC # 6.42) 
The board provided people at all levels with substantial training to 
broaden their range of skills; board members learnt new skills and 
convinced managers to learn new skills, and managers convinced team 
leaders to do the same. (IM SOC# 6.43) 
6.8 Synthesising the second order constructs for each 
conceptual category: case conclusions 
The aim of this section is to conclude the Foundry Insurance case study. 
The brief concluding comments below are not linked back to the second order 
constructs at this point of the analysis because in Chapter 7 the cases are 
synthesised at the level of the second order constructs and because these 
comments are not built upon in further analysis. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'rationale for radical process 
orientation' leads to the conclusion that Foundry Insurance had an inspection 
process that was inefficient (as evidenced by duplication and repetition of work) 
and ineffective (as evidenced by poor levels of customer service). The 
organisation also experienced its first financial loss in its history. The board and 
senior managers considered the redesign of the inspection process to be an 
opportunity to bring activities under the control of management. 
The second order construct categorised as 'choice of change initiatives' 
suggests that the organisation tried to address the operational and financial 
pressures by changing its information systems and reorganising its structure. 
The information systems were developed by the parent company's IT function. 
The systems took four years to be implemented and were imposed upon 
engineers. Consequently, the systems were rarely used. The reorganisation 
involved the creation of forty work groups, which resulted in fragmenting the 
organisation and moving the activities people performed apart rather than 
integrating them. Thus, the second order constructs suggest that other initiatives 
were deployed prior to process orientation. 
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The second order constructs categorised as 'content and nature of 
changes experienced' lead to the conclusion that organisational elements such as 
Foundry Insurance's strategy, structure, people's responsibilities and assessment 
criteria, their behaviours and information systems changed. For instance, board 
members and senior managers communicated with people in a formal manner. 
Board members spent most of their time in their offices and rarely spoke to 
people who were not their direct reports. However, the organisation became 
more informal as directors and senior managers spoke to people at all levels in 
the organisation. Each became more closely aligned to a function and process 
orientation. For example, the information systems supported the activities in the 
functions that form the parcel delivery process. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'gaining and sustaining buy-
in' suggest that understanding the changes board members and senior managers 
accept need to occur is essential to the achievement of radical process 
orientation. For example, the previous board did not accept that financial and 
operational information should be disseminated across the organisation. Hence 
this did not change until the new managing director was appointed. He accepted 
that financial and operational information should be shared with people at all 
levels in the organisation. The changes that board members and senior 
managers accepted were implemented; and those changes that were not accepted 
were not implemented. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'people affected by the 
changes' reveal that board members and senior managers in Foundry Insurance 
were affected by the changes. Some directors had the numbers of people 
reporting to them reduced significantly, while other directors, e.g. the IT 
director, had the number of people reporting to him increase from 29 to 190. 
Hence, these second order constructs lead to the assertion that board members 
and senior managers are recipients of the changes. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'selecting issues to be 
managed' suggest that the organisation identified issues based upon the changes 
that need to occur. For instance, the board became more open with information, 
and communicated more informally, i.e. in small groups on a face-to-face basis. 
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These second order constructs suggest that Foundry Insurance followed neither a 
prescriptive model nor a generic set of actions. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'mode of operationalising the 
Issues to be managed' indicate that Foundry Insurance utilised evolutionary 
modes of implementation, e.g. carrying out a customer survey, questioning 
assumptions and providing the implementation team with support during 
difficult periods of implementation. The organisation also used radical modes, 
e.g. insourcing information systems developments and setting tight deadlines for 
the implementation of the changes. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'actual implementation of the 
issues' suggest that people were willing to take responsibility for 
implementation and for carrying out the actions required to implement the 
change. For example, people had to manage the fears and insecurities of others 
who thought they might lose their job while at the same time reducing the 
number of people working in the organisation. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'post implementation of 
radical process orientation' suggest that as a consequence of implementing 
radical process orientation the drivers for change were addressed. The 
organisation returned to profitability, and improvements in customer service 
stemmed the flow of customers to competitors. However, some aspects of the 
organisation, e.g. people creating backlogs to indicate the pressure they are 
under, still remain. 
The second order constructs categorised as 'implementor and recipient 
roles' reveal that people fulfilled both roles as the inspection process was 
implemented. Managers were recipients, e.g. having to take on budgetary 
responsibilities but they were also implementors in the sense that they devolved 
responsibilities to team leaders. Thus, the second order constructs suggest that 
the demarcation between the roles is not evident in practice. 
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6.9 Chapter summary 
This chapter describes, in rich detail, Foundry Insurance's achievement 
of the inspection process. It developed second order constructs from an 
interpretation of the first order constructs. It then categorised the second order 
constructs according to the conceptual categories. The case study was 
concluded by synthesising the second order constructs for each conceptual 
category. 
In the next chapter, the second order constructs from Carton Carrier and 
Foundry Insurance will be conjoined and synthesised with the literature to 
develop theoretical propositions from the conceptual categories. The theoretical 
propositions will be used to construct an emergent model for the achievement of 
radical process orientation. 
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Chapter 7 Synthesis: constructing theoretical 
propositions and an emergent conceptual model for the 
achievement of radical process orientation 
7.1 Chapter introduction 
Whereas the three previous chapters presented an analysis of empirical 
data using the research methodology and conceptual model developed earlier, 
the focus of this chapter is the synthesis of the data. This develops theoretical 
propositions from the conceptual categories relevant to the achievement of 
radical process orientation based upon empirical data in the form of the second 
order constructs. The second order constructs are compared to the existing 
literature relating to each conceptual category to ensure each theoretical 
proposition's integrity. An emergent model for the achievement of radical 
process is constructed by drawing together the theoretical propositions. 
This chapter begins with a brief reminder of the initial conceptual model 
for the achievement of radical process orientation. This model's conceptual bins 
are revisited briefly. Next, theoretical propositions for the conceptual bins are 
developed. The theoretical propositions are based upon the second order 
constructs developed in the two previous chapters. A clear trail of evidence is 
established between the first order constructs and theoretical propositions, by 
referring to the second order construct numbers, details of which can be found in 
the respective case chapter. The structure to develop the theoretical propositions 
is explained. The theoretical propositions are then synthesised to form an 
emergent model for the achievement of radical process orientation. The 
penultimate section explains structural differences between the initial and 
emergent models. The final section summarises this chapter, and sets the scene 
for the concluding chapter. 
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7.2 A reminder of the initial conceptual model 
The initial conceptual model for the achievement of radical process 
orientation was based upon the conceptual categories that emerged from an 
analysis of the radical process orientation literature. The model has four 
conceptual bins (Miles and Huberman, 1994): commencement, changes that 
occurred, issues managed, and effects of radical process orientation. The 
model's conceptual bins were used as the analytical framework for developing 
second order constructs. The conceptual bin labelled commencement is 
informed by two conceptual categories, 'rationale for radical process orientation' 
and 'choice of change initiatives'. The existing literature characterises the 
rationale for starting a radical process orientation initiative in terms of the 
drivers for change, which can be threats or opportunities. The basis upon which 
organisations choose radical process orientation is unclear. The conceptual bin 
labelled changes that occurred is informed by three conceptual categories. First, 
'content and nature of changes experienced', as this is characterised by 
inconsistencies and contradictions in the literature. Second, 'gaining and 
sustaining buy-in' is essential to radical process orientation yet there is little 
agreement about the means of achieving it. Third, 'people affected by the 
changes' are considered, in the literature, to be sources of resistance and, hence, 
need to be identified so that resistance can be minimised. The issues managed 
bin is informed by three conceptual categories. One, 'selection of issues to be 
managed', as the literature provides contradictory prescriptive models and lists 
of generic actions that influence success. Two, 'mode of operationalising the 
issues to be managed' is poorly understood although it is recognised as critical 
to the achievement of radical process orientation. Three, 'actual implementation 
of the issues to be managed' informs this conceptual bin, as little research has 
been done to explain why one organisation actually achieves radical process 
orientation while another does not. The conceptual bin labelled effects of 
radical process orientation refers to the situation following the achievement of 
radical process orientation, and is informed by the conceptual category 'post 
implementation of radical process orientation'. 
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Having provided this brief reminder, this chapter proceeds to develop the 
initial model based upon empirical evidence, in the form of second order 
constructs, from the case study organisations. 
7.3 Interpretation: constructing theoretical propositions 
7.3.1 Structure of this section 
The following four-part analytical structure is utilised to develop each 
theoretical proposition. Part A is entitled 'recapitulating the literature' and it 
summarises key arguments and features for each conceptual category established 
previously (Chapter 2, section 5). Further information about the arguments, 
features and source literature can be found there. Part B is entitled 'second order 
constructs to be conjoined', and it brings together second order constructs from 
each case study based on the conceptual category under which the second order 
construct was classified. Further information about each second order construct 
can be found in the case study chapter by referring to the number in parenthesis. 
Part C is entitled 'interpreting the literature and conjoined second order 
constructs', and here the second order constructs are discussed and compared to 
the literature related to the conceptual category to highlight gaps in existing 
research that the theoretical propositions and emergent model aim to address. 
Part D is entitled 'resulting theoretical proposition', and proposes a theoretical 
proposition based upon the previous three parts. 
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7.3.2 Commencement 
7.3.2 (i) Refining conceptual category: rationale for radical 
process orientation 
A. Recapitulating the literature 
The current literature relating to this conceptual category argues that 
organisations initiate radical process orientation when faced by drivers for 
change. Drivers for change answer the question why change. Drivers for 
change are classified as either threats or opportunities. The drivers are used to 
create a case for change that board members can use to gain support for the 
planned changes. Current research suggests that it is vital for organisations to 
identify drivers for change because people are unlikely to support the changes 
unless they are convinced that the threats or opportunities do exist. 
B. The second order constructs to be conjoined 
The second order constructs that were classified as relating to the 
conceptual category of 'rationale for radical process orientation' in the literature 
are: 
+ GMR (Transport)'s previous parcel delivery service was ineffective, 
manually intensive and had poor systems support ( C _SOC # 5.1) 
+ Foundry Insurance's previous inspection service was highly 
fragmented, with much duplication and repetition and significant 
amounts of paper being passed between head office and engineers 
(C_SOC # 6.1) 
+ GMR (Transport)'s major customer, Home Merchandise, faced 
increased pressures from competitors (C_SOC # 5.2) 
+ GMR (Transport) continued to provide poor levels of service to Home 
Merchandise in spite of its changing situation (C_SOC # 5.3) 
+ Home Merchandise wanted the two organisations' operations to be 
more closely aligned (C_SOC # 5.4) 
+ GMR (Transport)' s customers were leaving due to long and 
inconsistent delivery times (C_SOC # 5.5) 
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+ In Foundry Insurance, the board realised that the organisation needed 
to retain existing customers, as longstanding customers moved their 
business to competitors (C_SOC # 6.2) 
+ One of GMR (Transport)'s depots had 82,000 undelivered parcels and 
27 trailers with undelivered parcels on board parked on the street 
outside the depot (C _SOC # 5 .6) 
+ Foundry Insurance experienced its first financial loss of £6.3 million 
and had unfulfilled contractual obligations (C _SOC # 6.3) 
+ In GMR (Transport) lack of management control over parcel selection 
and actual delivery of parcels led to inconsistent delivery times and 
poor levels of service and managers sought to take control over 
activities that affected delivery times and service levels to customers 
(C_SOC # 5.7) 
+ Foundry Insurance wanted to bring activities that affected customer 
service under management's control (C_SOC # 6.4) 
C. Interpreting the literature and conjoined second order 
constructs 
The second order constructs reconfirm current research: that 
organisations face drivers for change. The case organisations faced three drivers 
for change that are interpreted as threats. These are deep flaws in the previous 
business process (C_SOC # 5.1) and (C_SOC # 6.1), stakeholders changing their 
relationship with the organisation (C_SOC # 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5) and (C_SOC # 
6.2), and a major financial or operational crisis (C_SOC # 5.6) and (C_SOC # 
6.3). The organisations also identified a driver for change that is interpreted as 
an opportunity, namely seeking to bring activities in different functions under 
management's control (C_SOC # 5.7) and (C_SOC # 6.4). The second order 
constructs add an insight to current research relating to the conceptual category, 
rationale for radical process orientation. The literature often presents the drivers 
for change as being threats or opportunities. The second order constructs 
indicate that the organisations recognised threats and opportunities. Carton 
Carrier's board sought to bring two activities, parcel selection and physical 
delivery, that affected delivery levels under management control. In Foundry 
Insurance, inspection reports were delayed, as each report had to be checked and 
rechecked as it moved from one department to another. The board wanted 
managers and team leaders to take control of work priorities to ensure 
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individuals performed their tasks without customers having to wait months for 
their inspection report. Hence, this research asserts that the literature makes an 
undue suggestion, namely organisations face threats or opportunities. This 
research argues that organisations should consider threats and opportunities. 
D. Resulting theoretical proposition (# 1) 
Based upon the literature, the second order constructs and above 
discussion relating to the conceptual category 'rationale for radical process 
orientation', the following theoretical proposition is constructed: 
Theoretical proposition # 1: Radical process orientation is more likely to be 
achieved when people accept the organisation's drivers for change, 
which can be opportunities and threats. 
7.3.2 (ii) Refining conceptual category: choice of change 
initiatives 
A. Recapitulating the literature 
Current research argues that drivers for change lead directly to the need 
for a radical process orientation initiative. Researchers cite two reasons for this 
belief, although both lines of reasoning are deficient. One, other change 
initiatives are deemed to be inherently limited and two, organisations are 
expected to achieve radical performance improvements. However, the 
conceptual category, choice of change initiatives, reveals that organisations have 
several change initiatives available to them, which can be used to address the 
drivers for change. Hence, organisations have to select radical process 
orientation from a range of change initiatives. Yet current research is silent in 
terms of providing analytical criteria that organisations could use to select 
radical process orientation rather than another type of change initiative. 
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B. The second order constructs to be conjoined 
The second order constructs that were classified as relating to the 
conceptual category of 'choice of change initiatives' in the literature are: 
+ Carton Carrier began to address its drivers for change with a work 
study initiative, which involved examining the activities performed to 
deliver a parcel (C_SOC # 5.8) 
+ Foundry Insurance previously attempted to address drivers for change 
by upgrading its information systems and carrying out a 
reorganisation (C _SOC # 6.5) 
+ In Carton Carrier's the drivers for change required organisational 
changes to be co-ordinated across sort centres and depot operations at 
managerial and operational levels (C_SOC # 5.9) 
+ In Foundry Insurance, the drivers for change required organisational 
changes to be co-ordinated across engineering, boiler, electrical, 
machinery, administration, and customer services functions, at 
managerial and operational levels (C_SOC # 6.6) 
C. Interpreting the literature and conjoined second order 
constructs 
Current research makes the assumption that the drivers for change lead 
automatically to a radical process orientation initiative. However, the second 
order constructs, (CTO_SOC # 5.8) and (CTO_SOC # 6.5), indicate that the link 
between drivers for change and the selection of a radical process orientation 
initiative is not as obvious as current thinking assumes. These second order 
constructs reveal that the organisations did not immediately choose radical 
process orientation as the means of addressing drivers for change. Instead, they 
addressed the drivers for change with other types of initiatives such as work 
study, technology-based automation and restructuring. This confirms findings in 
the radical organisational change literature, which recognises that organisations 
have several change initiative options. These second order constructs suggest 
that organisations need to understand and agree that the drivers for change will 
be addressed by a radical process orientation initiative. The current radical 
process orientation literature overlooks this decision point, which results in 
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organisations either selecting radical process orientation when its inappropriate 
or, as the case organisations discovered, attempting to address drivers for change 
with unsuitable initiatives. The second order constructs suggest that the need for 
radical process orientation is bound up with the drivers for change identified 
earlier. 
The literature also fails to provide analytical criteria by which 
organisations can systematically assess the suitability of radical process 
orientation. The second order constructs, (C_SOC # 5.9) and (C_SOC # 6.6), 
suggest tentative criteria that could be used to establish the need for radical 
process orientation. Organisations are more likely to need radical process 
orientation where drivers for change require changes to organisational elements 
to be co-ordinated across several functions, and require increased levels of 
managerial and operational interdependence between activities in those 
functions. The changes in the case organisations were co-ordinated in the sense 
that each function's changes dovetailed together. Managerial and operational 
interdependence refers to aligning activities in different functions to create a 
concurrence of effort that will resolve the driver for change. These second order 
constructs indicate that the drivers for change and the need for radical process 
orientation are coupled. 
D. Resulting theoretical proposition (# 2) 
Based upon the literature, the second order constructs and above 
discussion relating to the conceptual category 'choice of change initiatives', the 
following theoretical proposition is constructed: 
Theoretical proposition # 2: Radical process orientation is more likely to be 
achieved when people establish the need for radical process orientation 
rather than another type of change initiative. 
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7.3.3 Changes that occurred 
7.3.3 (i) Refining conceptual category: content and nature of 
changes experienced 
A. Recapitulating the literature 
The radical process orientation literature contains an imprecision at the 
heart of its conceptualisation of radical organisational change, namely it is 
characterised in terms of significant expected performance improvements. The 
content and nature of changes to organisational elements, such as strategy, 
structure, people and information systems, are regarded as a consequence of the 
radical improvements sought by that organisation. The literature review relating 
to this conceptual category concluded that this conceptualisation of radical 
organisational change differs from that of the mainstream organisational change 
theorists. They conceive performance improvements to be contingent upon the 
changes to organisational elements. There is also much confusion regarding the 
nature of changes organisations experience due to radical process orientation. 
Some researchers suggest realignment from a functional to a predominantly 
process perspective; others either suggest organisations retain their functional 
structure; others are silent about the nature of the changes that occur. The 
literature review also identified a weakness in current research, specifically that 
board members and senior managers pay insufficient attention to the content and 
nature of the changes that are likely to occur during the achievement of radical 
process orientation. 
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B. The second order constructs to be conjoined 
The second order constructs that were classified as relating to the 
conceptual category of 'content and nature of changes experienced' 1n the 
literature are: 
+ Carton Carrier treat performance in terms of both service quality and 
profit and cost control as strategically important (CTO_SOC # 5.10) 
+ Foundry Insurance's objectives became to provide customers with 
inspection reports promptly and to achieve profit targets (CTO SOC# 
6.7) 
+ Carton Carrier created the parcel delivery process from activities 
within the functional structure (CTO_SOC # 5.11) 
+ Carton Carrier altered the balance between functions and the parcel 
delivery process, such that the process is considered as essential as the 
functions in the organisation (CTO_SOC # 5.12) 
+ Foundry Insurance created the inspection process from activities in 
the functional structure (CTO_SOC # 6.8) 
+ People, including directors, depot managers and parcel delivery 
managers, in Carton Carrier took responsibility for their functional 
activities as well as the parcel delivery process (CTO_SOC # 5.13) 
+ In Foundry Insurance, directors, managers, team leaders and clerks 
are responsible for their functional activities and the inspection 
process (CTO_SOC # 6.9) 
+ In Carton Carrier, people's appraisal criteria are linked to their 
functional activities and the results expected from the parcel delivery 
process (CTO_SOC # 5.14) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board changed appraisal procedures to align 
appraisal criteria for functional activities and the inspection process 
(CTO_SOC # 6.10) 
+ In Carton Carrier, people, board members, regional general managers, 
depot managers, assistant depot managers, parcel delivery managers, 
and drivers, changed their behaviours towards one another where they 
are less threatening and recognise people at all levels contribute to the 
business (CTO_SOC # 5.16) 
+ People including board members, senior managers, team leaders and 
clerks behave in an informal way with one another, are more 
communicative and open with each other (CTO_SOC # 6.12) 
+ Carton Carrier's new information systems track parcels across the 
parcel delivery process (CTO_SOC # 5.17) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board realised that information systems needed 
to provide seamless support across the activities that form the 
inspection process (CTO_SOC # 6.13) 
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C. Interpreting the literature and conjoined second order 
constructs 
The current literature recommends board members and senior managers 
spend up to 70% of their time on radical process orientation initiatives. This 
implies researchers consider these initiatives to be strategic importance to 
organisations. Yet the radical process orientation literature rarely suggests that 
the organisation's strategy itself needs to change. The prevailing strategy is 
assumed to be appropriate and that the radical process orientation initiative is 
expected to fit around it. This perspective differs from the second order 
constructs, (CTO_SOC # 5.10) and (CTO_SOC # 6.7), that reveals board 
members and senior managers changed their organisation's strategy. For 
instance, Carton Carrier's previous board members considered profitability to be 
more important than customer service. However, the new chairman and key 
directors recognised that consistency and quality of service and profitability 
were vital to Carton Carrier's future success. The strategy was refocused to 
reflect the importance of satisfying stakeholder's expectations, in terms of 
consistent service levels, service quality and profitability, through the redesigned 
process and the functions. One reason the radical process orientation literature 
neglects to identify that the strategy needs to change is centred on its 
conceptualisation of radical organisational change. Researchers argue that 
organisations can set challenging new performance improvement targets and 
retain their current strategy. However, they neglect to check the appropriateness 
of the current strategy to the drivers for change and the 'stretch' targets. Any 
potential discord between the drivers for change, strategy and improvement 
targets manifests itself in a lack of clear direction. The second order constructs 
show that the organisations changed the strategy to align with the stretch targets 
and drivers for change. These second order constructs also reinforce the 
conceptual weakness of radical organisational change as it is presented in the 
process orientation literature. On the other hand, a change in strategy is central 
to radical organisational change in the radical organisational change literature. 
Drawing on this body of research and these constructs this research argues that 
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the content of change needs to include a change to the organisation's strategy. 
The second order constructs suggest the nature of the change to the 
organisation's strategy is to comprise the process and functional dimensions. 
For example, Carton Carrier defined its strategy in terms of service levels to be 
delivered by the parcel delivery process, and in terms of profitability to be 
achieved by the depot operations function. As the radical process orientation 
literature barely recognises the need to change the organisation's strategy, it is 
silent on the nature of change to the strategy. 
The literature provides little clarity on the content and nature of changes 
to the organisation's structure. The second order constructs ( CTO _SOC # 5.11 ), 
(CTO _SOC # 5.12) and (CTO _SOC # 6.8) suggest that the organisations 
specified the content of the changes to structure in terms of the functions that 
formed part of the process. For instance, Carton Carrier's parcel delivery 
process consists of activities in five functions namely, sort centre, trunking, 
depot operations, customer services, and finance. Foundry Insurance's 
inspection process consists of activities in four functions, which are customer 
services unit, field engineers, administration, and technical. The second order 
constructs provide an insight into the nature of change to structure, specifically 
the organisations managed the process and the functions. This diverges from 
current research, which frames the nature of change to structure as a choice 
between retaining the functional structure or creating a process structure. These 
second order constructs indicate that the choice in the current literature needs to 
be modified to 'function and process', as organisations strike a balance between 
the two. 
The literature relating to people's responsibilities and appraisal criteria 
defines the content of the changes in generic terms. For example, organisations 
are advised that levels of empowerment need to increase, decision making 
authority needs to be delegated and people compensated based upon the 
profitability or value created by the process. However, the literature fails to 
specify the extent to which people should be empowered or the level to which 
decision making authority should be delegated. As the content of the change is 
defined in nebulous terms, changes to these organisational elements are subject 
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to confusion, open to misinterpretation and are difficult to implement, as the 
issues to be managed will depend upon exact definitions. The second order 
constructs, (CTO_SOC # 5.13), (CTO_SOC # 6.9), (CTO_SOC # 5.14), and 
(CTO _SOC # 6.1 0), contribute to the literature by clarifying the content of the 
changes to people's responsibilities and appraisal criteria. The second order 
constructs reveal a link between people's operational and financial performance 
targets as specified by the process and the functional activities they perform. 
Hence, the content of the change is specified in terms of the extent to which 
functional responsibilities and appraisal criteria of people in the process are 
changed to correspond to the process's operational and financial targets. This 
insight allows organisations to begin to define more precisely the content of the 
changes to people's responsibilities and appraisal criteria. The literature related 
to the nature of changes to people's responsibilities and appraisal criteria 
emphasises aligning these elements to the process while neglecting functional 
requirements. The second order constructs suggest that neither the function nor 
the process can be ignored, and is illustrated with case evidence. For instance, 
people in Carton Carrier were previously responsible for their function only and 
they rarely concerned themselves with problems faced by other functions. The 
directors sought to have people take responsibility for problems that arise in 
their function and the parcel delivery process, and changed the responsibilities 
of people such as directors, depot managers, and supervisors accordingly. 
Carton Carrier's directors also recognised that changes needed to occur to 
people's appraisal criteria. For example, depot managers were appraised 
previously for their depot's operational efficiency, whereas they are appraised 
for depot profitability and also the quality of service provided to customers of 
that depot. In Foundry Insurance, people focused upon their individual tasks, to 
the virtual exclusion of customers and other departments in the process. The 
directors recognised that people needed to take responsibility for service levels 
as well as their functional activity in the inspection process. In Foundry 
Insurance, prior to process orientation, people were appraised on a functional 
basis. This changed as people agreed appraisal criteria that related to their 
function, e.g. the time they had to complete their task, and the inspection process 
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in terms of delivering reports to customers in 24 hours. The second order 
constructs add to the existing literature by suggesting that the nature of the 
change to people's responsibilities and appraisal criteria is an alignment to 
function and process orientation. 
The second order constructs {CTO_SOC # 5.16) and (CTO_SOC # 6.12) 
suggest that people behave in ways that are collaborative with colleagues in 
different functions and hierarchical levels of the process. The second order 
constructs reveal that the content of change begins with individuals realising 
their own behaviour needs to change. For example, Carton Carrier's managing 
director and senior managers realised that their behaviours towards each other 
and other people in the process needed to change. They also realised that people 
in direct contact with customers, not only drivers but depot line managers as 
well, were vital to the business. They changed their behaviours by listening 
directly to line managers' ideas for improving the business and their concerns 
about the changes created by radical process orientation, and by acting upon 
what they were told, where possible. The current literature implies that the 
content of change in relation to behaviours involves greater openness, increased 
communications and trust. However, the radical process orientation literature 
neglects to point out these changes begin with each individual, especially board 
members and senior managers, realising their own behaviour needs to become 
more collaborative. The literature is also unclear about the nature of the changes 
in people's behaviours. The second order constructs indicate that people need to 
collaborate within their function and across functions and hierarchical levels that 
comprise the process. For example, Foundry Insurance's managing director 
realised that people at all levels needed to be more involved in the business. He 
changed long established behaviours, for example, by walking around the 
building and speaking directly to staff at all levels. Senior managers changed 
their behaviours by encouraging clerks, for example, to speak directly to them 
and their colleagues in other functions that formed part of the inspection process. 
The second order constructs suggests insights into the content and nature of 
collaborative behaviours that are neglected in the literature. 
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The literature related to information systems emits contradictory signals 
about the content of the changes, and barely considers the nature of the changes. 
The content of change ranges from developing new systems to upgrading current 
systems with new systems added on, and the literature provides little guidance to 
understand the content of the change. The second order constructs (C _SOC # 
5.17) and (C_SOC # 6.13) suggest that information systems developed by the 
case organisations depended upon the state of their existing systems. Carton 
Carrier's operations were very paper intensive with virtually no systems and so 
the organisation developed new systems; whereas Foundry Insurance 
significantly developed their existing systems and added on new systems. 
Hence, the content of change to information systems depends upon the 
organisation's current systems. As regards the nature of the change the systems 
support the functional activities and the process. For instance, in Carton Carrier, 
directors and senior managers realised that the existing systems were inadequate 
for the parcel delivery process to operate effectively and that new systems were 
required to support the parcel delivery process. Foundry Insurance's board 
instigated changes to the existing systems, as these were disjointed and 
supported individual activities. Foundry Insurance developed systems that 
supported the functional activities that form inspection process. The nature of 
the change is that information systems are aligned to the functions and process. 
In summary, the second order constructs in this section were classified 
under the conceptual category 'content and nature of changes experienced'. In 
relation to the content of the changes, the second order constructs indicate that 
radical process orientation should be conceptualised in terms of changes to the 
organisational elements, strategy, structure, people's responsibilities and 
appraisal criteria, collaborative behaviours and information systems. This 
conceptualisation is significantly different from current literature, which defines 
radical process orientation in terms of radical performance improvements. In 
relation to the nature of the changes, much of the current research suggests that 
organisations have to choose between a function or process orientation. The 
second order constructs indicate that organisations should balance the 
organisational elements to a function and process orientation. 
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D. Resulting theoretical proposition (# 3) 
Based upon the literature, the second order constructs and above 
discussion relating to the conceptual category 'content and nature of changes 
experienced', the following theoretical proposition is constructed: 
Theoretical proposition # 3: Radical process orientation is more likely to be 
achieved when people recognise organisational elements namely, 
strategy, structure, people's responsibilities and appraisal criteria, 
collaborative behaviours, and information systems, will change and that 
these elements will align to a function and process orientation. 
7.3.3 (ii) 
buy-in 
Refining conceptual category: gaining and sustaining 
A. Recapitulating the literature 
Current research argues that gaining and sustaining the buy-in of board 
members and senior managers is essential to the achievement of radical process 
orientation. Buy-in is conceptualised as people being committed to three 
overlapping components: the drivers for change, the organisation's vision or the 
implementation steps taken to implement radical process orientation. There is 
much written about the best means for obtaining people's buy-in. Some scholars 
argue for the use of rational approaches, e.g. a case for change, to gain and 
sustain buy-in; others argue that an understanding of the organisation's social 
and political dimensions is crucial to achieving buy-in. 
B. The second order constructs to be conjoined 
The second order constructs that were classified as relating to the 
conceptual category of 'gaining and sustaining buy-in' in the literature are: 
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+ Foundry Insurance's new managing director and senior managers 
accepted that line managers should actually have financial and 
operational information (CTO_SOC # 6.19) 
+ Carton Carrier's directors accepted that the withholding of 
information from or providing incorrect information to line managers 
actually needed to be reversed so that they had detailed and accurate 
information (CTO_SOC # 5.21) 
+ Carton Carrier's board accepted that people's remuneration, including 
regional general managers, depot managers, parcel delivery managers 
and drivers, should be changed (CTO_SOC # 5.15) 
+ Carton Carrier's directors accepted that existing operational 
assumptions were flawed and incompatible with the parcel delivery 
process (CTO_SOC # 5.18) 
+ Foundry Insurance's service target became to achieve a 24-hour 
turnaround of inspection reports (CTO_SOC # 6.14) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board recognised prevailing operational 
assumptions were untenable and changed them to align with the 
redesigned inspection process (CTO _SOC# 6.15) 
+ GMR (Transport)'s board did not accept that the organisation's 
autonomy needed to be reduced (CTO_SOC # 5.19) 
+ GMR (Transport)'s directors assumed that they could continue to 
provide line managers with inaccurate financial information or even 
withhold information (CTO_SOC # 5.20) 
+ In Foundry Insurance, the previous management team did not accept 
that greater emphasis needed to be placed on customer service than 
upon controlling costs (CTO _SOC # 6.16) 
+ Foundry Insurance's previous board also did not accept that 
operational· assumptions such as withholding information actually 
needed to change (CTO_SOC # 6.17) 
+ Foundry Insurance's previous management team did not accept that 
people's responsibilities should extend beyond their immediate job or 
be collaborative across hierarchy and function (CTO_SOC # 6.18) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board accepted that reward systems would not be 
changed (CTO_SOC # 6.11) 
C. Interpreting the literature and conjoined second order 
constructs 
The second order constructs listed above, (CTO_SOC # 5.21), 
(CTO_SOC # 6.19) and (CTO_SOC # 5.15) and (CTO_SOC # 5.18) and 
(CTO_SOC # 6.14 and 6.15), suggest that gaining and sustaining people's 
acceptance of the changes that actually need to occur in the organisation is 
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crucial. The second order constructs suggest that board members and senior 
managers be singled out as a particularly important group, as their acceptance of 
the changes directly affects the changes that will be implemented. The reasons 
underpinning this group's importance is already established in the literature. 
However, the second order constructs differ from the radical process orientation 
literature. This literature's conceptualisation of buy-in leads to board members 
being trained in the concepts of radical process orientation, convinced about the 
potential for significant performance improvements, and being satisfied that 
their personal standing will improve. However, the second order constructs 
reveal that these are superficial at best. Previous board members and senior 
managers in the case organisations bought into the drivers for change but still 
they did not accept the changes that need to occur. Yet, where they accepted a 
change needed to occur, it was implemented. This is borne out by the second 
order constructs (CTO_SOC # 5.19) and (CTO_SOC # 5.20). These show 
Carton Carrier's previous board found certain changes unacceptable, e.g. 
reducing the organisation's autonomy, and these changes did not occur while 
they were in charge of the organisation. On the other hand, the changes the 
previous board accepted needed to occur, e.g. to drivers' bonus payments, were 
achieved. In Foundry Insurance, the second order constructs (CTO_SOC # 
6.16), (CTO_SOC # 6.17), (CTO_SOC # 6.18) and (CTO_SOC # 6.11) show 
that the previous board and senior managers did not accept that a number of 
other changes needed to occur. For example, Foundry Insurance's board 
assumed that inspection backlogs were acceptable, providing the organisation 
was no worse than the rest of the industry. The change did not occur. 
A similar pattern emerges with the case organisation's new board. In 
Carton Carrier's where the new board accepted a change needed to occur, e.g. to 
the assumption that a fair day's work for a driver consisted of delivering 200 
parcels per day, the change was achieved. In Foundry Insurance, the new board 
did not accept that people's remuneration needed to change significantly and 
only minor changes were made to their remuneration. 
The second order constructs indicate that the incumbent management 
team's acceptance of the changes that actually need to occur is crucial to the 
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achievement of radical process orientation. The previous and new management 
teams had changes they did not accept needed to occur, and those changes were 
not implemented. These second order constructs reveal that where the 
incumbent management team does not accept that a particular change actually 
needs to occur it is unlikely that the change will occur, even though they buy-in 
to the drivers for change. 
D. Resulting theoretical proposition (#4) 
Based upon the literature, the second order constructs and above 
discussion relating to the conceptual category 'gaining and sustaining buy-in', 
the following theoretical proposition is constructed: 
Theoretical proposition # 4: Radical process orientation is more likely to be 
achieved when people accept the changes that actually need to occur in 
the organisation. 
7.3.3 (iii) 
changes 
Refining conceptual category: people affected by the 
A. Recapitulating the literature 
An argument in the current research relating to this conceptual category 
is that people most affected by the changes will resist the achievement of radical 
process orientation. Middle managers and employees are identified as being 
significantly and directly affected by the changes, and are considered to be the 
primary sources of resistance to change. The literature review also revealed that 
scholars assume two groups, board members and senior managers, are unlikely 
to be recipients of change. Led by this assumption the literature treats these two 
groups as though they are excluded from the changes. Yet were this assumption 
shown to be groundless, two vital sources of resistance, board members and 
senior managers, have been overlooked by current literature. 
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B. The second order constructs to be conjoined 
The second order constructs that were classified as relating to the 
conceptual category of 'people affected by the changes' in the literature are: 
+ Carton Carrier reduced the number of regions and created regional 
functions to support the activities in the parcel delivery process 
(CTO_SOC # 5.23) 
+ In Carton Carrier, board members and regional general managers 
were affected by the changes (CTO_SOC # 5.24) 
+ In Foundry Insurance, directors and senior managers were affected by 
the changes, as the organisation's structure and the number of people 
reporting to them changed, in some cases, significantly (CTO _SOC # 
6.20) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board was willing to reduce the number of 
people employed by the organisation (CTO _SOC # 6.21) 
+ Depot managers, in Carton Carrier, were willing to take on 
responsibility for their depot's profitability even though they had little 
control over the constituent elements, i.e. income and fixed costs 
(CTO_SOC # 5.22) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board devolved control over budgets to senior 
managers who, in turn, took responsibility to develop and operate 
their own budgets (CTO_SOC # 6.22) 
C. Interpreting the literature and conjoined second order 
constructs 
The second order constructs, (CTO_SOC # 5.23, 5.24) and (CTO_SOC # 
6.20, 6.21 ), reveal that board members and senior managers are affected by the 
changes that occur as are people at lower levels in the organisation. For 
instance, in Carton Carrier, regional general managers were affected by the 
reduction in the number of regions, as four out of seven regional general 
managers left the organisation. The remaining three were given greater 
responsibility over their region, and two were appointed associate directors with 
a seat on the board. Carton Carrier's directors of finance and personnel 
functions were affected as control over their functions was devolved to regional 
general managers. Carton Carrier's board members were affected as the board 
was restructured. In Foundry Insurance, for example, the number of people 
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reporting to the IT director grew from 29 people to 190 people. The director of 
the sales function was affected as it was split into the sales and marketing 
departments. The engineering director was affected as the number of people 
reporting into him fell from 754 to 589. The second order constructs highlight a 
number of weaknesses in current thinking. First, board members and senior 
managers are shown to be affected by the changes which suggests that the 
assumption in the literature that they are not affected by the changes that occur is 
unfounded. Second, as this group is affected they should be considered as a 
source of resistance, whereas this group is overlooked in the literature. Third, as 
board members are affected by the changes, gaining their acceptance of the 
changes that actually need to occur becomes even more critical than previously 
considered (see theoretical proposition# 4). 
The second order constructs, (CTO_SOC # 5.22) and (CTO_SOC # 
6.22), suggest that people were willing to allow the changes to affect them. The 
concept, willingness to allow the changes to affect them, is different to 
resistance to change in the sense that the latter is reactive. To explain, although 
many researchers advocate that resistance to change should be dealt with 
proactively, many of the proposed methods of dealing with resistance are 
reactive. However, the concept of willingness suggests that each individual 
affected by the content and nature of the changes considers whether he I she is 
willing to allow organisation elements such as their behaviour, responsibilities 
and appraisal criteria, and structure to move to a function and process 
orientation. This concept requires individuals, from board members to 
employees, to assess their own position in relation to the proposed changes the 
need to occur. Hence determinants of resistance can be brought to the surface 
and managed. The second order constructs indicate that people's willingness to 
allow the changes to affect them is coupled with the content and nature of 
changes to organisational elements and people's acceptance of the changes that 
actually need to occur. 
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D. Resulting theoretical proposition (# 5) 
Based upon the literature, the second order constructs and above 
discussion relating to the conceptual category 'people affected by the changes', 
the following theoretical proposition is constructed: 
Theoretical proposition # 5: Radical process orientation is more likely to be 
achieved when people, including board members, senior managers, 
middle managers and employees, are willing to allow the changes to 
affect them. 
7.3.4 Issues managed 
7.3.4 (i) 
managed 
Refining conceptual category: selecting the issues to be 
A. Recapitulating the literature 
An analysis of the literature relating to this conceptual category revealed 
that current research deals with issues managed to achieve radical process 
orientation in two ways. First, by developing prescriptive models that consist of 
a number of discrete stages and implementation steps and second, by creating 
sets of generic actions that direct organisations to the successful achievement of 
radical process orientation. The models and generic actions were criticised on 
three grounds. One, implying that they are universally applicable to all 
organisations contexts; two, presenting conflicting and confusing messages; and 
three, treating individual implementation steps and actions as though each is of 
equal importance and has a similar impact upon bringing about changes that 
need to occur. The literature review also revealed empirical evidence that, in 
practice, organisations rarely apply prescriptive models and generic actions to 
achieve radical process orientation. 
172 
B. The second order constructs to be conjoined 
The second order constructs that were classified as relating to the 
conceptual category of 'selecting the issues to be managed' in the literature are: 
+ Carton Carrier's board members refocused the corporate objective 
(IM_SOC # 5.59) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board agreed a new vision and objectives for the 
organisation (IM _SOC # 6.25) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board reduced the number of levels in the 
hierarchy, merged and created departments to align the functional 
structure with the inspection process (IM_SOC # 6.39) 
+ Carton Carrier's regional general managers devolved responsibility 
for budgets to and shared financial information with line managers 
(IM_SOC # 5.33) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board members shared financial information and 
devolved budgetary responsibility to managers (IM _SOC # 6.28) 
+ In Carton Carrier, drivers' pay and bonus scheme aligned to their 
responsibility to achieve service quality and volume of deliveries 
within a standard ten-hour day (IM_SOC # 5.56) 
+ Carton Carrier's directors accepted that they had to negotiate with the 
trade union to change drivers' pay conditions (IM _SOC # 5.43) 
+ Carton Carrier developed an appraisal system with criteria linked to 
the parcel delivery process (IM _SOC # 5.41) 
+ In Foundry Insurance, people aligned appraisal criteria to the 
inspection process and made the annual appraisal meeting discursive 
(IM _SOC # 6.36) 
+ Carton Carrier's people, from function and line management 
positions, in different regions and depots met each other to share 
information (IM_SOC # 5.34) 
+ Carton Carrier's directors and senior managers encouraged people to 
question the previous parcel delivery service as well as the proposed 
changes, and they were willing to do so and to provide feedback to the 
implementation team (IM_SOC # 5.53) 
+ Carton Carrier's board members, regional general managers, depot 
managers, assistant depot managers, and parcel delivery managers 
listened to those below them in the hierarchy (IM_SOC # 5.61) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board members were willing to communicate 
with people on a face-to-face basis, in small groups (IM _SOC # 6.30) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board and managers accepted that people wanted 
to know about the changes due to take place and they became more 
open with this information (IM_SOC # 6.27) 
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+ People in Foundry Insurance received consistent messages about 
external pressures facing the organisation and the need to implement 
the inspection process (IM_SOC # 6.31) 
+ Board members and managers considered van drivers key to Carton 
Carrier's future success (IM_SOC # 5.57) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board members and senior managers recognised 
that people at lower levels of the organisation, e.g. engineering and 
clerical levels, are important to the organisation's future (IM_SOC # 
6.33) 
+ Carton Carrier's board and regional general managers accepted that 
the quality, accessibility, and reliability of process-related information 
would be improved (IM_SOC # 5.35) 
+ Foundry Insurance's managers have operational information required 
to manage the inspection process (IM_SOC # 6.29) 
+ In Carton Carrier, van drivers recognised the importance of service 
quality (IM_SOC # 5.58) 
+ Carton Carrier's board encouraged people to develop a range of skills 
by moving from a service to a line management role, and from the 
warehouse to the depot operations and vice versa (IM_SOC # 5.63) 
+ Carton Carrier's directors invested substantial amounts in information 
systems, including the development of a small number of bespoke 
applications (IM _SOC # 5 .49) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board invested substantial amounts of resources 
in new systems, including some bespoke applications (IM _SOC # 
6.44) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board promoted people based on performance 
rather than length of service (IM_SOC # 6.40) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board introduced early retirement and voluntary 
redundancy schemes to reduce costs quickly and avoid trade union 
conflicts, but lost some 'good' people (IM_SOC # 6.34) 
C. Interpreting the literature and conjoined second order 
constructs 
The second order constructs confirm that the case study organisations did 
not follow a prescriptive model or a set of generic actions. Instead what 
emerges from the second order constructs is that the organisation's selected 
issues to be managed based upon the changes that people believed needed to 
occur. The second order constructs reveal that where the changes, in the case 
organisations, were similar so were the issues that were managed. For instance, 
the changes (CTO_SOC # 5.21 and 6.19) identified earlier involved the board 
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and semor managers agreeing to share financial and operational information 
with line managers. The second order constructs (IM_SOC # 5.61, 6.27, 6.30, 
6.31) reveal that each organisation managed similar issues such as 
communicating, listening, obtaining direct face-to-face feedback, and being 
more open with information. The second order construct (IM_SOC # 5.34) 
shows that Carton Carrier introduced formal mechanisms for sharing 
information, as its 36 depots operate across three regions. 
Where the case organisation undertook changes that were specific to it, 
they selectively managed the issues related to that change. This assertion is 
illustrated with two changes that occurred, although this pattern can be repeated 
for the other changes as well. One, Carton Carrier's directors realised that 
drivers' remuneration should be changed (CTO_SOC # 5.15). The second order 
constructs (IM_SOC # 5.41, 5.43, 5.56) reveal that directors managed these 
issues to achieve this change, specifically, they negotiated with the drivers' trade 
union, without whose agreement the change could not have been achieved; they 
aligned drivers' pay and bonus scheme to the service quality and volume of 
deliveries expected within a standard ten-hour day; and developed an appraisal 
system which linked appraisal criteria to the parcel delivery process. Foundry 
Insurance's board recognised that people's remuneration would not be changed 
significantly (CTO _SOC # 6.11 ). They did not therefore need to negotiate with 
the trade unions although, according to (IM_SOC # 6.36), the organisation 
aligned appraisal criteria to the inspection process. Two, the second order 
construct (CTO_SOC # 6.21) reveals that Foundry Insurance's board was 
willing to allow a reduction in the number of people employed by the 
organisation to occur. The second order constructs (IM_SOC # 6.34 and 6.40) 
suggest two issues were managed to achieve this change. The organisation 
introduced early retirement and voluntary redundancy schemes and it promoted 
people based upon their performance rather than tenure. Foundry Insurance 
introduced and maintained these schemes to achieve the change quickly, even 
though they lost capable people through the voluntary redundancy scheme. 
Carton Carrier, on the other hand, did not need to reduce the number of people 
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and, hence, did not need to manage the issue of early retirement and voluntary 
redundancy schemes. 
These second order constructs add to the literature related to the 
conceptual category, selecting the issues to be managed, in two ways. First, they 
reveal that people in the case organisations, especially board members and 
senior managers, had great clarity about the issues to be managed. The 
importance of achieving such clarity is barely recognised in current research, 
and where it is mentioned, it is usually in relation to the implementation team. 
Consequently, board members and senior managers become distanced from the 
issues to be managed. Second, the second order constructs suggest that the 
source of the clarity is identifying issues to be managed in relation to the 
changes that need to occur. This linkage is rarely highlighted in the literature 
because the changes that occur are ill-defined in the radical process orientation 
literature. 
D. Resulting theoretical proposition (#6) 
Based upon the literature, the second order constructs and above 
discussion relating to the conceptual category 'selecting the Issues to be 
managed', the following theoretical proposition is constructed: 
Theoretical proposition # 6: Radical process orientation is more likely to be 
achieved when people link the issues to be managed to the changes that 
need to occur. 
7.3.4 (ii) Refining conceptual category: mode of 
operationalising issues to be managed 
A. Recapitulating the literature 
The review of the research literature relating to this conceptual category 
revealed scholars have neglected to study the modes of operationalising the 
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issues to be managed to achieve radical process orientation. The work that 
exists is polarised on two dimensions, degree of planning and nature of the 
mode. In relation to the first dimension, scholars in favour of structured plans 
suggest that organisations should develop a formal plan, which lays out specific 
tasks, people and dates. Others refute this position and suggest that such plans 
are inappropriate to radical process orientation and that organisations should 
manage each issue as it emerges. The second dimension refers to the nature of 
the mode. Some proponents argue for radical modes of implementation. Others 
hold an opposing view. They suggest that organisations face a choice between 
radical and evolutionary modes of operationalising the issues to be managed, 
and they argue strenuously in favour of evolutionary modes. However, this 
argument is flawed as evolutionary modes lead to adaptive, rather than radical, 
process orientation. 
B. The second order constructs to be conjoined 
The second order constructs that were classified as relating to the 
conceptual category of 'mode of operationalising issues to be managed' in the 
literature are: 
+ Carton Carrier's directors undertook a customer survey from which 
they identified that customers were dissatisfied with the service and 
that they wanted consistent delivery periods within an overall delivery 
time of a week (IM_SOC # 5.37) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board commissioned a survey and the results 
revealed that customers' expectations were not being satisfied and 
gave people, in the organisation, customer feedback about the quality 
of service customers received (IM _SOC # 6.32) 
+ Carton Carrier's board set up a cross functional team, led by a person 
from the service function, with a mandate to design the parcel 
delivery process (IM_SOC # 5.38) 
+ Carton Carrier's cross functional team challenged existing operational 
assumptions made by directors, managers and drivers (IM _SOC # 
5.39) 
+ Carton Carrier's cross functional team and line managers identified 
the principles of the future parcel delivery process, designed the 
managerial, operational and systems aspects of the process, and 
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proved it worked prior to implementing it in other depots (IM_SOC # 
5.40) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board members and managers designed the 
inspection process after questioning existing operational assumptions 
(IM_SOC # 6.50) 
+ Carton Carrier outsourced its computer department and future 
information systems development to Home Merchandise's IT 
function, but retained control over the information systems budget and 
development schedule (IM _SOC # 5.4 7) 
+ Carton Carrier's board recognised that the organisation had 
inadequate financial resources and poorly skilled people to develop 
the information systems required to support the parcel delivery 
process (IM_SOC # 5.46) 
+ Foundry Insurance insourced the plant database, from Composite 
Insurer's IT function, thereby bringing its systems under its own 
control (IM _SOC # 6.45) 
+ Foundry Insurance developed systems to support the inspection 
process at less expense and in a shorter period of time by managing 
the development themselves rather than relying on Composite 
Insurer's IT function (IM_SOC # 6.46) 
+ Carton Carrier introduced systems in modules rather than develop 
entire systems and implement them in a single attempt (IM_ SOC # 
5.50) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board implemented systems to support the 
inspection process (IM _SOC # 6.48) 
+ Foundry Insurance's managing director and IT manager set tight 
deadlines for implementation teams, and prioritised systems, which 
were developed in modules (IM_ SOC # 6.49) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board members and managers provided 
implementation teams with support, especially when things were not 
going according to plan (IM_SOC # 6.53) 
+ Carton Carrier's implementation team members listened to people's 
ideas and incorporated these into future implementation plans 
(IM_SOC # 5.54) 
C. Interpreting the literature and conjoined second order 
constructs 
The second order constructs reveal that the mode of operationalising the 
issues was radical and evolutionary. Specifically, Carton Carrier realised that it 
needed to develop new systems. The organisation had its own IT department 
that traditionally developed information systems. The second order construct 
(IM SOC # 5.4 7) reveals that the IT department and systems developments 
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were outsourced to Home Merchandise, while Carton Carrier retained control 
over only budgets and development schedules. The board took this step because 
it recognised that the organisation had inadequate resources in terms of finance 
and skills (IM_SOC # 5.46). However, the previous management team faced 
similar resource constraints when developing earlier systems. Yet they did not 
consider outsourcing the development of those systems. Foundry Insurance also 
invested in developing systems. As it had a small IT department, the Group IT 
function developed all its previous systems. However, the second order 
constructs (IM_SOC # 6.45) and (IM_SOC # 6.46) reveal the board decided to 
insource systems developments away from the Group IT function. This allowed 
Foundry Insurance to control the systems, and develop the new systems more 
quickly and cost effectively. This mode of operationalising the development of 
systems was radical for Carton Carrier and Foundry Insurance. 
The second order constructs (IM_SOC # 5.38, 5.39, and 5.40) reveal that 
Carton Carrier set up a cross functional team under the leadership of an 
individual from the services function. This team designed the parcel delivery 
process and its future operating principles, and questioned current operational 
assumptions. This was radical in Carton Carrier for a number of reasons. One, 
people from operational areas were considered more powerful than their 
counterparts in the services area. Hence, having a person from the services 
function being in charge of the team challenged tradition. Two, board members 
and senior managers told people in lower echelons what they should do, yet the 
cross functional team were challenging board members' assumptions about the 
business and recommending a set of principles by which the organisation would 
be managed in the future. 
However, other second order constructs (IM_SOC # 5.50) and (IM_SOC 
# 6.48) suggest that other issues were managed in a more evolutionary manner. 
Specifically, systems were developed and implemented in modules rather than in 
a single attempt. According to the second order construct (IM_SOC # 6.49), the 
IT modules were developed in a short time period, and while the organisation 
had an implementation plan, the plan was not strictly observed, as evidenced by 
the second order construct (IM_SOC # 6.53). Carton Carrier too developed an 
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implementation plan, and as the second order construct (IM_SOC # 5.54) 
indicates there was latitude in the plan to adapt it to feedback received from 
recipients. The second order constructs (IM_SOC # 5.37) and (IM_SOC # 6.32) 
reveal that both organisations undertook customer surveys. This was the first 
time both organisations acted on the results. Carton Carrier used the results to 
determine the service levels customers wanted; Foundry Insurance's board 
shared the results with the rest of the organisation to sensitise people to the poor 
service levels customers received. 
The second order constructs suggest that the mode of operationalising 
some issues to be managed was radical, to the extent it was contrary to the 
organisations' current situation; and the mode for operationalising other issues 
was evolutionary, i.e. it conformed to the current situation. This insight differs 
sharply from the argument prevalent in the literature, related to the nature of the 
mode, namely that organisations have to choose between radical or evolutionary 
modes of operationalising, and that the evolutionary mode, i.e. conformance 
with the current situation, should be the preferred choice. The second order 
constructs suggest that that the argument, i.e. either radical or evolutionary, is 
unsustainable and detracts from the achievement of radical process orientation. 
These constructs indicate that radical and evolutionary modes of 
operationalising issues to be managed are essential to the achievement of radical 
process orientation. In relation to the degree of planning, these second order 
constructs reveal that the case organisations developed an implementation plan 
but operationalised the plan flexibly. These organisations did not, as suggested 
by some in the literature, simply allow the issues to emerge as implementation 
progressed. 
D. Resulting theoretical proposition (# 7) 
Based upon the literature, the second order constructs and above 
discussion relating to the conceptual category 'mode of operationalising issues 
to be managed', the following theoretical proposition is constructed: 
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Theoretical proposition # 7: Radical process orientation is more likely to be 
achieved when people plan for and deploy radical and evolutionary 
modes of operationalising the issue to be managed. 
7.3.4 (iii) Refining conceptual category: actual implementation 
of the issues to be managed 
A. Recapitulating the literature 
Chapter 2 revealed that the literature related to this conceptual category 
focuses mainly on problems associated with the achievement of radical process 
orientation and tactics for overcoming these problems. These problems fall into 
two categories: the social aspects of change and a lack of know-how of radical 
process orientation and attendant techniques. Many of the tactics to deal with 
the problems are contained in the prescriptive models and generic actions extant 
in the literature, and hence are superfluous. A more concerning omission in the 
literature is that researchers have neglected to identify the reasons that underpin 
what makes people actually implement the tactics. Hence little is understood 
currently about the transition from the selection of issues to be managed to 
actual implementation. 
B. The second order constructs to be conjoined 
The second order constructs that were classified as relating to the 
conceptual category of 'actual implementation of the issues to be managed' in 
the literature are: 
+ In Carton Carrier, the chairman was willing to understand the reasons 
for the crisis and be involved directly to resolve the crisis (IM_ SOC # 
5.29) 
+ In Carton Carrier, the chairman appointed a Home Merchandise 
director to the Carton Carrier's board to manage the non-operational 
functions (IM _SOC # 5 .25) 
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+ Carton Carrier's services director was given managerial and 
operational control over depots in the southern part of the country to 
prove that the parcel delivery process and systems could be 
implemented successfully (IM _SOC # 5 .27) 
+ The chairman won the power struggle against the existing joint 
managing directors and divided the depots into two groups and 
assigned operational control to different directors (IM _SOC # 5 .26) 
+ The existing joint managing directors left the organisation and a new 
managing director was appointed (IM _SOC # 5 .28) 
+ Foundry Insurance's general manager retired and the chairman 
appointed a new managing director even though he had little 
insurance experience (IM_SOC # 6.23) 
+ In Foundry Insurance, board members retired or resigned, and the 
board was restructured with new board members appointed from 
outside or promoted from within the organisation (IM_SOC # 6.24) 
+ In Foundry Insurance, the managing director was willing to find out 
about the previous inspection service and to lead the implementation 
of the inspection process (IM_SOC # 6.37) 
+ Carton Carrier created implementation teams, consisting of 
implementors and recipients, who took joint responsibility for 
installing the new systems that underpinned the parcel delivery 
process (IM_SOC # 5.51) 
+ Foundry Insurance created IT implementation teams with people from 
different departments and external support (IM_SOC # 6.51) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board gave the implementation teams a mandate 
to implement the inspection process and the supporting information 
systems (IM_SOC # 6.55) 
+ Foundry Insurance's line managers and implementation team 
members took responsibility for implementing the inspection process 
(IM_SOC # 6.52) 
+ Foundry Insurance created user groups to work with implementation 
teams during the development of the systems but mismanaged some 
oftheir expectations (IM_SOC # 6.54) 
+ Carton Carrier's board members and line managers made symbolic 
changes in support of the parcel delivery process (IM_SOC # 5.62) 
+ Foundry Insurance's managing director made symbolic changes to 
bring people together (IM_SOC # 6.38) 
+ People unwilling to accept the changes or unable to meet the required 
standards after being trained left Carton Carrier voluntarily or were 
sacked (IM _SOC # 5 .45) 
+ In Foundry Insurance, engineers and other system users were willing 
to learn to operate the systems, and their aptitude to use the systems 
was tested (IM_SOC # 6.47) 
+ Depot and assistant depot managers were trained to understand 
financial accounts and budgets and were willing to learn about 
managing depot finances (IM_SOC # 5.36) 
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+ People left Foundry Insurance because they did not accept the 
proposed changes (IM_SOC # 6.26) 
+ Carton Carrier's board members and regional general managers 
recognised as important people's feelings of fear, insecurity, 
indifference, confidence and criticism (IM_SOC # 5.60) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board members and managers recognised and 
attempted to reduce people's fears, anxieties and stress levels by 
changing their own behaviour and by supporting people through the 
implementation (IM_SOC # 6.35) 
C. Interpreting the literature and conjoined second order 
constructs 
These second order constructs are of interest from two perspectives. 
One, to pinpoint tactics not already evident in the literature. Two, to discover 
insights into the deeper reasons that explain why people actually implemented 
the tactics. 
The content of second order constructs, (IM_SOC # 5.29, 5.31, 6.37, 
6.51, 6.52, 6.54, 6.55) suggest that people were involved in and took 
responsibility for the changes. The early lead taken by key board members is 
noteworthy. The people comprised in these second order constructs are from 
different levels of the organisation, namely chairman, managing directors, line 
managers and staff. These second order constructs are widely identified in the 
literature and reconfirm current research. 
The second order constructs, (IM_SOC # 5.25, 5.26, 5.27, 5.28, 6.23, 
and 6.24) reveal that board members took action. In terms of these specific 
second order constructs they acted to remove senior people, who were 
detractors, and placed people willing to implement the issues, in charge of the 
radical process orientation initiative. In Carton Carrier, this required the 
chairman to take several tactical actions. These included dividing the 
organisation in two so that he could give operational and managerial control 
over half the depots to one director. The chairman also entered into and won a 
power struggle against the incumbent joint managing directors, until they left the 
organisation, at which point the chairman appointed a new managing director of 
Carton Carrier. In Foundry Insurance, the Group chairman appointed a senior 
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manager from another division, with no insurance expenence, to support 
Foundry Insurance's IT department. A short while later the general manager 
retired and this senior manager was appointed as Foundry Insurance's managing 
director. The literature rarely advocates the removal of board members by 
natural or other means as an implementation tactic. However, the literature does 
indicate that the achievement of radical process orientation is most often 
associated with the introduction of a new management team. 
The second order constructs (IM_SOC # 5.62, 6.38) denote that board 
members acted to make symbolic changes in support of radical process 
orientation. These actions included changing the way in which people addressed 
each other in Foundry Insurance; breaking a hole in the wall of a depot in 
Carton Carrier; taking risks during implementation and closing down the 
manager's dining room in Foundry Insurance. These changes were quick to 
achieve, relatively inexpensive, and delivered both tangible and intangible 
benefits. They also sent powerful messages about management's intention to act 
and to implement more wide reaching changes. The tactic of making quick, 
symbolic changes is underplayed in the literature. Instead, organisations are 
advised to achieve quick wins, i.e. show tangible (usually financial) benefits 
quickly. Again this highlights a misjudgement in the focal point of current 
thinking. Rather than focusing upon quick changes that will deliver benefits, the 
literature guides organisations to identify benefits without first considering the 
changes. These second order constructs suggest that the tactic of making 
symbolic changes should receive greater emphasis in the literature related to the 
conceptual category, actual implementation of the issues to be managed, and that 
the tactic of 'quick wins' should be revised to 'symbolic changes for quick 
wins'. The overarching tactic that binds these second order constructs is that 
board members took action aimed at achieving of radical process orientation. 
The second order constructs (IM_SOC # 5.45, 5.60, 6.26, and 6.35) 
reveal that people, at all levels, managed a paradox. To explain, Carton 
Carrier's senior managers recognised that the changes would arouse, in people, 
feelings of fear, insecurity and indifference, and that these feelings reduce 
people's commitment to and support for the changes. The senior managers 
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treated people's feelings as important, yet concurrently, they were taking austere 
measures against people who were unwilling to accept or unable to meet the 
demands of the parcel delivery process. This included the joint managmg 
directors, other board members, and a large number of drivers. Foundry 
Insurance's board members and senior managers faced a similar paradox. 
Although they did little to support people through the changes at first, this 
changed as a result of one person having a nervous breakdown. Foundry 
Insurance's board and senior managers became acutely aware of the need to 
manage and reduce people's fears, anxieties and stress levels due to uncertainty 
about their jobs and senior managers changed their own behaviours to deal with 
managing people's feelings. Yet, board and senior managers had a policy to 
reduce the head count quickly. The rate at which people left the organisation 
was high: the average age of the management team fell by 15 years in 12 
months; 8 out of the top 10 managers left. The second order constructs 
(IM_SOC # 6.47 and 5.36) suggest that people at lower echelons had to manage 
the inverse of the paradox face by board members and senior managers. They 
had to be open to receive training, and yet, face the risk of being asked to leave 
the organisation. Managing this paradox is barely recognised in the literature. 
The second order constructs indicate that this is an essential tactic that needs to 
be added to the repertoire of actual implementation in the literature. This 
paradox also suggests that the choice offered in the literature between hard or 
soft tactics is misleading. Managers would be better directed to manage hard 
and soft issues concurrently. 
The discussion now turns to the second area of interest in relation to 
these second order constructs namely, reasons that underpin why people 
implement the tactics. The second order constructs suggest that the notion of 
willingness is central to the explanation. To explain, at board levels, the 
chairmen and managing directors of the case organisations were willing to take 
responsibility, take action where necessary and manage the paradox that could 
make them appear insincere and lacking integrity: on the one hand appearing to 
be sensitive to people's feelings and on the other hand, sacking people. At 
senior management levels, Carton Carrier's three regional general managers and 
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Foundry Insurance's key senior managers were willing to take responsibility for 
implementing the changes. At middle management levels, in Carton Carrier, 
Malham depot's management team and the implementation team were willing to 
ensure the rudimentary first version of the parcel delivery process was 
implemented successfully. Thereafter each depot management team was willing 
to implement the changes in their depot. In Foundry Insurance, team leaders 
were willing to support the implementation teams during the migration to the 
inspection process. At lower levels, drivers in Carton Carrier and clerks in 
Foundry Insurance were willing to tolerate the paradox that accompanied the 
changes. Hence, based upon these second order constructs this research argues 
that the concept labelled as 'willingness of people to implement the tactics' 
begins to provide an explanation of why people implement the tactics. This 
concept would be a valuable addition to the literature, which is unable to explain 
why people implement tactics. 
There is insufficient data to define precisely the concept of willingness. 
However, the second order constructs enable us to begin to outline its features: 
+ Levels: willingness needs to exist at all levels from board members to 
employees. 
+ Critical mass: not everyone has to be willing to implement the issues 
to be managed, but key people at each level need to be willing, e.g. 
each depot manager while their depot is being changed. 
+ Action oriented: for any particular tactic to be implemented, people 
either are or are not willing to complete the issues to be managed. 
+ Choice I priority: in a choice between two or more actions people 
may be willing to implement some but not all the actions. 
D. Resulting theoretical proposition (# 8) 
Based upon the literature, the second order constructs and above 
discussion relating to the conceptual category 'actual implementation of the 
issues to be managed', the following theoretical proposition is constructed: 
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Theoretical proposition # 8: Radical process orientation is more likely to be 
achieved when people are willing to implement the issues that need to be 
managed to achieve radical process orientation. 
7.3.5 Effects of radical process orientation 
7.3.5 (i) Refining conceptual category: post implementation of 
radical process orientation 
A. Recapitulating the literature 
As there are few studies of organisations that have achieved radical 
process orientation, the literature's coverage of the conceptual category, post 
implementation of radical process orientation, is weak. The literature argues for 
organisations to make continuous improvements to the process after 
organisations achieve radical process orientation. Organisations that initiate 
radical process orientation but achieve only partial improvements can either 
assess the performance improvements they have achieved; and where these are 
perceived to be adequate financially or politically, organisations can make 
continuous improvements. Alternatively, organisations can consider a further 
attempt at implementing the changes. 
B. The second order constructs to be conjoined 
The second order constructs that were classified as relating to the 
conceptual category of 'post implementation of radical process orientation' in 
the literature are: 
+ In Carton Carrier, the parcel delivery process was implemented in all 
depots so that the organisation operated with consistency 
(ERPO_SOC # 5.64) 
+ Carton Carrier entered into new markets successfully using the parcel 
delivery process developed to handle Home Merchandise's parcels, 
without increasing the number of depots (ERPO_SOC # 5.65) 
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+ Carton Carrier management have regained control over the parcel 
delivery process (ERPO_SOC # 5.66) 
+ Foundry Insurance implemented the inspection process and 
consequently, achieves substantially improved service levels and 
fulfils its contractual obligations to comply with relevant statutory 
regulations (ERPO_SOC # 6.56) 
+ Foundry Insurance moved back into profit (ERPO_SOC # 6.57) 
+ Foundry Insurance's systems are substantially improved although they 
were developed on separate platforms (ERPO_SOC # 6.58) 
+ In Foundry Insurance, some aspects of the old organisation can still be 
found in the redesigned inspection process (ERPO _SOC # 6.60) 
+ Foundry Insurance's management has better control over the 
inspection process (ERPO_SOC # 6.59) 
+ In Carton Carrier some aspects of the old organisation still remain 
(ERPO_SOC # 5.67) 
C. Interpreting the literature and conjoined second order 
constructs 
The second order constructs reveal that the drivers for change were 
resolved. Briefly, the drivers for change considered as threats were deep flaws 
in the previous process, stakeholders changing their relationship and a major 
financial or operational crisis. The driver for change interpreted as an 
opportunity was activities that affected customer service being brought under 
management's control. In respect of the threats, deep flaws in the process, 
second order construct (ERPO_SOC # 5.64) reveals that Carton Carrier 
implemented the parcel delivery process in all its depots, and Foundry Insurance 
implemented the inspection process across the organisation. The threat relating 
to stakeholders was resolved as indicated by second order constructs 
(ERPO_SOC # 5.65) and (ERPO_SOC # 6.56) that show that both organisations 
improved service levels significantly. Carton Carrier retained its traditional 
Home Merchandise customer base and was able to expand into new third party 
markets. Foundry Insurance's larger customers are no longer leaving them. 
Foundry Insurance is able to react quickly to changes in the market place. In 
terms of the threat of a crisis, the second order construct (ERPO_SOC # 6.57) 
reveals that Foundry Insurance reversed its financial loss and returned to profit. 
The organisation was also able to reduce its overdue inspection reports, as 95% 
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of inspection reports are sent to customers within 24 hours, while the other 5% 
rarely take longer than 3 days. This has led to substantial productivity increases. 
Carton Carrier no longer has problems with backlogs of parcels, as demonstrated 
by their successful entry into the third party delivery markets (ERPO _SOC # 
5.65). With the parcel delivery process, Carton Carrier's customers, in most 
neighbourhoods across the country, receive their parcels on a regular three-day 
cycle. In respect of the opportunity, the second order constructs (ERPO SOC# 
5 .66) and (ERPO _SOC # 6.59) show that management regained control of key 
activities in the process. These second order constructs suggest a broader set of 
factors should be considered after the achievement of radical process orientation. 
The literature related to the conceptual category, post implementation of radical 
process orientation, focuses upon assessment of performance improvements 
whereas the second order constructs point to the resolution of the drivers for 
change, of which performance improvement forms only one part. 
However, second order constructs, (ERPO _SOC # 6.60) and 
(ERPO_SOC # 5.67) show that some aspects of the behaviours found in the 
previous organisation still remain. In Foundry Insurance, people fearful of 
losing their job or position allow backlogs of inspection reports to build up. In 
Carton Carrier, senior managers continue to dictate to those below them in the 
organisation. Assessing the extent of behavioural residue is overlooked in the 
literature. These second order constructs suggest that this too should be assessed 
and that organisations should not expect every aspect of people's behaviours to 
change. 
D. Resulting theoretical proposition (# 9) 
Based upon the literature, the second order constructs and above 
discussion related to the conceptual category 'post implementation of radical 
process orientation', the following theoretical proposition is constructed: 
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Theoretical proposition # 9: The achievement of radical process orientation 
needs to be assessed in terms of whether or not the drivers for change 
were removed and the extent to which behaviours are unchanged. 
7.3.6 Implementors and recipients 
7.3.6 (i) Refining conceptual category: implementor and 
recipient roles 
A. Recapitulating the literature 
The literature related to this conceptual category separates people into 
two roles: implementors and recipients. Implementors instigate change and are 
responsible for its implementation. Included in the category of implementors 
are board members, senior managers and cross functional implementation team 
members. Recipients are those who experience the changes, and are mostly line 
managers and staff. Current research argues that these two roles are distinct and 
demarcate people to one or the other role. 
B. The second order constructs to be conjoined 
The second order constructs that were classified as relating to the 
conceptual category of 'implementor and recipient roles' in the literature are: 
+ Carton Carrier's chairman and key directors consolidated their 
position in the organisation (IM_SOC # 5.30) 
+ Carton Carrier's board devolved operational control of the parcel 
delivery process to regional general managers and regional functional 
managers (IM_SOC # 5.31) 
+ In Carton Carrier, responsibility for profitability and service quality 
cascaded from directors to regional general managers to depot 
managers to assistant depot managers and parcel delivery managers 
(IM _SOC # 5 .32) 
+ Carton Carrier's implementation team members were willing to 
withstand pressure from shop stewards not to implement the parcel 
delivery process (IM _SOC # 5.44) 
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+ In Carton Carrier, regional personnel managers monitored the 
appraisal system (IM_SOC # 5.42) 
+ In Carton Carrier, parcel delivery managers were made responsible 
for the service quality achieved by a team of van drivers (IM _SOC # 
5.55) 
+ In Carton Carrier, the managing director raised the service 
department's profile in the organisation (IM_SOC # 5.48) 
+ In Carton Carrier, training and IT managers trained line managers to 
use the systems, and line managers taught people in their depots 
(IM_SOC # 5.52) 
+ In Foundry Insurance, the board devolved operational responsibility 
for the inspection process to managers below them in the hierarchy 
(IM_SOC # 6.41) 
+ Foundry Insurance's managers took responsibility for the inspection 
process, and cascaded this responsibility to team leaders and 
engineers (IM_SOC # 6.42) 
+ Foundry Insurance's board provided people at all levels with 
substantial training to broaden their range of skills; and board 
members learnt new skills and convinced managers to learn new 
skills, and managers convinced team leaders to do the same (IM _SOC 
# 6.43) 
C. Interpreting the literature and conjoined second order 
constructs 
These second order constructs cast serious doubt over demarcation of 
roles advocated in the literature related to this conceptual category. These 
second order constructs reveal that people move from the implementor to the 
recipient role and vice versa. Specifically, the second order construct (IM _SOC 
# 5.30) suggests Carton Carrier's chairman and managing director were 
implementors when they consolidated their position of power in the 
organisation. The second order construct (IM _SOC # 5.31) locates the 
managing director in a recipient role, as he was given operational control over 
depot operations in the southern half of the country and asked to prove the 
parcel delivery process could be implemented successfully. The second order 
construct (IM_SOC # 5.32) shows a series of role changes, beginning with the 
managing director as an implementor, in the sense that he ensured regional 
general managers and depot managers (as recipients) took responsibility for the 
profitability and service levels of their depot. Then, depot managers became 
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implementors as they ensured assistant depot managers and parcel delivery 
managers (as recipients) took responsibility for profitability and service levels. 
The second order construct (IM_SOC # 5.55) shows parcel delivery managers in 
an implementor role as they had to ensure drivers achieved agreed service levels. 
According to second order construct (IM_SOC # 5.44) depot managers were 
recipients as the parcel delivery process was implemented in their depot; 
however, they (as implementors) had to stand up to shop stewards (recipients) in 
other depots. The second order construct (IM_SOC # 5.42) reveals regional 
personnel manager (as implementors) monitored the appraisal system to ensure 
the line managers (as recipients) complied with it. The second order construct 
(IM _SOC # 5 .48) suggests the service department were recipients, as their 
profile was raised. The second order construct (IM_SOC # 5.52) shows training 
and IT managers (as implementors) developed training modules and taught line 
managers (recipients) to use the systems. The line managers (as implementors) 
trained people in their departments (recipients) to use the systems. According to 
second order construct, (IM_SOC # 6.41), Foundry Insurance's board (as 
implementors) devolved responsibility for the inspection process to managers 
(recipients). They (as implementors) cascaded this responsibility to team leaders 
and engineers (recipients) (IM_SOC # 6.42). Line managers (as implementors) 
also convinced team leaders and engineers (as recipients) to learn new skills 
(IM_SOC # 6.43). 
These second order constructs refute the current argument m the 
literature that people's roles should be demarcated into implementors or 
recipients. The pattern that emerges from these second order constructs is that 
the roles are indistinct, with individuals moving for one role to the other and, in 
some instances, fulfilling both roles concurrently. 
D. Resulting theoretical proposition (# 1 0) 
Based upon the literature, the second order constructs and above 
discussion relating to the conceptual category 'implementor and recipient roles', 
the following theoretical proposition is constructed: 
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Theoretical proposition # 10: Radical process orientation is more likely to be 
achieved when implementors and recipients accept these roles as 
reciprocal, and enact both roles. 
7.4 Synthesis: an emergent model for the achievement of 
radical process orientation 
The emergent model is a logical representation for the achievement of 
radical process orientation. The model is exhibited in Figure 7 .1. It has five 
conceptual domains, namely, commencement, specific changes that need to 
occur, issues that need to be managed, effects of radical process orientation, and 
implementors I recipients. Each conceptual domain is constructed from 
empirically grounded theoretical propositions. 
Commencement This conceptual domain begins with the rationale that 
underpins the initiation of radical process orientation. Radical process 
orientation is more likely to be achieved when people accept the organisation's 
drivers for change, which can be opportunities or threats (theoretical proposition 
# 1). Three threats are interpreted from the second order constructs: one, a 
breakdown in the organisation's existing process, two, key stakeholders 
changing or seeking to change their existing relationship with the organisation, 
and three, operational and financial crises. An opportunity interpreted from the 
second order constructs is the organisation's ability to bring activities in 
different functions under management's control. The commencement domain 
also suggests that once drivers for change are identified, radical process 
orientation is more likely to be achieved when people establish the need for 
radical process orientation rather than another type of change initiative 
(theoretical proposition # 2). This theoretical proposition suggests that 
organisations recognise explicitly that they have a choice of change initiatives 
with which to address drivers for change, and that radical process orientation 
may be inappropriate to their specific circumstances. This research proposes 
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theoretical criteria to analyse the need for radical process orientation. The need 
for radical process orientation is greater when the drivers of change require an 
organisation to co-ordinate changes across several functions and increase levels 
of managerial and operational interdependence between activities in those 
functions. 
Changes that need to occur This conceptual domain deals with the 
changes an organisation experiences during the achievement of radical process 
orientation. This domain suggests that radical process orientation is more likely 
to be achieved when people recognise organisational elements namely, strategy, 
structure, people's responsibilities and appraisal criteria, collaborative 
behaviours, and information systems, will change and that these elements will 
align to a function and process orientation (theoretical proposition # 3). This 
domain also proposes that radical process orientation is more likely to be 
achieved when people accept the changes that actually need to occur in the 
organisation (theoretical proposition # 4). This is particularly essential at the 
board and senior management levels. The second order constructs indicate that 
where they do not accept that a change actually needs to occur in the 
organisation that change is rarely implemented. This domain also proposes that 
people impacted by the changes be willing to allow the actual changes to affect 
them. Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people, 
including board members, senior managers, middle managers and staff, are 
willing to allow the changes to affect them (theoretical proposition# 5). 
Issues that need to be managed This conceptual domain refers to the 
issues that enable the implementation of the changes that need to occur. This 
domain proposes that radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved 
when people link the issues to be managed to the changes that need to occur 
(theoretical proposition# 6). The second order constructs suggest that the case 
organisations did not follow a prescriptive methodology. Instead they focused 
the issues they managed to the changes that needed to occur. This domain also 
proposes that radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when 
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people plan for and deploy radical and evolutionary modes of operationalising 
the issues to be managed (theoretical proposition # 7). This domain also 
proposes that radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when 
people are willing to implement the issues that need to be managed to achieve 
radical process orientation (theoretical proposition# 8). 
Effects of radical process orientation This conceptual domain proposes 
that the achievement of radical process orientation need to be assessed in terms 
of whether or not the drivers for change were removed and the extent to which 
behaviours are unchanged (theoretical proposition # 9). The second order 
constructs reveal that organisations were able to align the process to the 
objectives set out by the board, retain their customers by increasing service 
levels, remove the crisis they faced and bring activities in the process under 
management's control. 
Implementors I recipients This conceptual domain identifies 
implementors as being responsible of the achievement of radical process 
orientation and recipients as being affected by radical process orientation. These 
two categories include employees at all levels in the organisation: board 
members, senior managers, middle managers, and staff. This domain proposes 
that radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when implementors 
and recipients accept these roles as reciprocal, and enact both roles (theoretical 
proposition # 1 0). 
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Key: t p = theoretical proposition - see 
relevant section for detail 
The theoretical propositions that constitute the emergent model aid the 
understanding of the achievement of radical process orientation. While this 
makes each theoretical proposition a necessary component for radical process 
orientation, from the arguments raised earlier, four theoretical propositions are 
deemed key to the achievement of radical process orientation. The four are: 
establishing the need for radical process orientation (theoretical proposition# 2), 
acceptance of the changes that actually need to occur (theoretical proposition# 
4), willingness to implement the changes (theoretical proposition # 8), and the 
reciprocal nature of implementor and recipient roles (theoretical proposition # 
1 0). Each of these theoretical propositions is considered a defining point during 
the achievement of radical process orientation. To explain, the theoretical 
proposition requiring the organisations to establish the need for radical process 
orientation (theoretical proposition # 2) ensures organisations make a 
'conscious' decision to adopt radical process orientation as the means of 
addressing the drivers for change, or else to set aside radical process orientation 
and utilise some other type of change initiative to deal with the drivers for 
change. The acceptance of the actual changes (theoretical proposition # 4) 
establishes the changes that board members and senior managers believe need to 
occur. Where the board and senior managers are of the view that the changes 
should be adaptive or evolutionary in nature, organisations will achieve adaptive 
process orientation and not radical process orientation. Hence, this theoretical 
proposition(# 4) has a major influence upon the achievement of radical process 
orientation. The theoretical proposition dealing with willingness to implement 
the changes is essential to delivering the changes. Where board members and 
senior managers are unwilling to take action to implement the changes, radical 
process orientation will not be achieved. This theoretical proposition requires 
individuals to make their position clear: either they are willing to act to bring 
about the changes or they are not willing to do so. The theoretical proposition 
relating to implementors and recipients (# 10) is vital because unless people are 
willing both to effect change and also be affected by change, radical process 
orientation will not be achieved. 
197 
7.5 Structural refinements made to the initial conceptual 
model to form the emergent model 
The emergent model develops the initial model in three ways. First, each 
bin and conceptual category is methodically developed into domains and 
theoretical propositions respectively for the achievement of radical process 
orientation. These theoretical propositions are grounded in second order 
constructs that can be traced back rigorously to data gathered from people 
actively and directly involved with achievement of radical process orientation. 
Second, in the initial conceptual model, implementors and recipients were at its 
periphery and were separated to reflect the literature's demarcation of their roles. 
However, the implementor I recipient domain is located at the emergent model's 
centre to highlight the importance of both roles to the achievement of radical 
process orientation. They are also adjacent to one and other to indicate that 
people move from one role to the other, and, often fulfil both roles concurrently. 
Third, the initial model served as a guide for the data collection and analysis 
phases of this research. However, the emergent model is proposed as a guide to 
organisations embarking on a radical process orientation initiative. 
Consequently, two conceptual bins, namely changes that occurred and issues 
managed, in the initial model are inadequate for the emergent model. The role 
of these bins in the future is to prompt managers utilising this emergent model in 
the future, to consider intended changes and issues rather than examine the past. 
Hence, the conceptual bins 'changes that occurred' and 'issues managed' are re-
titled to 'changes that need to occur' and 'issues that need to be managed' 
respectively. 
7.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter set out to develop the conceptual category identified from 
the literature to theoretical propositions based upon empirical data in the form of 
second order constructs. The theoretical propositions are summarised below in 
Table 7.1. This chapter also set out to construct an emergent model for the 
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achievement of radical process orientation by synthesising the theoretical 
propositions. The emergent model is exhibited in Figure 7 .1. This model fulfils 
the purpose of this research, which is to develop an empirically grounded model 
for the achievement of radical process orientation. 
Proposition Theoretical proposition 
number 
1 Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people 
accept the organisation's drivers for change, which can be opportunities 
and threats. 
2 Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people 
establish the need for radical process orientation rather than another type 
of change initiative. 
3 Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people 
recognise organisational elements namely, strategy, structure, people's 
responsibilities and appraisal criteria, collaborative behaviours, and 
information systems, will change and that these elements will align to a 
function and process orientation. 
4 Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people 
accept the changes that actually need to occur in the organisation. 
5 Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people, 
including board members, senior managers, middle managers and 
employees, are willing to allow the changes to affect them. 
6 Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people 
link the issues to be managed to the changes that need to occur. 
7 Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people 
plan for and deploy radical and evolutionary modes of operationalising 
the issue to be managed. 
8 Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people 
are willing to implement the issues that need to be managed to achieve 
radical process orientation. 
9 The achievement of radical process orientation needs to be assessed in 
terms of whether or not the drivers for change were removed and the 
extent to which behaviours are unchanged. 
10 Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when 
implementors and recipients accept these roles as reciprocal, and enact 
both roles. 
Table 7.1: Summary of the theoretical propositions developed from case 
evidence 
The chapter that follows concludes this work. It begins by recapitulating 
the arguments in the preceding chapters that lead to the emergent model for the 
achievement of radical process orientation. It examines the contribution of this 
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research to current knowledge about the achievement of radical process 
orientation. It highlights the limitations of this research study. It then identifies 
areas of further research that could be undertaken to build upon this research. It 
also outlines implications for practitioners. 
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Chapter 8 Concluding remarks 
8.1 Chapter introduction 
The previous chapters established radical process orientation as the area 
of study, located this research in the interpretive paradigm, developed an initial 
conceptual model, developed a research methodology, analysed empirical data 
from three cases based upon the methodology, and from this analysis developed 
theoretical propositions that were synthesised to construct an emergent model 
for the achievement of radical process orientation. This chapter concludes this 
research work by summarising its salient arguments. It also discusses this 
research's contribution to the 'business process orientation', 'information 
systems and business process orientation', and 'radical organisational change' 
bodies of knowledge. As no piece of research is ever perfect, the limitations of 
this work and areas for further research studies are discussed. To draw this 
research to a close, implications for this work for the practitioner community are 
discussed. 
This chapter comprises seven sections. Following this introduction, the 
arguments that substantiate the emergent model are discussed. Next, the 
conceptual and methodological contributions of this research to current literature 
are discussed. The fourth section examines the limitations of this work. 
Immediately following this areas for further research are examined. The sixth 
section identifies implications of this work for practitioners. The final section 
serves as an epilogue to this research. 
8.2 Summarising the arguments that lead to the emergent 
model 
Organisations have an inherent tension between the functional structure 
and the business process. The functions control and define activities, resources 
and responsibilities, yet a single function rarely satisfies any one stakeholder 
expectation. Business processes, namely activities that are integrated across 
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different functions to create outputs that are of value to the stakeholder, fulfil 
stakeholder expectations. More often than not business processes are barely 
managed, as each function focuses upon its own priorities, often to the detriment 
of the process. Recently, tensions between the functional structure and the 
business process has been exacerbated, as stakeholders, especially customers, 
become more demanding and sophisticated. Other factors have furthered 
tensions between the functional structure and the business process. These 
include the introduction of truly integrated information systems in the 
organisation, changes in industry structure as a result of new entrants such as 
internet-based companies and phenomena such as knowledge management. 
These factors require the conventional balance between functional structure and 
process, which has favoured the functional structure, to be redressed. 
Traditionally, organisations adapted the function - business process alignment 
by changing the business process in an ad hoc, piece-meal fashion. Functions 
developed their activities at different rates of change and at different times, 
which resulted in a myriad of separate changes. The intention behind each 
change was to bring about a convergence between functions and the business 
processes. However, the changes often resulted in a divergence between 
functions and business processes. Process orientation emerged as a way of 
counteracting the divergence between functions and business processes. Process 
orientation encourages organisations to take a holistic approach to redesigning 
business processes. Much of the current literature concentrates upon developing 
models that deal with the initiation phase of process orientation. However, the 
initiation and implementation of a business process requires radical 
organisational change, i.e. radical process orientation. Consequently, 
understanding the achievement of radical process orientation is of central 
concern to this research. 
Much of the current research into process orientation has been done from 
a functionalist perspective. Hence, the focus has been on conducting large-
sample studies (Grover et al. 1998; Kettinger et al. 1997) to develop models with 
discrete stages and specific implementation steps. Consequently, these models 
are prescriptive in nature, requiring systematic analysis and the creation of 
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detailed plans in which people are allocated discrete roles as either implementors 
or recipients. Moreover, the theories, e.g. contingency theory and systems 
theory, used by functionalist researchers to underpin these models lead to 
adaptive organisational change (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Thus, these 
prescriptive models are deficient not only because they understate the social 
interaction between people during the achievement of radical process orientation 
but also because their theoretical foundations lead to adaptive organisational 
changes. 
A few researchers studied process orientation from an interpretive 
perspective. The interpretive perspective, and the intellectual assumptions that 
underpin it, is conducive to the study of achievement of radical process 
orientation. This perspective is better geared to understand the social aspects 
associated with the achievement of radical process orientation. However, very 
little research effort has gone into studying the achievement of radical process 
orientation from an interpretive perspective. 
Researchers in the interpretive and functionalist paradigm diminish 
radical process orientation into adaptive process orientation. They do so by 
positioning their research to be the study of radical process orientation, whereas 
the organisations in these studies implemented adaptive process orientation. The 
common theme to emerge is that organisations are encouraged, during the 
initiation phase, to develop radical and innovative processes but are then advised 
to implement adaptive organisational changes. Consequently, the changes take 
too long to be implemented, senior managers become impatient because 
anticipated significant performance improvements fail to materialise, employees 
become cynical about process orientation because the status quo remains intact 
and the organisation continues to face drivers for change that sparked radical 
process orientation. Thus, this research takes an interpretive perspective to 
study organisations that have initiated AND implemented radical process 
orientation. The literature was analysed into ten conceptual categories that 
identify issues considered relevant to the achievement of radical process 
orientation. Drawing on these conceptual categories, an initial model for the 
achievement of radical process orientation was developed. This model consists 
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of four conceptual bins labelled commencement, changes that occurred, issues 
managed, and effects of radical process orientation. Thus, this research's 
interpretive perspective and the initial conceptual model frame its research 
objective and question. 
A methodology was established to ensure this research deployed rigorous 
and credible methods to fulfil the research objective and address the research 
question. The intellectual foundations of this methodology are rooted in an 
approach that places the views of people actively involved in and with direct 
experience of the achievement of radical process orientation, namely 
implementors and recipients, as the focal point for penetrating and 
understanding achievement of radical process orientation. The work of Schutz 
(1899 - 1959) is used to shape the collection and interpretation of data, and to 
form a methodical bridge between this data and the theoretical propositions, 
which form an emergent model for the achievement of radical process 
orientation. To ascertain the view of implementors and recipients involved 
actively and directly in achievement of radical process orientation, a case study 
approach was designed. Cases were selected where they had achieved radical 
process orientation. This is reflected in the three theoretical criteria used to 
determine their inclusion, namely business process orientation, radical 
organisational change, and the business process had to be operational for a 
period of six months. Data was collected from people directly involved with the 
achievement of radical process orientation through semi-structured interviews. 
To strengthen the robustness of the interview data, several people were 
interviewed to corroborate individual accounts, and data was collected from 
several sources for the purpose of triangulation. The case study design laid out a 
clear trail of evidence that ensured theoretical propositions could be traced back 
to case evidence. This trail used first order constructs and second order 
constructs to make the data and its interpretation transparent. 
A pilot study was conducted in Financial Data to assess the cogency of 
the case study design. The pilot revealed that this design was robust and 
workable. It also revealed that people who were not actively and directly 
involved with the achievement of radical process orientation were poor sources 
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of data, as they had insufficient information to address the interview questions. 
The pilot led also to the design being refined to include recipients as a source of 
data. Consequently, gaining the recipient's perspective of the achievement of 
radical process orientation was included in the initial conceptual model. 
Subsequent attempts to collect recipient data from Financial Data were refused. 
Financial Data's second order constructs are taken no further because recipient 
data is missing. Nonetheless, the conclusion drawn from the pilot study is that 
the case study design, subject to the above refinement, would adequately 
discharge the research objective and research question. 
The refined research design was deployed in Carton Carrier and Foundry 
Insurance. A rich description of the achievement of radical process orientation 
in these organisations was developed through an interpretation of the first order 
constructs. The first order constructs and their interpretation led to second order 
constructs, which were classified according to the conceptual categories 
identified in the literature. The analysis of the case studies yielded 127 second 
order constructs. These second order constructs were conjoined on the basis of 
their conceptual category classification. This enabled the conceptual categories 
that formed the initial conceptual model to be developed from an interpretation 
of the second order constructs and current theory. The resulting theoretical 
propositions were synthesised into an emergent model for the achievement of 
radical process orientation. The theoretical propositions and emergent model 
fulfil the research objective and research question of this work. 
8.3 The contribution of this thesis 
8.3.1 Clarification of concepts 
The process orientation literature currently defines radical change in 
terms of the magnitude of performance improvements to be achieved 
(Davenport, 1993; Hammer and Stanton, 1995; Stoddard et al. 1996). However, 
this research argues that this definition is misplaced and that the 
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conceptualisation of radical organisational change propounded currently in the 
process orientation literature should be replaced. 
The evidence from Carton Carrier and Foundry Insurance reveal that 
radical process orientation should be conceptualised in terms of radical changes 
to organisational elements such as strategy, structure, responsibilities and 
appraisal criteria, collaborative behaviour and information systems. This 
conceptualisation, derived from the second order constructs, contributes to 
current process orientation research at a theoretical and a practical level. 
Theoretically, it overcomes the criticism that the current conceptualisation of 
radical process orientation is imprecise. People within organisations can 
negotiate and agree the potential magnitude of change that will be made to each 
organisational element, rather than only setting a stretch performance 
improvement target. Practically, it addresses a crucial weakness in the literature, 
namely management's lack of appreciation of the change aspects of a radical 
process orientation initiative. Focusing on the content of change to specific 
organisational elements ensures board members and senior managers recognise 
the change aspects of a radical process orientation initiative. 
8.3.2 The emergent model for the achievement of radical process 
orientation 
The existing models in the literature are prescriptive in nature. They are 
based on an assumption that people in organisations share a single reality. The 
emergent model from this research is rooted in the belief that individuals in the 
organisation construct reality, and that these individuals are unlikely to remain 
neutral and objective about the changes that need to occur. This model enables 
people to structure and share their subjective views so that they can negotiate 
areas of disagreement in order to research a shared view of the radical process 
orientation initiative. For example, this model suggests that unless people, 
especially board members and senior managers, agree there is a need for radical 
process orientation such an initiative should not begin. 
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The emergent model is definitely not prescriptive in nature. There are no 
discrete stages and implementation steps. The model is structured to suggest 
that organisations iterate around each domain in an attempt to balance the deeper 
change dynamics. To explain, there is a dynamic interplay between theoretical 
propositions within each domain. The interplay in the commencement domain 
suggests that organisations proceed with radical process orientation once people 
in the organisation are able to establish the need for radical process orientation. 
Organisations that are unable to establish the need for radical process orientation 
should address the drivers for change with other change initiative options. 
Within the changes that need to occur domain, organisations are more likely to 
achieve radical process orientation when the theoretical propositions in this 
domain are in balance. In other words, people recognise that organisational 
elements such as strategy, structure, responsibilities and assessment criteria, 
behaviours and information systems will form the content of the change and that 
the nature of the change will be to align the organisation to a function and 
process orientation; and people accept the changes that actually need to occur; 
and they are willing to allow the changes to affect them. Where, for example, a 
gap appears between the changes people recognise need to occur and those they 
accept will actually occur, it is unlikely that the all the changes necessary for the 
achievement of radical process orientation will be implemented. Where a gap 
appears between changes people actually accept will occur and their willingness 
to allow the changes to affect them, the emergent model suggests that the 
changes that need to occur to achieve radical process orientation are unlikely to 
be implemented. Where the changes are not implemented, radical process 
orientation will not be achieved. In the issues that need to be managed domain, 
people link the issues that actually will be managed to the changes that need to 
occur. Where gaps appear between the issues that need to be managed and the 
changes that need to occur, the emergent model predicts that the changes that 
need to occur are unlikely to be implemented. People have to be willing to 
implement the issues that need to be managed. Where a gap emerges between 
the issues that are adapted to the organisation's context and people's willingness 
to implement the issues, the changes that need to occur are unlikely to be 
207 
implemented. In each instance that a change that needs to occur is not 
implemented, the emergent model predicts that radical process orientation is 
unlikely to be achieved. However, where organisations are able to minimise the 
gaps between the theoretical propositions, the model predicts that the radical 
process orientation will be achieved and that the effects will be the resolution of 
the drivers for change. 
8.3.3 Challenges to the current orthodoxy 
The literature assumes that radical process orientation initiatives are an 
appropriate response to drivers for change faced by organisations. However, the 
literature suggests no criterion by which organisations can assess whether or not 
radical process orientation is relevant to their particular context. This research 
proposes two tentative criteria that could be used to assess the need for radical 
process orientation. One, where the changes have to be co-ordinated across 
several functions. Two, where greater functional interdependence is necessary 
at a managerial and operational level. 
Researchers currently place great emphasis on the importance of gaining 
and sustaining people's buy-in. This research introduces the concept, 
acceptance of the changes that actually need to occur, which is substantively 
different to the conceptual category of buy-in as defined in the current literature. 
To be sure, the literature asks people to buy-in to drivers for change, 
organisation's vision or redesign methods. The concept of acceptance of the 
changes that actually need to occur suggests people be asked to accept the 
intended content and nature of changes to be made to organisational elements. 
Two consequences arise from this conceptualisation. First, the content and 
nature of change to organisational elements identified in this research (see 
theoretical proposition# 3) are coupled to people's acceptance that the changes 
actually need to occur in the organisation. Second, the concept of buy-in in the 
literature is misdirected, as people are being asked to buy-in to superficial issues 
that are unlikely to influence the achievement of radical process orientation. 
The second order constructs suggest that a more significant determinant of the 
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achievement of radical process orientation is people's acceptance of the changes 
to organisational elements that actually need to occur. 
The literature suggests that the changes affect people at the lower levels 
of the organisation. Board members and senior managers are placed above the 
changes in the role of implementors. This role is deemed to be discrete from 
that of recipients. Implementors are the creators and instigators of change 
whereas recipients experience the changes. This research demonstrates through 
case evidence that board members and senior managers are affected by the 
changes that occur during the achievement of radical process orientation. This 
research shows that the implementor I recipient roles are reciprocal, with people 
moving from one role to the other. 
The literature directs organisations to achieve 'quick wins', i.e. short-
term financial benefits. However, the literature neglects the changes that need to 
be made to achieve these quick wins. This research introduces the notion that 
organisations should focus upon designing and making symbolic changes to 
attain quick wins. These changes can be undertaken in a short period of time to 
demonstrate benefits from radical process orientation. 
8.3.4 Taking an interpretive approach to the study of radical 
process orientation 
Much of the current research is guided by the functionalist orthodoxy. 
The intellectual assumptions and theories that underpin the functionalist 
paradigm are unsuitable to the study of radical process orientation. They lead to 
prescriptive models that pay insufficient attention to the deeper social aspects of 
achieving radical process orientation. From the interpretive perspective, 
researchers conducted longitudinal studies in organisations that planned to 
implement radical process orientation but actually implemented adaptive process 
orientation (Currie and Willcocks, 1996). There are important lessons to learn 
from studies of failure to implement radical process orientation, e.g. 
underestimating vested interests can prevent radical process orientation from 
being implemented. However, little research has been carried out in 
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organisations that have implemented radical process orientation. This research 
partly fills this gap by focusing upon organisations that have initiated and 
implemented radical process orientation, and it avoids the functionalist 
paradigm. It adopts an interpretive perspective to develop a rich picture of the 
achievement of radical process orientation. This rich picture consists of vivid 
accounts of implementors and recipients directly involved in the achievement of 
radical process orientation, and an interpretation of these accounts. The 
methodical trail of evidence ensures that the pragmatic insights derived from the 
cases are robust and credible. This research makes a further methodological 
contribution, to the radical process orientation literature, by gathering the view 
of recipients. Current literature develops models and frameworks based upon 
the views of implementors, with the virtual exclusion of recipients' views. This 
significantly weakens the extant theories as a vital source of information is 
neglected. This research argues that researchers should adapt their case study 
designs to include recipients. 
8.3.5 Contribution to the IS/business process orientation literature 
The emergent model contributes to the IS/business process orientation 
body of literature in two ways. Much of the current research in this field focuses 
upon a single topic to the virtual exclusion of others. Topics for inquiry include 
politics (Sayer, 1998), behaviour (Zaidifard, 1998), knowledge based systems 
(Nissen, 1998), the implementation of software (Ross, 1999), and IT 
infrastructure (Broadbent et al. 1999). While each of these studies illuminates 
the specific, they are limited in the sense that the interplay between each of these 
topics is missing. Hence the first contribution of the emergent model is to 
provide a holistic framework within which studies such as these can be 
understood. This contribution is exemplified by Broadbent et al.'s (1999) 
argument that cross functional IT infrastructure leads to business process 
orientation being implemented faster. This suggests that organisations 
embarking on business process orientation should invest m such an 
infrastructure. However, the emergent model suggests that IT is only one 
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organisational element that needs to take on a process orientation. It indicates 
that there needs to be agreement in the organisation that changes to IT and the 
other organisational elements will be managed in functional and process 
dimensions. A focus on one organisational element may limit the amount of 
benefit gained from the investment in IT infrastructure. 
The second contribution to the IS/business process orientation literature 
1s the insights it provides when attempting to explicate business process 
orientation. In order to demonstrate the insights provided by the emergent 
model, two published cases in which IS played a prominent role during the 
achievement of radical process orientation were reinterpreted using the emergent 
model as the analytical framework. One case is that of a bank (Currie and 
Willcocks, 1996) and the second case is of a hospital unit referred to as ACAD 
(Sillince and Harindranath, 1998). The detailed analysis of the two cases is 
presented in Appendix 7. 
These two publications were selected because both are instances of 
disconfirming cases, that is, they describe organisations that set out to 
implement radical process orientation but actually implemented adaptive process 
orientation. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), the use of disconfirming 
cases in this way increases the confidence in the conclusions reached in 
qualitative research. 
The emergent model provides further insights into ACAD' s and the 
bank's inability to achieve the planned radical process orientation initiative. The 
model suggests that members of the management team in both organisations 
assumed that radical process orientation was the most appropriate change 
technique. Neither management team addressed whether or not the organisation 
should co-ordinate changes across several functions or whether operational and 
managerial interdependence increased. ACAD focused primarily on one 
organisational change element, namely information systems. Changes to other 
organisational elements, e.g. structure, behaviours, and responsibilities, were 
barely considered. A consequence of this is that inappropriate and incomplete 
issues were identified and managed, as IT changes received the most attention. 
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While the organisational changes identified by the bank were similar to the 
emergent model, they too focused upon IT and structural aspects of change. 
ACAD also failed to gain the acceptance of the actual changes from key 
staff groups such as consultants and senior nursing staff. These people therefore 
felt excluded and isolated, which resulted in withdrawal of their support. People 
within the bank were barely consulted about the actual changes that needed to 
occur. Implementors in the bank took the view that people would support the 
change. 
The ACAD implementors did not recognise that staff were unwilling to 
allow the changes to affect them. This realisation came about when staff openly 
rejected the proposed changes. The bank's implementation expected people to 
allow the changes to affect them and hence barely considered people's concerns. 
The implementation teams in both organisations attempted to achieve 
radical process orientation through an evolutionary implementation mode. 
Opportunities to take a radical mode of operationalising the issues to be 
managed were avoided. lmplementors in both organisations were also ill 
prepared for managing the paradox of empowering people while at the same 
time being directive. It is also apparent that the ADAC team consisted of 
implementors only, and they were unaffected by the changes, i.e. they were not 
recipients. Hence, they were often highly insensitive to the concerns of 
recipients, which resulted in recipients distancing themselves froni the business 
process orientation initiative. The bank's implementation team included line 
managers, however, once on the implementation team they took on the role of an 
implementor. Both organisations overlooked that recipient and implementor 
roles are reciprocal. 
These fresh insights gained by analysing the case through the emergent 
model indicate that the radical process orientation initiative would result m 
adaptive process orientation being implemented. 
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8.3.6 Contribution to the radical organisational change theory 
This research contributes primarily to that section of the radical 
organisational change literature, which deals with implementation (Meyer et al. 
1995). This section of literature falls into two broad categories (Ginsberg and 
Buchholtz, 1990). Researchers in both categories tend to emphasise mutually 
exclusive assumptions about organisational change (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985). 
One category of researchers focus upon inertial forces such as reliance on 
formulae of success, beliefs sets and ideology (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; 
Miller and Friesen, 1980). 
The other category believes that radical organisational change is a 
proactive response to external opportunities or threats. They focus upon the 
factors that enhance the organisation's proactive position, e.g. marshalling 
necessary resources, effective leadership and developing competencies 
(Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Porter, 1980). 
Ginsberg & Buchholtz (1990) criticise this polarisation and argue that the 
interaction of inertial forces and proactive choice lead to the implementation of 
radical organisational change (Ginsberg and Buchholtz, 1990). The emergent 
model supports Ginsberg and Buchholtz's assertion as data from the case studies 
suggests that implementors and recipients of radical organisational change faced 
inertial forces and made proactive choices within each domain and specifically, 
for each theoretical proposition within the domain. For example, Carton Carrier 
had to overcome the prevailing belief that poor customer service was acceptable. 
Concurrently, the board set out proactively to regain control over activities that 
affected customer service. 
8.4 Limitations of this research 
This research shares a limitation that is similar to other interpretative 
studies; namely it is subjective in nature, as interpreting data is an individualistic 
activity. Researchers bring their biases and preconceived notions to the act of 
interpretation and these invariably influence the outcomes (Legge, 1984). 
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Moreover, all acts of interpreting data are based on the researcher's personal 
'common sense' understanding and their stock of knowledge. As this varies for 
each researcher, it is likely that two people will interpret data differently. 
Functionalist researchers, in particular, criticise interpretive work for exactly 
these reasons. In an attempt to mitigate this limitation, this research discloses 
people's first order constructs and this researcher's interpretation of the data. By 
doing so, this research exposes what is often concealed in other interpretive 
studies. 
Gaining access to information was at times problematic. Access here 
refers not only to case study sites but also people with information relevant to 
this research's research objective. This researcher would have preferred to have 
conducted a greater number of case studies, however, organisations were 
unwilling to participate. In the case studies that were conducted, directors in the 
gatekeeper role were supportive while they were in their current role. However, 
their position changed during the study and this influenced other interviewees. 
For instance, Financial Data's deputy managing director was transferred and a 
request to interview recipients was refused by his successor. A similar situation 
arose at Foundry Insurance. This led to delays in arranging appointments and 
these being cancelled at short notice. The semi-structured interviews were on 
occasion interrupted by interviewees taking phone calls or being called away to 
deal with operational issues. This broke the flow of the interview and valuable 
time was taken up to re-establishing the discussion. At times, the interviewees 
dropped their voice and as a result, minor parts of their responses could not be 
transcribed. 
8.5 Areas for further research studies 
All research is based upon a limited number of research questions. Yet 
in the course of addressing one set of questions, others arise which expose areas 
that require further investigation. This section examines areas that require 
further research. 
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This research has shown that people occupy the dual roles of 
implementor and recipient. This duality is barely recognised in current research, 
and further research in this area would question the modes of the transition 
between roles, preparing people to perform one or other role, implications of 
people performing only one role upon radical process orientation, and effects of 
dual roles upon people in terms of stress, anxiety and resistance to change. 
Further studies into this area should be conducted on an exploratory basis. 
Researchers should endeavour to use ethnographic methods in a longitudinal 
case study design. This would enable researchers to observe, over time, the dual 
role people play during the achievement of radical process orientation. 
Another area for research is to investigate the financial implications of 
the theoretical propositions constructed in this exploratory research. Such a 
study would focus upon the financial costs necessary to operationalise the 
emergent model. Of particular interest would be the impact of radical process 
orientation on the organisation's fixed assets. This type of study might lend 
itself to quantitative methods exemplified by the use of instruments, such as a 
structured questionnaire and predetermined definitions of costs to gather 
comparative information. This would enable comparisons to be made across 
different organisations and industries. 
Another area for further study 1s the organisations that apply the 
emergent model to a radical process orientation initiative. This would lead to 
the model being refined and developed from a practical perspective. The study 
might span several organisations from one industry to determine whether or not 
the changes that need to happen and issues to be managed can be refined to 
particular sectors. Studies in this vein would find the action research method 
suitable. 
An area for research is to develop methods for assessmg people's 
perspective of each theoretical proposition. For instance, researchers could 
develop and test instruments that assess people's acceptance of the drivers for 
change, their recognition that organisational elements will change and align to 
function and business process, and their willingness to change organisational 
elements. This research might be conducted using qualitative methods. 
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Researchers could conduct case studies using methods such as repertory grid to 
gather data and develop instruments to measure user perceptions for each 
theoretical proposition. 
8.6 Implications for practitioners 
This research identifies several areas that are relevant to practitioners. 
One, current prescriptive models make an assumption that drivers for change 
lead directly to the initiation of radical process orientation. This research 
suggests that organisations should establish the need for radical process 
orientation. There are practical implications associated with neglecting to 
establish the need for radical process orientation. Some organisations might 
embark on another type of change initiative when radical process orientation is 
relevant, and hence waste valuable resources and time. Other organisations may 
choose radical process orientation when people consider it inappropriate, thereby 
causing delays in addressing the drivers for change. This is evident in one 
survey of North American companies, in which managers reported that they 
spent up to two years 'softening up' functional directors before they could begin 
to discuss radical process orientation (Grint and Willcocks, 1995 p. 107). Two, 
the assumption that the implementation of radical process orientation can be 
controlled by a small number of people, for example the redesign team, is 
flawed. This research argues that people move between implementor and 
recipient roles. Recipients become the implementor of an issue that needs to be 
managed once they have accepted or internalised that issue. The corollary of 
this is where individuals find an issue unacceptable they are unlikely to be able 
to adopt the implementor role with conviction and integrity. Individuals that are 
unable to take an effective implementor role are likely to resist implementing the 
changes. Three, practitioners need to recognise that board members and senior 
managers are also recipients of the changes. There are practical implications of 
continuing to treat board members and senior managers as though they are 
implementors only. Following the widely accepted argument in the literature 
that those most affected by changes are also most likely to resist them: if these 
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two groups are treated as implementors, they will be overlooked as potential 
sources of resistance. A deeper concern is that their personal determinants of 
resistance, be they, their fears, anxieties, or loss of power, will remmn 
unrecognised and unmanaged, leading perhaps to a prolonged and greater 
unwillingness to allow the changes to occur or to affect them. Moreover, during 
radical process orientation's initiation phase, board members and senior 
managers have substantial influence over identifying and legitimising the 
changes that actually need to occur in the organisation. Where board members 
and senior managers do not accept that a change actually needs to occur, case 
evidence suggests that the change will be excluded from the implementation of 
radical process orientation. This could jeopardise the achievement of radical 
process orientation. Four, this work highlights that organisations need to beware 
adopting prescriptive models that neglect the social aspects of reaching a 
common understanding of the need for radical process orientation, the changes 
that need to occur and issues to be managed. 
8. 7 Closing remarks 
The achievement of radical process orientation is complex, painstaking 
and laborious because it requires people, from different functions and 
hierarchical levels, to construct a shared perspective of the need for radical 
process orientation, the changes that need to occur, and the issues that need to be 
managed. In reaching this consensus individuals reflect upon their own beliefs 
about the organisation. They fall back on their own knowledge and prior 
experience; and at a point in time, they realise that these very things, that are so 
integral to each one of us as individuals, have to be relinquished, in order to 
reach some common ground with colleagues. It is at this point that the 
achievement of radical process orientation begins or simply peters out into 
adaptive process orientation. Where people let go and are open to embrace the 
challenges of questioning their own beliefs, of discarding knowledge they have 
nurtured for years, and of recognising that their experience no longer serves 
them, radical process orientation has the potential to succeed. This research 
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assists people in organisations to establish a shared perspective that is vital to the 
achievement of radical process orientation. 
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The Road Not Taken 
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, 
And sorry I could not travel both 
And be one traveller, long I stood 
And looked down one as far as I could 
To where it bent in the undergrowth; 
Then took the other, as just as fair, 
And having perhaps the better claim, 
Because it was grassy and wanted wear; 
Though as for that the passing there 
Had worn them really about the same, 
And both that morning equally lay 
In leaves no step had trodden black. 
Oh, I kept the first for another day! 
Yet knowing how way leads on to way, 
I doubted if I should ever come back. 
I shall be telling this with a sigh 
Somewhere ages and ages hence: 
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I -
I took the one less travelled by, 
And that has made all the difference. 
219 
Robert Frost 
(Robert Frost Selected Poems, 
1955, Penguin Books) 
Glossary 
This glossary contains a brief explanation of the key terms used 
throughout this thesis. Its purpose is to provide the reader with a quick reminder 
of the terms. 
Term Explanation 
Business process Forms the terrain of this research and refers to organisations 
orientation identifying and managmg business processes that cut 
horizontally across functional boundaries 
Business process Refers to activities that are integrated, across different 
functions, to create outputs that are of value to one or more 
stakeholder 
Achievement Refers to the initiation and implementation phases that effect a 
business process Ill an organisation, and the related 
consequences that arise from implementation 
Radical Refers to changes that are made to elements of an organisation 
organisational that leads to the transformation of the organisation as opposed 
change to an adaptive change in the organisation 
Radical process Refers to the achievement of a business process that culminates 
orientation in a transformation of the organisation 
First order Refers to the experiences people directly involved with radical 
construct process orientation consider important to its achievement and 
takes the form of interview data 
Second order Represent the researcher's interpretation of the first order 
construct constructs 
Conceptual Refer to issues that are considered important to the achievement 
category of radical process orientation in the existing literature 
Conceptual bins Are an intellectual representation of the conceptual categories 
derived from the literature 
Implementors Are the people who are responsible for designing and 
implementing the process-related changes 
Recipients Are the people who receive the changes, and hence must adopt 
and adapt to the changes 
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Appendices 
I 
Appendix 1: Schedule of interview dates 
This appendix lists the schedule of meetings held for collecting material 
for the case studies described in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 and the relevant supporting 
appendix, namely 4, 5 and 6. Only formally scheduled meetings are tabulated. 
The meetings for each organisation are listed in two sections: preliminary 
meetings and in-depth meetings 
Organisation Date Contact role 
Financial Data Preliminary meeting 
April and May 1993 Several phone calls were made to 
arrange a meeting with the deputy 
managing director. 
10m June 1993 Deputy managing director 
In-depth meetings 
25m August 1993 Deputy managing director 
23ro September 1993 Technical director 
24m September 1993 IS manager 
10m November 1993 Technical manager 
17m February 1994 Technical manager 
17m February 1994 Technical director 
22no February 1994 Divisional business manager 
22no February 1994 IS manager 
21 sr March 1994 Deputy managing director 
Foundry Preliminary meeting 
Insurance 
November 1994 to A number of phone calls were made 
February 1995 to arrange a meeting with the 
managing director. 
6m March 1995 Managing director and deputy 
managing director 
In-depth meetings 
4m May 1995 Customer services manager 
4Ln May 1995 Implementation team member 
4m May 1995 Deputy managing director 
4m May 1995 Implementation team leader 
4m May 1995 Department team leader 
4m May 1995 Engineering manager 
7m July 1995 Customer services manager 
7m July 1995 Implementation team leader 
2 
7m July 1995 Department team leader 
7Ln July 1995 Deputy managing director 
7Ln July 1995 Implementation team member 
Carton Preliminary meeting 
Carrier 
June 1995 Arranged to meet the commercial 
director 
11m July 1995 Preliminary meeting with the 
commercial director 
In-depth meetings 
28m September 1995 Team member 
29m September 1995 IT co-ordinator 
29m September 1995 Driver 
29m September 1995 Depot manager 
29m September 1995 Assistant depot manager 
2na November 1995 Personnel manager 
2na November 1995 Regional general manager 
3ru November 1995 Services manager 
3ro November 1995 Managing director 
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Appendix 2: Interview schedule 
Interviewee information: 
Name of interviewee: 
Date of interview: 
N arne of organisation: 
Introduction 
Note to the researcher: Begin by providing information about you, an overview of the 
research and the purpose of the interview. 
Questions 
1) Could I ask you to look back and reflect on what has changed in the organisation in 
the past_ years? 
Prompts: 
Actor's initials ~ 
• appraisal criteria 
• skills 
• roles 
• responsibilities 
• reward structures 
• number of people 
leaving I joining 
• information systems 
• other systems 
• process owners 
• process teams 
• power bases 
• reporting lines 
• hierarchy 
• culture 
• benefits 
• individual's role in 
change 
2) With the benefit of hindsight what critical issues were managed in order to achieve 
the change? Please reflect on all the issues and then we will examine each in tum. 
Note to the researcher: Keep a note of the list as you need to ask about these. 
3) Why do you think each issue is important? 
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Appendix 3 Extract from an interview showing the 
identification of themes 
This extract Is from an interview with Foundry Insurance's deputy 
managing director. 
WHAT HAS CHANGED IN THE PERIOD? 
I think, I think being ? changed from complacency through to, 'this is 
becoming quite a heck of a life, this through from, uh, and I can put it 
at the senior levels, is that people in senior levels had fairly good easy 
going jobs. The pressures were there but they were gentle pressures. 
They didn't realise what pressures were, I don't think either. And here 
comes the sort of change which says 'Well come on, what are you doing 
about it - what are you planning - what are you doing, and these are 
things that people didn't have to think about before. Urn, people 
became responsible for the budgets, whereas before they had budgets 
but they were always just merely some of the expense bud~t. About a 
third budget was actually budgetted; the other two-thirds were 
controlled centrally so that people didn't have any direct responsibility 
for things like staffing numbers and so on because 'that was Sir's job'. 
So if you wanted an extra member of staff to replace, you had to get 
Sir's permission. These are the changes, and in fact one or two people 
ound difficulty in taking on extra responsibility because they hadn't 
been developed in responsibility. ~d a bit more sort of, uh, I don't 
know, the Head Office syndrome is that we control eve h"na it 
comes t rough us and we check and double-check and sow~ was 
actually stiflina initiative elsewhere as well. So it was huge - whole 
range of things it was a ve in ery sort -of 
yertically structur£d,) 'I've got my job, bands otf. What's it gotta o 
with you. What's· my contribution to the organisation. I don't know, 
but I got this job.' And at the senior levels, it was status. And (could 
put it like the first business plans when I came here, the business plans 
existed of a page and a half that was submitted to our p.uen.t com any 
whtc IS all t 1e sort o general picture we ruled • Su ort the -.:om any 
an we will o . IS, e WI gen er growth, and all that sort of stuff 
Now we've produced business plans which are two or three inches thick 
because people now start ac t m 'ma of what t e are aoina to do. 
So people have been thinkin about thinas collectively, and that's also a 
change. he change - you could think of almost any change an you 
could say';fppplied to NV. It was really taking a culture that was very 
inward looking and become outward looking, and had been business 
like. 
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Appendix 4 Financial Data: first order constructs, 
interpretation and second order constructs 
Dl 4.3 Commencement 
4.3.1 A and 4.3.1 Bare located in the body of Chapter 4. 
4.3.2 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We were faced with considerable problems in terms of the clients' 
perception of the quality of service provided by Financial Data. Not so 
much in terms of the products themselves which generally and 
throughout have always been considered to be very good and have got an 
excellent reputation. It was more a question that the way we serviced 
our clients being, even down to the attitude of our staff, the slowness 
with which we handled queries, problems, complaints, the fact that our 
billing was so often incorrect and late." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"Release time - 7 weeks, 8 weeks lead time. I can remember I started 
trying to measure the lead times in the old environment and I worked out 
it took something like 30 calendar days for an order to get from a sales 
person to an engineer for him to even look at doing anything for it. Once 
he got it, it took him 30 days to install it. Ludicrous. No excuse for that 
first 30 days, even if one could try and find a logistic excuse for the 
second 30 days ... There was no measurement as to whether the order 
was actually done in the way the customer wanted it done in timescales 
or, indeed, the product. Our customers were appalled with us. Invoices, 
lead times, service they were getting, reacting to their needs, sales calls 
people didn't call back." (Implementation Team Member) 
"In the UK, for example, before we changed all this, to get a contract 
even if you were a very good bank and had a history with us of ten years, 
never had a problem with you, it took six weeks just to get a contract 
(and this) didn't mean you got delivery." (Implementation Team Leader) 
"The way in which the old ordering process was built up it was very easy 
to lose track of the fact you were coping with an order for a customer and 
people just saw bits of paper going from one department to another and 
they were dealing with the paper and losing sight of the fact that it was 
actually a continuous chain the whole way through to delivery to the 
customer." (IT Manager) 
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4.3.2 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Financial Data offered clients products that were of good quality and 
performed well. However, clients had to wait at least 60 days to receive even 
basic products, and hence were dissatisfied with the service levels they received. 
Longstanding clients with blue-chip reputations were treated in the same way as 
a new client. People within Financial Data did not resolve client enquiries or 
problems effectively. People tended to lose sight that customers were waiting 
for a product; instead, people in each function focussed on sending memos to 
each other. Customers not only faced long delays but also received incorrect 
invoices, and the wrong products. 
Financial Data's clients were deeply dissatisfied with the service levels they 
received. (C _SOC# 4.2) 
4.3.3 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Often months after the installation was carried out, our billing would be 
sent out, so that people therefore constantly questioned its accuracy, its 
validity, sometimes they couldn't even remember the installation taking 
place, so they would even question whether they had the work done and 
whether we had the right to charge for it . . . we were always being 
accused before of selling them one thing and then when the bill came 
there were about four or five other things on the bill which they had 
never been told about." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"We knew we had some levels of complaints from clients which people 
probably didn't fully understand. The first manifestation was that people 
didn't pay their bills, so that's the first thing that smacks you between the 
eyes. People were arguing about their bills. We, in tum, found it very 
difficult to actually explain those bills to the client because our 
background information wasn't good enough to actually confirm or deny 
what the client was saying. That then goes into a downward spiral 
because your bad debts begin to build up, not actually bad debts because 
they are not classified like that, but possible provisions in that you don't 
know when people will ever pay because they may be right and we may 
be wrong." (Technical Director) 
"Money was coming in the door significantly because clearly the 
business was going, people did pay some of the invoices which went out 
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and everything was desperately buoyant and bottles of champagne on the 
streets of the City and all that sort of thing. Then things started to slow 
down and what we found was that from a commercial point of view 
people were not paying invoices because they were not right ... 
customers were not paying their invoices. Debt position was growing 
and I don't know specifically but rumours on the street were that (our 
external auditors) were going to qualify our annual reports." 
(Implementation Team Member) 
4.3.3 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Financial Data had a major problem in respect of unpaid invoices. 
Invoices were sent months after products were delivered to the customer's site. 
Consequently customers often forgot that the product was ever delivered. 
Engineers often added product components necessary for the product. However, 
as these were not specified on the original order and the client was not made 
aware of the components in advance of the invoice, clients often claimed that 
they were being charged for things they did not know about. These clients 
simply refused to pay their invoices, and Financial Data lacked information to 
confirm or deny assertions made by clients. Over time, Financial Data's bad 
debt provisions had to be increased, as they were unsure whether the client 
would pay their invoices. The external accountants were concerned about 
Financial Data's debt position, and the organisation faced the possibility of 
having its accounts qualified by the accountants. 
Financial Data had a substantial amount of unpaid invoices, which required the 
organisation to raise its bad debts provision. (C_SOC # 4.3) 
4.3.4 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Prior to re-engineering everyone was cocooned in their own 
department, working for departmental goals, working for whatever the 
department happened to be rather than working for the service of the 
customer. All sorts of measures were going through in terms of lead 
time reduction, bad debt recovery, etc. which were indicative of the fact 
that we were not servicing the customer." (IT Manager) 
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"There were control issues from the point of view of the company often 
not knowing precisely what its monthly revenues were in terms of, 
particularly, new orders and things like that, installations, purely because 
there was no overall management of the information ... it had grown out 
of departments getting out of control and no one person you could go to 
could tell you end to end how we were running the business. It was a 
mess." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"We had no control over our revenue. Lead times were poor, no control 
over the revenue. The records we had on site were wrong ... it was 
business out of control. Nobody doubted we were making money but we 
just didn't know how much we were making ... we did not know what 
was installed. We did not have the control processes and the right 
administration when we installed it to be able to properly reflect that in 
the final invoice. Effectively it was time to deal with these issues which 
were missing during that boom phase." (Implementation Team Member) 
4.3.4 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
People in each department endeavoured to achieve their functional goals, 
even when these may have led to customers receiving poor service. The board 
and senior managers had very little management information, for example, in 
terms of revenue and the products installed on-site. Nor were measurements in 
place against which to assess the efficacy of the previous order process. 
Operational information, such as clients' records, was incorrect. The board and 
senior managers realised that they had little control over the order process and 
that this situation had to be reversed. 
Managers had little control over the previous order process but sought to gain 
control over it. (C_SOC # 4.4) 
4.3.5 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We tried things like TQ initiatives to minor extents in the past but they 
never managed to break down the functional boundaries. We tried TQ 
initiative here trying to be total quality within the functional boundary." 
(IT Manager) 
"Let's talk about total quality . . . I think that is expensive in 
administration effort. I think it is expensive in management time and 
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effort and it is building a second hierarchy which looks over the top of 
the primary hierarchy which is involved in doing the business . . . what 
you really need to do is to have an organisation that performs without 
that sort of 'policeman' sitting over the top of it ... the technical areas 
within the divisions buy into a total quality process. Our field service 
group, comms group, equipment preparation areas are all BS 5750 
registered. None of the divisions are 5750 registered and I am very 
sceptical as to its value, personally." (Implementation Team Member) 
"I've seen a number of initiatives within the organisation which had not 
worked. There have been quality management initiatives, and I think the 
style of those and commitment to those means that they wont succeed in 
the long term." (Implementation Team Leader) 
"You do a job and by God you have to have a bit of quality bunged in on 
top as well, so maybe you go and stick .... we actually stuck posters up 
that say 'quality comes first'. They were a waste of time ... so the last 
thing you should ever do if you want to improve the quality of an 
organisation is actually form a quality group. A complete waste of time. 
We tried it in the old days and it was just a joke. Didn't do anything. 
Complete and utter waste of time and people got very cynical about it. 
In fact we had posters that said 'quality comes first' and then we made 
the quality group redundant and some wag wrote on the bottom 'well 
then 'quality goes first". People get cynical about it, they see one half of 
the company saying 'a bit of quality, you don't do anything that's not 
quality' and then somebody comes along and says 'kill it now, come on 
get this revenue in, will you. Launch this product without understanding 
how you are going to administer it'. It's fatal." (Technical Director) 
4.3.5 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Financial Data previously attempted to address the drivers for change by 
implementing a total quality (TQ) initiative. The organisation established a 
separate TQ function to police the introduction and documentation of existing 
activities. TQ was implemented within each function, consequently, functional 
differences were reinforced and some functions progressed quickly to achieve 
BS 5750 accreditation while others lagged behind. Management commitment to 
the initiative was questionable, as evidenced by people receiving conflicting 
messages. On the one hand, people were told to follow the procedures laid 
down in the TQ documentation; and on the other hand, managers acted in ways 
that flouted the procedures, e.g. by telling people to launch products without 
understanding the administrative support required. These conflicting messages 
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led to people becoming cynical about TQ. The TQ initiative was considered to 
have failed to address the drivers for change. People in the TQ department were 
made redundant and the department was closed down. 
Financial Data attempted to address the drivers for change by introducing a total 
quality management initiative. (C _SOC# 4.5) 
4.3.6 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"They all thought they were doing a super job. By their own calculation 
they probably were. You know, 'how many bills have I issued this 
week? How many were requested? How many are backed up and 
stacked up? We've cleared the decks. We've all done a good job, we 
can go home'. The debt collectors would say 'We've collected this 
amount of money this month, more than last month'. They've done a 
good job, they can all go home. The engineers would say 'Well, they 
come in on a Monday morning, which clients are we going to install this 
month, or this week, or this day?' Not you know, 'Well these are the 
ones which are planned to be installed today'. It was, 'Oh gosh it's this 
Bank, oh gosh, ah he's complained this month. We'd better install him 
then, for God's sake, he's a big client paying us a lot of money. We'd 
better sort him out. Ah but what about so and so? Oh well put him to 
the back of the queue, do him in three weeks' time, when you have a bit 
of time'." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"A more efficient process in place, whatever that process is. In our case 
it happened to be ordering, billing and customer service. In other 
companies it may be different things. If you start looking at the 
efficiency of servicing whatever unit you want to service at the end of 
the day, I think that's the reason for doing it, a by-product of that is 
going to be cut down functions, cut out functional boundaries, combine 
functions and to orientate the company towards delivery of something ... 
start thinking 'think of yourself in your customer's shoes' and drag them 
across those functions and say 'what do we need to do to better see 
things across and everything else falls into place like structural changes, 
cultural changes, staff changes, attitude changes'." (IT Manager) 
"Poor invoicing and, therefore, failure to pay bills was actually the last 
carriage of the train. Prior to that were confused installations, failure to 
understand what it was that had gone in, what the client wanted or poor 
attention to dates and responsiveness and lead times, in fact nobody 
knew what the lead time was. 
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We created what we call 'service providers' which were the groups that 
were not practical to break up, although it may have been desirable but 
not practical ... who were integral in the overall provision of service to 
the client." {Technical Director) 
4.3.6 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Each function operated independently of each other and set is own set of 
targets. Engineers in the technical function decided on an ad hoc basis the 
orders they fulfilled each day. The board and senior managers realised that to 
address drivers for change, i.e. poor customer services levels and unpaid 
invoices, internal changes needed to be co-ordinated across the sales, technical 
and finance functions. These functions were central to identifying customer 
requirements, agreeing delivery dates, planning product installations, monitoring 
and recording products installed, invoicing and debt collection. The board and 
senior managers also realised that changes to other functions referred to as 
service providers, such as purchasing and training, central training providers had 
to also be aligned. 
The drivers for change required change initiatives in the technical, sales, and 
finance functions to be aligned. (C_SOC # 4.6) 
D2 4.4 Changes that occurred 
4.4.1 A and 4.4.1 B are located in the body of Chapter 4. 
4.4.2 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"I perhaps used the word 'order process'. You get a customer who 
orders something from us. What is the beginning of the process is the 
order. Sorry, the beginning of the process is not the order, the beginning 
of the process is a customer expressing an interest in a product. A sales 
lead. The end of the process is when we send him an invoice for what 
we have installed. That is the order cycle." (Implementation Team 
Member) 
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"The entire order process changed, the way we did things, individual 
steps, changed entirely. There were never procedures written down 
anyway so they didn't have to change, they didn't exist. Everything 
changed about what we did. About the only thing you could say was still 
the same was the overall objective- to sell a client something and install 
it. Everything about how we then took that forward was redesigned. 
You define the overall process and you then decide the functional groups 
that logically could support that process, it's very important you decide 
that after you have decided your overall process. You don't start with a 
set of functions and say 'ok what is it they can do to support the 
process?' You start with the process and say 'what functions do we need 
to support this process?' That may mean you have those functions 
already, they may be too big, too small or you may not have them, you 
have to create them." (Technical Director) 
"We recognised that ... instead of having lots of different departments 
where orders and requirements would go from building to building, 
group to group .... we (would) give a single business administrator 
(business administration function) direct ownership of the group of 
clients, and that administrator would work with a sales executive (sales 
function) who had exactly the same group of clients, and an engineer 
(technical function) who had the same group of clients. In other words 
they became an account team for that group of clients." (Deputy 
Managing Director) 
"The process has stripped through vertical functional departments and 
there is now an end to end user service because the range of new order 
processes is seen very much as end to end delivery and that people have 
got a view, the account team views the order process from end to end and 
is responsible for servicing the client, end to end, across some of the 
necessary functional splits and the re-engineering process itself swept 
away a large number of those departments and pulled people together." 
(IT Manager) 
"Now if someone is a client, they will be served by the same group, they 
know who he (the client) is, they know who within the (client 
organisation) is, they know who within the (client organisation) IS 
authorised to order services." (Implementation Team Leader) 
4.4.2 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Financial Data's board recognised that too many departments and 
functions were involved in the previous order process. They designed the 
process first and then considered the functional structure to support the process. 
Consequently, the business administrator role was established. They realised 
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that the activities performed by the functions were important, although many 
activities had to be changed. 
The directors created the order process with activities in the sales, technical, and 
the (newly created) business administration functions and gave priority to the 
process. (CTO_SOC # 4.8) 
4.4.3 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We recognised that ... we would completely change the sets of 
responsibilities. The business administrator took responsibility for what 
had previously been five or six administrators' separate tasks- the taking 
of the order, the checking of it, the inputting of it into an order 
processing system, further detailed analysis of the order in relation to the 
services which the client currently has installed ... It meant the fact that 
we redesigned our order process to give wider ownership and 
responsibility to the people who were working directly with the client, so 
that they were able to do their job to the best of their ability with the 
tools that they required and to timescales and the quality of service 
which we had laid down ... So we put the responsibility where it should 
be, in the hands of the people who deal with the client." (Deputy 
Managing Director) 
"In the old days they wouldn't have heard anything about it (a job 
completed late) because nobody would have complained, nobody's job 
to complain about them not doing it. As long as the manager said 'well 
you got through that work today, that's fine' then no hassle ... the 
aspects of moving somebody who's had 10/15 years experience working 
in a functional group, and trying to, actually saying 'you're turning 
round, now you're thinking laterally, it's not just your responsibility to 
be responsible for this bit, but your responsible for servicing the 
customer end to end and to facilitate things and to talk to other 
departments in other areas and get things moving'." (IT Manager) 
"They (account teams) are responsible from the beginning of the cycle to 
the end of the order cycle. The account manager is responsible for other 
company's long term relationship with that customer. Anything that 
might affect that relationship from invoicing to selling a new product, to 
the service he's getting from the maintenance department." 
(Implementation Team Member) 
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4.4.3 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Previously people were responsible for achieving their department's 
goals and targets only. They felt little responsibility to clients. The board and 
senior managers realised that this had to change, and that people, at all levels, 
had to take responsibility for the order process and the activities they performed 
within the process. The board realised that people could no longer assume 
responsibility for their functional activities, while neglecting related activities in 
the order process. People in account teams were made responsible for the order 
process and their functional activities. 
The board recognised that people would need to take responsibility for 
functional activities and the order process. (CTO_SOC # 4.9) 
4.4.4 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We did consider it (changes to reward systems) but decided that we 
wouldn't do that. We considered a number of options. We felt that it 
would be quite complicated. We didn't necessarily see that there was 
going to be any great gain compared with all the other things we were 
doing." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"Very limited (changes to rewards). That is one of the major issues we 
still have to face. The remuneration system is still set in stone I think. 
Slowly moving out of it with some initiatives to buy out allowances 
recently, place people on to 40 hour weeks when they were on 37 and a 
half hour weeks, but I think there is still some way to go." 
(Implementation Team Member) 
"We are starting to change rewards but it is not something we have 
totally worked out yet. Certainly in the account teams we have the 
reward/remuneration mechanisms in place to help them. In terms of 
some of the older, central departments or some of the functions who we 
now call service providers to the main order process, we still have not 
grasped that one totally. Still working on it." (IT Manager) 
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4.4.4 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board and semor managers considered changing people's 
remuneration. However, they recognised and agreed that they were not going to 
change people's remuneration packages significantly. 
The board realised that people's pay would be changed to a very limited extent. 
(CTO_SOC # 4.10) 
4.4.5 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"The one big change we did make was to give sales executives a 
commission based on the installation of new services to the client 
satisfaction, as opposed to paying them on contract signed, as we used to 
do. Salesmen used to get paid this commission at the point when we had 
just got the order signed. Effectively you were psychologically saying to 
the salesman 'you're job's done, someone else's problem now'. 
Whereas in the account team environment and from the account 
management view of things, it's not on, they have to see it through to 
installation and if there are any problems, they have to deal with them, 
and unless it's signed off and installed properly they don't get the 
commission. That was a change." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"We are looking for individuals to be more adaptable, who can cope, 
become multi-disciplined, who may have expertise in one particular area 
but who can rapidly learn skills in other areas." (IT Manager) 
"We are a lot more demanding in terms of performance, productivity and 
that may not necessarily mean we are asking people to be more active. 
What we are saying is we are providing people with simpler ways to do 
things, more efficient ways to do things through the order process." 
(Implementation Team Member) 
4.4.5 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
People were appraised based upon criteria determined on a functional 
basis. However, this has changed, for example, people are expected to learn and 
gain expertise in other functional areas. They are also assessed on the basis of 
performance and productivity criteria, which are linked to the order process. A 
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major change was made to the basis upon which sales people were assessed and 
paid commission. Whereas in the past sales people were paid when an order 
was confirmed by the customer, they were to be paid their commission when the 
product or service was installed and the customer had signed to confirm that 
they were satisfied with the installation. 
The board aligned people's appraisal criteria to the order process and the sales, 
technical and business administration functions. (CTO _SOC # 4.11) 
4.4.6 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"(The previous organisation) was dictatorial. There was one man who 
made all the decisions. . . . Previously everything had to go through a 
number of layers to the top and then back down again - that's a very long 
chain of communication, views got distorted, there was the policy 
making decisions which weren't open. Consequently, nobody could 
understand why decisions were being made, which is as important as the 
decision itself." (Implementation Team Leader) 
"The old Financial Data management style was very directive. I'd put it 
akin to when the army go into battle, you don't sit about chatting about 
the best way to do it. There's a man at the top who says what happens, 
and that's what happens. That's how the old Financial Data used to 
work because it was like going into battle. You had all these orders, you 
have to satisfy them, you never have enough people, so you just go and 
do it." (Implementation Team Member) 
"It's important to look at not only the process but inherently the cultural 
shifts and the behavioural characteristics if you want to make it work. 
We put pride and responsibility into the order process." (Technical 
Director) 
"Putting people like planning engineers into the account teams rather that 
relying on separate functions." (IT Manager) 
"We recognised that ... within each of these business units there would 
be collocated, preferably even on the same floor of a big building, would 
be all of the people necessary to conduct business with the client, the 
engineers, sales executives, account managers and the business 
administrators ... the whole business of one department, like sales, being 
all important, totally ego driven, who cares about the company 
ultimately, all of that had to go, be replaced by an ethos of 'we care 
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deeply about customers, we care deeply about the company and we are 
going to work together'. There is no one hero. That's one of the reasons 
we didn't have leaders for the account teams and still don't, because if 
you do that, it breaks up this whole idea that they are all working 
together as teams with their own individual but very important 
contribution to the team." (Deputy Managing Director) 
4.4.6 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The previous management team behaved in a dictatorial way. Decisions 
taken in each function were communicated from a senior manager or director to 
people at lower echelons in that function. People rarely understood the reasons 
that underpinned a decision. Senior managers rarely discussed issues with 
people at lower levels; instead they were told what to do. People in different 
functions saw no need to work together. However, the new board recognised 
that people's behaviours needed to become more customer focused and less 
functionally focused. The board wanted to move away from people in each 
function believing they were more important than another function and then 
behaving in a manner that reinforced functional boundaries. The board wanted 
people from different functions to work together in leaderless teams, recognising 
the contribution each function made to the order process. 
Directors realised that people in different functions needed to work together and 
that their behaviours needed to be more collaborative and customer focused. 
(CTO_SOC # 4.12) 
4.4.7 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"The old MIS systems were very modular. We had BOS which was 
effectively a billing and ordering system. We had FDITS (Financial 
Data Installation Tracking System), we had SIRI which billed the 
customers and we had SOL which dealt with all the lines, BT and all of 
these various system interfaces which ran overnight to shift data from 
application to application. We now have one box, NIS (new information 
system), which does everything for everybody." (Implementation Team 
Member) 
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"So instead of the (previous) order process threading the people together, 
the computer system threaded all these people together. From a client's 
perspective there was certainly no thread and, unfortunately, when you 
looked at the computer system, there was no thread there either because 
all of them were working in different ways often with different data 
which then required a further set of people who were permanently 
employed to reconcile databases, to find errors and correct them ... Well, 
we decided that replacing the system wasn't going to do it. What was 
required was (the order process)." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"The new order process system (is the new name for) the way in which 
we process orders, services and product (and) literally was a complete 
rewrite." (Implementation Team Leader) 
4.4.7 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The previOus systems supported individual functions rather than the 
order process. The sales function used a system for billing and ordering, the 
technical function had an installation tracking system, the finance function had 
an invoicing system and the purchasing function had a system to deal with 
suppliers. Each function managed its own system in terms of enhancements and 
amendments, and controlled the data that resided in their system. Data was 
transferred overnight from one system to another. However, there were often 
large numbers of errors, which a group of people were employed to correct. The 
organisation recognised the need to develop a single system, NIS, which would 
support the redesigned order process, rather than individual functions. 
Directors recognised that the existing systems were unable to support the 
previous and the redesigned order process. (CTO_SOC # 4.13) 
4.4.8 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Whereas before we had a situation which involved many different skill 
administrators, they all had very compartmentalised views of the 
business and of the order process. There was no ownership from the 
point of view of the client and the client could find himself dealing with 
different people for the same order, even, but certainly for different 
orders they would often find they were dealing with different people." 
(Deputy Managing Director) 
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"You looked at the previous order process, it didn't even work. We had 
a meeting with some key what we now call service providers, although 
then they weren't, trying to work out how the old process used to work. 
We got to a point where someone said 'well I tell him the plan', 'no you 
don't, you get it from them', 'no no I don't get it, I thought you got it 
(the plan)', 'no no we don't get it'. 
So I sat there and said 'are you telling me that nobody knows this' and 
they said 'no maybe not'. I said 'but I don't understand how you do an 
installation' and they said 'no we don't now'. Nobody could define how 
it actually worked. This may sound unbelievable but it's true." 
(Technical Director) 
"Now instead of a customer ringing and saying 'where is my order?' and 
being told 'I don't know, it is somebody else's job, try such and such a 
department' ... the only people with real power in the old regime were 
probably managers of those groups, because if something went wrong, 
you wanted a favour doing, you talked to the managers of those groups 
to actually get people to do things quickly. Perhaps they held some sort 
of power. Now they don't because it is not them who are responsible for 
ensuring things get done, it is people on the ground floor who are 
servicing the order progression, who because of things coming in and 
having to react within 2 hours, know they have to react within 2 hours 
and they are doing it." (IT Manager) 
4.4.8 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
People assumed that it was acceptable for them to work in their 
department without understanding activities undertaken by other departments. 
People at all levels in the organisation thought that they understood the way in 
which, for example, products were installed. However, many people did not 
know how products were installed nor were they aware of the role fulfilled by 
other departments to install products. People considered it to be acceptable for 
clients to deal with different individuals within the same department, and be 
transferred from one person to another each time they had a query. Managers 
treated the resolution of a client problem on behalf of another function as a 
favour, rather than taking ownership and responsibility for the problem. This 
changed as people, with greater visibility through the order process, became 
aware of their own activities and the timescales in which they had to carry out 
those activities. 
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The board realised assumptions people made that reinforced poor service levels 
needed to be removed. (CTO_SOC # 4.14) 
4.4.9 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We'd had barons of technical, sale, finance and they all thought they 
were the heroes, they were the ones who really mattered to the client. 
They were the ones who really sorted out the problem. They all had their 
own quality programme within their own departments . . . all of these 
different functions had grown up and developed their own fiefdoms." 
(Deputy Managing Director) 
"You could not have done this with the old management group, not 
because they are incompetent but because you cannot get somebody to 
change their approach 100% and have credibility very easily." 
(Technical Director) 
"Functional heads, over the last 10 years they rose to their positions on 
the back of creating their own little empires. I don't believe they saw the 
new reformed business process was anything more radical than just a 
different way of doing things. I don't believe they viewed it as 
something being about cultural/people change, they saw it purely just as 
titivating the mechanism of working and that they didn't realise that the 
whole emphasis of the company would shift from the vertical to the 
horizontal. They just didn't see it. It was alien to think in that way." (IT 
Manager) 
4.4.9 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Previous functional directors and senior managers of sales, technical and 
finance functions are referred to as barons, who managed their function like a 
fiefdom. Functional directors and senior managers rose through the organisation 
on the basis of creating their own empire. Each functional director and the 
people in that function believed they were the ones that are most important in 
the client's eyes. Each ran their function independently, for example, each 
function had its own quality initiative. This way of managing was associated 
closely with the individuals that ran Financial Data. They did not believe that 
there needed to be closer working relationships between people in different 
functions. For them functional collaboration was an alien way of working. 
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Previous functional directors and semor managers did not accept that 
collaboration across functions was necessary. (CTO_SOC # 4.15) 
4.4.10 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"So the previous process we were employing was fraud and the good 
thing that happened was, that was recognised fairly early, and the 
decision was taken that you don't just tinker with bits of the process, 
because that would never have fixed anything, this is a re-do the 
foundations job ... so it's escalating until you find the real cause and not 
just papering over the symptoms. The real cause was that the entire 
business process was incomprehensible, ill-defined, not written down, 
never trained people, particularly new starters and didn't work anyway." 
(Technical Director) 
"(The managing director and deputy managing director) played a very 
key role in developing the organisation. They were the people who had 
the goal, knew how it (the order process) should work and that was 
driven forwards single mindedly." (Implementation Team Member) 
"We had never been able to measure properly our business flow, our 
order flow, our timescales and the quality of the service we provided. 
BPR effectively allowed us to set proper timescales, to generate the right 
management reports and to manage, frankly, the overall position ... not 
only did the customer survey tell us what was wrong from the client's 
point of view, we had things wrong internally because we knew our debt 
level was too high." (Deputy Managing Director) 
4.4.10 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The new board and semor managers realised the prevwus business 
process was incomprehensible, ill defined and did not operate effectively. They 
recognised and accepted that service levels had to be improved. They realised 
that the previous order process had to change significantly, and that the new 
process had to operate within shorter timescales and with increased accuracy, 
especially in terms of invoices, so that the high debt position could be reduced. 
The new board accepted that late deliveries and inaccurate invoices would be 
eradicated. (CTO_SOC # 4.16) 
22 
4.4.11 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"(The deputy managing director) is overall process owner for sales order 
processing. Within that there's the technical element, and I'm the overall 
manager for the technical process. Increasingly we don't talk of separate 
processes because they are not. We did originally because it was 
convenient to do so but we just now call it the order process. . .. I own 
the technical function and then getting the technical structures in place to 
actually make it work. Working with the overall implementation co-
ordinators for the whole new business process. Because a technical 
function isn't something you can look at in total isolation, it's part of the 
order process." (Technical Director) 
"So we brought account ownership to individuals within (each function 
within) the structure. A typical team within City South of engineering, 
sales and administration (functions) might look after 100-150 accounts 
who generate different levels of revenue depending upon the nature of 
the accounts they happen to be assigned." (Implementation Team 
Member) 
"So the administrator has end to end responsibility. The sales executive 
became more of a account manager, an account executive, managing the 
day-to-day ordering but also worrying about the installed base, looking at 
what's already installed there, how much revenue they have already got, 
how we could protect and defend that revenue. How we could work with 
the client to maybe take more market share from other vendors and 
overall to make the client feel totally satisfied that we were doing 
everything we could to understand his business and how we could best 
serve him. In a similar way the engineers should ensure that they 
understand the site and are able to talk at whatever level is required about 
their technical requirements." (Deputy Managing Director) 
4.4.11 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
People at all levels in Financial Data were affected by the changes. The 
deputy managing director was affected as he became the owner of the 
redesigned order process. The technical director was affected as he took 
responsibility for the technical function and that part of the order process. The 
board created four divisions and appointed divisional directors. Senior 
managers in the previous functions became managers of their divisional 
functions and the order process. Sales people, engineers, and administrators 
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were affected too as they were brought into account teams, given overall 
responsibility for their functional activity and the order process. 
Directors, managers and account team members were affected as they took 
ownership for their function and the order process. (CTO _SOC # 4.17) 
4.4.12 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"The sitting of engineers next to sales people was more significant in 
terms of resistance. People felt engineers would lose their skills if they 
didn't sit next to their buddies and be able to talk about 
software/electronics day in and day out and swap notes, etc. . .. It was 
putting engineers sitting next to sales people, administrators. Getting 
people's minds and skills to broaden. No longer do we have an engineer 
who sits in a box and only does engineering things. 
There was considerable resistance from the people, all sorts of barriers 
were put up. Probably more vehemently from the technical and the 
administrators. On a scale the sales people really didn't mind, the 
administrators were in the middle the technical people actually hated the 
idea. The sales people, due the nature of their discipline and the nature 
of their work, are considerably more independent in their operation, and 
therefore the argument the administrators and the engineers always put 
forward is that 'I need to sit next to George, because when he has a 
problem, he tells me about it and I learn from it'." (Implementation 
Team Member) 
"The important thing is how are those individuals (in the account teams, 
and functional managers) work together to achieve the desired result 
with our clients. They must not have group loyalties, they have to have 
team and customer loyalties and loyalties to the (order) process. Not as a 
group of engineers or salesmen." (Deputy Managing Director) 
4.4.12 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board wanted people from different functions to be collocated. This 
meant that individual engineers, sales people and administrators sat next to one 
another; instead of being located together as a functional group and having each 
functional group in a different building and floor. The board's intention was to 
develop people's loyalty to their account team, their clients, and the order 
process. This change was a vital part of the overall changes. Engineers and 
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administrators strongly opposed this change as they did not want to be separated 
from others in their function. They put up a number of reasons to prevent the 
changes. However, board members were willing to force through this change, 
and eventually engineers and administrators were willing to allow this change to 
affect them. 
People from technical, sales and finance functions were willing to be collocated 
for the order process to operate effectively even though they disagreed with the 
changes. (CTO_SOC # 4.18) 
D3 4.5 Issues managed 
4.5.1 A and 4.5.1 Bare located in the body of Chapter 4. 
4.5.2 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"It was done by the consultants really. They obviously had to get very 
deeply embedded with the business process. They understood it as well 
if not better than we did at the end of the day because they saw more of it 
in more detail than perhaps individuals did. So they basically wrote it up 
as a description of what we were doing in practice." (Technical 
Director) 
"We had a large external organisation come and develop the business 
process specification." (Implementation Team Member) 
"The initiative itself was very much the brainchild of (the managing 
director) and (deputy managing director). 
It was an in-house project, but primarily the process consultancy led the 
development work and, indeed, it was the process consultants who did 
most of the design on the system." (IT Manager) 
4.5.2 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Financial Data's deputy managing director and external consultants 
designed the order process and the supporting new system, NIS. The 
consultants played a significant role during the design of the process and 
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systems although the managing director and deputy managmg director 
controlled the project. 
Financial Data's deputy managing director and external consultants designed the 
order process and supporting systems. (IM _SOC # 4.20) 
4.5.3 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Senior management commitment is essential, it's come from the top. 
Support from the top, the initiatives increasingly come from the bottom, 
you have to kick it off from the top, you cannot do it otherwise. You 
will not make the necessary changes in conditions which enable the 
behaviour to then generate the right sort of new ideas to actually make 
things even better in the long term ... We had a vision statement, vision 
of where we wanted to be and then we laid down policies underneath that 
and got down to the more detail." (Deputy Managing Director) 
The mission To serve our clients promptly and accurately and to 
statement their full reasonable satisfaction 
Policies Improve customer relationships 
More individual responsibility 
Adhere to business rules and procedural disciplines 
Objectives Shorten the order to billing process 
Bill accurately 
Reduce debt 
Optimise inventory management 
Improve technical site configuration records 
Maintain accurate view of installed kit and services 
by subscriber 
Achieve fast and accurate revenue reporting 
Optimise project management 
Source: presentatiOn matenal and business case 
"(A divisional director) would sit down and meet with the account teams 
and explain to them what he felt their objectives were and what he 
wanted from them. He'd have 10 meetings. We would discuss the 
objectives within (the division) and he would talk to us about the 
objectives and we would all more or less agree with him. It was a 
message all the way down, presenting, discussion." (Implementation 
Team Member) 
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4.5.3 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board recognised that the organisation lacked a mission of the 
future. The board agreed a mission statement based on the principles laid down 
almost 70 years earlier by Financial Data's founder. The board also agreed three 
policies and eight objectives in supported of the mission. The board committed 
themselves to behaving in accordance with the mission and policies. The board 
explained these to senior managers, who in tum explained these to people in 
account teams. 
Board members and semor managers agreed the organisation's missiOn and 
objectives and explained these to people. (IM_SOC # 4.21) 
4.5.4 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Management was acting as a single team for bringing about the change, 
strongly led by both the Managing Director and myself, we were not 
prepared to back down and back away from any of the problems which 
were identified . . . we acted as a single management team, it was very 
important that we all were on board for the changes. I had to work hard 
with some of the managers to keep them on side in the divisions. Many 
people kept losing their nerve - you have got to just keep on believing, 
have faith, faith in the programme is all important." (Deputy Managing 
Director) 
"When I was given the job I was told that's what we were going to do. 
My only question was 'I'll do this job so long as you don't want a 
whitewash. If you want us to do this job and then are going to come 
back and say 'ah yes we are more interested in generating new revenue 
now' then I'm not interested. If we have a commitment to do it, I'll take 
it on'." (Technical Director) 
4.5.4 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The managing director and deputy managing director were united in a 
determination to achieve the changes to implement the order process. They 
brought other members of the management team to unite around them. Other 
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directors were willing to take responsibility for implementing the changes only 
if the managing director and deputy managing director were committed and 
allowed individuals to take the actions necessary to achieve the changes. 
The board members and senior managers were willing to unite to implement the 
necessary changes. (IM_ SOC # 4.22) 
4.5.5 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Frankly we were worried that our ability to sell against an ever-
improving competition, we'd be thoroughly undermined. That helped us 
as well as we were able to show to our staff, 'look this is the level of 
debt. Service is a product in its own right'. Just as we put a lot of effort 
into improving our products, we've got to continually put a lot of effort 
into improving our service. If we don't, then clients will find the 
companies which do. Eventually we will not survive. Simple as that. 
That message was very strongly felt . . . a belief in the need for the 
programme. The management team's got to understand the problems 
that the company's facing. If they don't it's so much more difficult to 
move a programme like this along." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"We knew we had a problem, we were going to address it. There was 
not political reason for keeping it quiet either externally or internally, 
which was, I think, very positive." (Implementation Team Leader) 
"I don't think we had any (who did not accept the problems) to be 
honest, not at a managerial level. They knew the issues. Most people 
were delighted that something was being done. Particularly at staff level 
when they found out the complaints. I mean most staff said 'this is 
appalling, we have to do something about this'. They didn't need 
persuading there was a job to be done." (Technical Director) 
4.5.5 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board and semor managers realised that the organisation's debt 
position was too high and service levels to clients were inadequate. The board 
and senior managers also recognised that clients would move their business to 
competitors, were service levels to remain poor. Managers and staff also 
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accepted that the organisation had operational problems. People at all levels 
discussed the problems faced by the organisation openly. 
People at all levels, board members, senior managers and staff accepted the 
organisation faced major operational problems and discussed these openly. 
(IM_ SOC # 4.23) 
4.5.6 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We didn't monkey about, we decided what we had to do and enforced 
it. Then the people began to see the need for it." (Deputy Managing 
Director) 
"The change to the organisation was very top down ... (the deputy 
managing director) is good at telling people. I remember a number of 
occasions where you would be having a sort of views/discussion meeting 
and I have to remember an incident where I was standing downstairs 
having a glass of wine after a presentation at 5 p.m. with four engineers 
and they were hitting on me because they wanted to sit together and not 
with sales people. (The deputy managing director) was in this 
presentation and he walked into this conversation, listened for about 20 
seconds and he said 'all the other divisions are doing this, we are putting 
engineers together, we are going to do this, you are going to sit down 
here, here are the benefits b-boom b-boom b-boom. Nice to meet you 
Mike, how are you doing?' 'Ok' 'Just going to have a word with (the 
divisional director)'. It was like that all the time. Fair amount of telling. 
The (deputy managing director's) got a way of doing it, doesn't offend 
anybody. And that's exactly what the engineers needed, 'If he says it's 
right'. I think there is a fair amount of charisma/credibility there which 
led it through . . . . To a certain extent it was sheer pigheadedness. You 
listen to all the views and then tell people what's going to happen." 
(Implementation Team Member) 
4.5.6 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Board members and senior managers attempted to convince people of the 
need for the changes, and that they should allow the changes to affect them. 
However, board members and senior managers recognised that not everyone 
would want to support the changes. In such instances, board members and 
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senior managers enforced the changes, giving people little choice but to allow 
the changes to be implemented. 
The board and senior managers accepted that they would have to enforce some 
changes. (IM_SOC # 4.24) 
4.5.7 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Purely the leadership's skills. (The managing director) has a very 
strong view on what's important to him and he communicates it well and 
is extremely focussed saying: we have got to do this, explaining why we 
have to do it, explaining what we'd get out of it by doing it not just in 
terms of better customer satisfaction but in terms of how we will feel 
better having done it. 
I think it was important even though (the deputy managing director) was 
in charge of the (order process) programme, (the managing director) was 
seen to be still owning it, still wanting it to happen and was always in the 
picture, interested in it and wanted it to succeed. If he hadn't wanted it 
to succeed and taken such a personal interest in it, I don't think we would 
have got anywhere." (IT Manager) 
"It was essential to have a strong leader. Our MD fulfilled that role. He 
was seen as a strong minded implementor, analytically sound and one 
who had a good track record of leadership ... we had to focus clearly, 
with a micro focus down to the lowest level of detail which is required. 
Senior managers, top people were ready to attack that level of detail, 
understand it." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"You need to have somebody who understands at the top management 
level what the complications are, complexities, and understands it and is 
single minded. If you want to make money you have got to spend money 
as well. So that's vital. You can't try to con people that this is top 
priority, that you are going to do it and then go back 10 minutes later and 
say 'actually can you bung in this installation because it's important. 
Don't bother about the paperwork, just bung it in anyway'. That 
destroys people's confidence. That is vital." (Technical Director) 
"To be fair to the senior management of (Global Data), they took a 
hands-off approach, they said 'your problem, you've got a management 
team, go away and fix it and we wont bug you for two years. If you 
don't do it, we'll fire you all'. Fair enough. You can't be given a job 
and not expect to do it." (Technical Director) 
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"There was a project meeting with (the managing director) about once a 
month to make sure that progress was being made because in the sort 
term we went backwards because (the new system) had been built using 
a certain number of assumptions which were challenged." 
(Implementation Team Leader) 
4.5.7 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The managmg director developed a view of the future state of the 
organisation, and communicated it to people at all levels. He was perceived in 
the organisation to be strong minded and a good leader. His behaviour was 
consistent with his rhetoric. He and other directors ensured they themselves did 
not ask people to act in ways that contravened the organisation's mission and 
policies. The managing director participated in project meetings and reviewed 
progress of the changes. He was willing to be involved in detailed aspects of the 
order process when necessary. Even though he handed responsibility for the 
overall change programme to the deputy managing director, people in the 
organisation considered the managing director to be the owner of changes. In 
part, board members themselves had little choice but to ensure the changes were 
implemented, as the parent company gave board members two years in which to 
tum the organisation around. 
The managing director and deputy managmg took personal charge for 
implementing the order process and the supporting systems. (IM_SOC # 4.25) 
4.5.8 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"So we were presented with a number of problems. We recognised that 
... one of the ways to get over this was to firstly break the business down 
into smaller manageable units of about £50 million revenue each, so it 
was still quite sizeable - about £50 million each - and to put business 
managers in running those business units ... We just dismantled it (the 
old structure). We said 'right we will have divisions and within those 
divisions we will appoint divisional technical managers, divisional 
business managers, administration, and we will take them from the 
existing core people' ... we changed the structure and said: what we 
need are smaller business divisions, with account teams and collocated 
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functions and a belief that you are going to take responsibility from end 
to end for those clients. 
We started work on the set up of the divisions, and they were initially set 
up within 3 months." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"We actually started the reorganisation in September and we physically 
created this division, which was the first one, in March the following 
year." (Implementation Team Leader) 
4.5.8 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board recognised that Financial Data as one organisational unit was 
too unwieldy. They divided the organisation into four divisions, each covering a 
geographic region. Each division was about evenly sized in terms of revenue. 
A divisional director was appointed to take responsibility for each division. 
Each had the same organisational structure and operated the same order process 
and systems. 
The board accepted that the business would be divided into four divisions each 
using the same order process and supporting systems. (IM _SOC # 4.26) 
4.5.9 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"They were huge legions - the technical department with a huge escalator 
of hierarchy, people would slowly move up the steps of a ladder in terms 
of their career. It was all to do with time serving combined with 'they're 
good because they've made a certain contribution to the department' and 
they'd gradually move up the ladder of hierarchy. There were far too 
many levels, 6 or 7, whereas now we have 2, maybe 3 ... We got rid of a 
whole series of levels of management and in a division there was 1 
technical manager and there were a load of engineers in account teams 
and there were a few specialists that he has immediately under him to 
help in terms of coaching, directing, they have specialist knowledge. 
That's a very different structure." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"Effectively the pyramid was more than halved in structural terms ... Six 
isn't an exaggeration, it was 6 to the MD ... we have lost half the 
management structure. We have probably taken out two levels between 
the man on the street and technical director." (Implementation Team 
Member) 
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4.5.9 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Financial Data delayered the number of levels in the hierarchy from 
between 6- 8 to 4. The four levels are the board (including divisional directors), 
divisional managers, account team members and support staff. The divisional 
director and managers form the management team for each division. 
The board reduced the number of levels in the hierarchy. (IM_SOC # 4.27) 
4.5.10 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"There were a few very strongly led sessions down in places like the 
(central London) Theatre, where (the managing director) gathered the 
whole of Financial Data together, I think on at least two occasions 
saying: this is what's wrong, this is what we are doing about it, this is 
where I want to take the company, this is why and then a series of 
minor/smaller/supporting presentations, a lot of people saying what we 
were doing about it. Those went down really well because it was the 
leader doing it and he was very certain about what he wanted to do. It 
went down well because he was seen to invest a considerable amount of 
time, not just of his own, but the whole of Financial Data, bring them 
together for a day once every six months or whatever, is actually taking a 
lot of time out of the company and actually saying: it's important that I 
communicate to you. That was sending a good message." (IT Manager) 
"It is vital actually in order to do radical change people have to 
understand why, have to understand what is being achieved. The success 
of that is largely down to the visibility of the change and how easy it is to 
understand. Some change is very difficult, it doesn't mean much to 
some people. We were fortunate that this was a very clear thing to 
understand and everybody in the company attended presentations about 
why we were doing it and what was going to happen and what we 
intended to do . . . We also had a fairly comprehensive programme of 
presentations to everybody, run at a pretty high level. I was personally 
giving them, so was (the deputy managing director), assessing the 
impact, say why we were doing it, saying to people how this change 
would take place, what the impacts were on individuals." (Technical 
Director) 
"There was a lot of talking with groups by senior managers on a one to 
one basis in meetings talking about why we were doing this and what 
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benefit we were going to get from it, and what individuals could do on a 
personal basis. Most people when they are actually given something to 
do that they see is a good idea will get on with it, the difficulty is when 
it's 'what's it got to do with me?'. Everything was personalised 
wherever possible. 'This is what you can do to help' and 'this is why it 
is the right thing to do, because it may look wrong to you from your 
perspective'. 
So there was the winning of hearts and minds by talking on a personal 
basis, there were presentations to management and staff. There was the 
analysis and the analysis was done in some cases in open forum. It was 
not done as 'we've analysed this and this is the conclusion'. It was 'this 
is the sort of data we've got, what do you think it means to us? What do 
you think we should do?'" (Implementation Team Leader) 
"I started a newsletter telling people what was going on. Sometimes that 
gives you a problem, mind you, because you are upbeat in each one and 
then something goes wrong, how do you cope with it on the next issue. 
All very well having these announcements, but when something goes 
wrong you have to be able to handle that too. You have to think that 
through carefully, how will you handle the things that go wrong ... It 
was difficult. One month I'd say 'this/that is going to be done, we are on 
target on this/that/something else' and then the next time we issued we'd 
say 'we've had a major setback. This/that hasn't worked. We are doing 
further work to investigate this/that/something else'. I think it was a 
question of quickly showing people that you are ready to admit you had a 
problem. That you were not covering it up or ignoring it. That it was 
much too important to ignore. It was important to learn by it and just to 
say 'look we have a problem and we are doing something about it'. And 
to be able to respond rapidly to an issue. Being truthful and factual as 
the programme went along, it was very important, and, of course, there 
was a lot of training. 
We laid on a lot of training courses and as the training courses evolved 
that gave us an opportunity to constantly reinforce the right messages. I 
think I attended about two of them a week, every week for four or five 
months. An exhausting process, constantly turning up, addressing the 
staff, asking them questions, spending an hour with them and then going 
off." (Deputy Managing Director) 
4.5.10 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board and senior managers communicated the change programme 
through a variety of methods. The managing director held at least two 
presentations in a central London theatre, which could accommodate all staff 
members and which they were required to attend. At the first of these meetings, 
the managing director explained what was wrong with the organisation based 
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upon the customer survey, the changes the board intended to implement and his 
vision for the future. Directors believed it was important for people to 
understand why the changes were necessary, and the impact of these on people. 
The directors carried out a series of presentations to people in smaller groups 
and on a one-to-one basis. The directors also presented to people at the start of 
training programmes, which formed part of the implementation of the changes. 
The directors sought to overcome apathy, which manifested itself as 'what do 
the changes have to do with me?' The deputy managing director started a 
newsletter to inform people of the progress being made, difficulties faced and 
problems encountered, and the actions planned to overcome these. 
Board and senior managers were willing to explain to staff the proposed changes 
and its progress, using a variety of methods including a newsletter, town hall 
meetings, and small group discussions. (IM_SOC # 4.28) 
4.5.11 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"The marketing of the programme. That's part of the process of 
preparing staff for what's going to happen and ensuring that you haven't 
gone through the programme at a managerial level and missed the fact 
that your staff expected something else which you haven't got. I guess 
that was the main additional resource we brought in, and I think quite a 
carefully planned out programme as it turned out. It would have been a 
mistake not to do that ... actually talking to people and saying 'what are 
your concerns, what do you expect out of this, what to you will mean a 
successful implementation of this change' and then ensuring that was 
factored into the roll out process." (Technical Director) 
"We had an internal marketing campaign, lead by a consultant, to ask 
opinion leaders what they felt about the thing. Then we would better 
understand what their problem was and we would attempt to neutralise 
that, neutralise their argument, their abuse, by then coming out with the 
right things in our presentations and in our news letters which would 
attempt to meet their concerns. I think that was quite successful. We 
constantly used anonymous interviews to help us understand where 
people would say 'well I don't think it's going to work', 'why not?', 
'well ..... we've not got the training, we don't have this/that, we're not 
structured right. I think this is a load of rubbish'. 'Well why, tell me 
more'. So we'd get all that information and then we'd get people to 
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analyse that, form an opinion so that we could then tackle it. As we 
moved forward we also sampled people's opinions to see how many 
people thought the process was better, that we were providing a better 
service, etc. and we measured it and then compared it year on year to see 
how their opinions were improving or not." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"I would say that we addressed the fear, as I say, by communication, by 
showing them that we understood what we are doing and also by, 
hopefully, saying to people 'look you can contribute, you can make a 
difference'. And having end to end responsibility is actually at the end 
of the day much more satisfying than trying to work through a lot of 
other people trying to get something done and then failing ... It may 
have done, it's difficult to say. I think that end to end responsibility as 
such can strike fear in people because some people were saying 'well I 
used to work within a group and we were dependent on each other'. So I 
used to say 'yes but if you look at many countries which we operate in, 
small cities, small offices, we often only have got one of each discipline. 
They work very effectively and satisfy their customers. Are you telling 
me that you could not do the same?' Nobody was prepared to say 'yes', 
nearly everyone of them said 'well I suppose I could rise to the 
challenge'. So it's a question of really meeting their fears and addressing 
them. You won't address all of them. You never will." (Deputy 
Managing Director) 
4.5.11 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board were aware that influential 'opinion formers' in different parts 
of the organisation could adversely affect the changes if they disagreed with 
them. The board and an external consultant developed and internal marketing 
campaign. The external consultant carried out anonymous interviews to enable 
board members and senior managers prepare counter arguments and address 
relevant concerns. For example, people were concerned about issues such as 
taking end to end responsibility for clients and working in cross functional 
groups rather than functional disciplines. The board and senior managers also 
recognised that they could not address all the fears people had, but that they had 
to deal with as many as possible. 
Board members and senior managers recognised people's opinions and fears to 
be important and developed an internal marketing plan to address people's 
opinions and fears. (IM_SOC # 4.29) 
36 
4.5.12 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"~t took us another 6 months to get the process designed and piloted, we 
piloted it once and it didn't give us all of the gains that we were looking 
for. We piloted it again and we started again, efficiencies which were 
then 3 times faster, more accurate, satisfactory to the clients, etc. So then 
we launched it ... all you can do is try and prove to them (staff) that we 
are going down the right path. We did it by piloting it in one team, small 
group and then spreading it, and you get towards the end and everyone is 
saying 'come on, let's just get on with it. Let's make it happen'. You 
say, 'no we have to work to the project timescale. Oh blow the project 
timescale, let's just do a deal, it's clearly working'. The pressure to 
move and change was coming from below not from above." (Deputy 
Managing Director) 
"The other thing is we did pilot it. Albeit that the pilot was a learning as 
it went and we did fall down some rather nasty holes, we had support 
staff working with us so we had a manager, a supervisor, a BA, a 
planning engineer, two salesmen, some O&M staff who were writing 
documentation for us of the main issues, someone who was designing the 
new contract type, someone who would explain what sort of reporting 
we could get out. We had a whole series of support people. 
That was being reviewed by (the managing director) on a weekly basis at 
the very minimum and by (the deputy managing director) about 2-3 
times per week 'where we were', 'what issues we'd hit'. 
We cut off part of the business and actually ran it through as if we were 
live business. We were live, we were supporting those customers. 
Extremely aware that anything we did that was bad news hit the 
customer. We did involve those customers, we actually told them what 
we were doing. Their reaction was one off 'I'm not sure I like being the 
guinea pig but I do agree you do need to do something and you've 
explained what you are doing and this seems actually quite sensible'. 
There was an understanding from the customer. We didn't just do it to 
him .... I think we had about six large customers of whom only really 
two were active at that time. About 50 medium sized ones, again we'd 
only probably process orders on about one third." (Implementation 
Team Leader) 
"One thing jumped into my mind, everything was piloted. The order 
process, the paper technical process, redesigned. We took two engineers, 
20 accounts, a business administrator and a sales person which was even 
before the divisions were set up and went to talk to 20 customers and 
said 'we'd like you to order your services in this way, please'. They ran 
a little business for a couple of months using the new processes which 
were looked at, changed, etc. and that was expanded to the whole." 
(Implementation Team Member) 
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4.5.12 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The organisation carried out extensive pilots of the process. The initial 
pilots did not provide the board's desired levels of improvements. The order 
process was changed and piloted again. The pilots were undertaken by cross 
functional teams, with individuals representing the functional activities in the 
redesigned order process. The pilot teams ran the pilot as though it were a live 
business. In one division the pilot team worked with 20 clients and in another 
division they worked with 50 clients. The clients were asked to agree to the 
participate in the pilots. The pilot began with one team in one division. Once 
the team proved the process to be robust, it was implemented across the account 
teams in that division. Meanwhile a second division began its pilot, and once 
that proved to be working, the order process was implemented in that division. 
The implementation of the order process was achieved in the third and fourth 
divisions in the same way. 
Organisation piloted the order process and the systems with actual orders from 
clients and with their consent, and used the pilot as the start of implementing the 
new order process across each division. (IM_SOC # 4.30) 
4.5.13 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Everything else in the business had to work to them (account teams 
within the order process) as customers . . . we set up service level 
agreements (SLAs)with the central providers. For example, we had 
service level agreements with our cabling contractors. We set up service 
level agreements with British Telecom, we set up service level 
agreements with the warehouse, so that when we ordered equipment it 
would arrive on a date required to a certain level of quality, i.e. more 
than 98% of orders had to be on time to the original spec(ification) ... 
We got all (internal) supplier departments to focus on what were the 
order process targets, requirements of their internal customers and we set 
them measures to work to. Those departments for the first time were 
able to say to all their staff 'These are our priorities. To take an order, 
confirm it and deliver it within a certain timescale to this degree of 
reliability'. Getting people to understand what their department's role 
was, what its responsibilities and priorities were to fit in with the 
process, meant that we were gaining consistency, we were focussing 
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staff on their key priorities and making them much more process 
orientated, which obviously had knock on benefits to the quality of our 
service to clients." 
"Created service level agreements between the front line account teams 
who were doing the selling and the planning and the service providers . 
. . . It could be the account team goes back and says: look you are telling 
me this and that's what I see as my input instructions, but actually that 
isn't quite adequate, I'd like you to specify this or not specify that 
because it doesn't matter to you but it matters to me. So you can do that 
across the interface which is where the SLA's come in. That then gives 
people real process ownership. It gives departments a real ability to 
attend to the quality of what they do in control. What's fatal is allowing 
departments to make changes when they don't understand the impact on 
the overall process. There's anarchy then." (Technical Director) 
"We got to the point where we are bringing in other departments, 
materials management, communications, cabling people and client 
training, that's when you start to create SLA's because now there's a 
routine requirement for other departments to do some things, to get 
involved in the process and you can define these interfaces. Although 
you build up SLAs, you sit these two people down and say 'ok we all 
know we have to do this in X days so what do you want from me?' 
'Well I need details of the order, client's name and address, this date, 
that date, XYZ'. 'Ok I will give that to you and this is what I want from 
you. I want you to respond in 24 hours that you have an order and you 
can do it or you tell me you can't and I want you to commit that once 
you, if that 24 hour period has gone by and you haven't told me you 
can't do it, you will do it. 99% of orders will be done by the scheduled 
date if you confirm at the outset that you can do it'. So that's the build 
up of an SLA and you actually have people saying 'no I can't do 99% I 
can do 95%' or 'with the staff I have got I can only do it in 20 days and 
not 15'. Then you begin to build up fairly basic SLA type 
requirements." (Technical Director) 
4.5.13 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board and semor managers ensured that the order process took 
priority over activities, carried out in functions that were service providers, e.g. 
purchasing. The service functions and external suppliers had to prioritise their 
activities and work load based upon the requirements of the order process. To 
ensure the service functions and external suppliers worked in unison with the 
order process, service level agreements were established between the order 
process and the service providers and external suppliers. Service providers 
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prioritised their work to fit in with the order process. Responsibilities and time 
taken for each activity were agreed and made visible in the agreement. 
Individuals could not change activities in their part of the order process or 
service provider function without agreeing it with others in the end-to-end order 
process. People negotiated realistic commitments with others in the process, e.g. 
based upon the resources available to them, and these commitments were 
recorded in the agreement. 
Board and senior managers set up service level agreements, with internal central 
service providers and external suppliers, so that they fit into the requirements of 
the order process. (IM _SOC # 4.31) 
4.5.14 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Within each department you had somebody responsible for accepting 
where a department had not met their share of a service level agreement, 
we did it on a mutual basis, so if you as a receiving department got a 
typical work request and you said '****, they cocked it up yet again, I 
keep asking to do this' and they haven't, you would contact your 
counter-party in the other department and say 'look, it says here in our 
agreement you would always put the date, client's name and the delivery 
date, etc., and you haven't again for the third time. Spoke to you the first 
time and you said it was a pure mistake, it obviously isn't a pure mistake 
so can we agree this is a corrective action?' 'Yes ok agree this is a drop 
off.' So both parties agree that something has gone wrong, they are not 
implementing the SLA and they agree a resolution date as well, 'ok you 
are going to go away and fix this permanently, you are going to talk to 
people and when are you going to do it by?' 'Week on Wednesday'. 
'Good we agree a date'. That's what went in on the corrective action 
system, which was a centralised database system. If they didn't correct it 
by the date then it got gradually escalated. The thing is there was an 
agreed way of dealing with problems, it wasn't someone slagging off 
another department and then saying 'no it's not true'. They agreed there 
was a problem. It all helps ownership of tasks." (Technical Director) 
"If the SLA is breached on a single incident we have a corrective action 
system. We log an incident on that which gets dealt with by the 
corrective action control within the division - a clerk - in conjunction 
with the manager in the offending organisation. Action is taken to 
ensure it doesn't happen again and the incident is closed. The system is 
designed such that in the event that a particular corrective action hasn't 
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been closed within a certain time period, it starts to escalate up the chain 
and I think if it goes over its agreed date I end up with an email and if I 
don't do anything about it within 5 days, (the divisional director) ends up 
with it in his email box and he sends it back to me saying 'what's this?' 
This is a typical response. 
I have a severe problem with comms group at the moment. That's a 
short memo and on the back is a list of corrective actions for more or less 
exactly the same thing, (that occurred over) the last four months for more 
or less the same sort of incident which never gets fixed ... Dan Ozone 
manages the comms group and I copied it to his boss. Those are the sort 
of incidents. I received a gratifying telephone call from the assistant 
manager, comms group (with whom I get on well- useful to have these 
people who do things for you), his words to me were 'Mike I don't know 
what you have done but it's a hornets nest over here at the moment' ... 
Well, Dan would take it as a personal criticism, which it is and there is a 
lot of activity." (Implementation Team Member) 
4.5.14 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Within each SLA is an escalation procedure. This requires the breach of 
the agreement to be recorded in a corrective action system, which is a central 
database. Along with a note of the breach, the parties to the agreement record 
the corrective actions to be taken and the dates by which these actions will 
completed. Actions that remain outstanding beyond the agreed date are flagged 
automatically, by the system, with the functional manager. If he or she does not 
resolve the actions within a period of time, the system automatically sends a 
message to the divisional director, and eventually to the deputy managing 
director. 
Account teams and line managers use service level agreements to escalate non-
performance of activities in the process, which senior managers have to respond 
to. (IM_SOC # 4.32) 
4.5.15 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"What was required was this ability to train people up to take full 
responsibility for an order right through to billing, debt collection. To 
put all the responsibilities into these individuals ... the whole concept of 
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ownership whereas before we had no ownership really, to speak of, of 
clients, of orders, problems. At last we were saying, no you can't walk 
away from it, you can't blame someone else, it's yours. If it goes wrong, 
it's your fault. That radically changed, very quickly, the whole business 
ofblame culture and anything else, inter-departmental wrangling, blame, 
blaming the system. I kept saying 'No it's not the system, it's you, we 
have to change the process, and by changing the process you can do your 
job better'." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"The account teams being the unit which would look after the customer 
and be empowered to act on behalf of the customer. That was the prime 
function of that unit. So the account team itself was getting 
responsibility for the client. The salesman was traditionally always out 
with the customer but we were then getting the business administrator 
and the planning engineer out with the customer more, meeting with the 
customer, responding to his needs." (IT Manager) 
4.5.15 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board made divisional directors, functional managers, and account 
teams jointly responsibility for the end to end order process. In this way, 
individuals in one function such as sales, within an account team or at a 
managerial level, could not blame a colleague for poor service levels to 
customers: they are jointly responsible. The board wanted people, such as 
engineers and administrators, who did not usually get involved directly with 
clients to take ownership of client's needs. 
Board made people in the order process jointly responsible for customer service 
levels. (IM_SOC # 4.33) 
4.5.16 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Nowadays if you don't react within 2 hours or whatever the time period 
is whoever is responsible for progressing the order is going to be on the 
phone saying 'where is it, what are you doing? It's your job to be doing 
this, why aren't you actually delivering this?"' (IT Manager) 
"I used to be an area technical manager in the installation department. I 
was one of two managers and I managed half of the installation function 
within London. At the beginning of this process there were six layers of 
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management between me and the gentlemen responsible for the Financial 
Data business. There are now two. I have responsibility for a quarter of 
that business. 
I have my engineers out selling things. Not actively but it is not 
infrequent to find out that I have an engineer who has come back from a 
customer who signed an order for a couple of RTs or he's gone in with 
the account manager and spoken to a customer who was not quite sure 
what this prism product was, so he spent half a hour on the whiteboard 
telling him all about prism, what it could give him, etc. A week and half 
later the client signed an order for something." (Implementation Team 
Member) 
"They took full responsibility, they could not walk away and if you 
needed to know something you went to that business administrator. You 
didn't go to his manager, you went to that administrator, that account 
manager, that engineer ... the front line account teams so that, again, the 
person had full responsibility without having to go to lots of other people 
to get jobs done." (Deputy Managing Director) 
4.5.16 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Functional managers, from the technical, sales and administration 
functions took joint responsibility of the order process. They convinced people 
reporting to them to accept joint responsibility for their activity and the order 
process. Account team members took on this responsibility and proactively 
chased delays that might affect client service levels. 
Functional managers, in sales, technical and business administration, accepted 
joint responsibility for the order process, and convinced those below them in the 
hierarchy to take joint responsibility for the process. (IM _SOC# 4.34) 
4.5.17 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We also put all of our administrators on a 6 month probation, 
effectively saying 'you are a sales administrator at the moment or some 
other form, technical administrator. If you want to become a business 
administrator these are the things you are going to have to do, these are 
the standards you have to achieve, these are the courses, this is the 
training and this is what we are looking for'. We appraised them 
regularly. At the end of 6 months not all of them had made the grade, 
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those that had not left the company or were given other jobs or, in some 
cases, there were a few who were given a bit more time to improve. Just 
over 50% did make it. There were quite a few who left or were given 
lesser jobs." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"Some of the ones wouldn't make it and didn't have the skills to absorb 
some cross functional disciplines. Some of them did and did very well, 
some didn't, so we changed staff." (IT Manager) 
"There were certain people who overall didn't like it, not because they 
resisted it as such, just because they didn't feel it was something they 
then wanted to do. Their job role had changed and they perhaps didn't 
feel that the role they were doing was something they wanted. Some left, 
some changed, some found it difficult to change ... some people didn't 
make the change it has to be said. Didn't like it, left or did something 
else." (Technical Director) 
"We had situations where people, some of them managers, who really 
didn't buy the new approach, tried everything else, at the end of the day 
you can move them out of the way, you can get rid of them or you can 
explain to them the fact of life. Different processes used for different 
people. Some managers did go because they were getting in the way." 
(Implementation Team Leader) 
4.5.17 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board created the role of a business administrator. The previous 
functional administrator role was changed significantly, and people fulfilling 
that role applied for the new role. The board set standards individuals had to 
meet to be appointed to the role, and individuals were appraised against those 
standards. Just fewer than half the number of administrators failed to meet the 
required standard. These people either left the organisation or were given lesser 
roles. A number of people, not only business administrators, were 
uncomfortable with the proposed changes and the new role offered to them in 
the divisions, e.g. being part of an account team, either at a managerial level or 
in the account teams. These people left the organisation either voluntarily or 
were given little choice but to leave. 
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Board set standards that people at all levels had to meet to remain in the process, 
and those who did not, were unwilling to or unable to meet the standard either 
left the organisation or were given different roles. (IM_SOC # 4.35) 
4.5.18 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We spent a lot of effort defining the skills (of all of our staff) of the 
account manager, planning engineer and the skills required of the 
business administrator. The BA is a very important role in the new set-
up. We laid down, in addition, not only technical skills for that person, 
but also personal characteristics and we used psychometric analysis on 
each applicant. We had a psychologist in on the final interviews to help 
us decide whether or not these were the right people to have on board, to 
see what we laid down as a requirement." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"Staff changes, getting the right sorts of people with the right disciplines 
and skills to cope with some multi-functional disciplines in the account 
teams which we didn't have before. Recruited a lot, professional people 
in that area.'' {IT Manager) 
"Our problem was that we didn't have anybody or virtually nobody with 
administration skills within the company. A real problem." 
(Implementation Team Leader) 
4.5.18 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board and divisional directors analysed the skills and personal 
characteristics required by people in the account teams. The board and senior 
managers assessed the functional administrators, sales people and engineers to 
determine whether or not existing staff had the required skills and personal 
characteristics. They discovered that the organisation lacked people that met the 
requirements for the business administrators and recruited people to fulfil this 
role in the order process. 
The board accepted that people would have to be recruited with the skills and 
personal characteristics required by the order process. (IM_SOC # 4.36) 
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4.5.19 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Sure they might be paid different amounts because the market rate for a 
business administrator is different to the market rate for a sales 
executive. But you have to accept that, that's life, but it doesn't mean 
that you are not listened to or given the necessary responsibility or the 
necessary ability to veto something if it is wrong." (Deputy Managing 
Director) 
"There are different remuneration packages within the group and that's 
actually less of an issue when you put people together because they can 
see other people's skills which they previously couldn't see." 
(Implementation Team Leader) 
"On a financial base (technical people) see their earnings being eroded 
significantly . . . Through pressures of efficiency, reduction in overtime 
and different approaches. Central technical groups feel threatened. They 
can see they are next for the re-engineering of the business process, 
which will affect their organisation. I have engineers who on a 
£21/22,000 basic earn £35,000 a year ... because they are working 40/50 
hours per month overtime. I'm putting that under pressure. I'm saying 
'why are you going down there on Saturdays, couldn't you do it in an 
hour Thursday night? Couldn't you do that on the phone? Why are we 
going down to the West End to do a survey?' A couple of days later 
going down to do the cabling, 2 days later installing the equipment and 3 
days later going down and getting the customer to sign the acceptance. 
'Can't we do it in two trips?'" (Implementation Team Member) 
4.5.19 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Sales people, engineers and administrators were paid different amounts 
while they were in the previous functional structure. One consequence of 
bringing them together In account teams was they became aware of the 
differences in remuneration. The board aligned the remuneration of each role to 
the market rate for that role. Individuals within account teams accepted that 
people were remunerated according to the role and market conditions, rather 
than aligning remuneration of account team members. 
People at all levels accepted that individuals in account teams would be paid 
different amounts based upon their role in the team. (IM_SOC # 4.37) 
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4.5.20 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"At the time to actually make the mindset change, to change 700 or 800 
people's view of how they do their jobs, change the set-up, take a risk 
with a £250 million business - you have to be pretty brave and believe 
it's going to work." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"You need a very strong leader who shares it 100% and has got the 
courage to say 'yes we are doing this and this is the top most priority' 
because the thing that crucifies a lot of companies is they say they are 
going to do something and promptly get panicky when you start turning 
down work. So we had this over and above revenue generation, we 
didn't care what happened to revenue implicitly. Our first and foremost 
aim was the (process orientation) programme." (Technical Director) 
4.5.20 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Financial Data's managing director, deputy managing director, and board 
members set out to restructure the organisation, change people's roles, jobs and 
mindset, and introduce new systems. These changes affected about 800 people 
in an organisation of 1100 people. The board gave the change programme 
priority and was willing to set aside short-term revenue generation pressures to 
achieve the order process. 
Board members were willing to take risks to ensure implementation was 
achieved. (IM _SOC# 4.38) 
4.5.21 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Ours is an overall order process. These are the sorts of things you want 
to know typically: sales by division, net installations which is the 
amalgam of what you have installed and what you have taken out, 
installations by division, how much backlog of orders you have got, 
orders by division, how much revenue you sold in the month, the number 
of the key stations, revenue per key station, all these sorts of things are 
measurables at one level. 
There's a further level of detail that says if you take an individual order, 
how long is it between the date we receive the order, in other words this 
high level flow plan, so these we consider to be quite important dates and 
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particularly where they transit functional boundaries, so from the time 
the order is placed, how long does it spend in business admin, is it two 
days? How long do the planners spend before it gets to 'order in 
progress' as we call it, how long does it then spend under 
implementation, and how long does it take to commission and when to 
we get sign off? They basically are the measurables. And within each 
department then they can have measurables within their process. We 
would typically measure on an order what we call 'COF' (client order 
form) to commission, and COF to order in process which is the planner's 
done all his bit and this brings in the central service providers. 
The important thing is on measurables that if you have a problem, so if 
we decide it's actually taking the planners 20 days instead of 10, can you 
drill him and find out why? What is it that's causing the planners a 
problem?" (Technical Director) 
"We introduced measurables right across the board in terms of the 
number of orders, percentage of orders delivered on the day we promised 
to the client, etc., etc. The number of days overall it took to process the 
order, the number of days it took to bill, the number of days to get lines 
delivered, etc., etc. With those measurables we ran the business, started 
to run the business because we could see what was actually happening." 
(Deputy Managing Director) 
"Within the installation group, starting to take a few measures and 
people suddenly realising how awful they were at things and maybe they 
could do a little bit better and starting to think about some of these 
numbers." (Implementation Team Member) 
"Some of it's straight measurement. 'We're going to measure this', 
'well we don't have a problem with that measure because we are very 
good', 'fine', and when it turned out it wasn't very good they had a real 
problem because they bought into the process, and many people you 
could capture that way because you didn't get them hearts and minds day 
one but very quickly by putting in measures they found they weren't 
actually performing anywhere nearly as they thought they were and were 
quite determined they were going to do a good job. Most people are 
determined to do a good job it's just how do you measure it. We tend to 
measure it ourselves, we don't always by somebody else's measure, but 
if you have agreed the measure you're stuck with it." (Implementation 
Team Leader) 
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4.5.21 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Financial Data introduced measurements at two levels. One, at an 
organisational level, for example, Financial Data measured sales by division, net 
product installations, and group revenues and costs per month. Two, at the level 
of the order process, Financial Data measured the flow of individual orders 
across the order process. For example, Financial Data measured the time taken 
by each activity in the order process, in service provider functions and external 
suppliers. Each activity such as planning, implementing an order, 
commissioning a service, and invoicing has a time, accuracy and quantity 
measure attached to it. Measurements were placed on activities that people 
believed they were good at and were performing well. Over time, people 
realised that the activity performed in the previous order process fell below the 
measurement laid down in the redesigned order process, and this reinforced the 
need to achieve the redesigned order process. Directors, managers and account 
teams, and service providers gained greater visibility of the activities in the order 
process, and were in a position to query why a particular activity took longer 
than it should or continued to deliver inaccurate information. People set the 
measurements that applied to activities and hence were unable to disregard them. 
Board introduced measurements for each activity m the order process. 
(IM_SOC # 4.39) 
4.5.22 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"In line with the redesign of the process and the restructuring of the 
groups, we had to train them up, for example, on how to bill, most of the 
administrators had no idea how to bill the clients, we had to train them. 
We had to train them to manage all aspects of the order process ... 
training up 700 staff in the new process and the use of the systems." 
(Deputy Managing Director) 
"We modified the way in which people used the system ... which was by 
training people properly on how to administer the products, which had 
never been done here before." (Implementation Team Leader) 
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"We put the disciplines together and you could see that some individuals 
did more than an installation engineer's job, they also did a bit of sales 
person's job because they had that personality or they had those sort of 
personal abilities naturally. Those individuals, those skills were 
supplemented with additional training courses and, indeed, exposure to 
opportunities where those skills were used. The engineers very tightly 
within the engineering chain, we tried to put them into a sales situation 
and really had no skills within a sales environment or, indeed, a finance 
or business environment, still sit within the organisation, and those are 
the individuals who still think very clearly along their disciplined lines 
and, if you like, are the anchors on a chain within the organisation. We 
are using the people who have additional skills and supporting their skills 
to pull the organisation forward. 
Engineers always considered that they could never project manage. You 
always have a project manager if you have a big installation. You sit 
down and say 'why, what does he do'. 'He draws up all the plans, 
organises all the people. Could you do that?' Because people have it in 
their mind the fact that their management has always said you can't do 
this because it's not your job and it's his job. What you actually have to 
do is to do a lot of talking in different situations to say 'it's more 
efficient if you do it. You're going to enjoy it. Do you feel you can do 
it? Great, go and do it'." (Implementation Team Member) 
4.5.22 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board instituted an extensive training programme, which covered the 
operational aspects of the order process, and the new systems that supported it. 
Each member of the account team was trained not only in their functional area 
but also learnt to perform jobs carried out by the other functions represented in 
the account team. People were trained shortly before they used the skills in the 
account team. In addition to formal training, people were encouraged to take on 
broader jobs that were outside their functional roles. For example, engineers 
were put in sales situations and took on project management jobs. 
People were trained to have a broader range of skills for the order process and to 
operate the systems. (IM_SOC # 4.40) 
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4.5.23 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"He assembled around him a number of key managers who had a variety 
of experience and skills. We all knew there were problems and the unity 
of purpose evolved quite quickly, like in the first few weeks. Sharing the 
objectives, well we took the next line of management who reported to the 
senior team, so that probably meant about 40-50 people. We all went 
away fairly quickly for a 2 day strategic discussion, in fact I would 
almost call it a tactical discussion rather than a strategy, because we all 
sat around and broke off into various teams to discuss the key initiatives 
that we all felt to be important to our agenda for improvement, the 
change, for radical improvement really to the service we provided. We 
gave everybody the chance to question everything. That added a vast 
number of extra items to the agenda. We at that point had obviously got 
some key things on our list. But what that session did was to add a lot of 
extras that we could do, in many cases, quite simply and easily. All sorts 
of things which people came up with an idea and we noted it down 
religiously, we followed it through and it was action pointed and 
followed through weeks and months afterwards to make sure we 
achieved those things. Everybody knew that would happen so anybody 
who took an action had to follow it through. I think at that session there 
was a gelling, a pulling together because everyone could see what the 
clients were telling us and everyone could see there was a core 
programme and everyone was encouraged to add their own agenda items 
to it, we allowed to take ownership. Nobody could walk away. I think 
every single person in that room ended up with an action. 
We started off by saying 'this is a project plan for achieving the change'. 
Then it suddenly dawned on me that this was totally the wrong way to do 
it. The way to do it was actually force the managers of the various 
divisions to come up with their own project plans. What I did was I gave 
them a project manager to help them do it all in the same format so that 
we could amalgamate the various plans into one overall plan, so he took 
with him software, an approach and effectively helped them to facilitate 
their own project plans. In that way it forced them to be upfront and 
say/show how they were managing their own activities to meet the 
overall objectives. That was probably one of the most effective 
decisions I took because up until that point there was always the risk of 
non engagement, of neutrality, of hedge sitting. Once I suddenly turned 
it round and said 'right, you all think that I have got you in here today to 
present to you the plans. Mistake number one. So what am I going to 
do? I am going to get you to go away now and present your own plans 
as to how you are going to achieve, and you are going to present those 
back to us in two weeks' time as to how you are going to actually meet 
these requirements'. The whole of the company board would sit there 
and have it presented to them. 'I have a project manager here, he has 
some software, he has an approach, he has a methodology. He will show 
you that in the next two days. After that you go away and you work it 
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out. If you need any help from him he will be there to help you'. I can 
assure Y?U, Ashl~y, that after two weeks we had a complete set of 
presentatiOns, whtch were excellent, showing all the different levels of 
commitment. They all knew they had to perform and they were not 
going to fail. That probably was more important than anything in getting 
the message across." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"We (the divisional managers) worked it out ourselves. The three 
managers reported to a divisional director. Divisional director had the 
objective in mind, we all had common objectives, we all worked together 
with the teams and that's what happened ... The decision (to leave it to 
the divisional managers) was made at quite a senior executive level 
within the organisation. Tim is the Sales Manager within the division. 
He is one of the four people who run the division. I'm the top technical 
man . . . We decided then who was going to work on which account. 
This was fundamental to the structure within the division, rather than 
something which was facilitated ... all decisions were made by (the 
managing director) and (the deputy managmg director)." 
(Implementation Team Member) 
4.5.23 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The managing director created an implementation team consisting of the 
managing director, deputy managing director, technical director and senior 
managers. The deputy managing director led this team and he employed an 
external Consultancy firm to support him and form part of the implementation 
team. This team developed the mission statement, policies and objectives, and 
commissioned the customer survey. The team asked Financial Data's senior 
managers, about 50 people, from different functions to a two-day workshop. At 
this workshop, the implementation teams presented preliminary plans of the 
change and the senior managers were encouraged to question and refine the 
plans, for example, by adding their items they considered important to them. 
Managers at the initial workshop had an action to complete by the end of the two 
days, as a means to involving them in the changes. The divisional directors, 
once they were appointed, became part of the implementation team for their 
division. The deputy managing director began by developing a project plan for 
the changes. He changed this approach by getting each divisional director and 
their management team to prepare project plans for their division, which were 
then co-ordinated for Financial Data as a whole. Divisional directors had little 
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choice but to prepare implementation plans for their division. The divisional 
directors and divisional functional managers formed the nucleus of the 
implementation team in their division. 
The board created implementation teams with senior managers and external 
consultants, and devolved responsibility for achieving the redesigned order 
process to them, they took on the responsibility and made divisional directors 
and divisional functional managers responsible of implementation in their 
division. (IM_SOC # 4.41) 
4.5.24 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We were modifying 2 possibly 3 existing systems to support the new 
order process." (Technical Director) 
"Initially the order process was reengineered using a paper based system 
and some minor changes to existing administration systems. The paper 
based system was then taken into FDITS (the installation tracking 
system), and that was fairly radically adjusted to allow it to support, in a 
slightly cackhanded way, the basis of the new process. . .. The original 
system we had within technical on FDITS changed fundamentally. We 
originally supplemented its working/operation with forms that engineers 
would have to fax around the company from group to group. We then 
took those forms and incorporated them into the system, so the FDITS 
system actually went through quite a significant development phase and 
change in both the way it was used and the way the code was put 
together." (Implementation Team Member) 
"At that stage we were only modifying what was already there. Broadly 
speaking previously all the systems had been used as being systems to 
support the function. What we did was to say 'that's just not interesting, 
we'll change the system to support the process' ... they were basically 
able to support the process, albeit with difficulty." (Implementation 
Team Leader) 
"We had to, from our systems viewpoint, take our current systems 
quickly amend them to cope with the new order process. So that was one 
of the first things we had to do in the systems department. We didn't at 
that stage totally go overboard and say 'no, what we can't do is we 
cannot support the new order process with these existing systems'." (IT 
Manager) 
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4.5.24 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board realised that the redesigned order process had to be achieved 
quickly and hence could not wait of the new system to be developed and 
implemented. Yet the redesigned process required systems to support it. The 
board modified its existing systems to support the redesigned process. The pilot 
teams developed paper-based forms to bridge the existing functional systems. 
Initially these forms were faxed from one department to another. These forms 
were written into the existing systems so that the systems could support the 
order process, pending the development of the new system. Consequently, the 
upgrade of the existing systems was done quickly and, shorter-term 
compromises that had to be made to the order process were reversed once the 
new systems were implemented. 
The implementation teams used the existing systems to support the order process 
prior to developing the new systems. (IM _SOC # 4.42) 
4.5.25 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"They were given an overall business perspective by (the managing 
director) which is a document of about 40 pages with high level, detailed 
things in there. Things like the ability to invoice, the ability to discount, 
what sort of discount should be allowed, what shouldn't be allowed, how 
we report on those things. Quite detailed in some instances. That's the 
spec they were building to . . . most of the process was relatively well 
understood before NIS really got underway." (Implementation Team 
Leader) 
"In parallel with that (modifying existing systems to support the order 
process) we were designing a huge new replacement system which 
replaced all the others. We had the luxury of being able to design the 
new system based on working practice process we knew was working, so 
we were automating a working process. Because of timing that came in 
about a year at least after we rolled out the first implementation of the 
new process." (Technical Director) 
"To put in a system which more suited the order process rather than the 
elastoplastic existing system." (IT Manager) 
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4.5.25 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The implementation team designed the order process and the business 
rules by which it needed to operate. For example, the design included the rules 
by which invoices, discounts, and management reports would be carried out. 
The order process design was contained in a document of about 40 pages and 
was approved by the managing director. While the new system was being 
developed the order process was implemented in the divisions. Hence, Financial 
Data was able to develop the new systems to support the actual activities and 
workings of the order process. 
Financial Data designed and implemented the order process first and then 
developed the new information system to support activities within the order 
process. (IM_SOC # 4.43) 
4.5.26 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"In fact the documentation produced actually says 'the order process' -
the thick red book actually says 'The Order Process' and is the textual 
description of the entire order process. One book which includes all the 
technical functions. Any change on a technical function or process I 
would get involved in - it would probably be me that actually carried it 
through. If we have a problem and it's down to some of the technical 
groups, it would be my job to find out what's going wrong and initiate 
the change. There are really two key process owners. That's vital 
otherwise you have no overall control." (Technical Director) 
"It meant re-writing all of our processes and procedures, not even re-
writing, writing them originally because we didn't actually have decent 
procedures or method prior to this. So we completely wrote it up from 
scratch, came out with books, folders, all the documentation was 
properly set up in a way which enables us to properly update it, maintain 
it." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"(The previous order process and procedures) were but they were fairly 
informal. They were not well documented. As part of the BPR initiative 
going in procedures came under very rigid change control, version 
control, release control, quality. That remains in place now. Those 
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procedures were put m place substantially by the re-engineering 
programme." 
4.5.26 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The redesigned order process was documented in great detail. Each 
major functional activity, sales, technical and administration, was documented. 
The documentation specified what people and systems did in each activity: 
what should happen on receipt of an order, during a technical specification, 
when releasing orders from one activity to another, when removing orders from 
the system, raising invoices, and following up late payments. The 
documentation laid down changes to activities and the level of authorisation 
required to change activities. 
Financial Data documented all aspects of the future order process in 
considerable detail to achieve consistency across divisions. (IM_SOC # 4.44) 
4.5.27 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We sat down, in particular with a relatively small group, mainly John 
Home, myself, Tony Allen and Mike Rooney and the systems people, 
went through what was going on in terms of the process and how that 
meant we needed to change the existing system. When we started we 
were told: 'no no you have got to change everything so you can't put the 
system in'. 'No no no we are going to put this process in so we have to 
change the system as quickly as we can, but we will accept some 
compromises in order to do this.' We were using a system at that stage 
called BOS which I had no experience of at all, John Home had had 
extensive experience, he'd implemented it in another country and their 
implementation had been extremely smooth when compared with the 
problems (Financial Data) had got. Because he'd had onsite support he 
had developed a series of reporting modules that helped him. Tony 
Allen put the system in in (another region) and converted from a 
previous system, so he had experience of that but he asked me to help 
him convert his data from the old approach to the new approach so I've 
written the control reports that allowed him to work out whether the data 
was clean or not. So there was experience of working with this system 
brought into the group from outside, so that experience wasn't within the 
group." (Implementation Team Leader) 
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"NIS was developed through discussions, meetings, workshops held with 
functional managers . . . The deputy managing director (co-ordinated the 
development of the new system). We had a large external organisation 
(support the IT department) to design and build the system, project 
manage it and they worked alongside our existing MIS people. We had 
60 people at one stage from this external organisation sitting on a floor in 
Great Sutton Street building a new computer system. They weren't staff. 
Once the system was rolled out into the divisions, very slowly these 
people started to leave the organisation. Support demands became less 
and less leaving with us with our MIS UK people who were quite 
sufficient in number to be able to support the running and modifications 
to the system as are required from time to time." (Implementation Team 
Member) 
4.5.27 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Financial Data had an information systems (IS) department that 
developed the systems that supported the previous order process. People in the 
IS department understood the systems, however, people in other parts of the 
parent organisation had experienced changing the systems. This expertise was 
made available to the IS department. The board looked to the deputy managing 
director to co-ordinate the development. He recognised that the existing IS 
function lacked skills in terms of designing, building and project managing 
systems developments. Rather than outsource the development of the new 
system, Financial Data engaged an external consultancy to supplement the IS 
departments skills. The consultants worked alongside people from the IS 
department until the system was developed. Thereafter, the IS department took 
control of the systems and the consultants withdrew their input. 
The board recognised that the internal IT department, with additional expertise, 
could develop the systems to support the order process. (IM _SOC # 4.45) 
4.5.28 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We have paid significant attention to the accuracy of the data which is 
held within our administration systems. We have audited all of our 
customers, been into their premises, seen what products they have, 
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adjusted their invoices and cleared up the debt position and the record 
inaccuracy." (Implementation Team Member) 
"To actually say: well the billing system says this guy's got so much but 
our contractual system says we have so much, and our commissioning 
system says something else, so what is it really? That was done very 
much really in conjunction with the programme called account audit 
which was going on as part of the (process orientation) change anyway, 
and the account audit programme was where the business administrators 
were actually sitting down with our customers and saying: well what do 
you think you have got? Our records show this, let's agree a position on 
this. That account audit programme was introduced to correct as much 
as possible the information on our separate systems to make them clean 
prior to us moving to NIS." (IT Manager) 
"We cleaned up our data through account audit and through the use of 
the new order process which kept it clean. The problem is if you had 
dirty data on (a client's) site you couldn't clean it up so we actually had 
to look at site data separately ... We had a massive workload which the 
accounts called account audit. It's ongoing but the first time we did it 
was about going on to site, cleaning up all the data, making sure the 
customer basically was totally satisfied with his contractual position, etc. 
We did that and we told people we'd be doing it again and again and 
again, a rolling process. But one of the messages that was built in 'why 
we must do it' - and it was only one of the messages - we must do it in 
order to be able to dataload NIS." (Implementation Team Leader) 
4.5.28 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Financial Data's account teams conducted an account audit on their 
designated clients. This involved going through each of the client's records to 
assess the accuracy of the data. The audit required the account teams to visit 
customer premises to check the physical products held on site, to verify the 
services they held or bought, and to bring all billing details up to date. Each 
team had to agree with the client the true position of the account and get a 
signed statement to that effect. Product and debt errors were corrected to reflect 
what was agreed with the client. Each account team corrected the data held on 
Financial Data's functional systems. The account audit was conducted prior to 
migrating to the new systems, so that the new system was loaded with clean 
data. The documentation developed for the order process specifies who is 
responsible for ensuring data items remain clean on an on-going basis. 
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Account teams cleaned clients' data before migrating to the new system. 
(IM_SOC # 4.46) 
4.5.29 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"In terms of the systems interface to the processes, what we have are 
systems user groups whereby we split the process down to three main 
areas. We have business managers who are responsible for chairing our 
system user groups in those areas, and then systems changes to support 
the process are generated from those groups and the IS department takes 
its prioritisation and its resourcing from those groups, we service those 
groups." (IT Manager) 
"Each functional group is resourced to different levels depending on the 
workload and the workload is managed through user groups. I chair the 
technical user group. We meet once a week. We review requests for 
changes that come from users. We review the work which is ongoing 
and sitting in front of the development team and basically who does what 
next. We actively drive the writing of any specifications for changes. 
You acceptance test them and control the main production. 
Communication from the users is good, close and it's the users who set 
the priorities for the IS department." (Implementation Team Member) 
"We (our user group) literally decided on all the priorities for the 
systems. Yes you can have that, no that's irrelevant. Yes I know it's 
painful, don't care. We targeted those things that were the most key in 
the short term and for the first year to eighteen months we prioritised all 
systems development - a non democratic approach." (Implementation 
Team Leader) 
4.5.29 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
To develop the new system, Financial Data created three user groups: 
sales, technical and administration. Line managers from these areas chair the 
user groups. User groups prioritised developments, agreed changes to the 
system design and allocated resources to the information systems department. 
The user groups had a high degree of authority in terms of prioritising 
developments. These groups also communicated progress to their colleagues in 
the division. 
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Senior managers set up user groups and they controlled priority of the new 
system developments. (IM_SOC # 4.47) 
4.5.30 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We then had a series of migration reports which took the BOS data and 
compared it with what it looked like when it was moved across to NIS. 
We literally migrated data and looked at it and got NIS to tell us all its 
problems ... 
When we moved out to the divisions and we were going to migrate we 
did 2 or 3 runs for each division and as we found issues for one division 
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we wrote them down and gave them to the next division. Not 
surprisingly North's was the hardest migration because they were first, 
followed by East, followed by West, followed by South because that was 
the order in which we did them. We were looking for what have we 
done that actually helped us, what have we done that caused us 
problems, what data inconsistencies are we now aware of that we were 
not aware of last time, or South you have still got 3 months to correct 
this, it's much easier to correct this before you do it. So a series of 
reiterative learning effectively. 
We had a cut over plan. I remember this, you effectively had to close 
down, we had to freeze BOS and move orders to certain states within it 
so they could pull the data across. If it had gone beyond a certain state 
you would actually finish it off on BOS and then move it to NIS so there 
was a series of conversion routines. Broadly speaking it went along the 
lines of something like: you closed down BOS, ran the billing, moved 
everything to a particular order status, did the billing again, then you did 
the conversion run, then you did a series of reconciliation reports and 
then you had, NIS was live but you weren't allowed to use any account 
until each element of data of that particular account was signed off, so 
you went through a series of activities to add data you couldn't hold in 
BOS or to correct data that was inconsistent between the two, or 
whatever, you then signed off as being correct and then you could 
process an order. In the meantime you had a problem if someone 
ordered in the middle. We had to have the ability to hold that data to one 
side and make the order happen. Mind bogglingly boring." 
(Implementation Team Leader) 
"NIS was introduced to City North in the Pilot 1 team about 50 accounts, 
started running orders through that and then half the division went and 
then the other half. Part of the migration process involved a significant 
amount of data transfer from the old to new systems ... Each division 
took at least two months because the migration actually occurred on each 
month's financial cut-off dates." (Implementation Team Member) 
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"We certainly rolled out the system in very small batches first of all -
into one division, into one account team, they ran .... I don't know, it was 
probably 20 or 30 accounts on NIS to start with and probably not key 
accounts either, you probably specified those. You had a ghastly 
problem of handling orders in flight as well, because you can't cut into 
our process. You always have orders ongoing. You have a planner 
handling maybe 5 or 6 orders simultaneously and it was difficult for him 
to handle some on the old system and some on the new system. That 
was quite complicated but they found a way round it. It was a pain 
actually. Service providers found it ghastly because of course they were 
using two systems until everything had been cut over. At least at the 
planning level you could cut over individual new orders on to the new 
system, but these poor******* out here were seeing orders from all over 
the company because they are central groups and they had to look at two 
systems for many, many months. That was complicated." (Technical 
Director) 
4.5.30 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Financial Data produced a detailed migration plan to guide the transfer 
from the previous functional systems to the new single system, NIS. A key 
stage in the plan was the transfer of data. The organisation began by transferring 
a small quantity of clean data to the new system. Reports were produced from 
the new system and compared with the original data check for anomalies. Once 
the data could be transferred accurately, data for one division was transferred to 
the new system. Initially data for one account team and their clients was 
transferred, other account teams followed this, until the entire division's account 
teams were on the new system. The migration plan followed the same pattern in 
each of the other divisions. Order received during the migration period were 
fulfilled, and the data relating to these orders were added to the new system after 
the migration was completed. Each division had to use both old and new 
systems during the migration. People in the service functions had to use both 
the old and new systems until the last division migrated to the new system. 
Developed a plan to migrate from old to new systems one division at a time and 
used both old and new systems in some parts of the organisation. (IM _SOC # 
4.48) 
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4.5.31 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"For a start we broke up a large central technical planning group and 
positioned those people with those who carry out the sales administration 
and formed account teams ... We had before an installation group with 
an installation manager. 80 odd people. That changed to be 4 separate 
installation groups as part of 4 separate business divisions. So nominally 
20 technical people in each division but they were then split up into the 
account teams, so there isn't now a group called installations anymore, 
it's part of the account teams." (Technical Director) 
"We put in place in the teams a multiple disciplines that would support 
the customer base. . .. I think the key was breaking down the functions." 
(IT Manager) 
4.5.31 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Financial Data had a strong functional structure. The functions most 
affected by the order process were sales, technical and finance. These functions 
were divided into four, and about a quarter of each function was placed in each 
division. People from each function were split further into account teams, which 
made the need for the previous functional structure superfluous. 
The board broke up traditional sales, technical and finance functions and moved 
people from these functions into account teams. (IM _SOC # 4.49) 
4.5.32 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Initially they were all moved into the same building and you had an area 
which was technical, an area which was sales and an area which was 
administration. 
You'd let it ride for a couple of months and then you stuck them all 
around the same desk. It was in that approach." (Implementation Team 
Member) 
"We then brought them into this division and we sat them, for example, 
admin was sat in three blocks, technical in two blocks, account managers 
in two blocks. Still sitting together ... we started explaining to them 
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wh~t was going to be done. We actually, I remember, August Bank 
Holiday when we moved everybody into their own teams . . . We split 
them on August Bank Holiday and rearranged the desks so they were in 
teams whereas previously they had been in blocks and that was done 
over one long weekend." (Implementation Team Leader) 
4.5.32 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The prevwus sales, technical and finance functions were located in 
different buildings and on different floors. People in these functions were 
relocated to the building that housed each division. Each functional group 
initially sat together, however, once the account teams were formed, people 
moved out of their functional groupings and were collocated as cross functional 
teams. 
The board and senior managers collocated people from the sales, technical and 
finance functions. (IM _SOC # 4.50) 
4.5.33 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"The first thing we did was to sit, say, the technical people together in 
blocks of, say, 7 people, 7 planning engineers. We knew they had to 
support clients, they were aware of the changes going on in the 
background but they hadn't changed yet so they were just becoming 
aware of what was going to change. And they started by actually 
working together to support the clients as they had them now. They had 
not previously done that, what they'd always done was react to a specific 
instruction about a particular job. They were mapped to accounts. So 
we mapped them to accounts and said right 'this group will work on this 
account' . . . same clients ... Group A of clients - they all had 
responsibility for that group, so the planning engineer was mapped, one 
sales manager, and one business administrator. 
Physically it was, they had already started working together because they 
ended up starting talking to one another as a natural basis of being on the 
same accounts, they were encouraged to meet on a regular basis, they 
were formally being told they had to meet, say, once a week to go 
through the order book. We drove them through the process, rather than 
being the cosy 'let's sit you together' routine, we drove the process 
through and made them work on that basis." (Implementation Team 
Leader) 
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"And have as many individuals as you needed, have as many teams as 
you needed to suit the volume of work being generated by that number of 
clients. So obviously some teams had 3 or 4 clients if they were high 
volume, large clients and high volume of ordering, I mean, and large 
revenue. Other teams had large numbers of clients, maybe 60 or 70, 
because they had small numbers of orders in a year and maybe quite 
small revenue." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"Then in responsibility terms, as the next stage, you identified an 
engineer who would work on the same customer as the administrator 
would work on and the sales person would work on, even though they 
happened to be sitting on three different floors. 
Basically it was achieved through agreement between me, the sales 
manager and the business administration manager. We sat down and 
carved up the accounts, very sales driven but I think the nature of the 
change in the organisation is that everything is very much more sales 
driven now than it was before. Tim decided which accounts he was 
going to give to which sales executive, and then we looked at the 
technology that sat within these accounts and I said which engineer was 
going to work on which set of accounts and which business 
administrators would then support those accounts. Effectively it was 
manipulated." (Implementation Team Member) 
4.5.33 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The division's sales, technical, and administration managers assigned an 
individual from their function to a client. The managers selected individuals 
based upon their knowledge of the client and the type of products they had. 
Individuals were told which clients they would assigned to, and the specific 
people in other functions also assigned to that client. Hence, one sales person, 
engineer, and administrator began working together on the same client (although 
they were not collocated at the time). Some teams were assigned to 3-4 clients 
and others had up to 70 clients, depending upon the volume of business. They 
were encouraged to meet their colleagues both formally and informally. 
Senior managers allocated clients to specific account teams. (IM _SOC # 4.51) 
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D4 4.6 Effects of radical process orientation 
4.6.1 A and 4.6.1 Bare located in the body of Chapter 4. 
4.6.2 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"I have a structure that I believe in, I have a business that's running well, 
I have processes that run effectively, and now they can be better and 
finely tuned by people who understand their job and whose behaviour 
can only be enhanced." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"Internally things are much more in control. Everybody can see what 
part they play in terms of the input to the process and the visibility of the 
process end to end, so that instead of things halting or maybe papers 
were going into someone's in-tray and staying there for 4 days before 
anything happened, that does not happen anymore because people are in 
control of the process . . . the new order process was put in place 
facilitating account team structure to allow the account teams to be in 
control of the order process, to allow the account teams to know in what 
state an order was and then allow the account team to track and monitor 
the progress of the order through those other simple functions." (IT 
Manager) 
"The sorts of benefits we had were genuinely steps forward. We are able 
to process a service only order, straight through our commissioning 
systems from the order. We'd never been able to do that before. What 
we'd done was move our file maintenance staff into the division and we 
would pass them an order which they would have tore-key. We were 
now able to get the BA to commission it directly by keying the order 
which converted into the instructions for our commissioning system. 
That's a major step forward. It cuts out problems, it cuts out time. So 
we were in a situation where we were able to say to account teams 'you 
can now control service and the orders, you're not dependent on anyone. 
You check to see if they are right, you commission it'. That's an 
enormous sense of control for the BA, so that is a key deliverable to 
them and to the customer." (Implementation Team Leader) 
"Those people (with a functional focus) now have a view of the fact that 
their team, made up of an engineer, sales person, administrator, actually 
sold £10,000 worth of kit last month and we installed it in 7 working 
days and we only have a debt position of £5000 after the last quarter's 
billing and we are winning the team competition. They feel in control of 
the business, they understand how their contribution goes straight to the 
company. 
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We were in the installation department in a building housing the 
installation department. The new process was re-engineered by 
installation engineers and it was an installation process. It wasn't until 
we started to put people together that our outlooks broadened and people 
started to understand the implications of their process on the guy next 
door's process. At that stage there wasn't a great deal of cross discipline 
consciousness, because people who were designing the process and 
being trained in the process had no experience of the other functions. It 
wasn't until we actually got them all sitting round the same desk and the 
engineer seeing the customer order coming in off the street, handed by 
his sales person, actually realised 'he's got to do all of that in that 
process there. Well can't I help him? Half of that isn't necessary 
because I do it all again over here'." (Implementation Team Member) 
4.6.2 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Board members believe they have a structure and order process that has 
given them greater control over the business. People at all levels have greater 
visibility of the order process, their part in it, and the effect they have on 
activities in other parts of the process. People in the account teams are in 
control of the order process, can monitor its performance, and can act to ensure 
customer service levels are maintained. People have a high level of 
consciousness of activities in other functions. People have become more 
sensitive to pressures faced by people in other functions in the order process. 
Management and staff are in control of the order process and understand the 
implications of their activity on others in the order process. (ERPO _SOC # 
4.53) 
4.6.3 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Financial Data traditionally has never been a consultative organisation. 
The old structure was hierarchical and task driven. People were told how 
to work and told what to do and effectively nothing changed in the 
management style, we just reorganised people by telling them what to 
do. Of course selling benefits, selling benefits, selling benefits all the 
way through. That was it. How did people respond? There are still 
places within the organisation where all you have done is moved the 
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same people with the same attitudes doing the same job to sit in a 
different place. I guess that would be true of any major change. What 
you have done is changed the relationship they have with other people 
through a process redesign, there are inefficient processes and efficient 
processes and we made an inefficient process more efficient so therefore 
you are more productive, but in terms of style and thinking, he's still 
sitting behind his desk doing the same job ... I think we still have a lot 
more work to do. One of the problems we have with the current 
structure is that a lot of the executive decision making is still made 
between Tim, Chris and me and the assistant managers are all managing 
tasks and customer relationships, etc. and technical assistant managers 
don't talk to business assistant managers who don't talk to sales 
managers. You find a technical person who has an issue with an 
administration problem come all the way up to me, I go to Chris and 
Chris goes all the way down, and that's wrong." (Implementation Team 
Member) 
"The process control still resides with (deputy managing director) and 
(managing director), they still haven't released process down to process 
managers. What has happened is that you have a group of people who 
document procedures surrounding the process and that changes to 
procedures are often sanctioned and are asked for, they are signed off by 
(the deputy managing director), so he still keeps very much control over 
it." (IT Manager) 
4.6.3 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The previous management style, characterised as 'telling those below in 
the organisation', has changed in a minor way. Board members still tell 
divisional directors what is expected of them, and they tell line managers, who 
tell people in account teams. Some traditional functional attitudes continue to 
prevail, especially at the level of assistant managers. 
Some aspects of the organisation have not changed. (IM_SOC # 4.54) 
4.6.4 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"All sorts of bills were unpaid, which eventually got paid and we were 
covered and we had obviously made all the right accruals, etc. but that 
wasn't the point, each year on year we were getting a larger and larger 
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accrual for unpaid debts which then become harder and harder to collect. 
There was also a lot of uncertainty about the revenue figures." (Deputy 
Managing Director) 
"I think it was something in the region of £5 million debt provision when 
we started, now £100,000. As we got more and more control over the 
organisation, the provisions fell ... it was necessary to have such large 
provisions, because without them we didn't have control over the 
business so you didn't know what your revenue was going to be. You 
needed to have that lump of money there." (Implementation Team 
Member) 
4.6.4 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The organisation was able to reduce its debtor position and hence was 
able to improve its cash flow and reduce its provision for bad debts. 
Substantial decrease in bad debt provision and invoices are accurate and paid by 
customers on time. (IM _SOC # 4.55) 
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Appendix 5 Carton Carriers: First order constructs, 
interpretation and second order constructs 
This appendix forms an integral part of Chapter 5. 
El 5.3 Commencement 
5.3.1 A and 5.3.1 Bare located in the body of Chapter 5. 
5.3.2 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Round about 1989, as Home Merchandise generally started to reach a 
plateau in terms of its growth and future." (Managing Director) 
"For the industry as a whole, however, the average number of customers 
per agent has fallen from 12 in 1970 to under three in 1988. And modest 
sales increases have been generated only by huge promotional spending 
which has succeeded in bringing in new catalogue holders whose 
average spend has fallen. The number of catalogues sent out by (GMR 
Home Merchandise) and its sister company (GMRK) rose from 3.4 
million in 1985 to 5.7 million in 1988." (Source: newspaper report) 
"Home Merchandise is of course a much larger company, much more 
important to GMR. So I think he was able to ... I suppose in our way, if 
we gave a bad level of service, it wasn't just revenue lost to Carton 
Carrier, it was profit lost to Home Merchandise." (Services Manager) 
5.3.2 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Home Merchandise's chairman and directors realised that year on year 
growth was no longer guaranteed. Home Merchandise contributed roughly 66o/o 
to GMR' s total turnover and between 40 - 45% of its pre-tax profit. A 
slowdown in Home Merchandise's growth would adversely affect GMR, and its 
overall ability to invest in future developments. Industry changes, which 
affected Home Merchandise's growth, are reflected in press reports at the time. 
Home Merchandise's competitors offered an equal or greater range of products 
to customers. In 1984, most customers had a catalogue from only one company. 
Customers were spoilt for choice as each catalogue often held 1,000 pages with 
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50,000 different items to select from. By 1990, 55% of customers with one 
catalogue were likely to have a competitor's catalogue as well. This, in a 
stagnating market, led to a limited amount of total customer expenditure being 
spread thinly across competitors. Home Merchandise and its competitors 
increased the number of catalogues distributed; some companies nearly doubled 
the number they circulated. Also towards the end of the 1980's credit was easier 
to obtain, as banks, credit card companies, and retailers all offered easy credit 
terms. The wide range of product choice and the availability of credit meant that 
customers were unwilling to accept poor levels of service. 
GMR (Transport)'s maJor customer, Home Merchandise, faced increased 
pressures from competitors. (C_SOC # 5.2) 
5.3.3 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"(Home Merchandise's) policy of ongoing investment has been 
maintained with a view to providing an improved level of service to 
agents and customers by increasing productivity and reducing 
overheads." (Source: GMR Group press release on 20 July 1990) 
"GMR (Transport) developed as an internal division of Home 
Merchandise, and as the sole distributor of parcels from the Home 
Merchandise company through to the end customer ... It's (GMR 
(Transport's) client, at that stage, major client was GMR Home 
Merchandise. Home Merchandise . . . would have no real power to 
threaten the transfer of that business away from GMR (Transport)." 
(Managing Director) 
"We ( GMR (Transport) had this one major customer (Home 
Merchandise) and it didn't really matter whether we served them or not 
... the company were able to . . . say to (Home Merchandise), 'This is 
what we can provide you with'." (Regional General Manager) 
5.3.3 B. Interpretation and second order constructs 
Home Merchandise realised it had to improve customer service levels 
due to growing competition and changing customer expectations. Yet, GMR 
(Transport) disregarded the competitive pressures facing Home Merchandise and 
its intention to deal with the pressures. GMR (Transport's) directors believed 
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that Home Merchandise, as a sister organisation, had little real power to transfer 
its annual traffic of 70 million parcels away from GMR (Transport). Home 
Merchandise was considered a captive client, and GMR (Transport)'s directors 
believed that the service levels provided to Home Merchandise could continue 
unchanged. 
GMR (Transport) continued to provide poor levels of service to Home 
Merchandise in spite of its changing situation. (C_SOC # 5.3) 
5.3.4 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Whilst it (GMR (Transport) was part of the group, (it) had a degree of 
autonomy in the past, and as a consequence it was treated almost as if it 
were an independent company, so there was no real affinity or empathy 
in the Home Merchandise production processes leading through the 
distribution network in the form of GMR (Transport) through to end 
delivery ... we've sought to bring the tail end of the Home Merchandise 
activity closer to the front end of the Carton Carrier activity." 
(Managing Director) 
"GMR (Transport) was very much a business on its own, and it still is, 
but for years we had run so independently, we had hardly any contact 
with Home Merchandise ... this was my understanding anyway, is one of 
the things that (the chairman of Home Merchandise) was trying to do, 
and has done, is to try and bring Home Merchandise and GMR 
(Transport) under one umbrella." (Personnel Manager) 
5.3.4 B. Interpretation and second order constructs 
GMR (Transport) had a high degree of autonomy. It operated as though 
it was an independent organisation, and had little contact with Home 
Merchandise. However, Home Merchandise's directors sought to bring the 
operations of the two organisations, namely Home Merchandise and GMR 
(Transport), closer together. The managing director's description of a parcel 
moving through distribution to end delivery reflects the level of alignment 
sought by directors. 
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Home Merchandise wanted the two organisations' operations to be more closely 
aligned. (C_SOC # 5.4) 
5.3.5 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Home Merchandise customers . . . indicated that there was a degree of 
dissatisfaction ... about the length of time it took to deliver parcels. And 
may be more critically, the inconsistency in that time between placement 
of order and receipt of goods." (Managing Director) 
"In terms of the actual quality of service, with mail order customers, I 
think its probably fair to say they're a fairly forgiving lot, mail order 
customers, and they don't mind if you leave the parcel in the bin or on 
the doorstep. And without wanting to sound dreadfully snobbish, a lot of 
them were working class people, some of them in fact had nowhere else 
where they could get the credit. So they had to put up with whatever we 
dished out to them. But you know, they were working class blokes, and 
if you were dealing with a complaint, nine times out of ten, you could 
finish up with 'well I don't want to get the driver into trouble', and all 
this sort of thing because they were fellow workers." (Regional General 
Manager) 
"If individual customers were dissatisfied by the service, they would 
have no real power to threaten the transfer of that business away from 
GMR (Transport)." (Managing Director) 
"It used to be a standing joke: at Christmas, you'd deliver a catalogue 
and Mrs Bloggs would say 'where's my Christmas present for little 
Johnny?' and you'd say 'on page 32 of the catalogue!'" (Depot Manager) 
"The industry has paid lip service to catering for working women, for 
example, but still it is too often not prepared to make sure that deliveries 
are made while people are at home." (Newspaper report) 
5.3.5 B. Interpretation and second order constructs 
Home Merchandise's directors recognised that customers expected 
shorter delivery times and consistency delivery periods between placing an order 
and receiving their goods. These expectations were not being met. GMR 
(Transport) considered Home Merchandise's four and a half million customers 
to be not very demanding in terms of service standards. Customers were 
considered to be relatively less powerful, as once they purchased a Home 
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Merchandise product they had little choice but to await its delivery. Little 
attention was paid to informing the customer about delivery delays. Often 
customers had to wait until a GMR (Transport) driver came along, with some 
part of their order, or simply to deliver the latest catalogue, to find out when 
their goods might arrive. The gap between customer expectations and industry 
service levels are evident also in press reports. GMR (Transport)'s directors 
believed that customers would continue to tolerate poor service levels that they 
had been offered in the past. The directors also expected customers to behave as 
they had done in the past. However, customers had a greater choice of products 
from a larger number of competitors, which meant that they could shop where 
they received better levels of service. 
Customers were leaving due to long and inconsistent delivery times. (C _SOC # 
5.5) 
5.3.6 A. First order constructs 
"I was a depot manager, five years ago. The changes to this company 
really came about, or the catalyst that started it, I believe, although it was 
thought about a long time before the catalyst had started, was Malham 
depot. Because five years ago, Malham depot had so many parcels 
around us we were sinking. Literally sinking. I had 82,000 parcels in 
the depot and 27 trailers backed up behind me with parcels on board." 
(Depot Manager) 
"A good example of this is when we went to Malham in January, we 
found parcels - the oldest parcel in the depot was from May (previous 
year). (The depot manager) wouldn't thank me for repeating that story." 
(Services Manager) 
5.3.6 B. Interpretation and second order constructs 
Board members and managers considered that the organisation needed to 
change but had taken no action in spite of the backlog of parcels. The 82,000 
parcels alone represent about a 2Yz-week backlog. This brought one of GMR 
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(Transport)'s largest depots to a complete standstill. This crisis was the catalyst 
that focused management's attention on starting to change the organisation. 
A depot had 82,000 undelivered parcels and 27 trailers with undelivered parcels 
on board parked on the street outside the depot. (C_SOC # 5.6) 
5.3.7 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"So instead of the drivers coming in and picking and choosing what they 
wanted (to deliver), the management would plan the drivers' days work 
and tell them what to take out." (Assistant Depot Manager) 
"If you lived on a tower block on the 23rd Floor and you'd ordered a 
bike, you might have got it in six months time. You might not get it ever 
because the driver didn't want to go to your flat. So just leave it there. 
As long as he took out 'time critical parcels' he didn't mind, so he never 
took your bike, because he knew it was a pain in the bum to take it up 
there." (Depot Manager) 
"These drivers (would go) to their cages of parcels and say 'Oh, Christ 
not that one (address), it's got an alsatian dog'." (Services Manager) 
"If we go back to 1991, at that time we operated a system within the 
depots whereby basically the good drivers managed management, rather 
than management managing the drivers." (IT Co-ordinator) 
"We used to do what we wanted to do or what we thought was a fair 
day's work ... Five years ago I'd come in in the morning and I'd sort out 
maybe 200 parcels for what I thought would be a good area, and I knew I 
could cope with . . . however, decisions about which parcels would be 
delivered were taken out of drivers' hands ... whereas now our job's are 
all planned for us. We can only take what they've planned for us, what 
they want us to take." (Driver) 
"In effect the drivers themselves were really dictating the service that 
was provided by the carrier ... we had to seek ways of taking that control 
away from drivers and putting it in the hands of the management of the 
business." (Managing Director) 
5.3.7 B. Interpretation and second order constructs 
Drivers had no clear instructions for the selection of parcels to be 
delivered each day. Depot management left parcel selection up to the drivers, 
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which resulted in an arbitrary 200 parcels per day being delivered to customers. 
Depot line managers neither specified which addresses drivers delivered to nor 
monitored which parcels were actually delivered. Hence, drivers delivered 
parcels to whichever address they wanted to on their round, and by default, 
controlled the parcels that were delivered, and dictated the level of customer 
service provided by GMR (Transport). Drivers often did not deliver parcels to 
certain addresses simply because they knew that it had an awkward location or 
some other characteristic about the address made the delivery difficult. GMR 
(Transport)'s management had little or no control over two key delivery 
activities: (i) selecting parcels for delivery, and (ii) ensuring parcels were 
actually delivered by drivers. A van driver acknowledged that he, rather than 
depot managers, decided the parcels he delivered and the addresses he delivered 
to. He based his decision upon what suited him in terms of the deliveries that he 
thought he could cope with. However, Carton Carrier's board members and 
senior managers wanted to manage the levels of service offered to customers by 
taking control of the activities performed to deliver a parcel. 
Lack of management control over parcel selection and actual delivery of parcels 
led to inconsistent delivery times and poor levels of service and managers 
sought to take control over activities that affected delivery times and service 
levels to customers. (C_SOC # 5.7) 
5.3.8 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We were well along the route of changing it on to this work study 
process. Work study was already been used in Home Merchandise, 
which is where (the chairman) had come from. So I think it was almost, 
if you like, it was a first stab. 'Well it works in Home Merchandise so 
let's develop it for GMR (Transport)'. And when I joined we were well 
down the path with a lot the work that had to be done with Timing 
Studies and all this sort of thing. They'd done an awful lot by the time 
that I joined. But no agreements were in place. Now the work study 
gave us the tool to actually enable us to start saying to the drivers 'This is 
what we want you to do today. That's where we want you to go'." 
(Personnel Manager) 
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"Using _work study techniques we found a means of measuring work 
content In place of the number of parcels." (Managing Director) 
5.3.8 B. Interpretation and second order constructs 
Carton Carrier started a work study initiative in order to address the 
drivers for change. They chose this initiative as it had been used and shown to 
be effective in Home Merchandise previously. The people implementing the 
work study initiative measured each activity performed to deliver a parcel. 
Carton Carrier's directors felt that the work study initiative enabled activities to 
be brought under management's control. 
Carton Carrier began to address its drivers for change with a work study 
initiative which involved examining the activities performed to deliver a parcel. 
(C_SOC # 5.8). 
4.3.9 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Six years ago, we'd have just changed, and the warehouse would have 
done the same. They would have just changed something, and we would 
have probably found out about twenty-four hours beforehand ... whereas 
at least now, at least when there are board meetings and such like, you do 
get the heads of functions and directors and whatever from all different 
functions, and say six years ago, that just didn't happen. It just didn't 
happen. And I think at least now everybody feels as though they are part 
of a warehousing and distribution function, in that we can't operate 
without the warehouses, and they can't operate without us. So I think we 
know that we've got to work together, and six years ago, I don't think we 
did frankly." (Personnel Manager) 
"The old structure was divisive in the sense that there were clear 
parameters of responsibility, and as long as your own house was in order, 
then the last thing you want to do is do somebody else a favour. It's 
sounds extreme but that's maybe over-egging the difference, but to a 
degree that's the way the thing was structured. I think the bringing 
together (of activities in the parcel delivery process) then meant that 
there were far greater opportunities to look at corporate issues that could 
be compatible." (Managing Director) 
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4.3.9 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The functional structure divided the organisation into separate areas, 
each of which operated independently. Each had its own set of responsibilities, 
and so long as these were met, people rarely concerned themselves with the 
performance of other areas. Each function changed activities under their control 
without reference to other functions. People believed their function could 
operate in isolation of other functions. The board realised that the changes had 
to affect several functions. 
The drivers for change required organisational changes to be co-ordinated across 
the sort centres and depot operations at managerial and operational levels. 
(C_SOC # 5.9) 
E2 5.4 Changes that occurred 
5 .4.1 A and 5 .4.1 B are located in the body of Chapter 5. 
5.4.2 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"The business was structured in such a way that there were joint 
managing directors at the time. One of the joint managing directors was 
the finance director and he controlled all the financial aspects of the 
business. The other joint managing director controlled everything else. 
And the service departments were managed in '89 by a management 
services director who looked after all the work study and in areas of 
security. He reported in to the operations director ... 
Today I manage the operation. I don't have trunking to worry about. 
That's controlled by (another director). The depot operations are my 
direct responsibility." (Managing Director) 
"As far as the trunking operation was concerned and the feeding of the 
traffic into the depots, we introduced Regional Sort at W embley in 1990, 
which replaced Depot Sorts at Depot level. We introduced a Regional 
Sort at Worcester which again, as far as the south-west depots were 
concerned replaced the conventional sorting arrangements." (Regional 
General Manager) 
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"The sort centres have changed things fundamentally, because we now 
trunk via a Sort Centre to a Depot rather than direct to the Depot. And so 
the Sort Centres are new ... the delivery process I would say it was from 
the warehouse, the point of delivery. And I'd include in that despatch 
from the warehouse, sortation (sic) and trunking." (Services Manager) 
5.4.2 B. Interpretation and second order constructs 
The senior management team of GMR (Transport) consisted of the board 
and the regional general managers. At the head of the management team were 
two joint managing directors: one carried the responsibility for the financial 
performance of the organisation, and the other was responsible for the rest of 
GMR (Transport). In addition to the joint managing directors, the GMR 
(Transport) board had directors of other functions for example, contract hire and 
management services. Carton Carrier retained the functional structure and 
created the parcel delivery process from within the functional structure. 
Carton Carrier created the parcel delivery process from activities within the 
functional structure. (CTO _SOC # 5.11) 
5.4.3 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"And therefore what we sought to do was to move away from what could 
have been described as an autocracy at the time where all decisions were 
Head Office taken, and issued in the form of dictats (sic)." (Managing 
Director) 
"Whereas six years ago, we'd have just changed, and the warehouse 
would have done the same. They would have just changed something, 
and we would have probably found out about twenty-four hours 
beforehand." (Personnel Manager) 
"And the way that it's best described is the warehouses, who would 
receive the orders to pick, assemble, pack and despatch, would go 
through those processes and load the parcels on the back of a trailer, 
close the trailer doors, end of ownership and concerns. That's it. It's 
somebody else's problem, even though it was within the Group, it would 
be assumed then to be handed over and it was thereafter Carton Carrier's 
problem to deal with it." (Managing Director) 
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"We operate on the basis that in relation to Carton Carrier, if we can 
bring about a change that has a net benefit to the operation, it means that 
a cost is incurred at one stage of the process but to the benefit of another 
stage. Then, as long as the net is profitable it doesn't really matter where 
the costs occur, so long as the benefits are taken ... whilst one of the 
parties to that would perhaps incur some costs, if they just viewed it from 
a parochial point of view." (Managing Director) 
5.4.3 B. Interpretation and second order constructs 
Each function operated autonomously and changed activities under its 
control without consulting other functions. For example, Home Merchandise 
changed its sorting activity even though the change resulted in difficulties in the 
depots. Each function operated on the basis that as long as it performed its 
activities it was unconcerned with others' performance. Carton Carrier directors 
recognised that this needed to change, and sought to move away from functional 
and head office autocracy. The parcel delivery process became the basis upon 
which changes, benefits and costs were evaluated. Carton Carrier focused on 
optimising the parcel delivery process rather than individual functional 
activities. This enabled directors to rise above short term, budgetary constraints 
and the optimisation of cost in one part of the parcel delivery process. Directors 
took decisions that ensured net benefits in terms of customer service and 
profitability were captured within the overall process. 
Carton Carrier altered the balance between functions and the parcel delivery 
process, such that the process is considered as essential as the functions in the 
organisation. (CTO_SOC # 5.12) 
5.4.4 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"A Supervisor, although there were three of them, you still looked at a 
Supervisor looking after sixty drivers. They didn't have twenty drivers 
each or anything like that. They looked after the whole lot. So three 
Supervisors would look after sixty drivers, or one Supervisor would look 
after sixty drivers. It depended who was in the office at the time ... in 
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those days they would put a problem in the Malham area on to a 
supervisor. Basically whoever came in the door first dealt with it. So 
there was no personal attachment to it at all." (Assistant Depot Manager) 
"The old supervisors used to run the whole depot, but they had no 
control over the whole depot, they were just booking out people, and 
adding up figures and checking things." (Depot Manager) 
"(Supervisors were) floor walkers who had no real responsibility. They 
used to literally check the drivers out in the morning and check them 
back in the afternoon and they would rotate the shifts, and that was it. 
They didn't recruit, they didn't discipline, they didn't cancel, they didn't 
do anything really." (Personnel Manager) 
"PDM' s role as against the old Supervisor's role again has dramatically 
changed .... a PDM now, a Parcel Delivery Manager, manages a team of 
drivers and he is responsible for everything that team does (in the parcel 
delivery process) ... They do everything for the driver. They arrange the 
training; they don't necessarily do the training themselves. The parcel 
delivery manager's do the training but they don't necessarily train their 
own people. But they certainly monitor them for the first thirteen weeks. 
They plan their day's work, counsel, and coach them. They deal with the 
discipline side of it up to first written warnings. They monitor the claim 
situation. They certainly monitor the claim situation. They do delivery 
checks on them. They go out and see the drivers on the ground. They 
actually manage that team of drivers completely. Whereas they never 
used to, they were really like a foreman role across the whole depot. But 
that's changed quite dramatically with them." (Depot Manager) 
"So the responsibilities have broadened out from that point of view. In 
terms of service, we are far more conscious of it. We always said that 
service was (a depot manager's) job, and now with development of (the 
process and), the ability to measure performance this is possible. 
There's far more autonomy in the field now than ever there was and the 
depot managers for example, when I was depot manager at Liverpool, I 
wouldn't even work a week-end, you know, tum the drivers out on 
Saturday without talking it over with my boss ... and now, the first thing 
you ever write when you're writing an appraisal of the depot manager is 
to say that he is responsible for the profitable operation of his unit." 
(Regional General Manager) 
"I think depot managers probably, we are very much more managers as 
against hands-on managers. You were really a glorified ancillary or 
labourer when I first came on board ... (now) you've taken a step back as 
depot managers, and you're very much more involved in managing the 
depot and worrying about the claims and the complaints and those sort of 
problems, as against the day-to-day operation of the depot." (Depot 
Manager) 
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"The responsibility for the sorting of parcels and the route of the parcels 
through the network to the depots has become the responsibility of the 
guy who runs the warehousing operation. So he, like I, has got a 
responsibility to both Home Merchandise for warehousing activities, and 
to Carton Carrier for part of this operation. And that's meant that there's 
an opportunity to take advantage of the empathies (sic) (across the parcel 
delivery process). 
We've sought to have far greater participation in that objective 
(consistent delivery of parcels, improved quality of service while 
achieving profitability) by delegating responsibility, . . . we've actively 
sought again to develop our own people in such a way that they can grow 
with the new responsibility." (Managing Director) 
5.4.4 B. Interpretation and second order constructs 
The supervisor's role was to log drivers into and out of the depot. Each 
depot had about three supervisors, who worked on a shift system, one on the 
night shift and the other two on morning shift. As each depot also had between 
50 - 70 drivers, a supervisor dealt with a large number of drivers. The drivers 
were not allocated to any one supervisor, and therefore dealt with different 
supervisors each day. The extent to which a supervisor managed and controlled 
such a large number of drivers was limited. Because supervisors had unclear 
responsibilities and accountabilities, they had little ownership of problems that 
arose due to incorrect or late deliveries. Customer complaints were either 
unresolved or else dealt with unsatisfactorily. 
The supervisor position changed to that of the parcel delivery manager. 
The responsibilities attached to this position are deeper and broader in scope, 
content and structure than that of the supervisor. The parcel delivery manager is 
responsible for a team of drivers. They monitor drivers' performance, arrange 
training for them, deal with disciplinary matters and coach and counsel drivers. 
The parcel delivery managers monitor claims made for non-delivery and 
perform delivery checks, i.e. go out on the road with drivers. 
Depot managers barely managed the depot at all. They had hands-on, 
day-to-day operational responsibilities, and reacted to problems. Depot 
managers focussed internally and had little time for external customers. They 
dealt with operational issues from paying cash wages, to disciplinary matters, to 
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dealing with head office. However, depot managers were rarely involved in 
managerial issues such as improving the depot's financial performance, reducing 
customer complaints, or improving the depot's operations. They had little 
interaction with their counterparts in other depots, which meant that they rarely 
shared good practice or resolved common difficulties. 
Depot managers became responsible for activities in the parcel delivery 
process that were within the depot operations function. They are responsible for 
ensuring their depot achieved agreed levels of customer service, i.e. parcels 
delivered in three days. They control activities in the parcel delivery process 
and take operational decisions that balance customer service with delivery costs. 
Depot managers have functional responsibilities in the sense that they are 
responsible to the regional general manager for their depot's profitability. 
Directors previously were responsible for their function only and barely 
concerned themselves with problems faced by other functions. This changed to 
where directors are responsible for their function and the parcel delivery process. 
The warehouse, sort centre and trunking functions are the responsibility of a 
director in Home Merchandise; the depot operations function is the 
responsibility of a director in Carton Carrier. As these functional directors are 
on the boards of both organisations they are responsible for the parcel delivery 
process. The directors also sought to have people at all levels take responsibility 
for the function and parcel delivery process. 
People, including directors, depot managers and parcel delivery managers in 
Carton Carrier took responsibility for their functional activities as well as the 
parcel delivery process. (CTO_SOC # 5.13) 
5.4.5 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Pre SMS, people were not assessed, it's fair to say. Management have 
an appraisal, if you were lucky, once a year, which would be - a depot 
manager would sit down a couple of days before there was supposed to 
be the appraisal, write down a few notes about you, then that would be it. 
And you'd sit down, you would discuss it. If you agreed with what he 
said, fine, if you didn't agree, then again, fine." (Team Member) 
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"It was very much a case of the appraisal would be written out 
completely before the guy ever carne into the room, and it would be a ten 
minute discussion, and he would be expected to sign the piece of paper. 
And that was it. That was his appraisal for the year. Not a lot of 
emphasis was ever put on appraisals prior to 1989/'90. 
Some people, you can look back on their files, at that time, say they'd 
been here sort of ten year, and you'd probably be lucky if you found two 
appraisals on their file." (Personnel Manager) 
"We made no attempt to appraise the driving staff." (Regional General 
Manager) 
"I think (appraisals have changed) very substantially. The process had to 
be driven against the fundamental customer service requirements, 
consistent reliability of service. But that had to be done on a cost-
effective basis. 
We have progressively linked quality of service performance into our 
appraisal systems. 
We tried desperately to supplement that quality of service information on 
the basis that we would like to appraise our managers against both the 
cost effectiveness of their operation, and the quality of the service they 
were producing." (Managing Director) 
"If (drivers) had any complaints, or achievements, percentage brought 
back, things like that, and they had to mark that off. They'd get a weekly 
sheet and have to mark it off daily like what you've brought back, how 
much you've done obviously. So drivers are assessed that way." 
(Driver) 
5.4.5 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
People in GMR (Transport) were rarely appraised on an annual basis for 
the work they did. The organisation had an appraisal procedure for assistant 
depot managers, depot managers and regional general managers. However, an 
individual's performance was rarely evaluated or discussed with them. 
Managers often completed the appraisal forms without necessarily discussing it 
with the individuals concerned, which meant that appraisals held little meaning 
for either party. However, Carton Carrier's directors recognised that for the 
parcel delivery process to achieve improvements in service quality and 
consistent delivery times and be cost effective, people at all levels had to be 
appraised against the process's criteria. Depot managers were appraised on the 
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efficiency of their depot. This changed as depot managers are appraised on the 
quality of service and profitability oftheir depot. Drivers' performance was not 
appraised in any way. Drivers are appraised on the basis of quality of service 
and quantity of parcels delivered. 
People's appraisal criteria are linked to their functional activities and the results 
expected from the parcel delivery process. (CTO_SOC # 5.14) 
5.4.6 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We've introduced bonus schemes for as many managers as we felt we 
could actually accurately assess their contribution to the performance 
they were making in the business. So we have sought to enhance 
remuneration through that approach, but only where we felt that there 
was a clear opportunity to measure individual contribution. And that has 
taken a form of bonuses linked to, again, profit achievement and quality 
of service, etc. And there are now significant senior managers who are 
on that type of incentive scheme." (Managing Director) 
"In a more general sense, depot managers now get a bonus based on their 
performance as do regional general managers. And this is a bonus which 
is based on profit, and service criteria .... the average senior manager of 
the company, stands to make an extra 15% of his salary if his 
performance in terms of profit and service is up to a defined standard." 
(Services Manager) 
"Whereas before, you were paid just by the parcel. I think when I started 
here, it was 2p up to about 150 parcels, and it went up for however many 
parcels you'd done over 150 in the old days. Whereas now you're given 
a ten-hour figure and to earn ten hours money for that day, you've got to 
get that figure. So it's changed in that way." (Driver) 
5.4.6 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Managers in Carton Carrier previously received a salary for performing 
the functional responsibilities or in the case of drivers a per-parcel payment. 
Directors recognised that this needed to change. Managers still receive a salary 
for their functional responsibilities, however, an aspect of their remuneration 
changed to where they earn a bonus for achieving agreed service and/or 
profitability levels of the parcel delivery process. For example, Carton Carrier 
84 
managers receive a salary based upon their functional responsibilities and a 
bonus linked to profit achievement and quality of service of the parcel delivery 
process. The board brought driver's pay and bonus scheme into line with the 
deliveries made in the ten-hour standard day. Drivers who delivered all the 
parcels allocated to them within the standard day were paid in full. Drivers who 
did not make all the deliveries were paid proportionately less based upon the 
number of undelivered parcels. On the other hand, the company paid drivers, 
who put in more than 42 hours per week, at the rate of time and a half, and for 
over 50 hours per week at the rate of double time. 
The board accepted that people's remuneration, including regional general 
managers, depot managers, parcel delivery managers and drivers should be 
changed. (CTO_SOC # 5.15) 
5.4.7 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"A complete and utter dictatorship. You had no input at all into anything 
that happened in the Depot. You were just told what to do. If you didn't 
do it, then basically your arse was kicked. As I'm a big man, not 
physically I might add, but I mean that was the sort of thing. And it was 
all 'You will do', 'You will do'. 
The only time senior management used to come and see you was if you 
was in trouble, and it was for a bollocking session. 
I think the senior management now are prepared to listen to us. 
When we had meetings we'd go for lunch. And I know it's a small 
investment, but it was something that they'd never ever had before. You 
just didn't do things like that. The environment- the depot- we painted 
the floors, we cleaned the depot a lot better. We employed a cleaner ... 
We put flowers in boxes out there." (Depot Manager) 
"The old culture, and this is very much a personal opinion, because 
certainly not everybody agrees with me on this one. The old culture, I've 
felt, was very dictatorial. They managed by frightening people, by 
threatening to sack them, by telling them what to do. The managers, the 
depot managers, I feel, had very little room for manoeuvre as far as what 
they felt was right for their depot. And it was very much wagging the 
old finger 'You will do what you're bloody well told, and if you don't, 
there's the gate'. To me, that was the culture of managing by fear." 
(Personnel Manager) 
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"But recognising that, at the end of the day, that our performance as a 
business resides fundamentally with the people in the business who have 
contact with the external customers. Because whatever else we do in 
terms of systems or price competitiveness and so on, our performance 
dictates around how well the last person in the process actually does the 
job. And in our case, that's usually the delivery drivers, but it can also 
include those people who come into contact with customers either at 
depot level or over the telephone. So we've tried to install within the 
organisation a feeling of ownership of the business . . . so what we've 
tried to do is to recognise the strengths and weaknesses of the 
organisation. The people who are key to the success of the business are 
the people on the ground. They have tremendous skills and knowledge 
which are often difficult to actually tap into or appreciate, so they have to 
be operating on our behalf and on a trust basis." (Managing Director) 
"When you've got a hundred and eleven drivers, they're going to have 
personal problems, they're going to have home life problems, they're 
going to have all sorts of problems. And all they really need to do is sit 
down and talk to someone for five minutes, and that problem has actually 
gone out of the window. They need somebody to know that someone's 
out there listening to them, and that I firmly believe, is quite a large part 
of my managers' jobs, and it's certainly a large part of my role is to let 
people know that I am there, my door is open, that they can come in, 
they can sit down, they can talk to me, and they can talk to me on a very 
easy basis. I'm not 'Mr', my name is Steve. They come in and they talk 
to me and it's 'Steve', and 'John', for the want of a better word, or for 
the want of a better name, and you have to be ... you have to do this for it 
on the individual basis especially with a large concern ... 'I've become 
more conscious of looking after drivers, . . . counselling drivers, rather 
than 'Can't do the job, get out the door'. Now I ask 'why can't you do 
the job? What can we do to help you do the job?"' (Assistant Depot 
Manager) 
5.4.7 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The ways in which people behaved towards one another has changed. 
Previously, head office personnel told depot managers what to do and they were 
expected to comply with few, if any, questions. Depot managers told their staff 
what to do and so it cascaded down through each level, in the structure, to the 
drivers. The impression is that the threat of physical violence, bullying and 
aggressive threatening behaviour was acceptable. People managed by using fear 
and the threat of getting sacked. The crisis in the Malham depot provides an 
example of the poor relationship between Carton Carrier's head office and depot 
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staff. The crisis at Malham depot namely, the backlog of 82,000 parcels built up 
over several weeks, yet neither head office nor the depot took action to deal with 
it until a crisis ensued. Directors and line managers changed their own 
behaviours as they began to consider people at the lower echelons of the 
organisation as being important to its future success. Directors and line 
managers became more willing to listen rather than managing by fear. The 
directors' willingness to listen cascaded down and influenced line managers' 
behaviours. PDM's and assistant managers now attempt to find out difficulties 
faced by drivers and others, and attempt to resolve these problems. Depot 
managers are much less aggressive. To have 'hairy arsed depot managers' 
talking about the importance of having flower arrangements in the entrance to 
the depot would have been unheard of previously. 
People, including board members, regional general managers, depot managers, 
assistant depot managers, parcel delivery managers and drivers, changed their 
behaviours towards one another where they are less threatening and recognise 
people at all levels contribute to the business. (CTO_SOC # 5.16) 
5.4.8 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"GMR (Transport), in the old days, would buy a computer that it could 
afford, and get away with buying. And it was therefore something that 
was not man enough to do the job, because it seemed to be competitive 
with Home Merchandise's mainframes." (Services Manager) 
"(Systems have changed) very dramatically. I think we've sought to take 
maximum advantage from information systems. I have to say that, going 
back to 1989, the information systems were very crude in our terms. 
That's not to be disparaging about it, but they met the requirements of 
the business needs at that particular time. Our business needs have 
grown, as I've described, therefore we've sought to utilise information 
technology to as high a level as we possibly can. But against a 
background of not introducing technology for technology's sake, but 
simply to say that where there are advantages for either the customer 
service or the cost point of view. 
I think with all the systems development we've been involved in, we've 
sought to develop it from our core delivery process." (Managing 
Director) 
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"We now have a system which records every individual parcel as it goes 
through the (process). As the parcel is automatically sorted at the Sorter, 
the information that it is now on its way to us is collated into a manifest 
~or the depot, and when that trailer comes to the depot, the Sort Manager 
JUSt presses a few keys and all the information about every parcel 
including name and address and so on is automatically downloaded t~ 
the system. So the depot gets a massive information about the parcels. 
The parcels are tracked all the way through the depot, whenever they go, 
they come back in with a driver. When a driver goes out, the parcels 
he's supposed to be taking are assumed to go out with him. So we 
generate hundreds of tracks about each parcel, which are all then sent to 
a mainframe in Manchester which everybody can enquire on the 
customer services, the hot line agency, the Home Merchandise and so on. 
We can enquire on it." (IT Co-ordinator) 
"And as far as computerisation, virtually everything now has changed in 
that respect. We've got computers for everything. The information 
available to us now is much much greater." (Depot Manager) 
"Everybody's got a computer really. Everything that anybody does has 
reference to the computer one way or another, either by use of a little 
hand held computer; some of the motor things like checking the number 
of parcels on a particular round which we run occasionally. And most of 
the depot tasks such as taking parcels from the driver when they're not 
for him, if they've been mis-sorted for instance, or if there's a particular 
problem with booking parcels to a driver, checking that driver out, 
checking the driver in when he returns, sorting the parcels, all the wages, 
all the personnel files, everything's held on computer now, which allows 
us a great deal of scope, and gives people a great deal of information. So 
that's has changed very dramatically." (IT Co-ordinator) 
5.4.8 B. Interpretation and second order constructs 
GMR (Transport) had full control over its computer resources. It 
specified, designed and developed IT systems needed to support its activities. It 
took decisions about the choice of systems independently of Home Merchandise, 
which resulted in GMR (Transport)'s systems competing with rather than 
complementing Home Merchandise's systems. This led to inefficiencies, 
duplications and errors. Previous systems supported individual activities with 
little co-ordination across the activities. GMR (Transport) had a much smaller 
budget than Home Merchandise to spend on IT systems. GMR (Transport)'s 
directors based system development decisions upon the amount it could afford, 
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which resulted in financial pressures rather than business requirements driving 
IT development decisions. Consequently, IT systems were crude and inadequate 
and barely supported the business. 
Board members wanted to use IT in innovative ways to support customer 
service or increase efficiency. They recognised that the systems needed to be 
developed to support the parcel delivery process, so that a parcel could be 
tracked all the way through the process. The system needed to treat each parcel 
as unique to identify it as it passed from one activity to another. The new 
computer systems integrated activities across the parcel delivery process. 
Carton Carrier's new information systems track parcels across the parcel 
delivery process. (CTO_SOC# 5.17). 
5.4.9 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"In 1989 the way the product was controlled within the GMR (Transport) 
network was fundamentally a volume driven control. If a delivery van 
generated 200 parcels and 200 were delivered, then the van would be 
controlled." (Managing Director) 
"There was nothing to indicate what was, to use a well worn Carton 
Carrier phrase, 'What was a good day's work'. There was a figure 
bandied round at around 200 deliveries a day. But when I joined, and I 
asked the question, 'Well why is it 200?', no-one could ever tell me. It's 
just 'Well it's 200' ."(Personnel Manager) 
"Whereas before, the only measure that I can remember that you (depot 
managers) were judged on, was how many parcels you had left in the 
depot after checkout that day. And it didn't really matter whether those 
parcels were three or six months old, as long as you didn't have above a 
certain amount of parcels. It was - if you had more than ten per cent left, 
then you were probably in for kak from the bosses, but if you had less 
than ten per cent, you weren't, and all sorts of tricks were played to get 
rid of that ten per cent." (Depot Manager) 
"The drivers just gave the managers a total count of how many parcels 
they'd delivered, they'd taken out which isn't a representative figure of 
the amount of work they're going to do, because some drivers had a long 
way to go, they had country areas to deliver, and others had compact 
areas nearby, so two hundred parcels for one driver might be an easy 
day, and might be an incredibly difficult for another. 
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Classically, what would happen is that the van would have a carry-over 
of 100 parcels: 200 parcels would come in and the driver may deliver 
100 returning 100 to the depot. The assumption would be the carry-over 
in the depot was therefore half a day, 100 out of 200 delivered. Simple 
assumption, but of course if you take an average rather than actual, then 
within the 100, some could be one day old, but some could be potentially 
seven to ten days old." (Managing Director) 
5.4.9 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
GMR (Transport)'s delivery operation was based upon volume, that is 
the number of parcels delivered per driver each day. The organisation assumed 
that each driver should deliver about 200 parcels per day. The reasons 
underpinning this assumption are unclear. Yet depot budgets, the numbers of 
drivers, driver's wages, the length of a working day, and other depot operations 
were governed by this operational assumption. Depot management and staff 
performances were judged upon whether or not each driver delivered his 200 
parcels. Drivers chose which parcels were delivered, and managers accepted 
drivers returning to the depot with undelivered parcels. Depot line managers 
and drivers assumed that the carry-over of parcels were acceptable, and did not 
realised that this assumption resulted in parcels being left in the depot for weeks 
and sometimes months. 
The board and semor managers accepted that these operational 
assumptions were incompatible with increasing service levels to customers. The 
operational assumptions of 200 parcels per day and the carry-over of 
undelivered parcels were questioned and removed. Instead, the requirement to 
meet customers' expectations of short delivery times and consistent delivery 
periods took priority. 
Directors accepted that existing operational assumptions were flawed and 
incompatible with the parcel delivery process. (CTO _SOC# 5 .18) 
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5.4.10 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"GMR (Transport) was more autonomous in the past, and would 
therefore be by the nature of that structure, less sympathetic towards 
Home Shopping, more sort of parochial." (Managing Director) 
"The GMR (Transport) directors were physically separate for a start. 
They were in Worcester compared to Manchester. But they held quite a 
remarkable degree of autonomy." (Regional General Manager) 
"GMR (Transport) board of directors who were very closely knit and 
they wanted to keep Home Merchandise at arm's length, for their own 
personal reasons I think, because they liked the power. They knew that 
when they got closer to Home Shopping, they would lose a lot of the 
power they had as individuals." (Services Manager) 
5.4.10 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
GMR (Transport) had its own board of directors and they had a high 
degree of autonomy. GMR (Transport)'s head office was in Worcester whereas 
the Home Merchandise board was in Manchester. This physical separation 
reinforced a parochial and distant relationship between the two organisations 
and their operations. Home Merchandise's board sought to align the two 
organisations' operations. GMR (Transport)'s directors realised that this would 
lead to a loss of their power. Consequently, GMR (Transport)'s directors 
wanted to maintain their autonomy and keep Home Merchandise at arm's 
length. 
GMR (Transport)' s board did not accept that the organisation's autonomy 
needed to be reduced. (CTO_SOC # 5.19) 
5.4.11 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"(GMR (Transport)'s joint managing director) said to me 'we don't want 
the depot managers distracted by finance. We just want him to manage 
the operation and ensure productivity is right!"' (Regional General 
Manager) 
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"GMR (Transport)'s board of directors' ... philosophy was such that 
depot managers didn't need to understand what profit they were 
making." (Implementation Services Manager) 
"Nobody really took any interest at all about management accounts that 
we got out, and when I first went into the company as a manager of a 
transport, we used to get the accounts sent out to us every month and 
nobody ever looked at them. We'd just throw them aside and that was 
the end of it." (Depot Manager) 
"(Depot managers) had no idea whether they were making money, 
whether they were losing money, how much their drivers were costing, 
how much their claims were costing them. They didn't have any idea 
because the information was never sent to them ... so from the budgeting 
and accounting point of view, again a lot of them (depot managers) had 
to start from scratch . . . six years ago if you threw a set of accounts at 
them they wouldn't have a clue, and that's from a depot manager's point 
of view." (Personnel Manager) 
5.4.11 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The GMR (Transport) board let depot line managers have little, if any, 
useful information about the depots financial and operational performance. 
Information was withheld consciously by GMR (Transport)'s board, on the basis 
that they did not want depot managers to be isolated by financial aspects of the 
depot. Hence, depot managers were unaware of their depot's profit or loss 
position. Depot managers usually disregarded financial information sent from 
head office. They took little interest in their depot's budgets, as few managers 
had financial skills. The directors of GMR (Transport) had a deep-rooted belief 
that depot managers did not need to have information about the depot's financial 
situation. 
GMR (Transport)' s directors assumed that they could continue to provide line 
managers with inaccurate financial information or even withhold information. 
(CTO SOC# 5.20) 
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5.4.12 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"I suppose six years ago, a depot manager and his entire team would not 
have known what profit that depot was generating, and didn't know what 
its costs were in real terms. It wouldn't know what revenue it was 
receiving, therefore it wouldn't know what profit there was. All of that's 
changed and we've sought to bring all managers including parcel 
delivery managers into that debate. So that if they understand the 
business they can contribute to it." (Managing Director) 
"Six years ago, a depot manager didn't know what profit his depot was 
making. And if he was told, those figures were doctored before they got 
to him. So certainly a chunk of money was creamed off, so that some 
depot managers must have thought they were making a loss." (Services 
Manager) 
"They (depot managers) know exactly how much their fuel's costing 
them, their insurance, their vehicles, their drivers, their claims, their sub-
contractors, they know everything. And they get a full set of accounts, 
and they understand them now." (Personnel Manager) 
5.4.12 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Whereas the directors of GMR (Transport) did not provide depot line 
managers with information necessary for them to manage the depot, the new 
managing director and board accepted depot line managers should have this 
information. The new managing director and board wanted this to change so 
that the depot line managers contributed to the improvement of the parcel 
delivery process. These directors recognised the information needed to be in a 
form that line managers could use to manage their depot. The information also 
had to be detailed and accurate. 
Carton Carrier's directors accepted that the withholding of information from or 
providing incorrect information to line managers actually needed to be reversed 
so that they had detailed and accurate information. (CTO_SOC # 5.21) 
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5.4.13 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"And now, the first thing you ever write when you're writing an 
appraisal of the depot manager is to say that he is responsible for the 
profitable operation of his unit ... So a broadening of responsibility and I 
think a more onerous duty if you like, on the depot managers. We tend 
to regard the success or failure of a depot far more as a reflection of the 
depot manager than we used to ten years ago. 
I mean, we give them no end of information on how the depot is 
performing ... We tend to give a lot of information, a lot of which can be 
argued against, it's suspect." (Regional General Manager) 
"And in fairness a lot of the criteria that we (are) measured against, we 
had no control over. We can't control the profitability of the depots 
because the profitability's governed by what comes in to us, what our 
sales are basically, and we are told as managers, what that is going to be 
twelve months in advance. If it doesn't achieve that, then your costs go 
out of the window. Against a fixed budget, they don't reduce, but 
against the profitability of the company they do, because you're 
governed purely and simply by sales ... The only thing I would say that 
you know, they do still, I believe, on appraisals, judge you on things that 
you have no control over. And, like I said, I come back to sales. I can't 
do anything about sales. The system, the culture, the company doesn't 
allow me to go out and sell the product. So the product doesn't come 
into me. My fixed costs are out of my control as are the profits, and I 
think most managers that you talk to would feel that that is unfair. You 
are judged on that sort of criteria. 
We're not judged as depots on what we actually do, but we're judged as 
depots on what we're perceived to be doing because the information is 
created by the offices at Manchester, and it's their perception of what we 
do as against what we're actually doing. Now I know that there is fixes 
being put in to try and rectify that, but at the moment depot management 
feel that it's unfair, the way we're judged to be truthful." (Depot 
Manager) 
5.4.13 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Depot managers were previously not responsible for the profitability of 
their depot. This changed to where their responsibility for the depot profits is 
one of the key criteria they are appraised against. Yet, depot managers have 
little control over profits, as the depot's revenue is dependent upon the number 
of parcels routed through them, which in tum depends on customers orders 
received by Home Merchandise. Depot managers are prevented from going 
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directly to the marketplace to generate business. They also have little control 
over their depot's fixed costs. They have some control over variable costs such 
as fuel and the use of contract drivers during busy periods. However, variable 
costs are a small element of the overall depot profitability calculation. 
Carton Carrier's board considers the depot's performance to be a 
reflection of the depot manager. The board forms their opinion on the basis of 
incorrect information. Senior managers admit that the quality of depot 
performance information is suspect, and that depot managers' performance are 
judged on the basis of this suspect information. Depot managers feel it is unfair 
that the organisation holds them responsible for depot profitability. Nonetheless 
depot managers were willing to accept the change which made them responsible 
for depot profitability. 
Depot managers were willing to take on responsibility for their depot's 
profitability even though they had little control over the constituent elements, 
i.e. income and fixed costs. (CTO_SOC # 5.22) 
5.4.14 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"The major difference would be that in 1989, there were seven regions I 
believe, and we've reduced that to three regions. So we haven't 
delayered the management structure, we've actually just expanded the 
responsibility, while reducing the numbers of regions and regional 
managers. The other changes that we've brought about is, within each of 
the regions of which we've now got three, we have decentralised the 
functions from the true centre down to the general managers of each 
region. So you've got a Regional Personnel Manager, Regional 
Financial Information Manager, and a Regional Distribution Planner who 
looks after the round configuration. So again that was part of the 
migration from a Head Office autocracy to putting more of a local 
emphasis and feel to it." (Managing Director) 
"An additional level has gone in, and then clearly who didn't exist, like 
(the personnel manager) well she existed but not in this company. (The 
personnel manager) and her colleagues now report to me and then they 
have their dotted line reporting to their various functional people." 
(Regional General Manager) 
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"I report to the regional general manager. That's my solid reporting line, 
and my dotted line, if you like, has always been off to the Personnel 
Manager or the Director whoever it was at the time." (Personnel 
Manager) 
5.4.14 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The organisation had seven regional general managers, and reduced the 
number of regions to three. A new functional structure was introduced to assist 
the regional general managers. Support functions, such as human resources, 
finance, and distribution planning that resided centrally in Carton Carrier's head 
office were devolved to each region. The functional roles at each regional level 
are new, as there were no equivalent roles in GMR (Transport). The managers 
of these functions report primarily to the regional general manager, and have a 
dotted reporting line to their functional director at Carton Carrier's head office. 
The regional functional managers are responsible for the depots in their region. 
These changes have brought greater local control over the specialist functions 
into the hands of regional general managers. 
Carton Carrier reduced the number of regions and created regional functions to 
support the activities in the parcel delivery process. (CTO _SOC# 5.23) 
5.4.15 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"They used to have GMR (Transport)'s operations managed by seven 
regional managers . . . now I have the three regional general managers, 
two of them are now associate directors." (Managing Director) 
"My two regional general manager colleagues are both in fact, associate 
directors of the company, because they've been around a lot more years 
than I have." (Regional General Manager) 
"Regional general managers are also associate directors and again they 
are the manager of customer services, as associate directors." (IT Co-
ordinator) 
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5.4.15 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
As a result of the consolidation in the number of regions, four regional 
general managers left the organisation. Of the remaining three, two were 
appointed as associated directors. These regional general managers have greater 
control over the parcel delivery process, as they are responsible for profitability 
and customer satisfaction in their region. People at board level were also 
affected by the changes. This is evidence by directors leaving the organisation 
and new directors being appointed to the board. 
Board members and regional general managers were affected by the changes. 
(CTO_SOC # 5.24) 
E3 5.5 Issues managed 
5.5.1 A and 5.5.1 Bare located in the body of Chapter 5. 
5.5.2 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Certainly, one got the impression that there was a power struggle at the 
top. One (the chairman) won and the other two left the company. So 
certainly we're much more focused in one direction now." (Team 
Member) 
"Part of the way through that process, I took a change in responsibilities. 
I became operationally responsible for one half of the country, whilst the 
previous Head of Operations was confined to the other half of the 
country. 
We (the chairman and services director) then, after a period of about 
twelve months, went back and gave the operation back to the Head of 
Operations and I (services director) returned back to managing the 
Service side of the business." (Managing Director) 
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5.5.2 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
GMR (Transport) had its own rnanagmg directors, board and 
organisation structure. The board had three major personalities on it: the 
chairman and the two joint managing directors. The joint managing directors 
and the chairman had different views of the organisation's future. The joint 
managing directors wanted to maintain GMR (Transport)'s autonomy, whereas 
the chairman wanted to align the operations of Horne Merchandise and GMR 
(Transport). The joint managing directors attempted to maintain their position 
but the chairman's view prevailed. The chairman split managerial and 
operational control over the depots in two: those in the north of the country and 
those in the south. The existing joint managing director responsible for 
operations continued to control depots in the northern half of the country. The 
services director took control of depots in the southern half of the country. This 
was the first time the organisation had been split in such a way. 
Chairman won the power struggle against the existing joint managing directors, 
divided the depots into two groups and assigned operational control to different 
directors. (IM _SOC # 5 .26) 
5.5.3 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"That meant that I could take direct control of the whole of (the 
southern) half of the country in terms of system change and day-to-day 
operations, to demonstrate how the two could be fused together to 
produce the desired end results. And that was successful. It helped to 
speed up the integration (of systems and the) delivery process. 
(The Malharn) depot had a worse than average track record in terms of 
performance, and therefore the view was that if you could make that 
depot work, and function well, then when it carne to migration to the 
other 35 depots, you would have already encountered the worst 
problems. And so, rather than pick on a soft target, pick on a hard target. 
That way you got the maximum opportunity to see all the problems and 
feel more comfortable." (Managing Director) 
98 
"A lot of money was spent on this (Malham) depot to get it right because 
it was the model depot." (Depot Manager) 
5.5.3 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The service director was made responsible for proving the parcel 
delivery process could work in the depots located in the southern half of the 
country. He had to demonstrate that the parcel delivery process and system 
could be implemented together and produce benefits to the business. He proved 
that the parcel delivery process worked successfully in practice. He chose the 
Malham depot as the first to be redesigned because it faced a major crisis in 
terms of undelivered parcels and its performance had to be improved quickly. 
He wanted to prove the parcel delivery process and systems would work in a 
difficult depot and in this way, build up a degree of confidence and bring major 
difficulties and obstacles to the surface. 
The services director was given managerial and operational control over depots 
in the southern part of the country to prove that the parcel delivery process and 
systems could be implemented successfully. (IM_SOC # 5.27) 
5.5.4 A Conjoining first order constructs 
"He (the GMR (Transport) joint managing director) moved off to another 
company." (Team Member) 
"(After the joint managing directors left Carton Carrier) I then took 
control for the rest of the operation. I control all the Depot Operations. 
It becomes easier then, in terms of establishing a culture and a style in 
the business, because it's all coming forward. 
I think we had one board member leave, sorry we had two board 
members leave. One right back in the early days, which could well have 
been as a result of the different style of management. I was not involved 
in that process. It was right at the very outset, and I think there was a 
view that maybe his management style didn't suit the direction we were 
going to take. And we've had one director leave to set up business on 
his own . . . And then we obviously upset the guy who was running 
operations at the time, because he was the one who then left to start his 
own business." (Managing Director) 
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5.5.4 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
GMR (Transport)'s joint managing director's left the organisation. They 
did not agree with the direction the organisation was planning to take, namely to 
become more closely aligned to Home Merchandise. Once they left the 
chairman appointed the services director as managing director of Carton Carrier. 
He took control over the depot operations for all of Carton Carrier's depots. He 
was then in a position to introduce the changes to parcel delivery process. He 
controlled the budgetary aspects of the change and was able to invest significant 
sums to get the first depot working effectively. 
Existing joint managing directors left the organisation and a new managing 
director was appointed. (IM _SOC # 5 .28) 
5.5.5 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"And so he (the chairman) came to see me and said 'Why did I think it 
had gone under', and I said 'GMR (Transport) head office have taken 
away all our flexibility'. As depot managers, you did have a bit of 
flexibility, you could duck and dive a little bit, and sort of get parcels out 
this way, that way and the other. But then head office brought in certain 
rigid rules and you couldn't do anything. You just had to do exactly 
what they told you. And one of the rigid rules were that we had to 
deliver 'next day parcels', i.e. TNT, without fail on that day. And 
because of the structure of TNT in those days, every single parcel that 
came to this depot on that day was a 'time critical' parcel. It isn't any 
more. We can get 'time critical' parcels that are - well we can get 
parcels coming from TNT that are two days and three days old, or three 
day deliveries. So we've got flexibility, we never had in those days. 
Every parcel that came into us was 'time critical'. 
I said to him (Group chairman) 'You've taken away our flexibility' and 
he said 'Why?', and I said, 'Well because of TNT', and he said 'Well 
we're not going to do it any more'. And I nearly fell off my chair. 
Because it had altered. There was the Chairman of the company telling 
me that we're not going to do what I've been told by the managing 
directors that 'you will do'. And his view was higher than the managing 
directors, so I believed him." (Depot Manager) 
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5.5.5 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The chairman went personally to Malham depot to discover the reasons 
behind the crisis namely, 82,000 undelivered parcels in the depot and 27 fully 
laden trailers lining the road outside the depot. The chairman asked the depot 
manager for his analysis. The depot manager explained that rigid operational 
rules, imposed by GMR (Transport) head office, were the main cause of the 
backlog of undelivered parcels. 
The chairman bypassed GMR (Transport)'s board and issued instructions 
which countermanded operational rules imposed by them. His actions signalled 
that he was willing to be involved directly in depot operations. GMR 
(Transport)'s board operated with a great deal of autonomy. The chairman's 
intervention challenged GMR (Transport)'s autonomy, and in effect questioned 
the degree of control exercised by the joint managing director who was 
responsible for operations. 
The chairman was willing to understand the reasons for the cns1s and be 
involved directly to resolve the crisis. (IM _SOC # 5 .29) 
5.5.6 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"It's more centralised on one person now. If you put the directors into 
three piles. The one pile would be enormous (in terms of the numbers of 
directors), the second pile would be probably be Tim Lot (Carton 
Carrier's managing director) and (the commercial director) and (the 
warehouse director), and the other pile would be just Alex Hammond 
(the chairman) on his own." (Services Manager) 
"About five years ago, around 1989, Alex Hammond became the 
chairman of the Home Merchandise, and he brought with him some 
directors, and (the commercial director), and one of them - (the 
warehouse director) another, Carton Carrier's managing director is 
another . . . the power base seemed to go to (them) then." (Depot 
Manager) 
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5.5.6 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Towards the end of 1989, a new chairman was appointed to Carton 
Carrier. Within eighteen months he replaced many GMR (Transport) board 
members with people from Home Merchandise's board. The chairman, Carton 
Carrier's managing director, and a small number of directors took control of the 
organisation. They formed a powerful alliance and consolidated their position in 
the organisation. 
The chairman and key directors consolidated their position in the organisation. 
(IM_SOC # 5.30) 
5.5.7 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"There's real decision taking now in regions compared to what there 
used to be ... there is no doubt about it, that compared to when I was a 
Regional Manager in '86, compared to since I've been a Regional 
Manager in '94, there is much more power down as far as regional level. 
The team of eight or nine people in the regions wield very considerable 
amounts of power, if only on a day-to-day basis." (Regional General 
Manager) 
"Regional Managers are also associate directors and again they are the 
manager of customer services, as associate directors." (Team Member) 
"I think the Regional Manager's status has improved dramatically. I 
think two of them are now associate directors. Well, they are, two of 
them are associate directors. So that has changed. They've become 
much higher levels of status within the company." (Depot Manager) 
5.5.7 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Regional general managers and regional functional managers gained 
greater operational control, status and power over the parcel delivery process. 
They take most of the day-to-day decisions that affect the operations of their 
regiOn. 
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Board devolved operational control of the parcel delivery process to regional 
general managers and the regional functional managers. (IM_SOC # 5.31) 
5.5.8 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We've sought to have far greater participation in that objective (service 
quality and profitability), by gradually delegating responsibility, 
increasing accountability through the structure, and we've had to do that 
from the top down point of view . . . people are accountable for 
performance, each tier within the management structure has to be able to 
take on board that accountability and then obviously influence the results 
they've achieved." (Managing Director) 
"Every month now, we are measured on what we've achieved; whether 
we've made our budget, whether we haven't, whether our costs have 
increased." (Depot Manager) 
5.5.8 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board wanted people at all levels to participate in the fulfilment of 
the business objectives of customer service and profitability. They wanted 
people to be accountable, and therefore began measuring their performance in 
terms of customer service and profitability. They expanded and clarified 
regional general managers' responsibilities to include profitability and service 
levels achieved by depots in their region. Depot managers and assistant depot 
managers, in tum, were made responsible for depot profitability and service 
levels to customers of their depot. This was a significant increase in depot line 
managers' primary responsibilities. 
Responsibility for profitability and service quality cascaded from directors to 
regional general managers to depot managers to assistant depot managers and 
parcel delivery managers. (IM_SOC # 5.32) 
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5.5.9 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Where once a month, the (depot) manager will meet with either his 
immediate superiors or someone up the chain, and will really then 
analyse in detail the performance financially, and terms of quality of 
service of the depot, and talk about any other issues that need raising. 
And again, that's perhaps happened in the last five or six years." 
(Services Manager) 
"The regional general manager is very much his own boss, responsible 
for all the financial performance, the financial figures. But prior to 1988, 
they were filtered down to depot level, were virtually meaningless. The 
depot managers are now called very much to account for their own 
financial performance, and have become very good at it; in terms of the 
service performance, we are sharpening that up, but they are held 
responsible for that as well." (Regional General Manager) 
"They (depot managers) didn't have any idea, because the information 
was never sent to them. So regional general managers embarked on this 
process of Cost and Performance meetings. So from the budgetary and 
accounting point of view, again a lot of depot managers had to start from 
scratch. Some of them had been doing their own sort of accounting 
system, so they knew roughly whether they were making any money or 
not, but others just wouldn't have a clue really. All they would know 
was whether or not they had any parcels in the depot and that was it. 
And that has now been developed to an nth degree, if you like. They 
know exactly how much their fuel's costing them, their insurance, their 
vehicles, their drivers, their claims, their sub-contractors, they know 
everything. And depot managers get a full set of accounts, and they 
understand them now ... they're not just sort of depot managers any 
more, because the assistant managers basically run the show on a day-to-
day basis." (Personnel Manager) 
5.5.9 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Regional general managers became more open and willing to share depot 
performance and financial information. They had budgetary responsibilities 
devolved to them, and they in tum, devolved these to depot managers and 
assistant depot managers. Regional general managers explained the new 
budgetary procedures to depot line managers so that they could take ownership 
of these. Regional general managers explained to depot line managers the 
financial and service performance targets to be achieved by their depot. Depot 
managers were provided with detailed budgetary information, e.g. full sets of 
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depot accounts and a breakdown of their costs. Regional general managers also 
monitored depot performance through monthly cost and performance meetings. 
The purpose of these meetings was to analyse, in detail, the depots financial and 
service quality performance and to discuss other managerial issues that needed 
to be resolved. 
Regional general managers devolved responsibility for budgets to and shared 
financial information with line managers. (IM_SOC # 5.33) 
5.5.10 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"A good example is, when all the managers in one region would sit 
round the table and they'd all share their experiences and discuss the cost 
and performance of their depots. That didn't happen before. They 
probably rarely saw their neighbouring depot managers." (Services 
Manager) 
"And they have regular personnel meetings. They have, if you like, a 
dotted line responsibility into Jim Plant in the personnel department. 
And they are every two months or so, personnel meetings which they go 
to, work study and yes, finance, but not quite to the same degree with 
finance. They have regular meetings as well across the three regions." 
(Regional General Manager) 
5.5.10 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Functional experts and depot line managers in one depot or region met 
their counterparts in other depots and regions to share operational experiences 
and to discuss their depot's performance. For example, the personnel managers 
from the three regions meet regularly. Line managers hold meetings to 
exchange structured information with people in the parcel delivery process, e.g. 
depot managers meet their line manager and other depot managers. 
People, from function and line management positions, in different regions and 
depots met each other to share information. (IM_SOC # 5.34) 
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5.5.11 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"But initia~ly the financial information needed to be (a) more 
comprehensive, and (b) more accessible, ... so we put a lot of time and 
effort into training our managers to understand costs, running in profit, 
and controlling the financial side of the business." (Managing Director) 
"This was like a Head Office rule. And you could never tell a depot 
manager what his profit was. Now you can." (Services Manager) 
"In fact, if I can remember that far back, the information we received 
about our profitability as a depot was very very limited." (Depot 
Manager) 
"The depot managers had no idea whether they were making money, 
whether they were losing money, how much their drivers were costing 
them, how much their claims costing them." (Personnel Manager) 
5.5.11 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The chairman and key directors recognised that people at all levels of the 
parcel delivery process needed access to financial and performance information 
that related to the parcel delivery process. By giving people in the depots 
information they began to understand the effects of their actions upon the 
business, so that they better managed their activity within the process. Other 
board members supported a more open attitude to sharing process-related 
financial and performance information. Board members accepted that they 
would discuss a depot's 'real' financial situation with the regional general 
managers and depot manager. The quality of financial information provided to 
people in the parcel delivery process was improved substantially. It was also 
made more accessible and comprehensible for depot line managers. Financial 
figures were no longer doctored by head office, for example, income figures 
were reported accurately and costs allocated by head office were made 
transparent. Depot line managers could begin to rely on the financial 
performance statistics they received. 
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Board and regional general managers accepted that the quality, accessibility, and 
reliability of process-related information would be improved. (IM_SOC # 5.35) 
5.5.12 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We (depot managers) went through a great learning curve with the 
accounts. Fortunately for me, I did a course on accountancy, so it helped 
when I went to business college when I came out of the police force. So 
I knew a bit about accountancy. But a lot of the blokes, in all fairness, 
haven't really got a great perception, and whilst we haven't got to be 
accountants, we do know where the money goes and where it doesn't 
now. So a lot of that training's going on. I think when they implement 
things now, the depots, they do consider that we've got to be trained, up 
front training." (Depot Manager) 
"Learning how to understand cost and performance; that was a big 
change. When the managers discussed the performance, the depots in 
terms of profit, it tends not to be in the same way that an accountant 
would, but they certainly realise the effect of revenue, various costs, and 
overheads . . . we had a management course actually, which was... I 
forget what it was called ... but the theme of the course was 'How to 
communicate with accountants'. And that course was partly explaining 
about GMR, and the way it accounted for things, and also just teaching 
technical issues like ratio analysis, profit and loss, and things like that." 
(Services Manager) 
5.5.12 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Training specialists in the training department developed a programme to 
teach depot managers the financial aspects of managing their depot, e.g. 
budgeting, accounting skills, and financial analysis techniques such as ration 
analysis. This training was provided concurrently with making financial 
information available. Depot managers faced a steep learning curve because few 
had received formal training previously or had any financial related training. 
Depot and assistant depot managers were trained to understand financial 
accounts and budgets, and were willing to learn about managing depot finances. 
(IM_SOC # 5.36) 
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5.5.13 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"(Home Merchandise) people started to question the whole package that 
was being offered to (their) customers who clearly, within that market 
research, indicated that there was a degree of dissatisfaction for 
customers with worries about the length of time it took to deliver parcels. 
And may be more critically, the inconsistency in that time between 
placement of order and receipt of goods ... The consistency of delivery 
time, whilst next day delivery would have been ideal, most customers 
were satisfied with delivery being within the week. As long as that was 
on a consistent basis . . . The processing of the order, the sanctioning, the 
production of the despatch note, the sending of the order, are all earlier 
stages of that process which themselves would be subject to delays and 
inconsistency. And so the group, conscious of that, decided to seek those 
measurings (sic) of different elements ofit." (Managing Director) 
5.5.13 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Home Merchandise carried out market research to identify customers' 
expectations of its service. The research highlighted that customers were 
unhappy with the length of time taken to receive goods once they had placed an 
order with Home Merchandise. In addition to the total length of time, customers 
were also unhappy with delivery consistency. Findings from the market 
research led the chairman and directors to question the service levels offered by 
Home Merchandise and Carton Carrier. Home Merchandise measured each 
activity performed by Home Merchandise and Carton Carrier. Home 
Merchandise's activities included taking orders from individual customers, 
assembling orders, packing each parcel in the order, handling customer billing, 
and sending packaged parcels to Carton Carrier. The activities undertaken by 
Carton Carrier included activities such as sorting, delivering, recording delivery 
details and tracking parcels. 
Directors undertook a customer survey from which they identified that 
customers were dissatisfied with the service and that they wanted consistent 
delivery periods within an overall delivery time of a week. (IM_SOC # 5.37) 
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5.5.14 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We put a team of people into this particular depot and members of the 
board gave this team of people who were assembled a variety of 
backgrounds, the task of finding ways of actually bringing about this 
control." (Managing Director) 
"We had this, as I called them 'the magnificent seven', which was seven 
managers from services area, work study, and head office. (The Services 
Manager) was one of them, who came here, they were here for three 
months and we went through every aspect of the company." (Depot 
Manager) 
"So when we started SMS six years ago, seven of us from services, 
systems and work study were thrown together and told to find a way of 
controlling the delivery process." (Services Manager) 
5.5.14 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Carton Carrier created a cross-functional team with responsibility for 
designing the parcel delivery process. This team reported to the services 
director, who controlled the depots in the southern half of the country. The 
cross functional team included people from the services function, work study, 
depot operations, and systems areas, and was led by a person from the services 
function. The chairman and the services director gave the team a mandate to 
find ways of controlling delivery consistency across the parcel delivery process. 
This mandate placed the customer's expectation of consistent delivery times at 
the centre of the redesign, and it created a space within which the team could 
question existing assumptions within the organisation. 
Carton Carrier's board set up a cross functional team, led by a person from the 
service function, with a mandate to design the parcel delivery process. 
(IM_SOC # 5.38) 
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5.5.15 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"(The cross functional team) were able to come up with a process which, 
in principle terms satisfied the requirements we were looking for from a 
service point of view and, from a control point of view. That was simply 
to break every delivery round into delivery sectors, on average 10-12 
sectors per round." (Managing Director) 
"(Drivers might deliver) forty parcels to farms in the middle of Scotland 
or it could be two hundred and forty parcels to a housing estate in 
Manchester." (Services Manager) 
"The fundamental change, SMS for example. A driver is taking out a 
number of ten standard hours worth of parcels. In that process we're 
making sure he comprehensively does the geographical area. Now the 
driver previously, could say, 'I'll take that parcel, that one and that one', 
and select 180 that he felt like doing that day. We took that control away 
from the driver and through the SMS system given it to the manager. So 
the manager says 'This is where I want you to go'. And I think that's 
such a fundamental change. That wasn't just tinkering. That was saying 
to the drivers 'Look you have decided what you were going to do long 
enough. We're now going to decide, in the interest of the company, 
what you should be doing'." (Services Manager) 
5.5.16 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The cross functional team designed the parcel delivery process to ensure 
customers received their parcel in a consistent delivery period and managers 
gained control over the parcel delivery process. The parcel delivery process 
required drivers to deliver parcels for ten standard hours per day within a sector. 
All parcels for a sector had to be delivered prior to the driver returning to the 
depot. Line managers decided which sectors drivers delivered to, based upon 
the number of parcels for that particular sector. The principles of the parcel 
delivery process challenged a number of operational assumptions; especially, 
allowing drivers to decide which parcels they delivered, letting line managers 
concern themselves only with the quantity of parcels that remained in the depot 
rather than service quality, and permitting drivers to return to the depot with 
undelivered parcels. 
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Cross functional team challenged existing operational assumptions made by 
directors, managers and drivers. (IM_SOC # 5.39) 
5.5.16 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"The approach that we took was that we felt there was a need to change 
the way the depots were managed, controlled. We didn't know how to 
do it so the idea was that we would select a depot and appoint people to 
have a look at the operation within that depot and to make 
recommendations as to how it could be improved. To actually convert 
those recommendations into practice within that depot so that before we 
took changes anywhere else, they would be tried and tested in one depot. 
And that parcel would have a unique identity in the system, and could 
therefore be tracked ... through the process (and) systems. 
We then moved the systems, the delivery systems, attached to every 
parcel going through an identifier which linked it into that particular 
sector, and then to measure the work content of those sectors on the basis 
of the length of rounds from sectors with a guarantee that we could 
service every sector within that round at least once every three rounds. 
Whilst at the same time guaranteeing a minimum of ten standard hours 
worth of work every working day to the drivers who were responsible for 
that round." (Managing Director) 
"(The process is based upon) a neighbourhood scheme which is a round 
set out into usually ten neighbourhoods, where you could plan the 
neighbourhoods for the driver, i.e. today the driver would go out on A, 
B, C and D. And tomorrow he'd go out onE, F, G and H. And we 
would cover the whole sector within three working days. That was on 
SMS 1." (Assistant Depot Manager) 
"(The IT) system records every individual parcel as it goes through the 
delivery system." (IT Co-ordinator) 
Unit: Refers to: 
Depots Between 10 - 80 rounds 
Teams Usually ten drivers managed by Parcel Delivery 
Managers 
Rounds Drivers' delivery areas made up ofNeighbourhoods I 
Sectors 
Sector(s) Single or groups ofNeighbourhoods 
Neighbourhoods Groups of postcodes or subdivisions of postcode sectors. 
Table A: Source: Extracted from the Delivery Management System 
Handbook 
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5.5.16 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board recognised that the way in which depots were managed and 
controlled needed to change. They appointed a cross functional team to 
recommend ways of bringing depots under control. This team studied the 
operations of one depot, and designed and documented a future state model of 
the parcel delivery process. They identified three principles for the parcel 
delivery process. First, the parcel delivery process would ensure regular 
coverage, defined to be every three days, of each neighbourhood. Second, the 
locus of the parcel delivery process would be individual parcels, with each one 
uniquely identified and linked to a particular sector. Third, the measurement of 
a unit of work would be the time required to deliver each individual parcel and 
each driver would be given ten standard hours of work for their round. In 
addition to these principles, the team also documented the managerial, 
operational and systems aspects of the parcel delivery process. This included 
redefining terminology used in the organisation, e.g. neighbourhoods, sectors, 
and rounds. The cross functional team and line managers from the depot piloted 
the parcel delivery process to ensure the changes led to the anticipated 
performance improvements in practice. The directors wanted the proposed 
parcel delivery process to be tried and tested in one depot prior to its 
implementation in other depots. 
Cross functional team and line managers identified the principles of the future 
parcel delivery process, designed the managerial, operational and systems 
aspects of the process, and proved it worked prior to implementing it in other 
depots. (IM_SOC # 5.40) 
5.5.17 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We have had to address the question of a quality of service in people's 
minds, and really their understanding of how they can influence that. 
What they're accountable for. And that has meant that all managers have 
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had to be capa?le. o~, appraising the people that work for them, against 
them type of cntena. (Managing Director) 
"Three and a half years ago, when I was in Leeds, they certainly started 
the appraisa.ls. They started to be more formalised. Again each depot got 
the appropnate, the company-wide appraisal documentation ... so now 
everybody in the management role is appraised on the same basis, ... 
using the same set of instructions and the same documentation." {Team 
Member) 
"We had no criteria originally, other than the managers' feelings, and 
that's why, in a sense I think, sort of certainly why everybody just got up 
to grade at the end of the year. And to some extent that still happens. It 
certainly, you see it occasionally in depots. And that has been in a lot of 
depots resolved, and is being resolved in others by use of this appraisal 
training. But we didn't have any formal criteria at all. Now we have 
performance criteria based on claims for missing parcels, complaints, 
delivery volume, pence per parcel, if you like. So we can make 
assessments of performance based on all the traditional measures, 
whether it be cost or quality of service." {IT Co-ordinator) 
"But quantity is only one of the criteria now, whereas six years ago, it 
probably would have been the only one. And the only time you knew 
you had a bad driver was when things were absolutely totally disgusting. 
If a driver gets a clean sheet on all five of those headings, then he 
qualifies for a bonus for that week quantity, and quality, in terms of 
complaints, claims, poor delivery service." (Implementation Services 
Manager) 
"This agreement, which supersedes all earlier incentive agreements, is 
intended to establish the conditions under which a new payment 
structure, incorporating incentive payments related to measured 
productivity is being introduced for the parcel delivery drivers of GMR 
{Transport)/Carton Carrier." (Source: Trade union I Carton Carrier 
agreement document - Parcel delivery incentive scheme negotiations, 
1990) 
5.5.17 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board wanted people at all levels to be accountable for service 
quality. A formal appraisal system was established, which included criteria 
linked to the quality of service and financial performance expected from the 
parcel delivery process. These criteria included minimal claims due to missing 
parcels, customer complaints, and delivery volumes. Carton Carrier developed a 
set of appraisal documentation for company-wide use to ensure people were 
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appraised on the same basis. The chairman and directors recognised line 
managers needed to be capable of appraising people's performance. Each 
regional personnel department introduced the documentation to the line 
managers in their region. Criteria against which drivers would be assessed were 
introduced for the first time and these were incorporated in the new payment 
structure agreed with the trade union. 
Carton Carrier developed an appraisal system with criteria linked to the parcel 
delivery process. (IM_SOC # 5.41) 
5.5.18 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"The personnel departments in the regions ... they were pressured to keep 
the appraisals on course and at the right time, and there were the 
occasional visits to depots by personnel department to check with the 
actual appraisees to make sure that they had had their appraisals. And 
the whole thing got put on a more formal footing." (Team Member) 
"We've had to develop the depot managers and the assistant managers 
particularly, into actually developing their skills to do appraisals and 
taking the right approach, the right sort of questions to open up the 
interviews." (Personnel Manager) 
5.5.18 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Senior managers in Carton Carrier ensured the appraisal system was 
operationalised. They pressurised line managers from the regional personnel 
department to visit depots to check that appraisals were actually being carried 
out. Regional personnel managers reviewed personnel files, asked appraisees 
whether or not they had had their appraisal, and ensured the correct 
documentation had been used. They coached depot managers and assistant 
depot managers to develop their skills to carry out appraisals. 
Regional personnel managers monitored the appraisal system. (IM_SOC # 5.42) 
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5.5.19 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"If we hadn't had that agreement with the unions, we would have been 
back to square one before we even started, because we would not have 
been able to progress very far without changing the Bonus Scheme and 
the way that we wanted to operate the drivers as far as planning their 
day's work for them." (Personnel Manager) 
"The workforce in some depots, will only ever do things that are agreed 
by the union. So that was very important to us that the union should be 
aware of what was happening, because again if we're making a change, 
we're making it for good. At least until the next new change comes 
along. What we're not going to do is put a system in and then have the 
union say 'Oh we didn't agree to this'. 'Failure to agree, take it out'." (IT 
Co-ordinator) 
"This final version of the (work measured incentive) scheme has been 
agreed following a series of negotiating meetings by the 
Company/Trades Union Parcel Drivers Committee and is unanimously 
recommended by that committee for introduction into the parcel depots 
of the Company." (Source: Trade union I Carton Carrier agreement 
document- Parcel delivery incentive scheme negotiations, 1990) 
"If the manager and their unions have said 'Look we've gone through 
this, and it's OK. We think it's a good idea. It's a good step forward', 
then change gets accepted more readily." (Services Manager) 
5.5.19 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Carton Carrier's drivers were members of a trade union. Hence, Carton 
Carrier had to seek the union's support for changes to drivers' payment terms 
and conditions. Carton Carrier could not have avoided negotiating with the 
trade union because the union could have the changes reversed and many drivers 
only acted once the union agreed. Negotiations with the drivers unions began in 
about 1989. The purpose of the negotiations was to change drivers' terms and 
conditions such that they would be paid on the basis of the number of parcels 
they delivered in a standard ten-hour day, rather than the traditional two hundred 
parcels per driver per day. Once the company and trade union reached 
agreement, depot line managers and union representatives informed drivers that 
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their overall performance would be measured on the basis of service quality 
criteria and number of parcels delivered in a standard day. Depot managers and 
parcel delivery managers explained to drivers that service quality criteria 
required them to minimise the number of complaints, volume of claims, number 
of late deliveries, and poor delivery service. 
Carton Carrier directors accepted that they had to negotiate with the trade union 
to change drivers' pay conditions. (IM_SOC # 5.43) 
5.5.20 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Relationships with trade unions down here are pretty cordial, and I've 
never had, in ten years down here (a southern region) .. .I've never had a 
real nose to nose with the trade union, not like I had up north. We've 
never had a strike in the south, compared to up north .... Liverpool! I 
remember a Trade Union officer coming to us (and saying) 'If people 
didn't do what the trade union wanted in Liverpool, the employers didn't 
meet the union requirements, they'd drive them off Merseyside!' And 
that is what this union officer said to me." (Regional General Manager) 
"Subsequent to the Malham changeover, I went to Liverpool because 
they were going to implement (similar changes to Malham). At 
Liverpool they had a strong union, and they didn't want it all because (1) 
it controlled them and (2) they perceived that it was going to stop them 
thieving, although it doesn't necessarily stop them thieving, it does 
control them a bit more. And Liverpool was going to go on strike ... and 
it was very, very difficult with the workforce in Liverpool... The 
Liverpool blokes basically didn't understand, didn't want to understand. 
They were ruled by the shop stewards, and we didn't have that problem 
here (at the Malham depot). I think that the shop stewards, because 
traditionally they don't like change, I'm not saying (this of) all shop 
stewards or all union people but certainly in this company they are 
frightened of change. The unions are worried because they perceive that 
it is going to do something to their power base, or they're going to lose 
money. And it was very difficult to convince them they were not going 
to lose money but they were going to do their job properly." (Depot 
Manager) 
116 
5.5.20 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
In spite of trade union agreement and support for the new payment terms 
and conditions, a number of individual shop stewards and trade union officials in 
the depots went against the implementation of the changes. On several 
occasions, implementation team members, for example, depot managers and 
regional general managers in whose depots and regions the process had been 
implemented, stood up to the stewards and officials. 
Implementation team members were willing to withstand pressure from shop 
stewards not to implement the parcel delivery process. (IM_SOC # 5.44) 
5.5.21 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"While the directors faded away, one by one, they left the company, I 
think most of them have now gone entirely." (Services Manager) 
"I think they've driven the depots very very hard over five years to get to 
the level we are now, and it's worked but there's been a lot of pain 
through it. We've lost a lot by the wayside. A lot of people don't feel 
that they could keep up with it. We've lost managers, certainly we've 
lost a lot of driving staff. In all categories we've lost - either they 
couldn't accept change or they didn't like the way it was going. But 
certainly a few have fallen by the wayside over the last few years ... 
Quite a lot. We're talking hundreds. The turnover at Malham 
traditionally, and the London depots traditionally has been very high. 
Off the top of my head I wouldn't like to tell you the exact figure, but I 
would say it's certainly in excess of four hundred over the last four years 
have been through our books, like the staff. Not four hundred 
management, don't get me wrong there, but the vast majority were 
drivers in the depots." (Depot Manager) 
"But I think the case of drivers and first line managers, the chaps who 
were nearer retirement who were either having trouble taking in the 
change to a system which hadn't changed for twenty years, or were 
uncomfortable with the new or certainly line management of having to 
manage people rather than just hide away there in an office and take 
some figures every time the driver came in. I think we found a very 
small number of people that couldn't adapt to the change. In most cases, 
in fact, we did ... the examples I'm thinking of ... we found them a less 
demanding role or they left." {Team Member) 
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5.5.21 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
People from different levels of the organisation left during the 
implementation of the parcel delivery process. At senior management levels, the 
joint managing directors and four regional general managers left the 
organisation. At depot management levels a smaller number left. At the level of 
drivers a large number left the organisation. The reasons for people's departure 
vary. Some people left as they were unwilling to accept the changes. The joint 
managing directors and some drivers fall into this category. Other people were 
unable to meet the new service quality criteria laid down in the parcel delivery 
process, and they left the organisation voluntarily, took early retirement or were 
sacked. 
People unwilling to accept the changes or unable to meet the required standards 
after being trained left voluntarily or were sacked. (IM_SOC # 5.45) 
5.5.22 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"It was decided we should share computers with Home Merchandise, and 
so the system started to change ... putting in computer systems, major 
change. I don't think we had the skills at the time. We learned them 
very quickly, designing the systems." (Services Manager) 
"Pre SMS, we had two computers in the depot, linked by one wire and 
they would be linked by another wire into part of a mainframe (Head 
Office whereas the depots used) an old Apricot machine like a megabyte 
of memory machine (to tally the volume of parcels that flowed through 
the depot) everything was just pure volume. On a daily basis, we would 
say we had X amount came in, X amount went out, X amount left." (IT 
Co-ordinator) 
5.5.22 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Carton Carrier recognised it had insufficient financial resources to 
develop information systems that met the requirements of the parcel delivery 
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process. The previous board attempted to develop information systems on a 
limited budget, and these attempts produced inadequate information systems. 
People in the IT department, through poor training over the years, had 
inappropriate and outdated technical skills. This is evidenced by the low level 
of information systems in the organisation. Few, in any, of the information 
systems experts had managed the installation of a major new IT application. 
Carton Carrier's board recognised that the organisation had inadequate financial 
resources and poorly skilled people to develop the information systems required 
to support the parcel delivery process. (IM _SOC # 5 .46) 
5.5.23 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Since then all our systems have been designed and loaded on to the mail 
order mainframes, and this has allowed us a lot more freedom in 
designing systems because we've got a massive computer capacity which 
is available to us. At the same time, the computer programmers were 
absorbed into Home Merchandise, so Carton Carrier doesn't employ 
anybody who's an IT specialist. We buy those services now from Home 
Merchandise." (Services Manager) 
{The service department) then monitor(s) the progress of the computer 
department to make sure they deliver within agreed timescales, and 
setting out projects, specifying them and then monitoring the progress 
and ensuring that delivery was on time . . . we ourselves now have a 
budget which we can spend on the different areas, to the different 
computer departments, and we work with them. We buy their services, 
but we do, we buy their services off them, on behalf of our own 
customers, the depots and the other departments. So that's a role which 
never really existed." {IT Co-ordinator) 
5.5.23 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Carton Carrier's board accepted that computer hardware and software 
should be compatible with Home Merchandise. The board outsourced Carton 
Carrier's computer systems, IT department and future IT developments to Home 
Merchandise's IT department. Although Carton Carrier outsourced its systems 
to Home Merchandise, they retain control over the budget for information 
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systems, and could specify, prioritise, monitor and control each IT development 
being carried out by Home Merchandise. The services department held the IT 
budget and act on behalf of their customers namely, depots and other Carton 
Carrier departments. 
Carton Carrier outsourced its computer department and future information 
systems developments to Home Merchandise's IT function, but retained control 
over the information systems budget and development schedule. (IM_ SOC # 
5.47) 
5.5.24 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We had to spend a fair bit of time elevating the role of the Service 
Departments within the business and converting it from being 
operationally driven, very powerful from the Operations point of view, to 
being a more service organisation without making the operators feel 
threatened by that process. So that was the path that we embarked 
upon.'' (Managing Director) 
"We've invented whole areas of responsibility, particularly in terms of 
(systems) development and implementation. Services department of 
which I am a part, started off really as one of the computer departments, 
and we've developed the responsibility originally of interpreting the 
requirements of the users, the depots, and the various other departments 
into something that they, Home Merchandise's computer department, 
could understand . . . And (the services department) developed to a 
general project (management) role where, if you like, the departments 
and internal Consultancy, where we identify problems and suggest 
solutions. And we canvass every other department, and every other part 
of the business for requirements, needs, wants, or suggest needs and 
wants to them that we then go away and develop solutions to." (IT Co-
ordinator) 
5.5.24 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The service department lacked credibility in the eyes of depot line 
managers. Traditionally line managers in depots and finance had greater 
influence over operational decisions than people from the service department 
did. Directors felt that a continuation of people in the service department being 
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perceived as less influential by people in operational departments a potential 
stumbling block to implementation to the parcel delivery process. Yet directors 
did not want the service department to assume control over operational areas, as 
this would result in operations people feeling threatened or withdrawing their 
support for the implementation of the parcel delivery process. The service 
department designed the detailed systems requirements for the parcel delivery 
process, and identified potential systems solutions with input from depot line 
managers and people from Home Merchandise's computer department. As 
individual information system developments were approved and prioritised, the 
service department specified the project plan and monitored its progress through 
to implementation. The service department took on the responsibility for 
managing the interface between Carton Carrier and Home Merchandise's IT 
department, ensuring they delivered each system on schedule. 
The managing director raised the service department's profile m the 
organisation. (IM _SOC # 5 .48) 
5.5.25 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Well this year's IT project is £2.7 million. And the capital project for 
this year is about £1.2 million . . . in addition, there would be major 
projects, for example, our plan is to give all the drivers hand-held 
computers. That would not be part of the normal annual budget. That 
would be a one-off project. We've probably spent ten million pounds on 
sortation centres which are computer controlled ... We've got systems 
where we have Ordinance Survey maps digitised for whole country. . .. 
We've designed and built in some systems which are state of the art, the 
way we plan our drivers' rounds for example. We spent a lot of time and 
money designing a system to do that." (Services Manager) 
"We've sought to justify investment in the IT area, and we've been very 
successful in that. However, as any business will recognise, it's an 
ongoing process. We continue to develop our information technology 
systems." (Managing Director) 
"Carton Carrier's has invested in its sorting and distribution systems." 
(Source: GMR pic Annual Accounts) 
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5.5.25 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Carton Carrier invested substantial sums of money in the development of 
new systems. The amounts invested warranted a mention in the GMR Group's 
annual accounts. According to press reports, Carton Carrier invested over £80 
million over the previous five years (1989 - 1994) in state-of-the-art sorting, 
routing, tracing and tracking technology. IT specialists in Home Merchandise 
and the service department in Carton Carrier installed local area networks in 36 
depots and about 400 personal computers across all depots. This ensured people 
in the parcel delivery process had electronic access to information. Home 
Merchandise's IT specialists developed bespoke applications to support the 
parcel delivery manager's ability to plan drivers' rounds. They developed a 
bespoke software application to calculate the number and type of deliveries 
made on a round within a standard ten-hour day. A key variable in this 
calculation is the type of delivery because this affects the 'drop' time, i.e. the 
time required to deliver a parcel. For example, a delivery to an apartment on the 
25th floor of a tower block takes longer than a delivery to a semi-detached house 
on a suburban street. This application recognises the type of delivery address 
(semi-structured residence, apartment in a tower block, etc.), adds the time for 
each delivery, calculates the approximate time to driver between addresses, and 
suggests the number of parcels to be delivered in a standard ten-hour day. From 
the driver's perspective, the revised bonus scheme reflects the time difference 
between delivering a parcel to, say, a tower block than to a house on the street. 
Carton Carrier bought standard, off-the-shelf packages, which saved 
development time. Examples include Mosaic, a demographics package and the 
use of standard bar-coding technology to track parcels all the way through the 
delivery process. 
Directors invested substantial amounts in information systems, including the 
development of a small number of bespoke applications. (IM _SOC# 5.49) 
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5.5.26 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We te~ded to. do it in 'delivery per year'. So rather than just go away 
and design a big system, put it in and set it up, systems are evolving year 
by year. We found that easier for us to design. It's easy to take account 
of a changing company. It's also easy for the operators to absorb it then. 
(Now) we've got computers everywhere." (Services Manager) 
"Fairly primitive in terms of lack of computerisation." (Managing 
Director) 
"The developments to some extent outstripped the implementation, so 
while some of the Depots were on SMS 1, we developed SMS2, and so 
some of the Depots jumped straight in at SMS2. Then while that was 
developed some of them then jumped into, moved to SMS3. We've just 
been implementing a sort of an upgrade, SMS3.5, which we're rolling 
out throughout the country, we're rolling out very quickly because it's an 
upgrade, there's not too much difference." (IT Co-ordinator) 
5.5.26 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Previously, Carton Carrier made few information systems changes that 
spanned the entire parcel delivery process. Therefore, the service department 
implemented the systems in stages, rather than develop the entire system and 
then implement it in one attempt. The first version of the sector management 
system relied upon current information systems. Later versions introduced new 
information systems. Later versions of applications were implemented in 
depots, which did not have previous versions. Depots with a previous version 
were upgraded to the newer version on a rolling schedule. 
Carton Carrier introduced systems in modules rather than develop entire systems 
and implement them in a single attempt. (IM_SOC # 5.50) 
5.5.27 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
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"Using wherever possible, the people who had been involved in its 
design in the trial depot, and sending those people out as implementation 
managers to assist in the implementation throughout the depots. 
There's always a danger that bringing too many people to implement or 
~hange things c~uld.then be seen as too many head office people coming 
In to put somethmg m. And then once it's installed, they will walk away, 
and the operators are left with the responsibility of making it work ... the 
idea was that if the operators were in control of that process, and had the 
final say as to when it went in and how it went in, and to the extent that 
they forced the operators to actually sign off implementation to say that 
it had been installed to their satisfaction, that they were now prepared to 
take ownership of that, there's a key step critical path in the 
implementation programme ... they (people in the depot being changed) 
had to become integrated into that (implementation) process in such a 
way that they were benefiting from the skills of the technical team, but 
not in a way where they could actually stand back from it if it didn't 
work, if it wasn't their fault, and if it did - they would just take the 
benefits of it. They had to be integrated, that was the key to our policies. 
So we worked very hard on that ... we established implementation teams 
in each of the regions who were responsible to the regional managers for 
introducing SMS into their depots." (Managing Director) 
"I've developed my system in a team which has consisted of myself, a 
chap from the computer department, one guy from the van fleet 
management side of things, in terms of looking at the data we can get on 
vans. We've had operational people, people from the customer side of 
things. We tried to build up a broad team of people, in a sense a broad 
group and refine it down to a bit of a closer working team of the actual 
development." (Team Member) 
5.5.28 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Carton Carrier formed implementation teams to manage information 
systems implementations. Implementation teams consisted of people from the 
depot in which the change was being implemented (recipients). In addition to 
recipients, implementation teams included people that had experienced the 
changes already, e.g. depot managers and parcel delivery managers; people from 
service areas, e.g. internal consultants, work study experts; functional experts, 
such as Home Merchandise's IT people and regional personnel department. 
Implementation teams were collectively responsible for systems 
implementations rather than the service function being solely responsible. Each 
implementation team was responsible to the regional general manager for 
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ensuring deadlines were adhered to. People, i.e. recipients in the depot where 
the system was being introduced, forged relationships with implementation team 
members (implementors) through day-to-day contact and conversations with one 
another. Implementation team members were based at the depot that was 
adopting the system. The implementation team developed a plan for installing a 
new system, however, the pace of installation was determined by the system's 
users. 
Carton Carrier created implementation teams, consisting of implementors and 
recipients, who took joint responsibility for installing the new systems that 
underpinned the parcel delivery process. (IM _SOC # 5.51) 
5.5.28 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Every time we put in a new system, we have a training package which 
is part of the role up front for that system. We have professional trainers 
whose job is really to train the managers on how to train their staff. The 
trainers tend not to stand up in front the workforce. That was supposed 
to be done by the managers. So managers again, they've had to get used 
to doing that." (Services Manager) 
"The training as well, is that we need - the trainers need confidence in 
the system before they can pass their knowledge on to the end operators, 
if you like. And the trainers need confidence in their own abilities." (IT 
Co-ordinator) 
5.5.28 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Line managers, rather than IT specialists or training managers, taught 
people to operate the new systems. Training managers prepared line managers, 
including depot managers, assistant depot managers and parcel delivery 
managers, with an ability to train their staff. IT specialists trained line managers 
in the functionality of the systems. Line managers then had to explain the 
system to their staff. 
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Training and IT managers trained line managers to use the systems and depot 
line managers taught people in their depots. (IM_SOC # 5.52) 
5.5.29 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Certainly in the depots people were cowed by the fact that there was no, 
how can I describe it . . . they were much more concerned with 
conforming to what the system should be, rather than trying to suggest 
changes that could be made to the system. So we'd find in depots people 
would be rigidly trying to fit in with something that didn't really quite 
work. And perhaps some of them in the early stages resented some of 
the problems, some of the systems, because of the occasional problem, 
the occasional teething problem. Whereas now, if there's a teething 
problem- teething problem with the system, we get gip about it, or we'll 
give gip about it, depending which side of the coin you're on. But 
people are much more understanding and they also know that the 
suggestions are going to be taken on board. It's changed quite radically 
in the time I've been here." (IT Co-ordinator) 
"We've actively sought to encourage people to challenge procedures and 
practices, and to have the opportunity to constructively input into the 
change process by saying 'This doesn't work, we need to revisit or 
change that'." (Managing Director) 
5.5.30 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The way people in the depots reacted to the systems changed during their 
implementation. When the systems were first implemented, people in the depots 
conformed to them even though the systems were inadequate for the task at 
hand. They became frustrated with the system and the implementation team, 
and built up resentment towards both. Board members and senior managers 
encouraged people to question current procedures and practices, and changes 
being made by implementation teams. As the implementation progressed, 
people became more confident in their own abilities and also in the 
implementors. 
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Directors and semor managers encouraged people to question the previous 
parcel delivery service as well as the proposed changes, and they were willing to 
do so and to provide feedback to the implementation team. (IM_SOC # 5.53) 
5.5.30 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"And from that, very early on, came the work on the SMS, and through 
the SMS project we were able to bring together operators and service 
people as a working team, and therefore some of the barriers were being 
literally broken down. Service people became site based, talking to 
operators on a day-to-day basis." (Managing Director) 
"I have to say that we weren't averse to learning from experiences. If 
people found that what we were doing was not right, we were quite 
happy to take on board their ideas and suggestions and incorporate those 
when possible into future versions of the system. So it wasn't 'We're 
from Head Office, and we've come to help install this wonderful new 
system'. It was very much an interactive affair." (Team Member) 
5.5.30 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board collocated implementation teams with people in the depot in 
which the parcel delivery process was being implemented. Implementation team 
members listened to people's ideas and incorporated these into future 
developments, where possible, to demonstrate the ideas were not ignored. 
Implementation team members listened to people's ideas and incorporated these 
into future implementation plans. (IM_SOC # 5.54) 
5.5.31 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"But the day-to-day planning is all devolved to the parcel delivery 
managers now ... I'd say week on week, it's perhaps the Assistant 
Managers, but when it comes down to the actual driver coming in in the 
morning, the parcel delivery manages a team of drivers, and who he's 
going to send where; then that's all down to the parcel delivery 
manager." (Team Member) 
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"We are now talking about drivers in groups of about ten or fifteen 
working for a particular manager. So the drivers know exactly who they 
work for, and the managers know exactly who they're responsible for. 
We know what vans, what drivers and on a map you can draw a line 
around that part of the UK that a manager's responsible for." (Assistant 
Depot Manager) 
5.5.31 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Parcel delivery managers were made responsible for a team of ten to 
fifteen drivers. This responsibility included drivers' performance, training, 
development, disciplinary and grievance procedures for each driver. Parcel 
delivery managers were made responsible for the day-to-day planning of drivers 
rounds. They were also made responsible for service levels provided to 
customers in their geographic area. They also became responsible for activities 
in the process such as booking out drivers, all aspects of delivery, and returns. 
Parcel delivery managers were made responsible for the service quality achieved 
and quantity delivered by a team of van drivers. (IM_SOC # 5.55) 
5.5.32 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"So the idea is that we pay the driver for each bit of work he does. So 
now we plan the drivers to what we expect is going to be ten-hours work 
if he completes it. And then any drivers who complete that work get the 
full payment. If they do a little bit extra like collect more parcels, not 
from tenants, from agents, then they're going to get more than that. If 
they don't complete all the work they're going to get less." (Team 
Member) 
"The basic working week shall be based on 39 hours to be worked in 5 
days, Monday to Friday (i.e. 8 hours on a Monday and 7 and 3/4 hours 
on other days). Management will endeavour to provide not less than 42 
standard hours work per driver each week, and payment will be 
guaranteed to this level (i.e. £143.55 per full working week). Where not 
less than 42 standards hours work is allocated and a driver fails to 
achieve 42 standard hours, then the company will investigate the reasons 
for this failure. If there is evidence of consistent poor performance then 
this will be resolved through counselling, retraining or discipline as 
appropriate. In order to meet the Company service levels and at the same 
128 
time optimise earnings potential, it is intended to plan weekly workload 
to appro~i~at~ly 50 standard hours. During periods of peak parcel 
volume, It Is mtended to plan weekly workload to approximately 60 
standard hours." (Source: Trade union I Carton Carrier agreement 
document - Parcel delivery incentive scheme negotiations, 1990) 
5.5.32 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Drivers' responsibilities were made explicit: They became responsible 
for a geographic area, typically a number of sectors, and for the delivery of 
parcels allocated to them while ensuring customers were satisfied with each 
delivery. To reinforce the change in responsibilities, the board redefined the 
drivers' working day and changed the basis of calculating their bonus. A 
working day is equated to a standard ten-hour day, which is about 42 clock 
hours per week. A 10 standard hour day includes 'drive time' to and from the 
round, plus 'drop time', i.e. the number of minutes to deliver a parcel, plus the 
'depot constant', i.e. the daily check the driver has to make on his vehicle. This 
check ensures the overall appearance of the van is clean and that it is in good 
working order by checking the oil, water and tyre pressures. Each driver has 
23 ~ minutes to conduct his daily depot constant. 
Drivers' pay and bonus scheme was aligned to their responsibility to achieve 
service quality and volume of deliveries within a standard ten-hour day. 
(IM_SOC # 5.56) 
5.5.33 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We tend to use our drivers as experts in an area rather than a flexible 
resource that could go anywhere and deliver a number of parcels. 
So when we sit down with a driver and agree his round, the driver is 
actually there helping to draw the boundaries, down streets, round 
bridges, over canals." (Services Manager) 
"The people who are key to the success of the business are the people on 
the ground. They have tremendous skills and knowledge which are often 
difficult to actually tap into or appreciate, so they have to be operating on 
our behalf and on a trust basis." (Managing Director) 
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5.5.33 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Board members and semor managers changed their perceptions of 
drivers. Board members and senior managers realised that drivers affected 
Carton Carrier's future success, as they are in direct contact with customers, and 
hence, directly influence service quality. Board members and senior managers 
also recognised that drivers accumulated a great deal of knowledge about a 
neighbourhood and that this knowledge was valuable, as it enabled them to 
make quicker deliveries. Managers encouraged drivers to take ownership of 
their geographic area and obtained their direct input to design their best route. 
This was especially important to the development of the bespoke route planning 
application. Drivers sat with members of the implementation team to agree 
issues such as the boundaries of his rounds and likely routes up or down specific 
streets. 
Board members and managers considered van drivers key to Carton Carrier's 
future success. (IM_SOC # 5.57) 
5.5.34 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Drivers aware of the fact that he's being criticised for individual 
deliveries, not just overall performance in terms of quantity delivered." 
(Services Manager) 
"It was all part of these meetings we had. They went all through that -
what was expected of you; how to deal with people. They went all over 
that. I think that was one whole meeting, was emphasised on customers, 
how to deal with them, and what was expected of you. So everyone 
knew, basically, what had to be done ... well years ago, you never hardly 
heard about the customers, but now I think they realise that the customer 
is the important one, and with the changes they've made, I think they've 
got to put a lot more emphasis on the customer. You know, uniforms, 
obviously, so they know who you are. You've got to be more polite, try 
and speak to the customers ... most of the ones (drivers) I know do it 
pretty good anyway. I can't speak for everyone, but most of them, they 
realise that the customer is important. That's your job isn't it? I think 
most of them do, yes." (Driver) 
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"S~me of the~, needless to say, they did it naturally anyway, it's just 
their personality. But others, we've actually had to encourage them and 
coax them into being able to be polite to customers, actually knocking on 
the door and waiting for Mrs Jones to come to the door, so that they can 
actually hand her their parcel." (Personnel Manager) 
5.5.34 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Drivers were informed of customers' complaints about the service 
received at the point of delivery. Depot line managers explained the importance 
of customer service, and that the way in which they dealt with customers had to 
change. Drivers changed their perceptions of customers and the importance of 
improving service quality at the point of delivery. This included handing a 
parcel over to customers rather than door-stepping the parcel. 
Van drivers recognised the importance of service quality. (IM_SOC # 5.58) 
5.5.35 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Against the same fundamental objective has been there since 1989, and 
that is that we've sought to encourage the whole of our workforce to be 
party to the corporate objective of providing a first class service as cost 
effectively as possible ... we've sought to have far greater participation in 
that objective ... so we've tried to install within the organisation a 
feeling of ownership of the business, participation, ... We're all aiming 
towards the same end objective. We want job security, we want to be 
reasonably well rewarded." (Managing Director) 
"The depot manager has more input in the strategic planning." (Team 
Member) 
5.5.35 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board set out the corporate objective to be the provision of high 
levels of customer service that is cost effective. The board sought to instil a 
sense of ownership of these objectives within the people in the parcel delivery 
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process. The business objectives had financial and service level targets in terms 
of profitability, service quality and delivery volumes. 
Board members refocused the corporate objective. (IM_SOC # 5.59) 
5.5.36 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"The people that were a party to (GMR (Transport)) that operation had 
been with it in the main for a number of years. Naturally enough, they 
felt that they were doing the best they could, and felt it important that 
they shouldn't feel alienated or threatened by any proposal to come from 
head office and take a different approach. Because the philosophy that I 
and the Chairman had was that we would rather work with people and 
have them contributing to the activities and the developments than to 
alienate them and find either resistance or at best an indifference to what 
we were doing. So it's important we were always to have people feeling 
secure and people were contributing to any change or process that was 
taking place." (Managing Director) 
"We made every effort to look after people who were having trouble, 
either by training or by finding a less demanding role." (Team Member) 
"If the drivers, the workers trust their manager, then I think changes are 
easy to implement. They don't necessarily trust us, strangers in suits that 
tum up at depots, saying 'We'd like you to take this computer out every 
day' with your parcels." (Services Manager) 
5.5.36 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board and senior managers were concerned about the way people 
who supported the changes felt. They gained these people's acceptance of the 
need for redesigning the parcel delivery process while ensuring: 
• People did not feel they were being criticised for their current 
performance and actions; 
• People did not feel indifference towards the parcel delivery process; 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
People did not feel alienated from the parcel delivery process; 
People were supported in ways that suited them. For example, some 
required training, others required less demanding jobs; 
People were confident while making the transition to the redesigned 
parcel delivery process; 
People felt secure about their future with the company when they 
achieved what was required of them. 
Regional general managers, depot managers, and regional functional 
managers gained support for the changes from people at each level in the parcel 
delivery process. Regional general managers reassured depot managers; depot 
managers spoke to assistant depot managers and parcel delivery managers; they 
in tum reassured drivers; functional managers discussed difficulties with all the 
line managers and drivers. 
Board members and regional general managers recognised as important people's 
feelings of fear, insecurity, indifference, confidence, and criticism. (IM _SOC # 
5.60) 
5.5.37 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"I think the senior management now are prepared to listen to us. I'm not 
saying that they will act on what they listen to you, but at least they are 
prepared to listen to you ... senior management come and see you now, 
not necessarily to bollock you; they come and see how you are getting 
on." (Depot Manager) 
"Rather than five years ago: they'd come in and they was thrown a set of 
keys and a bit of paper, because one man had a lot more parcels on it 
than another van. They didn't know where they was going, so they used 
to come in with their A-Z, pick up their set of keys and go out to Brixton, 
where tomorrow they pick up their A-Z, their set of keys and go out to 
Malham or Croydon. But now that is not the case." (Assistant Depot 
Manager) 
5.5.37 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
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Directors and senior managers changed their behaviour to the extent that 
they are more willing to listen to line managers. This cascaded through the 
organisation. Depot line managers behaved less aggressively towards those 
below them in the hierarchy. For example, previously depot line managers 
threw people into a job and expected them to do it with a minimum of training 
or explanation. New drivers, in particular, were often simply thrown a set of 
keys and a piece of paper with delivery addresses on it. They were then pointed 
to a van and expected to make 200 deliveries per day. Drivers that could not 
cope left the organisation. 
Board members, regional general managers, depot managers, assistant depot 
managers, and parcel delivery managers listen to those below them in the 
hierarchy. (IM_SOC # 5.61) 
5.5.38 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We wanted a 'hole in the wall' as I called it. Before the depot was 
extended this was just a one-way depot. You just drove in that door and 
when you'd unloaded, you had to back out the door. And of course, we 
had accidents galore and chaos, and what we wanted was a door knocked 
in the end wall. £4000, the managing director then, McPatrick wouldn't 
have it. Alex Hammond came here. They recommended the 
implementation to him, and it was done. Overnight, the system operated, 
and you thought 'Jesus Christ, this is Father Christmas come along! ' I 
mean £4000 for this company is like well, not even peanuts." (Depot 
Manager) 
"I mean the fact that you'd got one of the black phones that was the old 
bakellite ones, we had those in these depots. I mean that was the way the 
depot was run." (Depot Manager) 
5.5.38 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Directors and line managers made a number of symbolic changes. 
Managers went out occasionally for lunch. The depot environment was 
improved: floors were repainted, cleaners were employed to tidy the depot, and 
flower boxes were placed in the entrance. Furniture, fixtures and fittings were 
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improved: parcel delivery managers were provided with a desk and chair each 
' 
depots were provided with an overhead projector, old photocopy machines were 
replaced with new ones, and a new telephone system was installed. 
Board members and line managers made symbolic changes in support of the 
parcel delivery process. (IM_SOC # 5.62) 
5.5.39 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Giving them the exposure, recognising their strengths and weaknesses. 
And by a very deliberate policy of trying to make sure that all our 
managers received some opportunity to be line managers, as well as 
service type of operatives. This broadening of their skills, as they 
progressed up the structure, they weren't just line managers, or just 
technicians, they had had some experience of all aspects of the job for 
the future. . .. A very definite policy to do that. We would seek to give 
our managers as much opportunity as possible to become multi skilled as 
they progressed through their career." (Managing Director) 
"As a graduate trainee, I was essentially put in a depot and expected to 
attach myself to various people and learn how they'd do each job. A 
couple of weeks with a driver, and so on, which is all fair enough. And 
then I was just put in a supervisor position and left there. And I didn't 
really get an understanding of how everything fitted together, 
particularly in regard to the rest of the group, other parts of the company. 
That really in the sort of twelve months after I'd joined gradually began 
to pick up. And with the graduates who started more recently, they get a 
proper induction, they get the chance to visit different locations. For 
instance, some graduates who joined Carton Carrier, get to visit the Sort 
Centres and the warehouses where the Home Merchandise parcels are 
packed. They get to visit marketing departments and all sorts of other 
areas that really I knew nothing about when I came out of Hull." (Team 
Member) 
"We're trying now to take the opportunity to take managers who are 
progressing through their career structure and deliberately give (them) 
exposure to do with clients on a first hand basis, so that as they mature 
and progress in the structure they have the required skills to actually deal 
with the kind of situations that arise from commercial activities, and 
were never previously evident." (Managing Director) 
"Like yesterday, I was talking to a company who now want us to deliver 
eight million parcels for them. Now this is the most exciting thing 
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because these parcels are unlike ~nything else we deliver, and already 
you can see the changes that are gomg to be necessary in the organisation 
to accommodate those eight million parcels. It was a good day it was an 
exciting day." (Services Manager) ' 
"To try and explain it a bit better, even on my side, when I joined, you 
would never get people coming from warehousing into Carton Carrier 
and Carton Carrier into warehousing from the management point of 
view. People just didn't swap. Once you went into one Division, that's 
where you stayed for the rest of your career. Whereas it's an active 
concept, particularly when we take on graduates, they are told that 
'You're going to do twelve months in warehousing, and twelve months 
in Carton Carrier, or vice versa, and then you can decide where you want 
to go'." (Personnel Manager) 
5.5.39 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
People raised their profile by switching from a line to a service role and 
vice versa. The organisation deliberately encouraged line managers to become 
involved in the implementation of the parcel delivery process, and let people 
from the service department take up line jobs. To reinforce this policy, several 
training programmes were developed. These include eight or nine core courses 
on the basics of sound management, computer courses which cover basis 
computer literacy and systems design skills, counselling and coaching 
programmes for line managers, and a graduate induction programme which 
trains graduates in different departments in Carton Carrier and Home 
Merchandise. Rather than have line managers who specialised in a single task, 
the board wanted people who understood and performed several different 
activities. People broadened their skills by taking line, service or technical roles. 
For example, depot managers implemented the parcel delivery process in other 
depots. People, starting with board directors, encouraged others to become 
experts in their job and to have a good understanding of the range of activities 
undertaken in the parcel delivery process. People have visibility across the 
process and hence understand the implications that a decision, made in one 
activity, has upon other activities in the parcel delivery process. People move 
between different parts of the depot, sort centres, and between Carton Carrier 
and Home Merchandise, which was previously unheard of. 
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The board encouraged people to develop a range of skills by moving from a 
service to a line management role, and from the warehouse to the depot 
operations and vice versa. (IM_SOC # 5.63) 
E4 5.6 Effects of radical process orientation 
5.6.1 A and 5.6.1 Bare located in the body of Chapter 5. 
5.6.2 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Up until '89 when the future of this business really was not risk in the 
sense that the bulk of the revenue came from one client, ... and they were 
unlikely to take that business and give it to anybody else. And therefore, 
there was this attitude, or a danger of an attitude of 'Well it doesn't really 
matter how long or badly we do the job, we'll still get the business. And 
if it costs us more then we'll just charge them (Home Merchandise) for 
it'. So it was comme ci, comme ca. In about 1989, Carton Carrier, or 
GMR (Transport) as it was then called, played around with outside 
business. They had some contracts to carry parcels on behalf of other 
people. But they tended to be a fairly small volume, loads of try's which 
never really came to fruition, and I would imagine the volume was no 
more than two to three million parcels in any one year against a 
background of 70 million Home Merchandise parcels ... again if we 
didn't have computers, we'd have more drivers. If we had more drivers 
we'd have to have more depots. Opening depots is a nightmare." 
(Services Manager) 
"Pre '89 there had been a number of ventures into the commercial market 
place, but they'd all been fairly short-lived. Whilst our marketing people 
had gone out and sold the promise of a service, the reality of it was an 
empty one and therefore in fairness, at that stage, had a very bad 
reputation of being a carrier that promises to do things, but doesn't 
actually achieve (its promises) ... we've had to get the core business 
under control through the process we've talked about. Having got to the 
stage where we felt we were controlling the business, and that people 
were accountable, we then embarked upon a positive move to enter the 
commercial market sector. To do that on the basis that we had now got a 
service that was marketable where previously it hadn't always been." 
(Managing Director) 
"One of the things I didn't say in all the changes has been that we have 
developed the outside business aspect of the company over the last few 
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years, and that's basically increased our business by, in broad terms, half 
as much again as we were carrying then." (Regional General Manager) 
5.6.2 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
GMR (Transport) had a single customer - Home Merchandise. GMR 
(Transport) had made several attempts to gain external business, however, these 
attempts ended in little success. One of the major effects of redesigning the 
parcel delivery process was that Carton Carrier gained external customers. By 
the middle of 1995 the volume of parcels for external customers reached close to 
30% of a total of 120 million parcels, an increase from about 3 million to about 
40 million parcels. This substantial increase in the number of third party parcels 
was achieved using the same number of depots. Carton Carrier invested in 50 
trailers and 30 truck units specifically to handle business growth. However, the 
number of physical depots remained the same throughout 1989 - 1995. There 
are cost advantages because the capital costs of setting up additional depots, as 
well as the on-going running costs are not incurred. 
Carton Carrier entered into new markets successfully using the parcel delivery 
process developed to handle Home Merchandise's parcels, without increasing 
the number of depots. (ERPO _SOC# 5.65) 
5.6.3 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We have much much tighter control of what goes on, because we 
control every individual parcel, and we've got a lot of information about 
every individual parcel, all based on the bar-code." (IT Co-ordinator) 
"The combination of control over transit times and control over work 
content issued to drivers which was the fundamental objective. To 
provide a consistent service within an agreed parameter of one to three 
days, add to that the most cost effective basis ... the Home Merchandise 
side of the business is still the major client in terms of the parcels ejected 
in to the process and because the third party business that we brought in 
has been brought in on the basis that it's been designed to fit in to the 
existing level of commercial optimised trunking routes and sorting 
capacity." (Managing Director) 
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5.6.3 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Carton Carrier resolved one of its key drivers for change, namely to 
provide a consistent delivery service in a cost-effective manner and regain 
control over the parcel delivery process. 
Carton Carrier's management have regained control over the parcel delivery 
process. (ERPO _SOC# 5.66) 
5.6.4 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"I've come back to what I said earlier on, it's still a dictatorship. Whilst 
we had some input on things, at the end of the day it was going to be 
driven from the top. It was going to happen whether I wanted it to 
happen, whether I'd allowed it to happen, or whatever. But I think to a 
certain extent, we felt that we were a part of it . . . the company is a 
dictatorship, but I think that within that it has flexed a little bit. It's not 
quite such a rigid dictatorship as it used to be, certainly not at our levels 
anyway." (Depot Manager) 
5.6.4 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
There is still a residue of the old organisation. While it has gone through 
a radical change there is a hint that old behaviours could return. 
Some aspects ofthe old organisation still remain. (ERPO_SOC # 5.67) 
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Appendix 6 Foundry Insurance: First order 
constructs, interpretation and second order constructs 
This appendix forms an integral part of Chapter 6. 
Fl 6.3 Commencement 
6.3.1 A and 6.3.1 Bare located in the body of Chapter 6. 
6.3.2 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We were beginning to lose major accounts. Our business is not a 
business where accounts leave you readily, but they were beginning to 
drift away and very significant accounts were beginning to drift away. 
Just before I came, we lost a single biggest contract of its type in the UK 
market to a competitor." (Managing Director) 
"And that we had to provide a service otherwise we're dead; and I think 
that was one of the major failures was that we weren't too worried about 
providing a service to our customers, and therefore that's why we were 
going downhill. That need was probably the most important thing. The 
customer is important to us . . . our existing market is the one we wanted 
to service better and needed to stabilise and hold on to ... that need was 
probably the most important thing: the customer is important to us and 
perhaps we had better start looking after them." (Deputy Managing 
Director) 
6.3.2 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Foundry Insurance began losing existing customers to competitors. In 
one case it lost the single biggest insurance contract of its type to a competitor. 
The board and senior managers realised that Foundry Insurance needed to 
improve its service levels to existing customers to retain them. The board 
accepted that the organisation needed to focus upon its existing customers, and 
provide them with service levels that were significantly better than existing 
levels. 
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The board realised that the organisation needed to retain existing customers, as 
longstanding customers moved their business to competitors. (C_SOC # 6.2) 
6.3.3 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"I. think in that sense it started off with the absolute requirement to get 
th1s company, uh, on the right footing and financially stable for the 
future as it was going downhill fast." (Deputy Managing Director) 
11989 11990 11991 
Table B: Annual profit I loss figures for Foundry Insurance 
(Source: presentation made by managing director) 
"Well you've seen what happened to us in 1991, we made a staggering 
loss ... we obviously had to get back to profit very quickly indeed. Our 
company had at best, two years left. We had a rich and wealthy parent, 
but nevertheless time was running out for us as an organisation. 
I remember a classic of this. I was going round the organisation in the 
early days, and I came across a chap who was at a desk. Well I think he 
was at a desk, but all you could see was paper all around him. Now this 
chap was an Acceptance Engineer. After one of the engineers in the field 
had filled in a report, everything would have to go to Head Office for 
acceptance before it went to the end customer. And I said to this chap 
'You seem to be struggling a bit here', and he said 'Well it's not as bad 
as it was, the backlog used to be six months. It's only five months today, 
it's improving'. And that was typical of our organisation at the time." 
(Managing Director) 
"The biggest problem in our industry, not just for Foundry Insurance, but 
the industry generally, was the fact that we had more business than we 
could service, and sometimes we were not getting inspections done on 
time. We call it overdue inspections." (Engineering Manager) 
"It could take anything from 3 to 12 months to actually issue the policy." 
(Implementation Team Leader) 
6.3.3 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Foundry Insurance had been profitable during the 1980s. However, 
profitability fell from £9.6 million (1989) to £6.1 million (1990), and the 
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organisation recorded a loss of £6.3 million (1991), the first in its history. The 
board realised that the organisation had to become financially stable. 
Foundry Insurance's customers wanted up to date reports that certified 
that their plant complied with relevant statutory regulations. In most cases, 
statutory regulations set out the frequency of the inspection. Foundry Insurance 
often took between three and twelve months to issue an inspection report and 
insurance policy to customers. Failure to meet statutory deadlines left customers 
exposed to censure under law and affected whether or not they operated plant. 
Foundry Insurance's contractual obligation with its customers required plant 
inspections within the timescales determined by law. Foundry Insurance had a 
growing backlog of late inspections, referred to internally as overdue 
inspections. 
Foundry Insurance experienced its first financial loss of £6.3 million and had 
unfulfilled contractual obligations. (C_SOC # 6.3) 
6.3.4 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Managers were really just supervisors of functions. 'My job is to do 
this'. I can quote a guy who was in charge of the policy department. 
He's the guy who produces the policies, head of the typing pool and so 
on. .. . When somebody wanted a policy as a matter of priority, he was 
very upset because it upset his scheme of things. 'Here's my pile of 
priorities, and I'll work through this pile, now you want this one. Now 
that's very upsetting because that's going to put this one back', and so 
on. The fact that this customer's screaming like mad wasn't concern, 
somebody else's concern. 'I've got my job to do'." (Deputy Managing 
Director) 
"I actually heard the classic words from one of our managers: 'well, I 
don't know what we've done wrong, we haven't changed - they must 
have done'." (Managing Director) 
"Do the jobs which are easy and leaving those jobs that are perhaps dirty 
and more difficult. I mean we've got clients who've got thousands of 
outlets. You couldn't have the surveyor in Birmingham doing something 
different to the surveyor in Manchester for the same client. You've got 
to get it right . . . we have to have that especially for clients who are 
dispersed throughout the country. You can foul up for one client at one 
address and he wont notice but you do two different things with the same 
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client and perhaps that client's got one engineer controlling several 
addresses, he soon sees 'Why is he saying that?' and 'Why is he not 
saying the same?"' (Engineering Manager) 
"By not following the corporate objective, we were therefore delivering a 
fragmented service to our customers. 'In the north region, you'll do this 
for me, but in the south region you won't'." (Customer Services 
Manager) 
6.3.4 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
People in Foundry Insurance protected their own work. People were 
largely unconcerned about customers and their needs. People focussed upon 
their individual jobs and rarely linked their actions to the effects upon the 
customers and service levels. Managers had little control over the conduct of 
the inspections and the administration involved in sending out reports and 
policies to customers. They had little control or influence over the amount of 
time an engineer spent on a particular site. This was because there were poor 
time records and very few checks to verify the times stated by the engineer. 
Each administrative department in head office checked and rechecked the work 
of other departments, as one department had little visibility of what an adjacent 
department did. The board wanted consistent service levels across the 
organisation, so those customers that dealt with different engineers received 
consistent quality of service. 
Foundry Insurance wanted to bring activities that affected customer service 
under management's control. (C_SOC # 6.4) 
6.3.5 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"And we were spending as an organisation, this Foundry Insurance, £2 
million a year on IT. They had - there'd been one of those typical IT 
stories I'm afraid; we had remote big data centres within the parent 
organisation who said 'We can help you with your IT development, 
Foundry Insurance.' ... the people in Foundry Insurance had never really 
used any IT, so you had innocent users and remote suppliers of the 
service. The suppliers of the service didn't understand the business. So 
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they (Foundry Insurance's management and IT suppliers) set in to 
rework our Plant database - this is the major database on which all of our 
activities in one way or another are really focussed. And we were 
spending £2 million a year for the system that they had delivered to us. 
It had taken them three years to design that systems and a year to 
systems test it, and when they delivered it, it didn't work ... So I 
inherited a situation with the management within Foundry Insurance, it's 
firs~ and only exp.erience with IT had been a crippling one - big 
mainframe box costmg them a lot of money which they were locked into, 
and actually didn't give them what it was they wanted." (Managing 
Director) 
"We did dabble with IT some years ago and we pulled back because it 
was a problem, ... when I mentioned that we scheduled surveyors back in 
the 80's, that was wrong because that would say to surveyors 'We don't 
trust you' ... that (surveyor scheduling system) was imposed on them 
and that was wrong and it wasn't managed properly- it wasn't explained 
to them properly why we were doing that. It was just imposed. The 
scheduling system was not liked." (Engineering Manager) 
"I think that creation actually created forty odd work groups which is 
quite a lot. Some of them very small .. . we actually split it (the 
organisation) almost too far." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"We had five or six regional teams servicing a geographical region. 
We're supposed to be a department working as one, but we weren't. We 
were six teams doing things, the same job six different ways. We had a 
lot of fragmentation, a lot of duplication." (Customer Services Manager) 
6.3.5 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Foundry Insurance, in the late 1980's attempted to address drivers for 
change in two ways. First, by upgrading the surveyor scheduling system and the 
plant database. Engineers and administrative staff, who were expected to use the 
new systems, were neither consulted during the development nor involved with 
the implementation. Many engineers felt the systems were being introduced 
because senior managers did not trust them. Senior managers attempted to 
impose the systems but were unable to. According to a number of managers the 
systems implementation failed. Second, by restructuring the organisation into 
40 work groups. The board created work groups from the prevailing functional 
structure. People began to understand how their function operated and to 
identify whether or not they were meeting their financial targets. However, 
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people in the work groups lost sight of the interdependencies between activities. 
For example, one department consisted of six regional teams, each one serving a 
geographic region. The department's manager recognised that each group 
operated differently. This restructuring initiative fragmented the organisation. 
Foundry Insurance previously attempted to address drivers for change by 
upgrading its information systems and restructuring the organisation. (C SOC# 
6.5) 
6.3.6 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"When he's typed up his reports on the machine, he plugs it into the 
modem, zaps it up over the X25 network into Head Office, and they're 
beautifully printed on the laser printer overnight, and out they go. 
Ninety-five out of every hundred reports are ready for despatch at 1 
o'clock in the morning. The other 5%, where it does require some sort 
of Head Office involvement, are on the screens of the engineers first 
thing in the morning when they come in, and are dealt with by 10 o'clock 
and then ready for despatch." (Managing Director) 
"So that if you (the customer) wanted to talk to me about a problem with 
a piece of engineering plant, you'd talk to me, but if you at the same time 
wanted to add a new item of plant, you'd talk to somebody else, and if 
you had a claim, you'd talk to somebody else. And if you actually said, 
'Well I really want to take out a new policy, as well', then it would be 
somebody else again - we'd try and draw all those together now, so 
you'd talk to me. So the underwriter will be the salesman, he'll be the 
administrator, and he'll answer some technical queries as well ... We've 
put the engineer surveyor type environment, the operations, with the 
customer service sales and the account teams together under the same 
umbrella . . . so that they work collectively as a team, servicing a 
customer stream, rather than all having a responsibility on that customer, 
but individually operating ... So instead of just doing Task A, I now do 
Task A, B, C, and D, all requiring different skills, knowledge, education, 
training, but the core job is still the same but we've put it together more." 
(Customer Services Manager) 
6.3.6 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The activities carried out to satisfy customers' requirements including 
the production of inspection reports spanned several existing functions and 
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departments within each function. Foundry Insurance's board recognised that 
these activities needed to be aligned. Changes to each activity needed to be co-
ordinated across functions and departments such as engineering, boiler, 
electrical, machinery, administration, IT, and customer services. Foundry 
Insurance co-ordinated the changes at managerial and operational levels, for 
instance, by bringing together activities in the inspection process and reducing 
the number ofhandovers between people in different functions. 
The drivers for change required organisational changes to be co-ordinated 
changes across engineering, boiler, electrical, machinery, administration, and 
customer services functions at managerial and operational levels. (C_SOC # 6.6) 
F2 6.4 Changes that occurred 
6.4.1 A and 6.4.1 B are located in the body of Chapter 6. 
6.4.2 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Prior to, I suppose, (the new managing director) joining us, and things 
taking off at that point, you were either an underwriter, you were an 
engineer surveyor, whatever. It was very, very functional, vertical." 
(Implementation Team Leader) 
"Executives have had to start learning how to look at the business 
process as a totality rather than just their own patch. Now we work it 
(the inspection process) all together." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"We had a Chief Boiler Engineer, a Chief Electrical Engineer, and a 
Chief Machinery Engineer, machinery in Foundry Insurance means lifts 
and cranes and excavators and plant that you see on the building sites ... 
we decided that there was a conflict of interest. Being a technical 
manager means you have technical responsibility for what goes on 
technically, but it also means you have responsibility for the 
administration of those surveyors which are out there in the field earning 
the com . . . to manage that at the same time as being technically 
responsible for technical decisions within the department, was proving to 
be a difficulty ... now the customer comes on the phone, he knows that 
he's going to speak to a team which is dedicated to him or his business, 
rather than probably, he might have a technical query in which he'll 
come on to the switchboard and the switchboard might put him to the 
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correct technical man, they might put him to a commercial man." 
(Engineering Manager) 
6.4.2 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Foundry Insurance had a functional structure and each function had its 
own director who managed his own vertical area. People were located in one 
function and rarely concerned themselves with other functions. Within each 
function there were several operational departments. For example, the 
engineering function consisted of marketing, electrical, machinery, boilers and 
administration departments. Each one had its own head of departments and 
structure. The chief boiler engineer, chief electrical engineer and chief 
machinery engineer ran their department autonomously. Each department 
ensured its technical standards were adhered to and that the organisation 
responded to changes in statutory regulations related to its area of specialisation. 
Chief engineers often prioritised technical excellence or the resolution of a 
thorny technical issue above the fulfilment of day-to-day contractual 
commitments. Foundry Insurance maintained its functional structure and 
designed activities in the inspection process from within the functional structure. 
For instance, the organisation created a department with responsibility for 
setting technical standards that other operational departments had to adhere to. 
Foundry Insurance created the inspection process from activities In the 
functional structure. (CTO_SOC # 6.8) 
6.4.3 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"The guy who was responsible for underwriting didn't make any 
underwriting decisions, because it was always left to the General 
Manager of the day . . . people became responsible for the budgets, 
whereas before they had budgets but they were always just merely some 
of the expense budget. About a third budget was actually budgeted; the 
other two-thirds were controlled centrally so that people didn't have any 
direct responsibility for things like staffing numbers and so on because 
'that was Sir's job'. So if you wanted an extra member of staff to 
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replace, you had to get Sir's permission . . . that would be the General 
Manager of the day. The code would always be that the General 
Manager makes all the decisions, not major decisions, all the decisions, 
you know, uh, if you wanted a new photocopier, he would make that 
decision ... that's one of the reasons why we ran into problems with our 
Computer Account, because we weren't charging the right premiums, 
and nobody had the responsibility for doing that. Sort of. 'Sir's happy, 
so why should we change'. 
It was a very inward looking company, very sort of vertically structured. 
'I've got my job, hands off. What's it gotta do with you? What's my 
contribution to the organisation? I don't know, but I got this job'." 
(Deputy Managing Director) 
"The General Manager had to agree everything. You couldn't hire, fire, 
spend any money, without his signature. So that's all changed, and we 
work more on the basis, 'Let's do it and argue about it later, or not argue 
hopefully'. 
I mean you do see people doing things that at one time they wouldn't 
have thought about doing on their initiative without getting approval 
from a supervisor or manager." (Implementation Team Member) 
"We were a very much old fashioned, hierarchical type organisation, and 
we've seen a lot of change that people, people who sat in the same desk 
for 20 years, did the same thing, the same pieces of paper crossed their 
desk. That has changed significantly." (Customer Services Manager) 
"(Foundry Insurance had experienced a) long period of, you know, 'Let 
me see everything before you do it'." (Engineering Manager) 
"I spoke to my deputy, Colin, not long after I arrived. Colin had been 
with the company 43 years, not a long time actually by our company's 
standards ... and I said to Colin, 'Colin, when did this process last 
change?' This was after I'd had my walk round, and he said 'Well not in 
my lifetime here'." (Managing Director) 
"I think the major change has been people taking ownership and 
responsibility for a number of tasks/functions which had always been 
delegated to the highest level possible before." (Deputy Managing 
Director) 
"We then give them the responsibility back. Because over the years 
that's one of the things, one the other major sort of restructuring ideals is 
to give ... to put responsibility down, to give people ownership. That 
has worked." (Engineering Manager) 
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6.4.3 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
In Foundry Insurance, the general manager took most decisions whether 
they were of a strategic or operational nature. The general manager took 
decisions relating to setting underwriting prices, agreeing staffing levels in 
departments and allowing them to order a new photocopy machine. 
Consequently, managers took few decisions in relation to running the business 
and had to obtain senior management approval before they acted to resolve a 
problem. Therefore, over time, people became inward looking with little 
interest in understanding their contribution to the business and being protective 
of their jobs. People also did not consider the need to change their job. For 
instance, people sat at the same desk for several years doing the same job using 
the same forms without any changes. Ironically, engineers and line managers 
took decisions that affected the public at large, e.g. when they certified the safety 
of a public lift; yet they could not take decisions to purchase a fax or photocopy 
machine. Some managers had difficulty accepting wider responsibilities, as they 
were accustomed to working with few responsibilities. Managers were fearful 
of making mistakes and they rarely took bad news to senior managers or board 
members. For example, Foundry Insurance began losing money on its 
Computer Account, yet people did not raise this with the general manager. 
One consequence of the implementation of the inspection process is that 
line managers and team leaders have greater ownership and wider 
responsibilities in their jobs. Board members devolved responsibilities to 
appropriate managerial levels. People in each function became responsible for 
their activity in the inspection process. 
Directors, managers, team leaders and clerks are responsible for their functional 
activities and the inspection process. (CTO _SOC # 6.9) 
6.4.4 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"It was very much, uh, if I were doing your appraisal for your year's 
work, I was instructed not to talk to you about it, so therefore behind a 
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piece of paper and so on, Ashley worth moving up from a 6C to a 6B. 
Now I've got to put a justification in so that Sir can accept it, or what 
have you. Urn. That would go forward." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"(Appraisals were) cloak and dagger stuff behind closed doors ... they 
were basically, in my opinion, a lot of them were not worth the paper 
that they were written on. You'd get very bland standard comments that 
could be interpreted in three different ways. Things like 'with a little 
more training, this person would be a useful member of a department' ... 
what we're not doing by making statements of that nature is we're not 
identifying where the shortfalls are and what the change programme 
should be. By saying someone needs some more training, you're saying 
they can't do something because they're not skilled at doing it, and what 
we ought to have been doing is up front saying 'Look, we need to get 
you more involved and more up to speed on a particular frame and then 
you'd be OK.' ... to tell people that they're doing a bad job, reluctance 
to tell them that they are doing a good job." (Customer Services 
Manager) 
"It was probably more decided behind a door before and people weren't 
open, and they didn't say to you, if you were falling down anywhere, you 
were really never told ... but as I said now, the PAis far better because 
again, you've confronted somebody on a one to one basis and saying 
'Well yes, well may be you're not doing that right. Is there anything we 
can do to help you do it right?' either training or whatever else. So no, 
that's far better, far better." (Departmental Team Leader) 
6.4.4 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The previous management team instructed managers not to talk to people 
they were appraising. Typically managers decided the new salary grade for an 
individual and then wrote an appraisal to justify the recommended increase. 
Managers wrote appraisal reports that were unstructured, contained bland 
comments, and had few facts and figures. As a result, many managers 
disregarded people's appraisals. Managers were reluctant to tell people that 
their performance had to improve in particular areas, and they were unaware of 
areas in which they needed to improve. Appraisal procedures changed in a way 
that made managers identify criterion against which people would be assessed. 
This changed to where line managers discuss and agree with people their 
appraisal criteria, which reflect the inspection process's requirements. 
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The board changed appraisal procedures to align appraisal criteria for functional 
activities and the inspection process. (CTO_SOC # 6.10) 
6.4.5 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Reward structure has perhaps not moved too much in the time period 
tha~ you are talking about, and it's still very much inter-departmental, 
maJor salary increases negotiated as a company with some latitude 
within each individual department." (Customer Services Manager) 
"They (financial rewards) haven't changed. The MSF, well, for the field 
force- no they haven't and that's the majority of our wages bill was our 
field force. Their salaries are still negotiated by their union ... but the 
engineering surveyors outside and all their supervisory staff up to 
assistant managers, that's one step down from me, up to that level were 
simply negotiated by the union. The union negotiated a 3% rise, 
everybody got a 3% rise." (Engineering Manager) 
6.4.5 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board and senior managers made minor changes to the financial 
reward structure. Increases are negotiated with the trade union for a large 
number of people including engineer, clerical and supervisory staff. Each 
department had a very limited discretionary amount that departmental managers 
could distribute to people in their area. The board did not feel that they wanted 
to renegotiate terms with the union. 
The board accepted that reward systems would not be changed. (CTO _SOC # 
6.11) 
6.4.6 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Nobody told people anything. Everything in this place was a 'need to 
know'. You don't need to know, so you don't get told. And therefore 
there was not enough what I would term conversation or discussion 
about the business, the plan, the objectives being conveyed up and down, 
and therefore managers were really just supervisors of functions. 
I think that if people just merely do a job, don't understand why they are 
doing it, or what the company objectives are, and so on, is, they will just 
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do a job. If that's all that's required, er, fine, but that's not what we 
requir~. That was the old culture which says 'OK, you do a job, you 
come I~ her~. You do the job. You can go home. That's fine'." (Deputy 
Managing Director) 
"When I first came to this company, there's no way that the management 
of the day would have departed from their offices on the first floor 
except once a year, perhaps at Christmas, and the second time, during the 
annual conferences, when they told the staff 'the state of the nation'." 
(Engineering Manager) 
"Far more approachable. I mean, really you never saw, you know, such 
as on this floor, you know, your General Manager or any of them, 
whereas now you're quite likely to bump into them anywhere." 
(Departmental Team Leader) 
"There are people out there, young kids who have come to me, yet I, as a 
young kid, wouldn't have gone to the person in this office in those days." 
(Engineering Manager) 
"It's a much more open working relationship ... communications have 
vastly improved. We are far more open than we used to be." 
(Implementation Team Leader) 
"The fact that five years ago plus, the General Manager was Mr So and 
So, a lot of the departments referred to each other as Mr This, Mr That, 
Mrs So and So, Miss." (Customer Services Manager) 
"We were very formal. Formal managing directors, known as 'Mr', and 
called everybody else 'Mr' or 'Mrs' or 'Miss' or by their surnames ... I 
mean, Ken used just to go wander round areas and sit down next to 
people and not necessarily go to the manager of the team leader of an 
area, actually go and sit with individuals doing a job, and that also helped 
break down potential barrier of middle management as well, who 
perhaps, used to a traditional approach, would maybe just give messages 
that we were expected to give rather than a true perception of what was 
happening." (Implementation Team Leader) 
6.4.6 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
People's behaviours towards one another changed. Managers previously 
released information relating to the organisation's business plan and objectives 
on a 'need to know' basis. The views of people in the lower echelons were 
rarely asked for, as senior managers placed little or no value on their views. 
Board members communicated with people once a year at the annual 
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conference. Board members were rarely seen around the organisation. They 
spent most of their time in their offices on the first floor of the head office 
building. This changed in the sense that board members and senior managers 
are more open and communicative across the organisation. People at all levels 
were able to approach board members and senior managers. A number of 
people described the flow of information as being 'open'. 
The organisation became less formal, as people referred to one another 
by their first name. Directors, including the managing director, walked around 
the organisation and spoke to people at all levels. People further down the 
organisation spoke directly to managers who were not their direct line report. 
They were encouraged to take control, make suggestions and discuss issues 
directly with relevant managers. 
People including, board members, senior managers, team leaders and clerks, 
behave in an informal way with one another, are more communicative and open 
with each other. (CTO_SOC # 6.12) 
6.4.7 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"When I first came here, which was eight years ago, there were four on-
line terminals in the building and a number of personal computers ... I 
went into the IT Department in '88. We had one PC between us all .. . 
and there was probably only half a dozen in the whole company at that 
time ... we were a very very IT illiterate organisation, six years ago." 
(Customer Services Manager) 
"I mean to be quite candid, we were not IT literate people as a company. 
The body of people, which at the 1988/9 going through to 1991, we 
would be a long way behind a lot of other organisations ... they (people 
in the process) knew nothing about computers. Absolutely nothing about 
computers ... some of the surveyors, we had about 500 at the time, I 
think it was exactly 4 7 surveyors we knew had already at home, bought 
their own stand alone PCs and were producing their reports on PC's 
rather than on the typewriter. Urn, we knew that. So 47 of them, we 
knew had quite good skills. Many of the rest had no computer skills 
whatsoever. So, they all had typing skills, they all had keyboard skills." 
(Engineering Manager) 
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~'We h~ve engineer~ out there in the field being used to going out 
Inspecting and checkmg the plant, boilers, etc. and we used to teach them 
typing on a manual typewriter." (Implementation Team Leader) 
"There was the basic system that we used through Composite Insurers 
which was called their Stage 2 system. That's a record keeping system 
of our pol~cies. and it did our renewals and accounting. That originally 
was a clencal1nterface and paper driven ... what we've done is we've 
now, uh, we still have the Stage 2 but front ended with EPOQ for 
producing the engineering policies and doing the engineering quotations. 
We've got our Report System which didn't exist before the change, and 
we've bought the Plant database up to here from Bristol, taking it away 
from them, so that it can exist on our system ... well the two very new 
ones are the Reports one, and the EPOQ one. You might call that Plant 
database system a new one because although it was there at Bristol, it's 
been brought up here and revamped and is our own." (Deputy Managing 
Director) 
6.4.7 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Foundry Insurance's information technology capability was negligible 
prior to the implementation of the inspection process, as people used manual 
typewriters. The organisation had four on-line terminals and a few personal 
computers, which barely supported the previous inspection service. This service 
was manual, paper-based and labour intensive. People in head office and the 
engineers had little experience with or knowledge of computers. Foundry 
Insurance's core information systems were bought from Composite Insurers. 
These systems were stand-alone, and supported activities undertaken to provide 
customers with inspection reports. For example, one system held policy records 
and another maintained plant records. A consequence of the stand-alone 
systems was that administrative clerks transferred data manually from one 
system to another. The new board recognised that systems needed to support the 
inspection process and the functional activities within it. 
The board realised that information systems needed to provide seamless support 
across activities that form the inspection process. (CTO_SOC # 6.13) 
154 
6.4.8 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"There was also a vision that Ken certainly came out with, which was 
you know, customer service, tum round enquiries, tum round 
correspondence and queries, and quotations within 24 hours. So there 
was very much a vision set there. And everything that was being done 
was geared to trying to attain that vision. So I think that certainly 
helped." (Implementation Team Leader) 
"When Ken came out with his statement 'We're going to provide a 24-
hour tum round' nobody believed that was at all necessary. The culture 
said, well we're as good as anybody else, that's all that matters ... The 
culture said that we don't issue a policy until we've inspected. That was 
the culture. That culture was destroyed." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"A means of focussing mainly on the customer. I think everybody in 
business these days has to be focussed on the customer, and we 
recognised this and we made initial changes three or four years ago." 
(Engineering Manager) 
6.4.8 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The new managing director set out a new service target: instead of the 
organisation taking months to issue inspection reports and insurance coverage, 
he wanted these to be issued to customers within 24 hours. Having set this 
target, the changes to the implementation process were geared to achieve it. 
People in the organisation did not believe that achieving such a delivery time 
was either possible or necessary. Nonetheless this target refocused the 
organisation on customers. 
Foundry Insurance's service target became to achieve a 24-hour turnaround of 
inspection reports. (CTO_SOC # 6.14) 
6.4.9 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"I think that being focussed upon here that this was a job, was a job for 
life. It was a family operation, and it was quite cosy. And I think there 
was this lack of awareness that the world out there is quite a hectic place, 
and the fact that we had never suffered any need to reduce staff numbers 
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or_ anything of that nature. This little cosy world was going on ... and I 
thmk they need to understand the business, they need to understand 
profit and losses, the importance of doing this, the importance of service 
... I think it's gone through from reacting to what the new 'Sir' says, 
t~at's (the new m~naging director), saying 'I don't understand why, but 
I v~ gotta to do It because he says so', through to appreciating the 
business, the bottom line, the customer, this is the big culture change. 
'Somebody out there actually depends on me'. 
I was completely destroying the old way of thinking . . . the whole 
objective is - how do we get Mr Customer happy by dealing with his 
enquiry or his request there and then. If you send him a letter, can that 
person complete the task; why not? what IT do we have to develop; these 
things have to be looked at." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"Prior to the change initiative, we had never had any redundancies, we 
were very proud that you could join Foundry Insurance, you could stay 
there for life. 
The main focus was providing better service to our customers. And 
really rationalising a lot of our processes. Making them much more 
efficient to obtain or produce a better customer service." 
(Implementation Team Leader) 
"How they see Foundry Insurance as a company, I think. So we've been 
a very patriarchal sort of organisation, and a lot of people perhaps lament 
that change because, in the old days - 'the good old days', some people 
say, don't they? In the old days, urn, you knew where you were, you 
came here at 16 and knew you could work through to 60 or 65 and then 
get a pension and whatever." (Implementation Team Member) 
"Instead of lots of people dealing with something, in every case one 
person is going to deal with it, and it will be their responsibility and 
they'll be empowered to do it.' Now I spelled all of this out for our 
managers, and at the end of the presentation, you could have heard a pin 
drop. And from the back of the room someone said 'Hans Christian 
Anderson - fairy tales'. Now I never did discover who it was but he's 
not with us any more." (Managing Director) 
6.4.9 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
People, at all levels of the organisation, held a number of assumptions 
about the organisation. They assumed that they had a job for life. The 
organisation had never reduced the number of people working in the 
organisation nor had anyone ever been made redundant. People assumed that 
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provided they followed the instructions of their line managers they would 
remain secure in their job. 
Whereas the board wanted people at all levels to realise that they no 
longer had a job for life within Foundry Insurance. This was a fundamental 
change for those people who typically joined at age 16 and left at retirement. 
People also changed their assumption that their activity could be performed in 
the same way without reference to external customers. The managing director 
wanted people to be responsible for satisfying customers and this required one 
person to be responsible for completing a task rather than having several people 
involved, of which no single individual had responsibility for the task. People 
became aware of the external environment, especially the importance of 
customer service and its effects upon profitability. 
Foundry Insurance's board recognised prevailing operational assumptions were 
untenable and changed them to align with the redesigned inspection process. 
(CTO_SOC # 6.15) 
6.4.10 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"This company having been, if you like, led by (the previous general 
manager) who, if you like, led from the top, i.e. he controlled the budget, 
he controlled the purse strings. But really what he did was he tried to run 
the company just by himself. And people just carried out functions." 
(Deputy Managing Director) 
"Rather than it be every five minutes, you know, 'What are you doing', 
'Why are you spending this', 'What are you doing there' ... where the 
previous regime had been 'Can't you share a piece here between four of 
you?' It was minding the pennies, and 'don't spend this', 'Do you really 
need to do that?"'(Customer Services Manager) 
6.4.10 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The previous general manager and semor managers did not share 
financial and hence, operational control with line managers. The previous 
general managers and senior managers expected line managers in the 
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organisation to justify virtually every item of expenditure. The focus was upon 
controlling costs and line managers dealing with customers shared resources 
rather than having the resources necessary to satisfy customers. The previous 
general manager continued to control costs and to pay little heed to the effects of 
reducing costs upon customer service until his retirement. 
In Foundry Insurance, the previous management team did not accept that greater 
emphasis needed to be placed on customer service than upon controlling costs. 
(CTO_SOC # 6.16) 
6.4.11 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"One of the big taboos, and I can remember the old General Manager, 
the man who used to appear twice a year in an annual conference or a 
meeting we had upstairs; when somebody asked him about the 
investment income, he was nearly banished overseas. You don't talk 
about investment income." (Engineering Manager) 
"Previously people were starved of what you would term facts and 
figures. A departmental manager never knew how he was really doing 
according to his budget, unless either he kept his own personal records, 
or every now and again sort of quarterly, somebody would float out some 
figures as recorded somewhere of 'This is what it is; now would you tell 
me if we're still going to hit the target at the end of the year?' And that 
was only a bit of it." (Deputy Managing Director) 
6.4.11 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The previous general manager expected people to do their job without 
asking questions related to financial and operational performance information. 
Line managers were not given basic information about their department's 
performance against budget. Some line managers kept their own records to 
estimate whether or not they were within budget. People at all levels were not 
expected to ask for financial and operational information and those who did ask 
were treated as outcasts. 
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The previous board did not accept that operational assumptions such as 
withholding information actually needed to change. (CTO _SOC# 6.17) 
6.4.12 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Another example, I was trying to introduce a new computer system 
which conveyed revenue account information for the first time to NV by 
premiums and claims information, and I said this statistical package that 
our parent company had been using for years, we ought to have, because 
it will help the underwriters underwrite. The No. 2 at that time said 
'That's nothing to do with the underwriters, the General Manager sets 
the rates' and that again is the psychology of it all, is that it was not your 
job, it was his job. And he was quite benign in his despot of misery ... 
(the go-betweens) could almost say to the General Manager- 'I think this 
is a good idea!I don't it's good idea' and he can get the blame and the 
other guy is not running his department because he's having to refer 
upwards all the time . . . I can recall because I found that fascinating, 
because I find myself making certain decisions without Sir's approval -
not that he disapproved but it was the culture. You referred matters to 
there. I remember I was supposed, on certain other topics, go through a 
colleague because it was his job to take these things to the General 
Manager for approval. I always turned round and said 'Oh, sorry I forgot 
again', simply because I didn't want to be bogged down by going 
through him ... and even at one stage when that guy left, I suddenly had 
the same responsibility - that colleagues were supposed to come to me 
for authorisation for additional staff or replacements and so on, and I 
would convey them to the General Manager. And I killed that off fairly 
quickly because all I was acting was a go-between, almost a mini-power-
house." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"In the old days, we used to have an 0 & M Division who would go 
round and help document procedures, and it could take a year to get the 
agreement of each divisional head to the very smallest changes because 
were looking at 'This is my area and I don't want that to happen, so, sort 
of, on your bike'. Nowadays people very much work a lot closer 
together and take an over company view rather than 'This is my patch, 
I'm going to dictate what goes on in it'." (Implementation Team Leader) 
6.4.12 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The previous board discouraged line managers from taking decisions or 
improving particular activities. The board expected line managers to refer their 
requests to a more senior manager in the hierarchy, until the request reached the 
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general manager. Consequently, a tier of 'go-betweens' was created. These 
people relayed line managers' requests to the general manager for authorisation, 
and affected operational decisions and managers' performance. These go-
betweens took no responsibility for the decisions they influenced. The previous 
board also allowed functional directors to determine whether changes were 
implemented in their functions. Each director took their own time to agree 
changes to activities in their area, and could reject changes without providing 
any justification for their decision. 
The previous management team did not accept that people's responsibilities 
should extend beyond their immediate job or be collaborative across hierarchy 
and function. (CTO_SOC # 6.18) 
6.4.13 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"So there's this greater awareness. There's also that awareness of effect 
of increased premiums or increased claims. What would that do for the 
bottom line, so that it's recognised that it that's going wrong, you may 
have to cut back on expenses because you're under target so take some 
costs off here. So there's that much, much greater awareness than ever 
existed before at all levels ... we started telling people where money was 
being spent. We produced figures which were never produced before for 
the senior management of the organisation. And for the management. 
Every departmental manager now gets details of his budget expenses." 
(Deputy Managing Director) 
"We need to understand all those (financial figures) not only as an 
individual but as what the real company targets are. The fact that I've 
got to do the job with one person and not two, is because there's a good 
financial reason for doing that to keep the expenses down." (Line 
Manager) 
6.4.13 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The new board accepted that people should have financial and 
operational performance information. They wanted people at all levels to be 
aware of the effects of increases in premiums or greater claims on the bottom 
line. The organisation began providing detailed financial and operational 
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information for the senior managers and departmental managers. Having such 
information made these managers aware of the impact of decisions taken in the 
inspection process, e.g. price changes and resource cutbacks upon customer 
service and profitability. 
Foundry Insurance's new managing director and board members accepted that 
line managers should actually have financial and operational information. 
(CTO_SOC # 6.19) 
6.4.14 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
Found'Y Insurance Limited 
Structure Chart (circa. January 1991) 
I Managing Director J 
Claims and Overseas II Sales and Customer Servic~J I Information Technology J l Finance Jl Engineering J l Support Services J 95 people 274 people 
1 Contingency J ~ Sales 45 people 104 people 
1 Claims I H Marketing 34 people 13 people 
1 R/1 & Overseas I 1 csu 16 people 157 people 
I 
I 
I 
29 people 66 people 
41T I Computer services J 1 Accounts 29 people 46 people 
1 NSVP 20 people 
Foundry Insurance limited 
Structure Chart (circa. January 1995) 
l Managing Director J 
J 1 
J K 
K 
K 
1 
1 
K 
K 
y 
754 people 85 people 
Marketing J K Office Services J 8 people 37 people 
Boiler J K Personnel J 162 people 15 people 
Electrical J K Training J 87 people 2 people 
Machinery J K PoHcy J 262 people 25 people 
Administration j ~ Type J 128 people 6 people 
Laboratories I 11 people 
NOT J 48 people 
Special Services J 39 people 
Managers office J 9 people 
l Claims and Overseasj I Sales 30 people 1 02 people J Information Technology I l Finance J l 190 people J L..,--34_:p_eo-'-p_l•_~ L-,----'---~ Engineering J I 589 people Marketing Jl Project office J 67 people 19 people 
I r Cla;ms I Rein. I OIS J u Sales L 30 people 1 L 74 people HIT I Computer services I I r Accounts J H 39 people 1 L 34 people 
H Key accounts H Training J 20 people 6 people U~T==ec=hn=lc=al'=sa:=les== H Office Services J 
1 e people 22 peopte 
H csu J 115 people 
U Personnel J 
j 6 people 
K 
K 
K 
H_ 
H_ 
Standards II 30 people 
lSD J 39 people 
Engineers J 437 people 
Laboratories J 10 people 
NOT J 27 people 
Special Services I 29 people 
~L--'--'----'---WSQA I 17 people 
Marketing J 67 people 
"You have to start at the top levels, managers had to learn the skills of 
genuinely managing the department, managing and opera~ing within 
budgets, managing within service level requirements, managing peo~le, 
relating to colleagues ... managers have had to learn to st~rt managin.g 
. . . most of the senior people were more acting as supervisors of their 
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teams r~t~~r th~n managers of their teams. So although they may have a 
respons1b1hty, It was a responsibility for carrying out a function rather 
than managing the function." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"Ce~ainly t~e way ':e worked was very different, because my 
appmntment, mstead of m charge of a particular project, I reported direct 
to the Managing Director, and at the time, I was Assistant Manager 
Level, and that sort of thing was really unheard of within the 
organisation. They were very traditional narrow approach." 
(Implementation Team Leader) 
"Fred Wilson is now responsible for three areas that he wasn't before. 
So that started the channel - all the interface with the customer through 
one executive, instead of having this constant interplay. 'We can't afford 
to have different operating groups reporting through different 
executives'." (Implementation Team Member) 
"If you take (the Deputy Managing Director) as an example. At that 
time, he was probably just in charge of IT. He then ended up having 
responsibilities, and being executive for services - which is (the IT 
manager's) area. Also the services of the group, which like look after the 
buildings as well as IT. And really his area has grown a lot." 
(Implementation Team Leader) 
6.4.14 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The organisation changed in structure: a marketing function was created, 
support services was absorbed into the IT function, and customer services 
department was transferred to the IT function. The number of people reporting 
to the engineering director fell from 754 in 1991 to 589 in 1995; in the same 
time period, the number of people reporting to the director responsible for sales 
and customer service fell from 274 to 102; during the same period the numbers 
reporting to the IT director increased from 29 to 190. Board members and 
managers acted like supervisors of their function rather than managers of their 
function. They saw little need to change their function or department. Senior 
managers had to learn skills in order to manage and change their department. 
Managers were affected by changes in reporting lines and responsibilities, for 
example they reported directly to the managing director. 
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Directors and senior managers were affected by the changes, as the organisation 
structure and the number of people reporting to them changed, in some cases, 
significantly. (CTO _soc# 6.20). 
6.4.15 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"All they saw were redundancies, was very specifically to say we were 
not going to do it by compulsory redundancies, but we would encourage 
voluntary redundancies. So if people felt they didn't want to play, or for 
whatever reason they'd like to leave, we encouraged them by that 
means." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"When the voluntary redundancies came along, which wasn't long 
afterwards, 'Well yes that's not for me, so I'll go'. But at least (the 
managing director) set out a style that he wanted and it was up to 
individuals then to choose, wasn't it. Those who chose to do something 
different, well they took redundancy or left." (Implementation Team 
Member) 
Number of employees in 1991: 1303 
Number of employees in 1995: 1031 
(Source: Foundry Insurance structure chart) 
6.4.15 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board reduced the head count in the organisation by 20% over a 
four-year period. They did this through voluntary redundancies rather than 
compulsory redundancies. People were asked to consider whether they wanted 
to experience the changes, and those who felt the changes were not for them 
were encouraged to take voluntary redundancy. 
The board was willing to reduce the number of people employed by the 
organisation. (CTO_SOC # 6.21) 
6.4.16 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Yes as I say the budget was always centrally capped. Now in terms of 
' ' the way we spend our money and how managers are aware of what s 
happening; they have their budgets, they help set them. They have 
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information to help them monitor it. They have feedback mechanisms to 
say why it may be varying and so on. And all this again aimed at setting 
a target for the year of 'This is our bottom line target aim, and we're 
going to start from January onwards and see how we get there'. As for 
example, last year, mid-year, we realised that we'd slightly overspent on 
certain things, therefore we needed to adjust. We made the adjustments 
and came in reasonably OK at the end of the year ... Every departmental 
manager now gets details of his budget expenses, his budget, and what 
he has spent, and also has to keep saying 'Are we still on target? Are we 
likely to spend more? Are we likely to spend less? So there's a constant 
'now' review of expenditure. Managers, as a result of this, have become 
aware of the role of expenses." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"So to be part of the planning of the process, and to put down the budget 
behind those plans, then you know, you're responsible for it at the end of 
the day, and you cannot manipulate, and I think its just how the job 
should be." (Customer Services Manager) 
6.4.16 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Managers set their own budgets and submitted these to the board. The 
board provided managers with financial information that enabled them to 
monitor their budgets and respond to budget variances. The board adjusted 
budgets proactively, across the process, during the year rather than after a 
financial deadline. The board and managers took ownership of the business as a 
whole and the inspection process. Managers became accountable for meeting 
their budgets as well as achieving better levels of customer service. 
Foundry Insurance's board devolved control over budgets to senior managers 
who in tum, took responsibility to develop and operate their own budgets. 
(CTO_SOC # 6.22) 
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F3 6.5 Issues managed 
6.5.1 A and 6.5.1 Bare located in the body of Chapter 6. 
6.5.2 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Of the top ten managers, only two still are with us, and as you go down 
the levels, it's not dissimilar. The average age of our management team 
fell about fifteen years in the space of about twelve months. So an awful 
lot of people left who had been with us an awfully long time." 
(Managing Director) 
"We've had members of the executive team depart. Two or three on 
retirement, well, probably four on retirement at least, one of those due to 
a work pressure sort of retirement, another who decided he couldn't play 
with the new regime." (Deputy Managing Director) 
6.5.2 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Several members of the semor management team either took early 
retirement or resigned. These retirements and resignations presented the 
managing director with an opportunity to restructure the board and to recruit 
board members from outside the organisation and promote from within. The 
people recruited to senior management positions were younger than the people 
they replaced, and the average age of the management team fell significantly in a 
short period of time. 
Board members retired or resigned, and the board was restructured with new 
board members appointed from outside or promoted from within the 
organisation. (IM_SOC # 6.24) 
6.5.3 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Now my v1s10n was, if we could actually get back the valuable 
difference, if we can get to the point where our people merely added 
value, we would release absolutely enormous potential within the 
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organisation. There was a goldmine there waiting to be exploited ... 
Now for most of our major processes our cycle times literally ran in 
months. But as the key processes were analysed, what you found was 
that the added value, the valuable difference bit was actually a minuscule 
part of the total, less than 1%, well under 1% ... I felt we had to define a 
crystal clear internal vision of where we wanted to go. Where did we 
want our business to actually be positioned? And were did we want to 
take it as an organisation?" (Managing Director) 
"There was also a vision that (the new managing director) certainly came 
out with, which was you know, customer service, tum round enquiries, 
tum round correspondence and queries, and quotations within 24 hours. 
So there was very much a vision set there. And everything that was 
being done was geared to trying to attain that vision. So I think that 
certainly helped." (Implementation Team Leader) 
"Whereas (the managing director) was saying 'Well there's more to it 
than that, we've got to recognise where we're trying to go, how we're 
trying to get there, the whole picture, and 'you' have got to do it ... this 
is what we're going to do about risk management, this is what we're 
going to do about the expenses, and for everybody to be 'Yes, we agree' 
rather than, er, 'Well I don't want to cut my expenses here. I'm hoping 
he will. No it's not our pigeon, it's his'. Then you have the next levels 
of managers translating that and using it in a way of creating a certain 
amount of conflict, unnecessary conflict .. .I think it's critical because if 
the top team doesn't work well together then it's impossible to ask the 
rest of the organisation to be working together, because they will see 
division. If somebody sees it that way, and somebody sees it that way, 
and therefore we need to be collective in our viewpoint . . . get the top 
team collectively, and agreeing collectively, they don't have to all totally 
agree with everything. Somebody's going to say 'You're going to have 
to cut the half a million in your area' is OK except inevitably it goes 
forward ... We started at exec. levels. You've gotta start leading, setting 
the tone, doing things, setting budgets and so on, and appreciating 
you've got a contribution to play as part of the totality ... once you've 
got people to start understanding that perhaps your role in the 
organisation was a little wider than just producing policies for 
yourselves, as it were, then a little more education, so you needed to 
talking to people, to manage them in the sense of what it is that they are 
really about is being part of the process." (Deputy Managing Director) 
6.5.3 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The new managing director developed a vision he termed 'the valuable 
difference', which focused upon adding value to customers. The vision, which 
was new to the organisation, set out the service target of delivering reports and 
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policies to customers within 24 hours. The managing director explained his 
vision to people at all levels of the business to ensure they had a common 
understanding of the vision. He wanted board members to consider the 
inspection process in its totality rather than focussing upon their individual 
function. The managing director and the board discussed and agreed the targets 
to be achieved by the inspection process. This agreement enabled board 
members to work together during the implementation of the inspection process. 
Consequently, senior managers were unable to exploit differences between 
board members: However, not all board members agreed to place the inspection 
process ahead of their function. The managing director explained to board 
members and managers that while each of them managed their particular 
function or department, they also contributed to achieving and maintaining the 
inspection process's performance. It was no longer acceptable for functional 
managers to optimise their function's activities to the detriment of the inspection 
process. 
The board agreed a new vision and objectives for the organisation. (IM_SOC # 
6.25) 
6.5.4 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"I don't want this to sound awfully macho or bloody, but I'm afraid there 
was a pretty high attrition rate within the organisation." (Managing 
Director) 
"There have been a few people who have not liked the changes and not 
particularly in the technical area, but in other areas who've fallen by the 
wayside, and have actually left, and they weren't committed. They 
didn't want the change, 'This isn't how we used to do it' sort of thing, 
'We don't want a change', couldn't see what was wrong." (Engineering 
Manager) 
6.5.4 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
A number of people left the organisation, as they were unable to accept 
the changes brought about by the implementation of the inspection process. 
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People left the organisation because they did not accept the proposed changes. 
(IM_SOC # 6.26) 
6.5.5 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"People need to understand why. I think it will help if they understand 
why." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"Understanding the objectives, is another one. What is that we're 
actually trying to do? And getting everybody to understand what those 
objectives are, as a corporate body rather than a hundred sets of 
individual views. If you can actually understand what the objectives and 
the benefits are, why we're doing something, it's easy to sell it to 
everybody, and to get them on board. 
We've been so used to doing things in the dark, behind closed doors, and 
then there's been turmoil, 'What are we doing this for?' If we can get 
that broad understanding of the objectives and benefits up front within 
everybody, then the acceptance of the change- they can see why we're 
doing it, they can see what we want to do, what we want to achieve." 
(Customer Services Manager) 
"I mean that, from personal experience, somebody could tell me 
something's happening. If I didn't know why, or understand why it was 
happening, then you can have resentment building up again, frustration; 
people feeling that they're not valued. You know, 'the organisation isn't 
valued enough to tell us why something's going on'." (Implementation 
Team Leader) 
6.5.5 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board and senior managers explained the organisation's vision and 
objectives to people at all levels within the inspection process. The board and 
senior managers accepted that people wanted to know, for example, why the 
changes were necessary, what the board and senior managers were going to do, 
what benefits were anticipated. They recognised that decisions taken behind 
closed doors and not shared with people in the inspection process would result in 
personal turmoil, resistance to proposed changes, fear and anxiety. For many 
managers and staff, having board members and managers explain the 
organisation's vision and objectives was a fundamental change from the way in 
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which the previous board treated them, which was to keep people in the dark 
about changes. 
The board and managers accepted that people wanted to know about the changes 
due to take place and they became more open with this information. (IM _SOC # 
6.27) 
6.5.6 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"I think they (people in the inspection process) need to understand the 
business, they need to understand profit and losses, the importance of 
doing this, the importance of service. If you don't provide a service, 
you'll lose business. 
Thinking of how they were going to run the business, how they were 
going to spend the money, and to be able to answer the why's and 
wherefore's and to justify them. 
We went into proper budgeting where everybody became involved from 
the executives down to the managers in particular. So that they 
themselves had to justify what they were doing." (Deputy Managing 
Director) 
"But now we do, and we're open and up front with it, and it's showed in 
the business figures. So we are a lot more open about how the company 
is because we want to bring people along. If the company's not 
profitable, you haven't got a job." (Engineering Manager) 
"If they're involved, if they feel part of it, it's their business, their 
process, their company, their profit, to feel part of it they can contribute, 
they're not just sat there in the dark as a bunch of people or numbers of 
whatever." (Customer Services Manager) 
6.5.6 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board wanted senior managers to know about the organisation's 
financial performance and service levels provided to customers. Senior 
managers recognised and accepted that people reporting to them had a 'right to 
know' why they were being asked to change their working practices. Senior 
managers ensured people felt motivated and valued during the transition by 
providing them with relevant financial and operational information. 
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The managmg director gave semor managers actual profit and loss 
information. The board made managers responsible for their budgets. 
Managers, for the first time, set their own budgets and took responsibility for the 
budgets they set. Line managers developed plans and justified these through 
discussions with board members and peers. Managers understood the effects of 
poor service levels upon profitability, and that service level improvement 
depended upon their actions. 
Board members shared financial information and devolved budgetary 
responsibility to managers. (IM_SOC # 6.28) 
6.5.7 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Because people were, with this IT information you see, we knew where 
people were. In the past they'd say 'No, I'm busy, I've got this to do and 
that to do', and we didn't know whether they had or whether they hadn't. 
And what they'd been doing was spinning out the work that they had got, 
rather than getting on with it, doing it this week and leaving themselves a 
week or a fortnight clear when they could do that." (Engineering 
Manager) 
"We need to communicate, 'Yeah, well I'll tell you when you need to 
know, but I need to know costs here' because there has always been the 
sense that it happened with (the previous general manager). As long as I 
know everything, that's the main thing, so you tell me, I won't 
necessarily tell you, but I know everything." (Deputy Managing 
Director) 
6.5.7 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Senior managers and line managers, such as team leaders, received better 
operational information. For example, engineering managers were unaware of 
the sites engineers visited on a particular day. As a result, engineers were able 
to obscure the true state of overdue inspections in their district. The managing 
director and implementation teams ensured managers received the information 
they required for managing the inspection process. Managers designed reports 
to format the information in ways that were relevant to them. 
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Managers have operational information required to manage the inspection 
process. (IM_ SOC # 6.29) 
6.5.8 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"I should say that two way communication is more important. You can 
write a lot down, you can produce videos or whatever, but it doesn't give 
the opportunity for feedback, and certainly from experience, face-to-face 
in smaller groups is the most effective form of communication. And 
people ... it's a basic human need I think to feel involved, to know what's 
happening." (Implementation Team Leader) 
"We have the people at the higher level now coming down talking to the 
staff ... (the engineering director) spoke to all the staff ... to allay fears, 
to help people, see the way through - mainly to allay fears, for the 
opportunity to question and to talk. That was all unheard of before. It 
was a question of 'This is what we're going to do. We know best. 
Never ask the staff. So now it's more the bottom fed situation where 
people are asked to contribute ... I can remember standing in front of the 
surveyors and trying to say 'Look, don't have a go at me, because if 
you've got no work, I've got no work. We're trying to do it together, I 
value your opinion, and I'm telling you about investment income, for 
example. I'm being honest with you - this is how much money we get 
from these large clients, this is how much money we get from the small 
clients. Don't worry too much about the small clients. You can lose a 
hundred small clients, but you lose one big one - you've lost more 
money'. Being open with people and telling them, you know, what the 
consequences of their actions were ... I'm saying to the surveyors, 'You 
know, we're all in the same team together'. That's what I'm saying, that 
we've got to be committed." (Engineering Manager) 
"So I think, getting people to understand at all levels what's going on, 
getting managers in particular to understand their role and their 
contribution within the total picture is going to be a lot better, and they 
can only do some of that by discussion." (Deputy Managing Director) 
6.5.8 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board and senior managers communicated the vision, objectives and 
financial and operational performance information to people at all levels. These 
communications were carried out using a variety of modes. Face-to-face 
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communications in small groups is considered one of the more effective modes 
of conveying information relevant to the changes that are to take place and the 
issues will be implemented. This mode allows people to feedback their 
comments and to discuss specific issues with board members and senior 
managers. Board members used face-to-face communications to allay people's 
fears about the changes. They recognised that without people's support, 
implementation would not be achieved. 
Board members were willing to communicate with people on a face-to-face 
basis, in small groups. (IM_SOC # 6.30) 
6.5.9 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Our customers - clearly we had to win back their confidence and we had 
to get them back to a frame of mind where we would be their first 
choice." (Managing Director) 
"Realisation by the staff that the company had to change and had to 
increase productivity, get the cost down to stay in business. And that 
was taken on board ... people realised that if they didn't change, the jobs 
would go. They could begin to see, and even more so now, they could 
begin to see the loss of work ... they could see that the competition was 
taking their work, so they in the field could see that or begin to see that 
. . . we communicated this message, that we have got to improve 
productivity and get the costs down, otherwise there's no work for 
anybody and it's this team. 
The surveyors have a trade union and they know that some of the 
companies were making people redundant, and that's not happened here, 
except a few who volunteered ... so there is a certain amount of fear, it's 
all wrapped up in the same thing - fear and security and so on, and the 
realisation of what you've got to do in today's world to stay alive, is the 
Issue. It all keeps coming back to that same thing." (Engineering 
Manager) 
"Instil this appreciation that everything out there is changing and we've 
got to be very commercial. We've got to be very with it, otherwise 
we're dead. And I don't think people initially believed it. But I think 
that they now understand that we weren't doing what it is that we should 
be doing ... it's critical in helping people understand why changes need 
to take place. I think that sometimes, and you know, you can actually 
cringe, and I know (the managing director) has actually done this with 
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the staff, i.s when he says 'I followed this case through'. It's only when 
y~u explmn that to people, 'Now this is what it looks like', that people 
thmk, 'That's not very good, is it?' But they have never realised it, 
because they have never looked outwards, they always looked inwards 
... it's 'why do we need to reduce our staff numbers?' Well if you don't 
explain it to them and it's part of the business that our expense bottom 
line is too high, therefore it makes us less competitive which means we 
may not get as much business, which means we will go backwards rather 
than forwards. People can understand that and even most clerks can 
understand it ... this world is a world that they all know in their own 
personal budgeting circumstances, you can't spend more than that, or 
Mr. McCauber 6p Profit Elation, 6p Negative Depression." (Deputy 
Managing Director) 
6.5.9 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board's communication of the organisation's v1s10n had a 
commercial edge that made people aware of changing customer demands, higher 
competitive pressures, financial losses and the effects of these upon staff and 
their employment prospects with the organisation. People realised that the 
vision required them to be externally focused. The board ensured people 
understood the implications of the information they were receiving, namely that 
their job was at risk. Board members provided managers, team leaders and 
clerks with common and consistent message about the proposed changes. 
Consequently, people developed a shared outlook of the organisation's future 
and the implications of not implementing the inspection process. They 
recognised the effects of external changes upon them, e.g. competitors making 
their employees compulsorily redundant, even though these very competitors 
were taking business away from Foundry Insurance. They accepted that to not 
change towards the new vision would result eventually in job losses. 
People in the organisation received consistent messages about external pressures 
facing the organisation and the need to implement the inspection process. 
(IM_SOC # 6.31) 
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6.5.10 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"So we went out to talk to our customers. We got in an external 
consultancy, and they wrote a voluminous report, it ran to 500 pages 
when they had finished; 17 major areas were looked, Service Record, 
Quality, Value Added. You name it, they looked at it. The results were 
absolutely and utterly dismal, they were dreadful. Out of all the points in 
the report, there was only one thing where we scored anything 
approaching a satisfactory rating, and that was the technical excellence 
of our people. There was not doubt in the market place, our people 
technically were good. Our problem was everything else surrounding 
them was abysmal. And that was having a major impact on our 
business." (Managing Director) 
"'My job is to do this'. I can quote a guy who was in charge of the 
policy department. He's the guy who produces the policies, head of the 
typing pool and so on. When somebody wanted a policy as a matter of 
priority, he was very upset because it upset his scheme of things. 'Here's 
my pile of priorities, and I'll work through this pile, now you want this 
one. Now that's very upsetting because that's going to put this one back' 
... then when you actually play this back to people. 'This is how we deal 
with our customers', people go 'Gosh, it's us', and nobody fully realises, 
and managers didn't realise that this was happening." (Deputy 
Managing Director) 
6.5.10 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Foundry Insurance commissioned an external consultancy organisation 
to conduct a survey of its customers. The survey covered a wide range of 
service issues such as Foundry Insurance's service quality, service record, 
technical ability and the value of the overall service. The survey results revealed 
that Foundry Insurance fell below customer expectations on all aspects of 
service bar one: the excellent technical abilities of its engineers. Foundry 
Insurance's pricing was at the top end of the market, and customers accepted 
these higher prices because of their long-standing relationship and the technical 
expertise they received. However, adverse economic conditions in the late 80's 
and early 90's forced many customers to become sensitive to service levels and 
price. Customers were also unwilling to tolerate overdue inspections and delays 
in having reports sent to them. These delays were due to people being internally 
174 
focussed. The board gave people customer feedback so that they realised, for 
themselves, the effects their performance had on service levels. 
The board commissioned a survey and the results revealed that customers' 
expectations were not being satisfied and gave people, in the organisation, 
customer feedback about the quality of service customers received. (IM SOC # 
6.32) 
6.5.11 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Well I think in a less formal organisation again, individuals who were 
doing the work, who were closest to the customer, who probably have an 
awful lot to offer in terms of ideas, suggestions, feel more able to 
contribute. So I think it aided the flow of information with suggestions 
and ideas ... I think also it helps individuals in an organisation as well ... 
you don't get the same positive result if you are dictating to people. If 
people feel they've been involved in that change process, then they're 
going to make sure it works. They've had the opportunity to contribute 
and shape their future effectively. If you have someone on higher saying 
'We're going to be doing this', then with poor communication as well, 
you might get compliance but you will lose great opportunities for the 
development of the organisation." (Implementation Team Leader) 
"I think getting engineers and clerical staff to contribute helps them, it 
motivates them, they feel valued, they feel part of the organisation. 
Their opinions, their attitudes are discussed, considered, taking into 
account. They can contribute and ... if you look at the contrary to that -
they're just sat there in the dark being passed pieces of paper, not 
knowing why they are doing something. They don't understand the 
function, they don't understand why they're doing it, what they're doing 
it for, and really it just becomes a routine, mundane." (Customer 
Services Manager) 
6.5.11 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The new managing director began sharing information, and consequently 
other board members and managers began changing their behaviour, as they too 
shared information. Board members and managers shared information to ensure 
people at lower levels of the hierarchy felt that they too were an integral part of 
the implementation of the inspection process. The board recognised that people 
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at lower levels, especially those that came into contact with customers, e.g. 
engineers and administration clerks, had much to offer and contribute to the 
organisations future direction. The board wanted these people to own the 
business and it's objectives. Board members recognised that a major barrier to 
gaining their support was providing information to them on a 'need to know 
basis'. 
Board members and senior managers recognised that people at lower levels of 
the organisation, e.g. engineering and clerical levels, are important to the 
organisation's future. (IM_SOC # 6.33) 
6.5.12 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Redundancy, the voluntary redundancy situation. Urn, if we had known 
that roles were definitely not going to be needed, I think we could have 
managed it probably more effectively from the organisation's point of 
view by a compulsory redundancy or by voluntary. It sounds a bit awful, 
that, but what has tended to happen is that individual ... good individuals 
who could probably have done with staying and helping shape our 
future, have taken the opportunity to move elsewhere. So we've lost 
some people that would have been very useful for us ... were doing the 
right thing and letting people go voluntarily, and we're still in that 
situation. We haven't had any compulsory redundancies. So whilst 
individuals have benefited from that, I think, organisationally, we've lost 
some good people but perhaps we needn't have done. And rather than 
tum round and say 'No, we don't want you to go on voluntary 
redundancy, we want you to stay and help, to help us for the future', 
we've perhaps been a bit too understanding from that point but then 
again, I mean, that's sort of a double-edged sword, because if someone 
came and asked for it and we refused, what motivation are they going to 
have anyway, when they've obviously planned their future on as well." 
(Implementation Team Leader) 
"So a lot of people have left and I think we have to accept that not all of 
them were the right people to leave. Some of them had a lot of 
knowledge and expertise tied up in their heads, and they've been allowed 
to leave and mistakes have been made I think." (Implementation Team 
Member) 
"If you look at the people that were here then, who are here now, it's 
totally different ... we have to work very carefully with the union over 
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this, because they don't like us thinking we're reducing numbers and 
thinking redundancies if we're recruiting ... people worrying about their 
jobs - 'Well if I don't keep checking these things, well that's half my 
work gone' ... I suspect behind it is this fear of job reduction. So there's 
this reluctance to keep simplifying the process or eradicating certain 
steps, or getting rid of unnecessary activities . . . I think that actually 
applies at the middle level management, because they don't like to be the 
hard hearted people." (Deputy Managing Director) 
6.5.12 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
People in Foundry Insurance assumed they had a job for life. However, 
the board reduced the number of employees by 20% in the space of 4 years 
(1991-1995). Employee turnover during this period was very high with several 
hundred people being replaced. The board knew that employees and the trade 
union would resist actions taken to make people redundant on one hand, while 
recruiting on the other hand. The board relied on two mechanisms to reduce 
numbers of employees. One, by allowing staff at or nearing retirement age to 
take early retirement. Two, the organisation introduced a voluntary redundancy 
scheme, as this route was less harsh than making people compulsorily 
redundant. However, the voluntary redundancy scheme was announced and 
introduced prior to defining roles needed in the inspection process. A number of 
'good' people and experts took voluntary redundancy and left. The board 
introduced the voluntary redundancy scheme early, as they were under pressure 
to reduce costs quickly. This pressure overshadowed the potential loss of good 
people. The board and senior managers recognised that the fear of job 
reductions prevented people from being fully committed to the inspection 
process in spite of introducing a 'no compulsory redundancy' policy. Managers 
had never previously made people redundant, and as most people had worked 
together for a considerable time, managers found severing personal ties difficult. 
The board introduced early retirement and voluntary redundancy schemes to 
reduce costs quickly and avoid trade union conflicts, but lost some 'good' 
people. (IM_SOC # 6.34) 
177 
6.5.13 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Somebody had a sort of breakdown, couldn't continue, and that was 
be~ause there wasn't enough time for him to develop himself, to catch up 
as It were. He was suddenly being asked to do things that we hadn't 
prepared him for. It was a company issue, not a (managing director 
related) issue. 
We have created stress by a lot of the change. Now stress is not just 
merely hard work, but I think stress is also occasioned by interfaces with 
people. I can create stress on people but being unreasonable with them 
in the sense of 'Don't tell me you problems, just deliver'. 'I'm not going 
to give you the resources but just deliver' or whatever it is and not 
helping people handle the stress . . . I think if you are causing so much 
change, if you don't understand it, you're causing change, or you're 
causing people a lot of uncertainty or anxiety, you don't recognise it, 
then you can be creating extra stress, and are you going to get the best 
out of people, both in the way of loyalty, support ... 'OK I know you're 
doing your best, I've given you 16 jobs, it's unreasonable of me to 
expect you to do all16 jobs. Let's sort out which are the important ones 
so you don't feel zapped by it'. . . . sometimes we can be very 
unreasonable in our demands because we maybe demanded upon and all 
we're doing is sort of shoving it down the line. 
I think from that point of view, if one of my people can't come to me 
saying 'Can you give me a hand, I can't cope with the load, or can you 
help me with the priorities?' I'm sure you can come to an agreement. 
When a person feels they can't do that, therefore you're not helping to 
manage their stress, and therefore they may either not tum in, or they're 
going to try and ... I think there's also a realisation or has to be a 
realisation that you can only expect people to do so much. And if you 
don't share it with them, they're going to suffer. 'I can't satisfy him, I'm 
doing my best. I can't do more than that.' And if you don't have some 
dialogue, then I think somebody could suffer ... or alternatively, we're 
feeling it and we're not talking about it. Management of stress is 
important because I think it gets the end result. It helps build that team 
approach which says 'OK I understand, perhaps I was being 
unreasonable'." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"I mean again, I think as human beings you get to a situation where 
you're comfortable- a change can sometimes be seen as a threat. So you 
hear a whisper about 'moving premises' for example, which is one that 
has been going around for a while. You know, 'Ifwe're going to move, 
how will that affect me? How will that affect my lifestyle?'. It's very 
natural for people to worry about change. And what we try and do by 
managing that situation is to minimise the stress, the worry, the concern 
that people can or might be facing." (Implementation Team Leader) 
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"Keep people on board and have them on board with us all the way 
through, we can see why we need to change. There's no fear in it though 
because a lot the changes that we've done in the past we've done without 
~he kno.wledge, consultation, and it develops this feeling of fear, worry, 
msecunty. So now we've got this understanding up front that people 
know what it is that we're doing, and why we're trying to do it, then we 
remove that kind of problem." (Customer Services Manager) 
6.5.13 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Board members did not realise, at first, the level of stress people 
experienced during the implementation of the inspection process. People were 
given responsibilities but were unprepared for achieving what had been asked of 
them. This culminated in one person suffering a nervous breakdown. This 
person's trauma heightened board members and senior managers awareness that 
the implementation of the inspection process causes people to feel a high degree 
of stress as they took on additional implementor and recipient roles concurrently 
with taking on new working responsibilities, changing working practices and 
personal relationships. People also felt uncertainty and anxiety about their 
personal future. 
Board members and managers attempted to support people in order to 
reduce their fears, anxieties and stress levels. They achieved this by recognising 
when they were making unreasonable demands on implementation team 
members and recipients changing priorities, managing rumours, and consulting 
with people in the organisation through face-to-face communications. For some 
board members and managers this required a change in their own behaviour. 
Board members and managers recognised and attempted to reduce people's 
fears, anxieties and stress levels by changing their own behaviour and by 
supporting people through the implementation. (IM_SOC # 6.35) 
6.5.14 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"It's a one-to-one, it's give them the opportunity of questioning me. It's 
gives me the opportunity of questioning them, and it gives us both the 
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op~ortunity of discussing where we feel that that person's place is and 
the1r pert,ormance criteria at the time. So on the people issues, big step 
forward. (Customer Services Manager) 
"Whereas under like My-Plan, it's far better because you can say to 
s~~ebody 'Well you know, what do you think?' And really if you're 
g1vmg them chance to air their views, then really you're learning 
probably from one another, because, as I say, you might have totally 
assessed a person wrong, when you then speak person." (Departmental 
Team Leader) 
"Now the annual appraisal - those facts of course were presented rather 
than 'how are you doing?' It's 'well, this is how you are doing'. So it 
was turned round . . . so they understood then where we were coming 
from . . . we had the information to present to them, rather than them tell 
us everything was hunky dorey, up to date, etc. We couldn't prove it 
wasn't ... Now we can, we can. That was the main thing. The appraisal 
of a surveyor - the actual reporting is probably one of ten characters of 
how we appraise surveyors. You know, it's their attitude - we go out 
with them, we look at them whilst they're doing certain inspections, 
that's part of the appraisal. We see how their manner is with certain 
clients, we see how they dress, we see the content of their reports, the 
correct use of English." (Engineering Manager) 
6.5.14 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Board members, managers and team leaders, who appraise others, enter 
into a dialogue with appraisees. Board members, managers, and team leaders 
appraise people who report to them on a one-to-one basis. Appraisal meetings 
are semi-structured and individuals discuss their contribution to the inspection 
process, potential strengths and weaknesses, training needs and successes. Line 
managers and individuals have information relevant to each individual's 
contribution to the inspection process prior to the appraisal meeting. For 
example, in the past, line managers had little information on engineers' 
performance, and engineers had no criteria against which they knew their 
performance would be measured. However, line managers and engineers agree 
assessment criteria at appraisal meetings. These criteria are aligned to the 
requirements of the inspection process. 
The organisation introduced a personal development plan called My-
Plan. Each employee has his or her own My-Plan, which is completed and 
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signed as an integral part of the appraisal meeting. My-Plan records the 
individual's assessment criteria, responsibilities and activities, and duties to be 
carried out. These are related to the department's objectives as part of the 
inspection process and key personal, operational and performance objectives 
including actions, performance measures, training needs and completion dates. 
Hence individuals know the basis upon which they will be assessed the 
following year. 
People aligned appraisal criteria to the inspection process and made the annual 
appraisal meeting discursive. (IM _SOC # 6.36) 
6.5.15 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"I remember when (the new managing director) came in to see me when 
he was introduced by the previous General Manager, he said to me 
'What are your problems?' and I said, 'Our problem is overdue 
inspections. That's what causing this company to get a bad name in the 
market, particularly in the property market'. And he asked me what we 
were doing about it. And we've done several things. The property 
market in London was a major problem ... and we couldn't afford at that 
time to put people in London because they couldn't afford the housing. 
So we introduced, what we called 'satellite working'. So we managed 
our way out of that by getting people from all over the country on 
convenient commuter lines, say Liverpool to London, Manchester to 
London, the north-east down to London, and we put these people up in 
an hotel where we negotiated a decent price, and gave them two weeks or 
a month's work in London as their responsibility, and that worked. We 
were told first of all, when we first started people were sceptical, didn't 
want to go. But after a while, because we made it comfortable for them; 
we sent them in pairs and the like, they actually found it somewhat of a 
holiday." (Engineering Manager) 
"He (the new managing director) looked at things, he did a walkabout of 
the company and he saw things taking place, and he said 'Well why did 
we do that?' and some answers were, 'Well we've always done that', 
'Well you know, what's wrong- it takes three months to issue a policy, 
so what', you know, 'That's the industry standard', but from where he 
was looking from a different plain altogether, he looked at it and 
probably thought to himself, well 'It shouldn't take more than a couple 
of days to do that, why on earth does it take three months?"' 
(Implementation Team Member) 
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"I took our simplest policy one morning and I went to one of our 
managers, and I said 'Tom, I'd like you to walk me round the building. I 
want you to show me what goes on in terms of this particular policy' 
and this was worth £75 to us, we charged the customer £75. It took u~ 
all morning to walk round the building. We went from department to 
department, we ended up going to ten different departments in all. There 
were 43 separate activities or steps within the process and 30 people 
were involved, and this was all for our simplest policy." (Managing 
Director) 
6.5.15 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The new managing director behaved differently in companson to 
previous general managers. For instance, previous general managers rarely 
walked around the building or spoke to people other than their direct reports, 
whereas the new managing director spoke to everyone. He enquired from 
managers and clerks what they thought the problems were in their department 
and in other parts of the organisation. He asked departmental managers for 
potential solutions to their departments problems. He demonstrated that these 
discussions were important to him and that he took them seriously, by 
attempting to resolve, albeit temporarily, the major problem of overdue returns. 
The new managing director found out about operational aspects of the inspection 
process. He asked people, at all levels, why they did certain activities. No 
prevwus general manager had asked people about their job. The managing 
director listened to people's reasons for doing a particular task but did not 
always accept their reasons. 
The managing director was willing to find out about the previous inspection 
service and to lead the implementation of the inspection process. (IM _SOC # 
6.37) 
6.5.16 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"When (the new managing director) came in on Day One, he said 'My 
name's Ken, you call me Ken'. Well that had never been heard of before 
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and Ken has been responsible for a lot of cultural and physical change as 
well." (Customer Services Manager) 
"We had three dining rooms, and various sittings, depending on what 
status you were, and traditional English management, or British 
management ... we have the restaurant facilities have been upgraded and 
everybody is uses it no matter what status you are. We do have a room 
upstairs for visitors that people can book and use." (Implementation 
Team Leader) 
"We had three levels of dining - we had the staff canteen, we had the 
Managers' Dining Area and the Executive Level, now we've just got the 
one. 
If you wanted a new pencil, to quote an example - if you wanted a new 
pencil, you had to hand your old one in to get a new one, because 
everything had to be accounted for, and there were only so many pencils 
allocated." (Implementation Team Member) 
6.5.16 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The new managing director instilled a degree of informality throughout 
the organisation. For instance, he stopped referring to people by their title and 
began using first names. The new managing director also loosened many 
controls, which created a high degree of rigidity in the organisation. One 
manager recounted the way in which senior managers controlled stationery. In a 
bid by the previous management team to minimise costs, people had to hand in 
used pencils before they could get a new one, so that each pencil was accounted 
for. The new managing director also reduced the number of dining rooms for 
people in different levels of the organisation, not only to reduce costs but also to 
breakdown hierarchical barriers between people. 
The managmg director made symbolic changes to bring people together. 
(IM_SOC # 6.38) 
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6.5.17 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"_N?w I'm in the position of being responsible for not just the 
hftlng/crane men, but all the men, lifting, crane, boiler and the electrical 
surveyors from the contractual point of view." (Engineering Manager) 
"You could have jobs through from sort of Clerk (Basic), Clerk (Semi-
skilled), Clerk (Skilled), Clerk, Senior Clerk, through to Assistant 
Supervisor, Supervisor, Assistant Superintendent, Superintendent, in 
order just to keep nudging people's money up. Therefore creating a 
hierarchy of that nature ... we had managers and group managers, and 
then we had the executive. What we're trying to do is finish off with 
group managers ... we revised the structure to get rid of the multiplicity 
of grades ... we actually went to the extreme and said 'Why don't we 
have one?' That causes problems with the union negotiations but we 
finished up with three ... it was interesting that as I had a hand to play in 
that in the last year or so, I actually thought that we might finish up with 
five grades, and even, I was going to say, six months or so ago, 
somebody might have argued 'Well perhaps that's too few'- and finish 
up with three." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"We've moved activities round, put tasks together, breaking down the 
barriers between different divisions and departments. We've never been 
able to do that in the past ... similar service functions together, or people 
servicing the same customer base together into the operations 
environment . . . things that were separate and reported to the different 
executive members, and this is why I referred to earlier as being the 
hierarchical, columnar type structure ... so what we've now done is, 
we've put the engineer surveyor type environment, the operations, with 
the customer service sales and the account teams together under the same 
umbrella, and now we're going to really look into integrating those 
people so that they work collectively as a team, servicing a customer 
stream, rather than all having a responsibility on that customer, but 
individually operating." (Customer Services Manager) 
"We were all part of, like one technical department and so much of it 
was, you know, divided up, and so much of it went to Customer Services 
Unit ... we had about nine levels from a clerical level up to managing 
director, . . . so we were very traditional and very hierarchical." 
(Implementation Team Leader) 
6.5.17 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board questioned the need for as many hierarchical levels in the 
organisation. They were unconvinced that the nine levels that existed were 
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necessary. The board considered having only one level below managers, but 
decided against this, as a single level would cause problems with the trade 
union. The board reduced the number of levels below managers from nine to 
five. The board introduced the role of a team leader. This level absorbed a 
number of previous levels such as supervisors, assistant supervisors, 
superintendents and assistant superintendents. The new structure has three 
levels below management: team leaders, team members and clerical support. 
Team leaders report to managers and they report to executives on the board. 
The board's willingness to question the organisation structure was a 
major departure from the past. Many managers were surprised that the board 
reduced the hierarchy. The inspection process required activities to move from 
one function to another. The board aligned the vertical structure with the 
inspection process, as activities moved from one function to another, rather than 
maintaining the structure and reporting lines. For example, within the 
engineering function there were three departmental managers: the chief boiler 
manager, the chief electrical manager and the chief machinery manager. Each 
manager had his own area of responsibility and functional experts reporting into 
him. Each chief manager was also responsible for the technical standards and 
operational aspects of their function. The chief boiler manager had 162 people, 
the chief electrical manager had 87 and the chief machinery manager had 262 
people reporting into each manager. The managing director made one manager 
responsible for all three departments. Technical standards were taken out of each 
department and consolidated under another manager in the revised structure. 
The board also created a separate customer services unit for dealing with 
new business. The engineering function that traditionally dealt with new 
business focused upon existing business. The board located the customer 
services unit in Manchester. This unit performed administrative activities 
centrally for all customers. The board recruited people for this unit from 
Foundry Insurance's branches. The result of centralising the administration was 
17 of Foundry Insurance's branches were closed. Customer services unit grew 
from a concept in 1990 to 300 people by 1992. As new information systems 
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were developed, the numbers within this unit fell, and by early 1995, the unit 
had 115 staff. 
The board reduced the number of levels in the hierarchy, merged and created 
departments to align the functional structure with the inspection process. 
(IM_SOC # 6.39) 
6.5.18 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We were going to get the right people doing the right things in the right 
places, and not wait Buggins tum to get there." (Deputy Managing 
Director) 
"Opportunities to move and develop were very much 'dead men's 
shoes', people ret1nng. There wasn't a lot of opportunity to cross 
departments." (Implementation Team Leader) 
"There are lot more younger people are being promoted to manager jobs 
... today we had four women there, you know, and two of them were in 
their twenties- unheard of in Foundry Insurance five years ago. You had 
to be, you know, fifty odd and have worked here for years and know all 
about insurance, and engineering, or one or the other, to have any chance 
at all. But now people, graduates are coming along and learning about 
the business side in a couple of years." (Implementation Team Member) 
6.5.18 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board reversed the long-standing practice of promoting people on 
the basis of 'dead men's shoes'. They appointed the right people to particular 
jobs based upon the individual's performance. The board promoted younger 
people and women to management positions, which previously had been 
extremely rare in the organisation. 
The board promoted people on the basis of their performance rather than length 
of service. (IM_SOC # 6.40) 
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6.5.19 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"S.o. we .had the drive ... it was strange, he's (the managing director) 
dnv1ng It to us, for people to take responsibilities on board, so that 
people would then be coming forward with ideas to him, or suggestions 
or 'This is how we can do this and how we can do that' ... (senior 
managers) their job wasn't to change anything, their job was to manage 
it. Now that really arose at all levels. I think that many people just 
thought of- that was all they had to do ... you see talk to them about 'Do 
you know what's taking place in you department. Do you know how 
you're dealing with people? Are you focussed on the customer?' ... so 
there's a whole change there we needed to get across from the Exec. 
downwards, to consider our place in the world, our responsibilities, our 
roles, how we should be communicating, and how we get the next level 
to change, and not start keeping running everything here and I was going 
to say, not practising what was being preached . . . I think as soon as 
senior managers realised that people weren't making decisions at the 
right levels it changed a number of perspectives." (Deputy Managing 
Director) 
"Managers used to be in my mind, and I've used this a few times, the 
first line of prediction in this company. They didn't manage it mind you. 
They were as much involved with the day-to-day business in the business 
process, in the business issues as everybody else in the department, and 
the manager tended to get the hard ones, the big ones or whatever, or the 
interesting ones. So we realised and we started to change and get people 
to manage rather than be involved too much with the day-to-day 
business." (Customer Services Manager) 
6.5.19 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The managing director convinced other board members to relinquish 
day-to-day operational responsibilities and to devolve these down to the next 
level of management. The managing director recognised that board members 
responsibilities were limited to maintaining the status quo in their function, and 
that this had to change whereby they improved and changed their function. The 
board asked managers to question their existing responsibilities and determine 
whether or not they knew what actually happened in their function. Board 
members and managers accepted that they could not continue to control all 
aspects of their department and that they had to widen and deepen the 
responsibilities of people below them. Board members and senior managers 
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realised that decisions were not taken at appropriate levels within the 
organisation. 
The board devolved operational responsibility for the inspection process to 
managers below them in the hierarchy. (IM _SOC # 6.41) 
6.5.20 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We came over here and dealt with the clients, whereas we'd just been 
dealing with the internal surveyors . . . I suppose they can still bring 
perhaps a little bit of old habits with them. You know, we're still like a 
little bit of the old boiler department." (Departmental Team Leader) 
"If you don't have commitment then you have compliance, and you 
might have malicious compliance, or reluctant compliance, which would 
be a barrier to any organisation." (Implementation Team Leader) 
"Rather than just, 'I've got responsibility with control of 100 people'. 
Eventually going to help them direct them, I'm going to give them 
managers to take on board the responsibilities, . . . I've got to delegate 
more, I've got to identify issues, training . . . I'm going to monitor you 
until you get there." (Deputy Managing Director) 
6.5.20 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board recognised that functional specialists needed to accept new 
responsibilities. The board and senior managers recognised that managers, 
engineers and clerks could not be forced to take on greater responsibilities 
unless they themselves wanted to do so. The board wanted people to commit to 
their responsibilities and they recognised that pressurising people would result in 
them complying with instructions. They wanted managers, engineers and team 
leaders to accept that their understanding of the wider aspects of the inspection 
process was important, and to realise that their activity could no longer be 
managed or performed in isolation of other activities in the inspection process. 
Functional specialists took on a wider range of responsibilities, e.g. people who 
dealt only with internal people began dealing with external customers as well. 
The board struck a balance between supporting people through accepting an 
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increase or reduction in their responsibilities and ensuring people were taking on 
the new responsibilities by monitoring individuals and their take up of the new 
responsibilities. 
Managers took responsibility for the inspection process, and cascaded this 
responsibility to team leaders and engineers. (IM _SOC # 6.42) 
6.5.21 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We suddenly realised that people weren't trained, and needed training, 
or were only trained in some things but not in the rest of it ... engineers, 
technical engineers in the field force . . . learned they needed to be 
commercial with [their skills], and that servicing the client was equally 
important ... and individuals at the workforce level were having to take 
on additional knowledge skills because they were just focussed on some 
small aspect of the work, and my job is to put this code over here and 
send it on to the next person. Without questioning 'well I wonder what I 
was doing that for. But now I can do this as well'." (Deputy Managing 
Director) 
"People that were formerly underwriters have been on marketing courses 
and got diplomas. A lot of IT, professional IT training going on, Open 
University's, MBA's, Business Studies ... for individuals, I think there is 
much, much more opportunity, to develop personally and to have a much 
more varied career within Foundry Insurance." (Implementation Team 
Leader) 
"So training is all preparatory work, it's putting somebody in the best 
possible position to tackle whatever it is that we're asking them to do 
with the best prospects of success. If we're not prepared for it, then no 
matter how difficult the task is, particularly on the more complex things, 
then we're going to fail. We need to be prepared ... we've developed 
multi-skilled people." (Customer Services Manager) 
"We have more customer skills, you know, customer care skills, really, 
in dealing with clients and ... because obviously they're there and they're 
answering phones to the client, whereas probably four years ago they 
might not have had the same contact with the client." (Departmental 
Team Leader) 
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6.5.21 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Previously, people specialised in their functional area and developed 
their knowledge and skills within their department. The board realised that 
people had little or no formal training and, as a result their skills were outdated. 
The board provided people at all levels with extensive training. People were 
trained to understand the inspection process and their responsibilities within it; 
for example, engineers and administration clerks were trained to be more 
commercially astute. People, starting with board members and senior managers, 
learnt to understand and manage wider aspects of the inspection process. 
Functional experts, such as the engineers realised that being sensitive to 
customer needs was as important as their highly regarded skills and technical 
knowledge. Board members and managers consciously set out to broaden 
people's skills. People move across different functions, which rarely happened 
prior to the implementation of the inspection process. Board members 
encouraged people to develop a wide range of skills and knowledge, so that they 
had better career prospects in the organisation. 
The board provided people at all levels with substantial training to broaden their 
range of skills; board members learnt new skills and convinced managers to 
learn new skills, and managers convinced team leaders to do the same. 
(IM_SOC # 6.43) 
6.5.22 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"A realisation that we had to invest in IT in order to enable us to simplify 
the processes. And to provide the service." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"But when we went to the Board and said 'We want to increase our 
spend from £2 million to approach £5 million' in 1991, I have to say, it 
wasn't a very good time to do this, because at the time Composite 
Insurance Group was just about to declare the biggest ever loss by a 
private company in this country of (nearly £500 million). I went along 
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with my begging bowl and said 'I'd actually like to more than double our 
IT budget'. 
The surveyor reporting software, for engineers, because that was actually 
a bit of creative swiping on our part. It was something that had been 
done for (another multinational organisation) in a different context, and 
we took that piece of software, and said to an external software house 
'Please refine this in this way for us'. So they did that and they 
continued to develop that package which was called 'Flexiforms' for us." 
(Managing Director) 
"The realisation again, by the staff, that we were prepared to invest in the 
future by introducing the IT. We did dabble with IT some years ago, and 
we pulled back because it was a problem. But this time we went in and 
we came from picking up the rear to the leader." (Engineering Manager) 
6.5.22 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Foundry Insurance's board accepted that the organisation had out dated 
systems. The managing director more than doubled the IT budget from £2 
million to £5 million per annum. People across the process realised that the 
board was serious about upgrading the systems and that they would not back 
away from implementation. The board used a mix of package software, but also 
tailored applications specifically to meet the needs of the inspection process. 
The board invested substantial amounts of resources in new systems, including 
some bespoke applications. (IM_SOC # 6.44) 
6.5.23 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We've bought the plant database up to here from Bristol, taking it away 
from them, so that it can exist on our system." (Deputy Managing 
Director) 
"We got rid of the Bristol database as it was called, and transferred it 
onto our Monitor System in Manchester here, and that operates broadly 
the same as it did. We did have before terminals in here which we could 
access direct to Bristol. Well, OK, quite good in fact, but now we have 
our Monitor database in here which is absolutely superb." (Engineering 
Manager) 
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6.5.23 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The plant database was on Composite Insurers systems in Bristol, as 
Composite's IT function was located there. Foundry Insurance, based in 
Manchester, had little day-to-day contact with the group's IT function based in 
Bristol. Foundry Insurance had no control over the formats of reports and 
outputs nor the schedule for the production of reports. Foundry Insurance had to 
fit into the prioritisation allocated to them by the group's IT function. Foundry 
Insurance insourced this database so that they controlled it. 
Foundry Insurance insourced the plant database, from Composite Insurer's IT 
function, thereby bringing its systems under its own control. (IM_SOC # 6.45) 
6.5.24 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We went to the (group's) IT people and we said 'What we need are 
actually three major systems. We need them very quickly- nine months, 
at most a year and we can't afford to pay you an enormous amount of 
money. We can pay you a fair bit more but not an enormous amount of 
money'. Now the problem I found is, it's not really legacy systems, it's 
the legacy ofthe systems. It's the legacy of the people that inhabit these 
data centres. And they said 'No, we think about 75 man years, we think 
about 3 years to deliver', and there were too many noughts on the end for 
our liking. We said 'Well, no thank you and goodbye'. And we decided 
to do it from scratch." (Managing Director) 
"What (being made responsible for IT only) did was make me focus on 
the IT that we were going to deliver, because of the change, we were 
going to do the IT this time instead of outsiders." (Deputy Managing 
Director) 
6.5.24 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Foundry Insurance approached the group's IT function to develop the 
systems required to support the inspection process. However, the IT function 
were unable to match Foundry Insurance's timescales or cost constraints. The 
organisation decided to develop the systems itself and made a senior manager 
responsible for delivering the new systems. 
192 
Foundry Insurance developed the systems required to support the inspection 
process at less expense and in a shorter period of time by managing the 
development themselves rather than relying on Composite Insurer's IT function. 
(IM_SOC # 6.46). 
6.5.25 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We went into a significant training programme. We spent a lot of time 
on those guys. A week's training course with a team of 10 people on the 
course, with two trainers doing four courses a week. There was an 
acceptance/pass criteria ... (the changes) would not have worked had we 
not gone into the training programme and the support that we put into 
that ... everybody was offered the opportunity of coming back for more 
whether it be on a team basis, or on a one to one; we had people 
specifically trained to do the one to one's who'd perhaps be a bit more 
sympathetic and understanding and not pushy, and the peer pressure was 
taken away . . . so we went into some depth on the preparation of the 
people for that one." (Customer Services Manager) 
"We then introduced the Reporting System, and our surveyors all spent a 
week in here. They were issued with their PCs; spent a week's training, 
and went away and the following week, started to . .I mean we did this 
over a period of six months training, about 20 a week . . . (Engineers) 
were brought in here and trained on how to receive the information from 
Head Office down the line, how to use a modem, receive information 
from Head Office to produce a report, to complete that report, to archive 
it as we say, which then transmits it back down the modem to Head 
Office." (Engineering Manager) 
6.5.25 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Most people in Foundry Insurance were 'IT illiterate' at the beginning of 
the implementation of the inspection process. The organisation invested in 
training people, from directors to clerks, to use the new systems. The training 
and IT departments developed the training programme in-house in conjunction 
with the software suppliers. Training was targeted to users' needs, for example, 
as engineers worked remotely, they learnt to uplift and download information. 
The training was timed so that people used what they learnt immediately. In 
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spite of the training given to engineers many experienced difficulties when using 
the systems on their own. People were trained in groups and could ask for one-
on-one assistance. The management team provided personalised support by 
people who were knowledgeable about the systems. Training was planned to be 
iterative and not a one off event. The trainers set a pass/fail criteria, which made 
it challenging for users, as not all people passed the test 
Engineers and other system users were willing to learn to operate the systems, 
and their aptitude to use the systems was tested. (IM _SOC # 6.4 7) 
6.5.26 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"And to underpin the inspection service we were going to use IT. Now 
the point is . . . we sorted out the business first, we sorted out the 
processes second, the IT carne a very poor third." (Managing Director) 
"We'd have tried to be more sophisticated or embracing and dealt with 
the issues 'why are we doing that', and so that we can get rid of that, 
let's get rid of that, can we alternate that and save the work." (Deputy 
Managing Director) 
"Getting the ownership of the system, making sure that we actually 
understand the business requirements." (Customer Services Manager) 
t.__B_r_an_c_h_e_s _ __..JI\ Head Office \ Composite Group I 
Abacus IBM 8100 Plant Register 
Manchester Bristol 
PC quote 
VDU's Policy Claims 
Dumb Statistics 
terminals 
Figure A: Systems configuration prior to the inspection process 
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SUN workstations Compaq notebooks 
(branch offices) for surveyors 
Insurance administration Plant database Report system -
SUN servers 
..... ... Wang VS 12000 ~ WangVS 8400 Ingres GUI .... ~ PACE4GL PACE4GL 
Figure B: Systems configuration to support the inspection process (Source: 
presentation made by managing director at Cranfield's 4th annual BPR 
symposium) 
6.5.26 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The managing director and board refocused Foundry Insurance's 
business objectives to improve customer service levels and control costs, prior to 
designing and implementing the new information systems. The board, senior 
managers and users simplified and redesigned activities in the inspection process 
and used this to determine the future business requirements to be supported by 
the information systems. 
The board implemented systems to support the inspection process. (IM _SOC # 
6.48) 
6.5.27 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We needed the IT facilities, and we needed them quickly. They had to 
be managed, because otherwise, er, if you like, track record on IT 
deliveries tend to sort expand with time quite handily, and forget there's 
business objective ... it's like the managing director would say, 'Yes 
well, I think that project should only take three months', and you believe 
it takes six- your best estimate. But you appreciated the objective was to 
do it quickly. Not necessarily whether it was going to be in three or six 
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months, but do it quickly ... needed that sort of very strong drive from 
the top in order to achieve it ... we have to get there and target for the 
right, you've got a target to go for, we're going to try and implement it 
by then ... but if we had gone along with the sort of, uh, well we'll 
develop it for when it's ready, then the danger was, it could have taken a 
lot longer ... (we tried) to not let too many people actually try to modify 
the system to their own liking which is the hardest part of all, I think ... 
it needed to drive to stop people slowing it down, with the best of 
intentions: 'What we really need is this as well as a bit of this', 'That 
doesn't deal with everything and we could do with another report form'." 
(Deputy Managing Director) 
"Well first of all, it really has supported a very very clear business 
strategy. We had a crystal clear view of what it was we wanted to apply. 
We applied the 80/20 rule ruthlessly to every aspect of our business ... 
every time those teams came back and said 'Well, just can't be done - we 
cannot meet these targets that you've set'; we would say 'Well just 
change the process so that you can' ... the new system, nine people, built 
in nine months. It replaced the one that had taken three years and a year 
to pilot ... they are all big systems, believe me, were developed in about 
nine months, with about nine or ten people on each team." (Managing 
Director) 
"We can't do everything and let's get people focussed, and I was able to 
work the team that way to enable that delivery to take place . . . we 
delivered our projects quickly, because we didn't waste time in a lot of 
justification, and we had people who would make decisions and say 'OK, 
do it' ... that was good for the team, because they weren't hanging, they 
weren't waiting, there wasn't a lot of deliberation, the speculation as to 
'should we, shouldn't we?' and that sort of thing ... some people were 
not capable of understanding; the systems are not ideal in every way, 
shape and form. The cost of development - 80% of your costs go to 20% 
of the system, so you put 80% into 20% of the cost. 'But it doesn't do X, 
Y and Z' - 'Yes, well we know that, but we don't know if it will go 
through . . . delivered something, they could then have modified it, 
changed it, improved it, but they'd actually have delivered something. 
They may have only done 80%, but they'd have done something'." 
(Customer Services Manager) 
6.5.27 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The managing director set demanding targets for the implementation 
teams to achieve. The managing director and IT manager considered whether 
the systems should be developed and introduced sequentially or simultaneously. 
They recognised that Foundry Insurance needed the systems quickly and 
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decided to implement the three systems simultaneously. The managing director 
and IT manager monitored the implementation schedule closely, as they were 
aware that late deliveries would have an adverse affect on implementation. The 
board prevented systems requirements from being continuously expanded or 
modified. The managing director and IT manager focussed implementation 
teams' activities and prioritised systems changes, as the organisation did not 
have sufficient resources to deliver each and every user requirement. They 
prioritised work so essential elements of the system were delivered on time so 
that 80% of the benefits from the system were derived quickly. The board 
accepted that while the system would not be ideal, achieving 80% was sufficient 
to support the inspection process and gain benefits from its implementation. The 
IT implementation teams developed the systems in modules, and once they 
delivered a part of the system it was modified and improved. 
The managing director and IT manager set tight deadlines for implementation 
teams, and prioritised systems, which were developed in modules. (IM _SOC # 
6.49) 
6.5.28 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We did it ourselves. And the way we did it was, we looked at our 
problem areas, we broke that down into sub areas, and then we looked at 
who should be involved in sorting out those activities." (Managing 
Director) 
"He (the managing director) and the teams realised that the inspection 
process could not be refined but needed a total revamp ... my motto is -
what stops A from doing it all, and then saying, OK we have to work 
with certain steps... the whole endeavour is really to try to treat the 
workforce as valuable useful people and not just merely shovers of paper 
and doing the odd things, but people who are going to be doing a useful 
job and hopefully being sufficient challenge in it to find that it's rather 
interesting, rather just be dull, boring, 'I go there to earn my ... get some 
money' and go home." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"We had a one stop shop vision, where an individual dealing with a case, 
dealing with a client would be able to do everything for them; rather than 
people being passed along the line, or rather than a piece of paper being 
passed along. So it was really a quick, efficient service. One person only 
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~ssued .the transaction - the interface with the client, and as I say, 
1mprov1ng the quality of that advice, reducing the number of people, the 
number of activities involved." (Implementation Team Leader) 
6.5.28 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Board members and managers designed the inspection process. They 
used the 'valuable difference' vision as a guide to identify the activities that 
should be co-ordinated in the inspection process. They designed the inspection 
process on the basis of minimising the number of activities and questioned why, 
for example, certain activities took 43 steps and passed across up to 30 pairs of 
hands. They examined the scenario in which one person dealt with every aspect 
of satisfying customers, rather than several people being involved. 
Board members and managers designed the inspection process after questioning 
existing operational assumptions. (IM _SOC # 6.50) 
6.5.29 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"So I think as an organisation we had to wake up to market forces that 
hitherto we hadn't been exposed to. The IT arena is very sort of cut 
throat and very aggressive and people, good people, are in great demand, 
and highly attractive to other organisations. So we had to actually break 
away from our traditional reward system, and cater for this new breed of 
people that we'd not been used to working with." (Implementation Team 
Leader) 
"We had Foundry Insurance people, we had managing contractors 
involved, we had people Composite Insurers involved, we had training 
people involved ... my development team and the Reports Project 
comprised of the IT Department, software house, users. And that was 
the team. Very important to have the users involved." (Customer 
Services Manager) 
"The teams were small and were always kept small, and they were mixed 
teams and they were always led by people from the business. Didn't 
matter that they had no IT experience, and we said above all we wanted 
speed of result. 
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And effectively we said, the people who've got most to gain by changing 
the process, we'll put them in charge of redesigning the process." 
(Managing Director) 
"We put in three systems, two of which were, well both were managed 
by me and under the IT, another one was run by another individual who 
had a totally different reporting relationship. And, in hindsight, if I were 
able to change anything, I'd have had that under the same umbrella. We 
might not have made so many mistakes - we certainly wouldn't have 
made one of them. Technical side - we might have done, but hopefully 
we might have had the chance to ask the questions ourselves. That's one 
of the things I would change." (Deputy Managing Director) 
6.5.29 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board created implementation teams to develop and install the 
information systems. The implementation teams consisted of people from 
operational areas such as engineers, line managers and clerks as well as external 
software contractors and IT specialists from Foundry Insurance's parent 
company. The managing director recruited IT experts externally as Foundry 
Insurance's IT department lacked relevant skills. The reward systems were 
changed to attract good quality IT personnel. The managing director and key 
members of the board decided team membership. They chose people who had 
the most to gain from the implementation of the inspection process. 
Foundry Insurance's board members created IT implementation teams with 
people from different departments and external support. (IM_SOC # 6.51) 
6.5.30 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Giving those with most to gain responsibility (for implementing the 
information systems), meant that in fact relatively junior people in many 
instances were put in charge of these projects, and they had some 
relatively senior people within those project groups effectively reporting 
to them. That caused a lot of difficulty for us as an organisation." 
(Managing Director) 
"The teamwork aspect - working as a team. . .. we were given the tasks, 
we were given the ownership responsibility, the accountability to go for 
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it, and that was very gratifying to people like myself and my team." 
(Customer Services Manager) 
"If an individual is asked to go and do something, and every step of the 
way the person is checked upon. It slows the process down, it reduces 
confidence, it creates frustration. If people have a defined role or an 
area, and said 'Go and do this' or 'Develop this product', and they're left 
to get on with it, then they are motivated, things happen much faster as 
well. So it helps individual development and development of whatever 
area people are working on." (Implementation Team Leader) 
6.5.30 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The managing director gave the teams a mandate to design and install the 
information systems quickly. The board made team members jointly responsible 
for creating and implementing the inspection process. The managing director 
removed obstacles such as conflicting priorities and inadequate resources. The 
board reset priorities as implementation unfolded. The board took decisions 
quickly so that the implementation teams continued to achieve the inspection 
process. 
Line managers and implementation team members took responsibility for 
implementing the inspection process. (IM _SOC # 6.52) 
6.5.31 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"So that support when the times were going badly, for the support to be 
shown visibly and publicly, as well as the good times, was also very 
good for the team . . . well I think, urn, when things are going bad, the 
flack starts to fly quite heavily, and nobody makes these problems ... 
you don't go out and design the problems, and it's very demoralising and 
demotivating when these things happen. So it's nice for the people to 
have a bit of boost by saying 'Yeah, we understand. We expect these 
things to happen from time to time', 'Mistakes are made', 'Things go 
wrong' ... we take those opportunities to learn and put them right. And I 
think just a few bits of intervention of words and a bit of support goes a 
long way. It's like telling somebody 'You've done a good job' to help in 
the morale of the people, the motivation, the attitude . . . a recognition 
and the fact that it is a corporate plan, it has got the support of the 
company, it's not just an insular activity. It's leading in the direction that 
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we want to go, and when the times get tough, it's nice to have that bit of 
support, because you do have tough times in these situations." (Customer 
Services Manager) 
".The other . thing that we did was, we backed those people 
(ImplementatiOn team members) to the hilt." (Managing Director) 
6.5.31 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board and managers supported implementation teams when they 
encountered difficulties and delays during implementation. Projects often ran 
behind schedule, as the managing director set very tight deadlines. The board 
recognised that team members felt demoralised and demotivated when things 
went wrong; and that they needed to be encouraged and motivated to continue 
implementation. 
Board members and managers provided implementation teams with support, 
especially when things were not going according to plan. (IM_SOC # 6.53) 
6.5.32 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"User involvement has been another major issue. . . . Getting the 
ownership of the system, making sure that we actually understand the 
business requirements, because I'm afraid we've done that without user 
involvement. Systems were implemented - 'It's not what we want' ... 
now the users have a main role to play in making sure that the 
requirements that have been specified are correct, 'It is what we want to 
do, not what somebody else thinks we ought to do' . . . (their 
involvement) also keeps them (users) on board that they are part of the 
development ... it gets the ownership of the system working properly, so 
when the system becomes to be implemented into the department, 'Here 
we go, we've been waiting for this' and they can take to it much more 
positively than they would have done. 
If there were problems, they thought it would be ideal. They couldn't 
understand that errors can be made ... one of the problems that we have 
here - this may only be a minor point - is that we are very good at 
creating user expectation, and our user workforce is very good at nailing 
the IT Department to the ground in terms of delivery dates. So the 
management of expectation could be better. 'How long is it going to 
take you to develop this system?' 'Three months'. 'Right, so a week on 
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- 30th ~uly,_ we'll have it, will we?' And if it's not there, 'Why haven't 
we got It?' Is the type of attitude." (Customer Services Manager) 
"I think, was a lack of reality of what IT systems are about. Perfection 
doesn't exist. That's all. And they were expecting perfection. One of 
the things we've got to constantly relearn is to manage expectations. If 
somebody says 'Here's a marvellous system - the inspection's been 
marvellous'. Somebody says 'Here's a system that works -it's going to 
have a few problems. It's not going to be perfect'. Then people are a 
little more understanding." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"On the IT side, we are the user group - we are the users . . . We were 
involved in some of the detailed specifications as to what we wanted and 
the agreement of those specifications and the user testing and the like." 
(Engineering Manager) 
6.5.32 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
People in the inspection process - users of the information systems -
were involved through the formation of users groups, during the development 
and implementation of the new systems. The user groups ratified the systems 
specified by the IT implementation teams. IT implementation teams 
familiarised users with the systems and transferred ownership of the systems to 
them during the development phase. By the time the systems were implemented 
users knew what to expect and were not surprised by the system. 
The board and implementation teams mismanaged user expectations. 
They created expectations that the implementation teams struggled to fulfil. The 
users expected the systems to have few, if any, faults from the first day of 
implementation, and they did not expect to have to deal with teething problems 
associated with a new system. 
Foundry Insurance created user groups to work with implementation teams 
during the development of the systems but mismanaged some of their 
expectations. (IM_SOC # 6.54) 
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6.5.33 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"We had tried and largely succeeded in terms of taking people out and 
putting them into separate projects, and not burdening them with two 
jobs. You know, a day and a night job, because I think apart from 
exceptional circumstances, they will fail. You'd just be asking too much 
of them. They won't give proper attention to either. So we tended to 
form specialised teams which then disbanded or whatever according to 
circumstance. 
As a top management team, we made an undying commitment to those 
people. We said 'We are with you one hundred and ten per cent. 
Whatever you need to do to make this work, you will get it from us', and 
we involved ourselves fully in that process." (Managing Director) 
"We also were able within the teams that were developing, to feel that 
what we were doing was in the right direction. It was worthwhile. It 
wasn't going to be a waste. It was profitable work, it was going in the 
right direction and that it would actually get us to there at the end of the 
day, and we would do it. 
To be responsible, not only from the implementation delivery, but 
through the formulating and planning side of it as well . . . and for the 
support to be there, with confidence and commitment to let us get on 
with the job." (Customer Services Manager) 
6.5.33 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The board gave the implementation teams their full backing to plan and 
implement the inspection process and the supporting systems. The teams 
accepted the responsibility for implementing the changes. The managing 
director provided teams with quality time within which to implement the 
inspection process, as he recognised that it could not be completed in the 
margins of time. He felt that when faced with a choice between fulfilling their 
line responsibilities or providing time to the implementation team, most team 
members would opt to complete their line duties. 
The board gave the implementation teams a mandate to implement the 
inspection process and the supporting information systems. (IM_SOC # 6.55) 
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F4 6.6 Effects of radical process orientation 
6.6.1 A and 6.6.1 B are located in the body of Chapter 6. 
6.6.2 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
£9.6m £6.1m £-6.3m (loss) £3.4m £5.5m £7.5m 
Table C: Financial performance of the organisation 1989 - 1994 
(Source: internal reports) 
6.6.2 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
The organisation's profitability fell over three years. By 1992, the 
organisation reversed this decline. 
The organisation moved back into profit. (ERPO _SOC# 6.57) 
6.6.3 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"And in terms of little things like competitive advantage; going back to 
the IRA terrorist campaign, when the industry, the insurance industry 
was actually plumbing the depths, we had a very big problem with 
terrorism which was probably never really appreciated by the public, and 
we decided we had to pass part of the problem back to the Government. 
We had to put a wording in our policies excluding effective terrorism. 
The day that that wording was agreed was the day it went on all of our 
policies. Now then, if you put that in an industry context, most 
companies took a long time to get the wording in, certainly a couple of 
months." (Managing Director) 
"The right (IT/Technical equipment) equipment is obviously very 
important. In hindsight we wouldn't have done some of the things that 
we've done. Well we have issues, we've got problems. We've got 
systems on three different platforms for example. It seemed the right 
thing to do at the time. It probably was the right thing, but one has to ask 
the question." (Customer Services Manager) 
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6.6.3 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Between 1992 and 1993 Foundry Insurance won several awards for its 
implementation of systems. The organisation took first prize in the 'IT for 
Excellence' awards, in the category of businesses with the turnover of less than 
£100m. It also won the Computer Weekly award for 'IT in Finance'. Foundry 
Insurance's use of technology to support the inspection process enabled it to 
change the policy wording to reflect market requirements quicker than its 
competitors. 
However, one potentially adverse aspect of the systems implementation 
became apparent later. The organisation used four IT suppliers, Wang, SUN, 
Ingres and Compaq. Wang supplied mainframe host for the plant database and 
reporting applications. SUN Microsystems were used in the branches and head 
office for policy administration, along with Ingres software. Compaq supplied 
the personal computers for the engineers. 
Foundry Insurance's systems are substantially improved although they were 
developed on separate platforms. (ERPO_SOC # 6.58) 
6.6.4 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"Before we didn't have control, we now had control. You know, we 
now had IT systems which told us. We could have done it before 
manually, but it would have involved huge numbers of people, and we 
simply couldn't afford to do that. We had to know what the state of the 
man's district was, and we achieved that by introducing PC systems in 
here. It gave us the handle on where people worked. . .. the big thing, of 
course, is we don't have to go to Bristol or ask them if we can have a 
different programme to extract different information. Management 
information reports we want, we can, say, specify what we want and the 
IT Department will fairly quickly, come up with a report that you want 
... those are reports available on the screen, those are information that 
you can sort, all sorts of things on the screen. Very, very good system." 
(Engineering Manager) 
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".And str~aml.ined the service that we provide, improved turnaround 
times, dehvenng surveyors' reports from three to four weeks, to three to 
four ~ays, so from the customer service point of view, and a quality point 
of view, that was a phenomenal benefit to us." (Customer Services 
Manager) 
6.6.4 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Managers in the organisation prior to the changes had little control over 
activities that people performed to deliver the inspection service to customers. 
However, managers are in control of the inspection process. 
Foundry Insurance's management has better control over the inspection process. 
(ERPO_SOC # 6.59) 
6.6.5 A. Conjoining first order constructs 
"In the customer services are, I keep worrying about the fact that they 
have a backlog and why have they got a backlog, and who is trying to 
deal with it, and there's always good reasons but I have difficulty in 
seeing somebody saying 'Let's own this, let's get it down', as well as I 
think for individuals, to recognise that, or perhaps I could make a 
contribution, without thinking I've got to have it on paid overtime. I 
suspect behind it is this fear of job reduction. So there's this reluctance 
to keep simplifying the process or eradicating certain steps, or getting rid 
of unnecessary activities . . . . And I think that actually applies at the 
middle level management, because they don't like to be the hard hearted 
people. They forget the bottom line that we've to aim for. They'd rather 
have stability and settle at many levels because they've been going 
through three or four years of change and seeing people leave and they 
feel uncomfortable." (Deputy Managing Director) 
"(We) have the power to instruct them ... you see, people working from 
home - it's so easy on a day like today, beautiful sunshine, to pack up a 
bit earlier and perhaps, I don't know, either go for a swim or play golf or 
something, because we wouldn't know ... we would not know. But now 
we know." (Engineering Manager) 
206 
6.6.5 B. Interpretation and second order construct 
Not all aspects of the previous organisation have changed. For example, in one 
part of the inspection process, there is a backlog of customer enquiries. Board members 
recognise that managers and team leaders maintain the backlog because they are afraid 
of further job cuts will affect them and their colleagues. 
Some aspects of the old organisation can still be found m the redesigned 
inspection process. (ERPO _SOC # 6.60) 
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Appendix 7- Using the emergent model to analyse two published cases 
Case A: Sillince and Harindranath, 1998 
Theoretical proposition# 1: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people accept the organisation's drivers for 
change, which can be opportunities and threats. 
Case details (Sillince and Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent mode--
Harindranath, 1998) 
•!• Health care project at Central •!• The establishment of an ACAD unit is •!• Implementors made little effort to establish whether 
Middlesex Hospital NHS Trust described as politically adventurous and people in the organisation considered the drivers for 
•!• Setting up a greenfield site politically controversial and at an early stage change to be opportunities or threats 
•!• £16 million funding available to of introduction in healthcare •!• Expansion of the hospital care facilities are an 
establish Ambulatory Care and opportunity, however, parts of the main hospital were 
Diagnostic (ACAD) Centre due to close 
•!• ACAD's aim is rapid throughput •!• The emergent model suggests that senior managers 
of patients should have discussed and agreed the drivers for 
change 
-~ 
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Theoretical proposition # 2: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people establish the need for radical process 
orientation rather than another type of change initiative. 
Case details (Sillince and Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent model 
Harindranath, 1998) 
•!• Radical process orientation is •!• The need for radical change •!• The changes required to establish the ACAD Centre could potentially 
assumed to be appropriate to working practices and be implemented through a number of different change initiatives, e.g. 
because: technology is assumed to work flow, a construction project, and apparently radical process 
•!• ACAD required radical change to lead to radical process orientation 
business and medical processes, orientation •!• The emergent model would require senior managers to take a conscious 
social structures, and the decision to adopt radical process orientation 
introduction of computerised •!• To reach this decision the emergent model requires people to address 
scheduling whether or not the organisation should co-ordinate changes across 
•!• New systems had to relate to several functions 
existing hospital functions •!• Hence, senior managers and consultants and senior nursing staff would 
•!• Hospital's existing work practices have to discuss the changes to be carried out 
were envisaged to require radical •!• The emergent model also requires people to understand that managerial 
change and operational interdependence between activities should increase 
•!• This could have circumvented one situation faced by the implementors 
•!• Sillince & Harindranath (1998) state that consultants and schedulers 
were in conflict because "to schedule on the basis of units of time, 
(meant) taking power away from doctors and giving it to schedulers" 
(p. 116) 
•!• The emergent model requires those recipients and implementors to 
recognise that radical process orientation involves greater 
interdependence 
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Theoretical proposition# 3: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people recognise organisational elements 
namely, strategy, structure, people's responsibilities and appraisal criteria, collaborative behaviours, and information systems, will change 
and that these elements will align to a function and process orientation. 
Case details (Sillince and Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent modf 
Harindranath, 1998) 
•!• Changes identified by the ACAD •!• There was a high degree of certainty about •!• The emergent model would require people in the 
team were: the contribution of the building in terms of hospital to consider changes to a wider set of 
•!• Changes to information systems physical characteristics organisational changes 
•!• Recruiting people for the Centre •!• Great uncertainty surrounding the •!• For example, ACAD's impact on the hospital's 
•!• Constructing the ACAD building development of IS and staff related changes strategy, structure, responsibilities and appraisal criteria 
•!• The reason for the uncertainty was people of people like consultants, administration staff and 
thought the building design was leading the nurses 
IS development •!• ACAD required people's behaviours to become more 
collaborative across the process and this was barely 
considered by the senior managers 
•!• The emergent model would have ensure the ACAD 
team focused upon the changes that would need to 
occur for the ACAD centre to become operational 
•!• In terms of the IS literature, the uncertainty 
surrounding the IS developments can be explained by 
the emergent model: an unclear strategic direction, 
conflicting responsibilities and behaviours that lacked a 
degree of collaboration 
-
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Theoretical proposition# 4: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people accept the changes that actually need 
to occur in the organisation. 
Case details (Sillince and Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent modt 
Harindranath, 1998) 
•!• The views of key people in the •!• Staff in the hospital were considered to be •!• Staff anger surfaced some months after the ACAD 
hospital were specifically "resistant yet manipulable" (p. 119) project began 
excluded: •!• However 60 staff, including 30 consultants, •!• The emergent model indicates that the ACAD team 
•!• "This exclusion of existing staff expressed anger at the proposed changes placed little, if any, importance on gaining people's 
(nurses, doctors, GPs) was seen as •!• In response the CEO set up a medical staff acceptance of the changes that actually need to occur 
central to the re-engineering focus group "designed to change attitudes •!• It is likely the ACAD team did not realise the 
objective" (p. 118) away from resistance towards acceptance of importance of gaining acceptance of the actual changes 
change" (p. 119) •!• The emergent model suggests that gaining the 
acceptance of the existing consultants and senior 
nursing staff is vital to implementing the changes 
•!• Yet it appears that the hospital specifically excluded 
existing staff 
------------
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Theoretical proposition# 5: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people, including board members, senior 
managers, middle managers and employees, are willing to allow the changes to affect them. 
Case details (Sillince and Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent mode; 
Harindranath, 1998) 
•!• The hospital board members •!• People were presented with positive and •!• The ACAD team recognised they would face resistan< 
supported the changes negative messages from senior managers to the changes but considered that staff would do as 
•!• However people felt they had little they were told 
control over the changes: •!• The emergent model suggests that the ACAD team 
•!• "(staff) felt they had 2 stark needed to understand staff's willingness to allow the 
choices - either accept ACAD or changes to affect them 
to see their departments closed on •!• Moreover this theoretical proposition within the 
the main hospital site" (p. 119) emergent model would have encouraged members of 
the ACAD team to question their own assumptions, 
exemplified by the assumption that staff would do as 
they were told 
•!• It is clear that a discussion about willingness to allow 
the changes to affect individuals did not take place 
-- ---
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Theoretical proposition # 6: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people link the issues to be managed to the 
changes that need to occur. 
Case details (Sillince and Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent modE 
Harindranath, 1998) 
•!• The issues to be managed were •!• There were several meetings and workshops •!• The issues to be managed are defined in terms of the 
identified as being: which focussed on: changes that need to occur 
•!• creation of a consortium to •!• identification of concerns, questions, •!• The exception is changes that affect staff 
construct the ACAD building problems and conflicts •!• It is likely that the reason staff changes do not feature 
•!• management of the consortium •!• · resolution of these by providing solutions, as issues to be managed is because of the assumption 
•!• systems development for the answers and discussion made by the ACAD team, namely that people will do 
ACAD Centre •!• prioritisation of the building and systems as they are told 
•!• creation of a steering team and development •!• The emergent model suggests that the issues to be 
project team structure managed are incomplete because the ACAD team 
scoped the nature and content of changes that need to 
occur too narrowly 
--------------
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Theoretical proposition# 7: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people plan for and deploy radical and 
evolutionary modes of operationalising the issue to be managed. 
Case details (Sillince and Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent mode 
Harindranath, 1998) 
•!• There is no evidence that the •!• The lack of an implementation plan is barely •!• It is apparent from the case that the actions taken by tl 
hospital developed an overall plan discussed by the researchers ACAD team were operationalised in an evolutionary 
for the implementation of the manner 
changes that needed to occur •!• The emergent model suggests that the ACAD team 
•!• However, the design and could have benefited from an implementation plan that 
construction of the building did contained radical and evolutionary actions to be taken 
have a plan 
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Theoretical proposition# 8: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people are willing to implement the issues 
that need to be managed to achieve radical process orientation. 
Case details (Sillince and Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent mod«; 
Harindranath, 1998) 
•!• The case provides source data •!• The researchers overlook the incongruence •!• People on the ACAD team were unwilling to 
from the CEO in relation to this between the CEO's rhetoric and his actions implement actions to substantiate the rhetoric 
theoretical proposition: •!• The actions they took were inappropriate to the 
•!• "The consultants will do as they circumstances 
are told" (p. 118) •!• The emergent model indicates that members of the 
•!• "ACAD has strengthened our ACAD team needed to understand that they were 
future, but the main hospital will dealing with people who were worried and concerned 
dramatically shrink" (p. 119) about the changes while, concurrently, getting them to 
•!• Yet when the consultants voiced support the changes 
their anger, the action taken by the •!• ACAD team members needed to be sensitive to 
CEO was to set up a medical-staff people's worries and concerns yet take tough decisions 
focus group •!• The team appeared to be ill prepared for managing this 
paradox 
•!• The rhetoric was uncaring and the actions inappropriate 
•!• The emergent model could have enabled them to avoid 
this situation 
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Theoretical proposition# 9: The achievement of radical process orientation needs to be assessed in terms of whether or not the drivers for 
change were removed and the extent to which behaviours are unchanged. 
Case details (Sillince and Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent modt: 
Harindranath, 1998) 
•!• The achievement of radical •!• The researchers explained the progress of the •!• The emergent model suggests that the ACAD team 
process orientation was not ACAD project in the following way: assess the achievement of radical process orientation i 
assessed by the hospital •!• "(The findings) suggest that situations where terms of resolving the drivers for change and the extet 
•!• One indication that the there are decisions, solutions, resolutions or of unaltered behaviours 
organisation may not have answers ... at important points of the •!• From the data available, it is unlikely that either have 
achieved its aims is that external process ... significant progress can be made been achieved 
software developers dropped out during the project, whereas ones ... where 
of the ACAD consortium part way there are questions, problems or conflicts ... 
through the design phase at important points are ones where blocking 
occurs" (p. 121) 
-
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Theoretical proposition # 10: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when implementors and recipients accept these 
roles as reciprocal, and enact both roles. 
Case details (Sillince and Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent modt 
Harindranath, 1998) 
•!• The hospital set up two teams: •!• The researchers observed that these teams •!• The ACAD team consisted of implementors only 
•!• A steering team consisting of the worked in 3 sub-groups •!• The emergent model suggests that implementors and 
CEO, 6 directors and •!• Each sub-group took responsibility for a recipients should have been part of the team 
representatives from the software specific area: •!• The ACAD team also neglected to consider 
developer, hardware manufacturer, •!• Design group considered building design implementor and recipient roles as being reciprocal 
builder, building architect and an •!• IS group considered systems requirements 
internal software requirements •!• Negotiations group considered contracts and 
team agreements with external parties 
•!• A project team was set up 
consisting of the software 
developer, hardware developer, 
board director/steering team chair, 
builder and software requirements 
team member 
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Case B: Currie and Willcocks, 1996 
Theoretical proposition# 1: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people accept the organisation's drivers for 
change, which can be opportunities and threats. 
Case details (Currie and Willcocks, 1996) Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent mode 
•!• Intense competition in the industry •!• Drivers for change were due to •!• The bank identified drivers for change that were threa 
•!• Lower profitability industry changes, e.g. deregulation in •!• The emergent model suggests that the bank's 
•!• Customer loyalty is no longer the financial services sector management team could have identified opportunities 
guaranteed as well 
-~ 
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Theoretical proposition# 2: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people establish the need for radical process 
orientation rather than another type of change initiative. 
Case details (Currie and Willcocks, Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent modt 
1996) 
•!• Radical re-engineering was chosen •!• The researchers assume that management's •!• The bank identified the drivers for change, strategic 
because senior managers intended stated intentions and the changes to be made aims and organisational changes to be implemented 
to transform the bank into the best are sufficient to justify the need for radical •!• However, the effects of the changes were barely 
retail bank by 1997 and wanted to process orientation considered 
achieve this by implementing •!• The emergent model indicates that senior managers 
major changes to the should recognise that the changes identified would be 
organisation's structures, products, co-ordinated across functions so that these dovetail 
services, job titles, roles, together 
technology, sales and marketing, •!• The model leads managers to realise that the changes 
and training policies are aimed at increasing managerial and operational 
interdependence across different functions in the 
processes 
•!• It appears that these discussions barely took place as 
exemplified by the following: 
•!• "What emerged from the interviews with senior 
managers from the business units and IT managers and 
technical staff from the Technology Division was that a 
wide gulfbetween the two groups persisted" (p. 224) 
---
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Theoretical proposition# 3: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people recognise organisational elements 
namely, strategy, structure, people's responsibilities and appraisal criteria, collaborative behaviours, and information systems, will change 
and that these elements will align to a function and process orientation. 
Case details (Currie and Willcocks, 1996) Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent modt ~-i-•!• People, especially senior managers, •!• The researchers identify the content •!• The bank identified the content of changes 
recognised the changes that needed to of the proposed changes •!• However, little thought is given to the nature of the 
occur •!• Their observations about the changes 
•!• The changes were structured into 6 areas: changes are: •!• The researchers also overlook this aspect of change 
•!• Key strategic objectives were established •!• People were sceptical about the •!• The emergent model suggests that the bank should 
•!• Structure was changed to business units: changes and concerned about their consider changes to organisational elements in terms of 
retail, commercial and corporate; position a function and process orientation 
responsibilities were redefined to separate •!• The changes relied heavily on IT •!• For example, the model requires people to consider 
sales and service people; people were to be hence the re-engineering project is changes in responsibilities in terms of function, 
empowered described as IT enabled with exemplified by customer facing centres as well as the 
•!• Information systems were to be changed - services moving from manual to process in which people in that function operate 
£100 million invested in new technology to computer based systems •!• It is apparent that senior managers defined the 
achieve a seamless service •!• Changes that affected people, e.g. functional perspective and that the process perspectiv e 
•!• Changes to the physical appearance of the empowerment and team working, was largely ignored 
branch - more open, less intimidating to were given the least attention by 
customers semor managers 
•!• Each branch was a mini-bank and this was 
to be replaced with specialist customer 
facing centres and back office service 
centres 
•!• HR policies and practices to be changed; 
team work to be introduced 
. --
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Theoretical proposition# 4: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people accept the changes that actually need 
to occur in the organisation. 
Case details (Currie and Willcocks, Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent mode 
1996) 
•!• The implementation team and •!• The researchers describe the gap between the •!• The case evidence suggests that little consideration w, 
senior managers were supportive implementation team and employees as given to gaining people's acceptance of the changes 
of the changes complex, political tensions that actually needed to occur 
•!• They set out the strategic •!• The gap arose because the "social and •!• This is in spite of people feeling concerned about the 
objectives to be achieved political processes of re-engineering were changes and its affects upon them 
•!• People were concerned about their also underplayed by senior bank personnel, •!• The emergent model suggests that implementors could 
own position, career and and this appeared to manifest itselfbetween have tried to discover the changes that people believed 
promotion prospects the business units and Technology Division" actually needed to occur 
•!• Implementor and senior managers (p. 233) •!• This would have highlighted changes peopled found 
seemed to be unaware of people's unacceptable, and enabled the implementation team to 
concerns either amend the project scope or identify issues to be 
managed to bring about acceptance of the changes 
-- -··· -- --
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Theoretical proposition# 5: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people, including board members, senior 
managers, middle managers and employees, are willing to allow the changes to affect them. 
Case details (Currie and Willcocks, Researcher's insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent mode 
1996) 
•!• People were unwilling to allow the •!• The researchers found "considerable •!• The implementation team and senior managers appem 
changes to affect them evidence of emergent protectionist strategies to have assumed that there would be little resistance t~ 
specifically: amongst the bank's workforce" (p. 232) change, exemplified by poor communication 
•!• Working practices •!• The researchers claim such resistance to •!• Senior managers took a hands-off approach, relying on 
•!• Responsibility and power change is typical of radical process contractors and project management techniques to 
redistribution orientation projects and are a barrier to its implement the changes 
•!• Employment contracts implementation •!• The emergent model leads senior managers to focus 
•!• Existing technology upon the changes people are willing to allow to affect 
•!• Reductions in the number of them 
middle managers •!• This in tum would require senior managers to 
communicate with people at all levels and gauge 
whether or not the original scope of the project could 
be implemented 
•!• This leads implementors to identify potential social, 
political and communication issues 
-
222 
Theoretical proposition# 6: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people link the issues to be managed to the 
changes that need to occur. 
Case details (Currie and Willcocks, Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent mode t 
1996) 
•!• The implementation team •!• The researchers focus on the issues managed •!• The bank focussed on the issues to be managed for 
identified several issues to be to implement computer systems presumably some of the changes 
managed, however many of these because changes that affected people were •!• The emergent model calls for the issues to be managed 
relate to the design, development unattended to be linked to the changes that need to occur 
and implementation of computer •!• They observed that the project management •!• This requires the implementation team to ensure the 
systems methodologies were not always appropriate issues are adequately specified or alternatively narrow 
•!• There are few details about the and that the organisation relied on trial and the scope of the changes to be implemented 
issues managed to implement the error as well as formal methodologies 
changes identified earlier 
--·· 
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Theoretical proposition# 7: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people plan for and deploy radical and 
evolutionary modes of operationalising the issue to be managed. 
Case details (Currie and Willcocks, Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent mod1 
1996) 
•!• The bank carried out a number of •!• The researchers observe that conservative •!• The bank apparently did not recognise the need for 
actions to implement the changes practices and procedures prevented large radical and evolutionary modes of operationalising th 
•!• However the organisation scale, radical implementation activities issues to be managed 
undertook few, if any, radical •!• Their view is that the methods used to •!• This is apparent by senior managers handing 
modes to operationalise the implement the changes were not convincing implementation to lower level management rather than 
actions to employees taking a top-down approach 
•!• Middle managers carried out evolutionary modes of 
implementation as they did not have the authority to 
make radical steps 
•!• The emergent model makes radical and evolutionary 
modes explicit 
•!• Consequently, managers need to identify issues to be 
implemented in one or the other mode 
•!• Where all the issues are implemented in an 
evolutionary mode, the content of the changes 
implemented is likely to be smaller than envisaged 
--- -------··--
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Theoretical proposition# 8: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when people are willing to implement the issues 
that need to be managed to achieve radical process orientation. 
Case details (Currie and Willcocks, Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent modE, 
1996) 
--
•!• The following comments illustrate •!• The researchers identify some of the •!• The inhibitors identified are related to the theoretical 
people's positions in relation to inhibitors of people's commitment: propositions discussed above and should have been 
the changes: •!• People do not recognise the drivers for resolved earlier in the project 
•!• "managerial staff increasingly change in terms of organisational survival •!• For instance, changes being a threat should have been 
began to question their own •!• Traditional function of boundaries addressed by understanding whether people understood 
commitment to the change •!• Poorly managed social and political issues the actual changes to be made 
programme" (p. 229) •!• Mixed messages exemplified by •!• Identifying and sharing the drivers for change address 
•!• "Senior managers from the empowerment and large job reductions external pressures and survival issues 
business units perceived the •!• Recognising the nature of changes in terms of function 
Technology Division as separate and process could have softened traditional boundaries 
from core banking activities" (p. •!• Understanding implementor and recipient roles could 
229) have overcome social and political impediments 
•!• Theoretical proposition # 8 of the emergent model 
recognises that managers face the paradox of involving 
people in the changes while also taking decisions to cut 
jobs 
-~-
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Theoretical proposition# 9: The achievement of radical process orientation needs to be assessed in terms of whether or not the drivers for 
change were removed and the extent to which behaviours are unchanged. 
Case details (Currie and Willcocks, Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent mod• 
1996) 
•!• The re-engineering project •!• The researchers suggest that these outcomes •!• There is insufficient evidence to assess whether or no 
became: arose due to lack of commitment, the radical the drivers for change were addressed 
•!• "a complex, ad hoc and nature of organisational change, and •!• However, it is clear that people's behaviour are largel 
fragmented response that was inadequate IT skills unchanged 
constantly being revised over a 
long period of time" (p. 229) 
•!• "little more than a melting pot of 
conflicting disciplines, coalitions, 
and interests across managerial 
and technical groups" (p. 229) 
•!• "elements of the (reengineering 
project) became descoped" (p. 
223) 
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Theoretical proposition# 10: Radical process orientation is more likely to be achieved when implementors and recipients accept these 
roles as reciprocal, and enact both roles. 
Case details (Currie and Willcocks, Researchers' insights Case details reinterpreted through the emergent modt' 
1996) 
•!• The bank set up a project team •!• The researchers point out that the •!• The implementors play a prominent role in this case 
with representatives from business implementors had major disagreements over •!• Recipients are barely recognised nor are their views 
units and Technology Division control over projects understood 
•!• Multifunctional implementation •!• Implementors in the Technology Division •!• The emergent model suggests that the implementors 
teams were also set up and also felt threatened by an influx of external should focus upon recipients, with a view to interacting 
included people for the contractors and communicating with them 
Technology Division, project •!• This reduced implementors' commitment to •!• The model also suggests that implementor and recipient 
managers, external consultants and the changes roles are reciprocal, which is the experience IT staff 
IT contractors faced unwittingly 
•!• These people, with the benefit of the emergent model, 
would be aware of their dual role and be prepared to 
switch roles 
--
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